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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF MULTILATERAL
SANCTIONS REGIMES UNDER GLOBALIZATION:
THE CASE OF IRAQ
by
Manuel De Leon
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Ronald Cox, Chair
This dissertation examines the effectiveness and limits of multilateral sanctions
regimes as instruments of foreign policy, particularly when trying to prevent the
acquisition, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. I
hypothesize that globalization undermines the overall effectiveness of sanctions regimes.
I analyze the agents and means of globalization. Agents are nation-states, corporations,
non-state actors and organizations, and individuals. Means are the global import-export
industry, global banking and investment, global corporate models, and global
manufacturing industries. They all have contributed to vast increases in transnational
economic activity and, furthermore, to more political tensions between nation-states, all
of which jeopardize the implementation and enforcement of multilateral sanctions
regimes.
To test this thesis, I examine how those factors impacted the multilateral sanctions
regime imposed against Iraq from 1991 to 2002. This multilateral sanctions regime was
conceived, approved and enforced by most nations in the United Nations.
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Indeed, evidence collected for this dissertation suggests that Iraq did manage to
consistently circumvent the UN sanctions regime, and that it did it by astutely utilizing
the agents and means of globalization. Evidence also indicates that Iraq managed to
rebuild parts of its military infrastructure, and that Iraq was on its way to rebuild its
missile capability, for which it purchased large quantities of parts, components,
technologies and manpower in the global market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, I will study the limits of multilateral sanctions regimes as
instruments of foreign policy. I argue that the political economy of contemporary
globalization jeopardizes the overall effectiveness of multilateral sanctions regimes in
two important ways. The first is the competing global agendas of states and non-state
actors with respect to sanctions regimes. The second is growing transnational economic,
political and civic activities linked to the process of globalization. To test this thesis, I
will examine how those two factors impacted the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.
The UN sanctions regime makes an excellent case study. First, the UN General
Assemble approved it, meaning that a majority of nation-states voted for it. Second, a
vast majority of nations stopped trading with Iraq. Third, UN inspectors monitored it
while the American and British armies enforced it. Finally, the sanctions included: trade
and military blockages, military occupation of northern and southern Iraq, autonomy for
the Kurdistan, enforcement of two no-fly zones, random inspections of military and
civilian facilities, random bombings and raids. The sanctions lasted for almost 12 years,
isolating the Iraqi government and causing hundreds of thousands of deaths among the
Iraqi people. Sanctions were so intense that at some point the Iraqi regime almost
collapsed. But it did not. Iraq suddenly began to evade the sanctions, and the Iraqi
economy began to grow. It required another American led invasion to bring down the
Iraqi regime.
In the Iraqi case, I hypothesize that there were several important contradictions
between the strategic and economic objectives of the five permanent members of UN
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Security Council and the implementation and enforcement of the sanctions. For instance,
the American unilateralism toward Iraq clashed with the mandates of the UN and with the
strategic objectives of European states. The U.S. switched its goals from finding and
dismantling weapons of mass destruction to regime change, undermining the overall
legitimacy of the sanctions regime. Besides, American, Chinese, French and Russian
corporations kept selling military technologies and hardware to Iraq and neighboring
states. They at times did it with the consent of their governments.
Second, I will study the relationship between globalization and efforts in UN to
establish viable and enforceable sanctions against Iraq. I will explore two issues. The first
concerns non-state actors like transnational corporations, financiers, and speculators
competing for Iraqi oil during the 1990s, a process that states, mainly industrial nations,
encouraged in their quest for global access to oil. Competition for global access to oil
intensified in the 1990s when oil became a national security concern for most nations,
thereby jeopardizing UN sanctions against Iraq. The second issue concerns the power of
states and international institutions relative to those of non-state actors. The core premise
is that states and international institutions have been losing power and influence to nonstate actors, a process that globalization accelerated during the 1990s. Drastic changes in
global trade and politics have led to a more profound trans-nationalization of economic
and political activities in detriment of national interests. As William I. Robinson states,
“Globalization represents a new transnational phase in the development of the world
capitalist system” (Robinson, 2004, p. 9), often in frank contradiction with states’
political and military goals, including the enforcement of a sanctions regime.
In all, I argue that due to the factors mentioned above, sanctions regimes have

2

become inefficient instruments of foreign policy. This was apparent in the case of Iraq,
where the UN conceived and enforced a sanctions regime to prevent the acquisition,
development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In order to test
my hypothesis, I will study four main points.
The first is the central question of whether or not Iraq violated the sanctions
regime. It is important to go beyond whether or not Iraq circumvented the sanctions for
economic survival in favor of examining whether or not Iraq acquired and developed
weapons of mass destruction despite the UN sanctions regime. The second issue is about
how Iraq circumvented the sanctions regime. I aim at identifying what I call the agents
and means of globalization that Iraq employed to evade UN sanctions. For instance, I
want to detect trade relations established for the sole purpose of acquiring goods, services
and technologies prohibited by the sanctions regime. I also want to find linkages among
corporations, banks, and other non-state actors with specific economic interests in Iraq
and the Middle East. A third issue to study is, in comparative terms, the state of the Iraqi
economy and trade relations with the rest of the world before and after the imposition of
UN sanctions. The goal is to determine how much of the economic decline was due to the
sanctions and not to factors such as world market conditions, economic policies, climatic
changes, etc, inherent or intrinsic to the Iraqi economic and political systems.

The Case Study
This dissertation tackles the following questions: Did the sanctions regime
imposed against Iraq reflect the development of thriving international cooperation among
states, global institutions and corporations? Or did the sanctions regime break apart due
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to conflicts among nation-states and/or the deepening of globalization? Why choosing
Iraq instead of other nation-states like North Korea, Libya or Iran, which were subjected
to sanctions during the 1990s?
Three main points qualify Iraq as a sound case study. First, the sanctions regime
imposed upon Iraq constitutes the most extensive and intensive effort among nationstates and international institutions to cooperate for the enforcement of a sanctions
regime. For the strength of the sanctions, for the commitment that the United Nations,
United States and other nations showed when enforcing the regime, and for the
consistency with which the international media, NGOs and international organizations
scrutinized it, the UN sanctions regime against Iraq has no parallel in the history of
international politics. This has important theoretical implications because if I find enough
evidence to confirm the central argument of this dissertation, then my thesis may have
validity against other cases not so rigorous as the case of Iraq.
Second, Iraq is a case worth studying because there seems to be an important
contradiction between the central question of this dissertation –to what extent multilateral
economic sanctions prevented Iraq from acquiring and/or developing weapons of mass
destruction- and the argument made to justify the latest American invasion of Iraq: the
illegal acquisition and/or development of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. This
contradiction suggests that, despite the sanctions regime and despite the support
expressed by the international community of nations and institutions with respect to the
sanctions, some credible sources affirmed that Iraq acquired and/or developed WMDs. If
this was correct, then I must conclude two things: first, that Iraq somehow managed to
evade UN sanctions and, second, as the thesis of this dissertation suggests, sanctions
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regimes are not effective means of foreign policy in the global economy.
The third aspect to consider is that this dissertation is time sensitive, meaning that
it only focuses on the 1991-2002 period. This is not arbitrary. First, it was during the
1990s that the world consolidated itself as unipolar and the United States secured its
position as the sole world superpower. This new structural configuration and the resulting
balance of power had significant implications for world politics. Some scholars soon
began to argue that the United States alone could not guarantee peace and stability in the
world, and that a unipolar world was more unstable than a bipolar one (Waltz, 1993.)
Next, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the second world nuclear
superpower, the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction occupied most
of the agenda of the United States, its allies and international institutions such as UN,
NATO and the EU. Also, it was during the 1990s that proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction suddenly became a serious concern as nations like Pakistan, India, and North
Korea resumed building nuclear weapons or, at least, increased their nuclear capabilities.
In fact, all throughout the 1990s, economic, political, and diplomatic sanctions of all sorts
were imposed upon North Korea, Libya, Pakistan, India and other nations for attempting
to acquire and/or develop nuclear capabilities and WMD.
Finally, it was also during the 1990s that globalization gained momentum in
academic circles as a phenomenon worth observing for its influence in culture, religion,
economics and, more broadly, world politics. Although there seems to be no consensus
on a definition of globalization, I can summarize it according to three main schools. For
instance, some scholars describe globalization as a socio-cultural phenomenon defined by
Tomlinson (1999) as complex connectivity. This school argues that even though
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globalization has been around for many years, it became more evident during the 1990s
thanks to new technological trends such as computerization, communication and
transportation. But scholars like Gowan (1999) and Negri and Hardt (2000) see
globalization as a political process related to power and world domination through
militarization, institutionalization and trans-nationalization of international relations. In
that respect, Huntington (1990) argues that globalization will bring about confrontations
among civilizations, and that the next wars will be fought along religious lines.
Still, for Fukuyama (1992) globalization marks the beginning of an era in which
the principles of liberalism and capitalism dominate world politics. Robinson (2004)
agrees, but he predicts more conflicts among social classes while Fukuyama sees a great
opportunity for cooperation. For Robinson, globalization represents an epochal shift in
world politics and economics. It is a transition toward a more severe systemic economic
interdependency. This transition entails three aspects: fragmentation of production, the
ascendance and dominance of transnational capital, and the consolidation of global
circuits of accumulation (Robinson, 2004, p. 9). The result is the substitution of national
markets for a global one that integrates the flow of capital, goods and services. It means
that a nation under a sanctions regime still have access to some alternative niches where
it can allocate its exports. It allows nations to import goods and services, technologies
and materials needed to stabilize their economy, sustain their military apparatus, and
safeguard their territorial integrity.
Based on those points, I define globalization as political and economic, highly
interconnected and interdependent relations between the agents and means of
globalization. I will elaborate more on such a definition, but first I like to examine the
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theoretical approach for this dissertation.
Theoretical Framework
Liberal Institutionalism, Realism, and Historical Structuralism
Three important theoretical approaches to international relations frame the central
question of this investigation: liberal institutionalism, realism and historical structuralism
First, I pay special attention to liberal institutionalism for one main reason: this
dissertation examines a sanctions regime promoted, enacted and enforced under the
auspices of the United Nations, arguably the most important international political
institution in the world.
Even though a final definition of institution is still in debate, most institutionalists
focus on the whole range of societal, state, and institutional settings that shape how
political actors define and protect their interests with respect to institutions. Liberal
institutionalism favors institutions as a forum for political debate, negotiation and,
conflict resolution. Institutionalism focuses on institutional structures that frame selfinterests, behaviors and outcomes. Included in the framework are: institutional rules,
procedures, conflicts among institutional actors, and relations of power between
bureaucracies and between them and non-institutional actors.
Most institutionalists are interested in what Peter Hall (1986) defines as the
relational character of institutions, meaning how a given institutional configuration
shapes political interaction not only with other institutions but also with respect to
individuals, businesses, and group interests. For example, Hall defines institutions in
terms of “Formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that
structure relationships between individuals in various units of the polity and economy”
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(Hall, 1986, p. 14). Most of all, Hall is concerned with how institutional structures offer a
comparative advantage to a particular nation. This approach has implications for: 1) how
institutions fit in the analysis of policymaking; 2) how institutional advantages affect
worldwide treaties and trade accords; 3) how corporations set macroeconomic strategies
with respect to international institutions in the context of the world economy.
For his part, Ikemberry (1988, 2000) concedes that institutions do matter in
international politics when trying to prevent conflicts, bring about peace, and promote
multilateralism among nations. Ikemberry breaks down institutions in “Three distinct
levels that range from specific characteristics of government institutions to the more
overarching structures of the state, to the nation’s normative social order” (Ikemberry,
2000, p. 27). His goal is to study intermediate institutional levels and compare them
across nation-states. He assesses how state-level institutions and assessments of states’
interests contribute to the creation of lasting and effective international institutions. In
line with Ikemberry, scholars like Katzenstein (1985) study structures and organizations
of key economic actors. Skocpol (1979) and Axelrod (1981) focus on public policy and
interest-group behavior.
Liberal institutionalists are prompt to question the overall effectiveness of a
sanctions regime under globalization. For example, they inquire about whether the
sanctions regime imposed against Iraq effectively grappled with the geopolitical realities
of the 1990s, mainly the emergence of a unipolar world and the subsequent consolidation
of liberalism and capitalism across nations. They ask whether institutional frameworks
conceived to facilitate international cooperation kept pace with new global economic and
political trends. They also refer to the increasing participation of global non-state actors
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and global civic societies in global institutions and politics. Consequently, based on those
assumptions, in the case of the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq, I can argue that if the
sanctions were effective, I should find enough evidence of institutional coherence that
would indicate some success related to the primary goals of the sanctions. Specifically, I
would be able to illustrate that the regime succeeded in its two most basic tasks: 1) the
prevention of weapons flowing into Iraq; 2) the prevention of exports to Iraq that would
have allowed the country to rebuild its WMD program.
Realism is the second theoretical approach to the central question of this
investigation. Realists are particularly skeptical about the overall effectiveness of
international institutions in world politics. For example, in the case of Iraq, realists would
argue that the UN sanctions regime was doomed to fail for two main reasons. First,
because it was promoted, enforced and monitored by international institutions that lacked
any independent legal authority and enforcement mechanism. Second, the conflicting
interests among great powers did not allow an institution like the UN to define a common
policy toward Iraq.
For realists, the problem of international politics rests with the true nature of
nation-states themselves. Realists consider nation-states as the single biggest obstacle to
the efficacy of institutions, multilateralism and a sanctions regime. Nation-states are
unitary actors, always concerned with their physical survival in an anarchic world
(Morgenthau, 1948; Viotti & Kauppi, 1999). In fact, it is national security and the
security dilemma that set the political agenda of nation-states at domestic and
international levels. Not surprisingly, nation-states spend many resources on the military,
the use of force, how to attain and maintain peace, and the prevention of violations of
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territorial integrity.
The concept of power is central to Realism, but there is no consensus among
realists on how to define it. As a whole, they agree that power is an attribute of states, and
that it is the sum of all the military and strategic capabilities of a state with respect to
other states. Realists define military capabilities as a strategic issue of high politics,
whereas economic and social issues are considered low politics. The terms are not
arbitrary for they are directly related to the concept of power and what it means to
Realism and the hierarchy of its geopolitical agenda. Finally, realists define nation-states
as rational self-interested actors, focused on their own political and economic wellbeing.
It means that I should expect from nation-states a rational foreign policy derived from a
unitary decision-making process which includes clear objectives, consideration of
alternatives, discussion of vulnerabilities vs. capabilities, and cost-benefit analysis.
However, some realists acknowledge some inconsistencies when defining nation-states as
rational actors. Gilpin (1981), for example, finds a contradiction between cost-benefit
analysis and the quality and quantity of information that governments utilize to engage in
decision-making. Jervis (1976), for his part, affirms that information is not always
accurate enough, that it may lead to faulty policy formulation and even misperceptions
about key issues in international politics. Faulty information can take nations to war and,
in some cases, to a military defeat.
Overall, the effectiveness of institutions depends on the extent to which the
interests of nation-states enforcing those institutional norms, rules and regulations are
consistent. But realists believe that they are not consistent. If realists are correct, I should
expect that strategic and economic interests of states would affect the level of cooperation
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and conflict in the development, oversight and implementation of the sanctions regime
that UN implemented against Iraq. Especially, I should expect national security issues,
not economic ones, to dominate the political agenda of nations in the UN. Also, I should
expect a high degree of skepticism by great powers in regard to the efficacy of
international institutions in world politics.
Finally, historical structuralism is the third theoretical approach to the central
argument of this dissertation. Three major assumptions are central to this framework.
First, the level of analysis in international relations is the global context within which
nation-states, businesses, and international institutions behave and interact. The rationale
here is that domestic politics is not the only factor shaping nation-states’ behavior. It is
rather the overall configuration of international politics and the international economic
system which determines political behavior.
The second assumption is that international politics must be seen from both
historical and economic standpoints. That is, history and economics are linked, so that in
order to understand the current configuration of world politics, I must look at the
historical evolution of the world economy. Here, historical structuralists, Marxists and
non-Marxists alike, affirm that capitalism is the defining historical feature of international
economic and political systems. Historical patterns of global capitalist production and
development frame the modern global political economy. In particular, historical
structuralists analyze a sanctions regime within a larger context of global capitalism and
the structural problems sustained and exacerbated by it. The analysis includes unequal
development and distribution of wealth, widespread poverty fierce competition for
market shares, cheap labor, and scarce natural resources. According to historical
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structuralists, those are the true causes of international tensions, conflicts and wars. If that
is correct, then I should examine how globalization affects international institutions and
multilateral regimes created to develop and enforce sanctions.
The last assumption is that, like liberal institutionalists, historical structuralists
acknowledge the roles that states and global non-state actors play in world politics. Yet,
they above all pay attention to how a minority of nation-states, businesses and elites
concentrate economic and political power and benefit from the preservation of the status
quo. Structuralists want to know how such a concentration of power came about. They
study the structural nature of relationships among states which they see as hierarchical,
based on economic exploitation and domination. For historical structuralism, dependency
is the most common relationship among nation-states, especially between developed,
developing, and underdeveloped nations. In fact, dependency is for historical
structuralism what interdependence is to liberal institutionalism and what balance of
power is to realism.
With respect to the Iraqi case, historical structuralists would argue that the
emergence of a global economy and transnational capitalism made it extremely difficult
for nation-states and international institutions to enforce a sanctions regime. Sanctions
regimes and global capitalism are incompatible. They cannot coexist. Sanctions regimes
alter the natural course of capitalism, which is toward expansion and dominance of global
markets. Sanctions regimes are irreconcilable with five fundamental features of global
capitalism: open markets, free trade, competition, free flow of capital, and profits. Also,
historical structuralists see sanctions regimes as a significant source of conflict within
nation-states and between transnational firms and nation-state actors. They argue that
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business interests are in frank contradiction with political ones; therefore, transnational
firms and state actors would disagree in their orientation to sanctions regimes. In fact,
historical structuralists tend to be skeptical about the ability of nation-states to enforce a
sanctions regime under globalization. They consider that sanctions regimes are
unenforceable not so much for the lack of commitment from nation-states but due to the
powers that non-state actors have gained with respect to state actors. In the era of
globalization, non-state actors such as banks, corporations and NGOs are more visible
and influential than ever. They seem more resolute than ever to seize power from state
actors. They have developed legal, financial and political powers to do so.

Regimes and Multilateralism
I utilize the term sanctions regime when referring to multilateral economic,
political, and diplomatic measures imposed against Iraq by the international community
of nation-states under the auspices of the UN from 1991 to 2002. The objectives then
were to isolate Iraq, weaken it economically and politically, and prevent it from acquiring
hardware and technologies that would allow it to develop weapons capabilities. Why do I
use the term regime and not simply economic sanctions, or embargoes?
Two key concepts are central to this argument: regime and multilateralism. First,
the term regime derives from domestic politics where it refers to an existing
governmental order, meaning monarchical, democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian in a
particular nation. A regime is a specific set of rules, laws, procedures and institutions
conceived and established to govern unilateral and multilateral relations among
individuals, groups, businesses and even social classes within a particular nation-state.
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Laws, procedures and institutions usually constitute the rules of the game, and in time
they become intrinsic features of the cultural and social configuration of a people.
Stephen Krasner (1983) too defines regime as a set of rules, but one conceived to regulate
multilateral

relationships

between

nation-states,

international

institutions

and

nongovernmental organizations. Nation-states recognize and promote rules voluntarily to
create some sense of order and certainty in global relations, which is very important
given the absence of a supranational authority in world politics.
The term regime also refers to “implicit or explicit principles, conventions, and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area
of international relations” (Krasner, 1983, p. 49). A regime may be associated with
international and nongovernmental organizations, but an international regime is not the
same as, or does not refer to, an international organization. Three schools of thought
address this issue. The first is power-based realism, with its emphasis on the role of
anarchy and relative distribution of capabilities in international politics. Within this
school, the theory of hegemonic stability argues that a regime is established and
preserved when a state dominates in terms of power. As power declines, so would do the
state and the regime it established. The second is the interest- based school. It focuses on
the role that international regimes play when states try to realize common interests.
Neoliberal institutionalism is a common approach in this school, which sees state and
non-state actors as key players in international politics (Keohane, 1984). The third is
knowledge based cognitive school. This school argues that actors of diverse backgrounds,
not states, create states’ interests. In order to understand politics, it is necessary to
examine preferences of actors and those who participate in the decision-making process.
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In sum, states can redefine their interests without altering the overall balance of power.
They can do it through regimes, institutions, and multilateralism.
Next, some scholars associate regimes with specific issue areas such as the
environment, genocide, economic development, nuclear proliferation as well as
proliferation of WMD and others. In recent years, the concept of regime has been
stretched out to move from the mere notion of international cooperation to
multilateralism, which is a much broader, more inclusive framework. But for Ernst B.
Haas (1990), multilateralism is an agent of change, a process tied to power, interests,
knowledge and access to information, decision making, and structures of international
organizations. Yet, voluntarism is the basis of multilateralism because, in the end, it is up
to the sovereign nation-state to engage in multilateral relations. And as for Ruggie
(1993), he defines multilateralism not as a theory of international politics in itself but as
concept, an organizing principle, an institution arranged in a multilateral form to
coordinate multilateral relations among nation-states on the basis of generalized
behavioral principles, always conditional to an already existing institutionalized
relationship. The main characteristics of multilateral relations are indivisibility,
nondiscrimination of issues, and dispersed reciprocity.
In all, multilateralism should be seen as a tool for compromising and/or
accommodating potential conflicting differences. It aims at finding common interests
through institutions and organizations acting as intermediaries or trustees. With the end
of the Cold War and the advent of a unipolar world, this yearning for finding common
interests through international norms and institutions became, more than a necessity, a
strategic maneuvering of second class world powers as they sought to counterbalance the
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might of the US, by then the world’s sole superpower. For example, Ruggie (1993)
argues that it was a common interest among nation-states, arguably a common fear
toward international political destabilization with the consequent smuggling and
proliferation of nuclear weapons that ultimately brought nations together to help stabilize
international politics after the collapse of the Soviet empire. A common interest brought
nation-states together to conceive, establish and enforce economic, political and military
sanctions against Iraq for most of a decade.

Defining Sanctions Regime
Generally speaking, sanctions regimes establish four forms of sanctions (Carter,
Chaves, Damrosch, and Lori, 1997). The first form is purposeful sanctions. They intend
to inflict economic hardship in order to force the targeted nation to change its overall
behavior with respect to another nation. A second form is palliative sanctions. These are
mild sanctions, imposed to publicly articulate the disapproval of the international
community, or supranational actors, for the reckless behavior of a nation. A third type of
sanctions is punitive, and they aim at inflicting actual economic damages upon the
sanctioned nation. The objective here is to retaliate against a specific action of the
targeted nation or reaffirm the status quo. Lastly, partisan sanctions target a specific
region or community of a nation. They are mainly employed in ethnic and religious
conflicts, and their attempt to affect specific commercial activities in a particular
community, religious group or entity. What about the specifics of those sanctions?
A first set of sanctions could suspend, limit, condition, terminate and/or prohibit
foreign assistance to a nation. A second round of sanctions might end all non-profit and
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NGOs programs as well as terminate all financial support to private organizations
operating within the sanctioned nation. A third level of sanctions could target both public
and private institutions by cutting off access to profits, trade, financing and even assets
deposited in foreign banks and investments firms. A more drastic round of sanctions
would restrict imports and exports of some or all goods, commodities and technologies
by revoking licenses, strengthening shipping stipulations and related commercial terms.
On top of all that, sanctions could terminate all governmental contracts and trade
agreements as well as restrict or deny access to international air and maritime corridors. It
could later become an air and naval blockade of low, moderate or high intensity. Other
mechanisms may include: deny visas to travel to sanctioned nations; increase fines and
years of imprisonment to individuals who violate the sanctions; prosecute corporations
suspected of breaking the sanctions regime; and arrest and prosecute political and
businessmen from sanctioned nations in international courts. Finally, it is worth noting
that economic sanctions do not necessarily include suspensions of diplomatic contacts
and relations, cut off of diplomatic and military attachés, and closing of embassies. Also,
direct military actions are not considered part of economic sanctions although enforcing
them may require some military involvement such as espionage, surveillance, patrolling,
and other low-intensity military means.
In all, I can affirm that the multilateral mobilization against Iraq included all the
features described above. It certainly included military occupations, raids and bombings.

Globalization and the Circumvention of Sanctions Regimes
Nation-states have historically circumvented sanctions regimes by establishing
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new chains of supplies and alternative markets, including the black-market. That is easier
under globalization because the global economy opens up domestic markets and
facilitates the flow of goods, services and capital. Likewise, globalization accelerates
economic competition, which in turn creates an excess of failing corporations seeking for
alternative ways of survival. In that respect, Wallenstein (1974, 1981) would recommend
examining the role played by corporations located in the semi-periphery and periphery.
They usually pick up economic opportunities left behind by more prosperous
corporations or winners of global capitalism.
There are specific features of globalization that facilitate the evasion of sanctions
regimes. The first is the nature of the global banking system and the widespread use of
offshore accounts, electronic money, transnational capital and indirect investments. The
second is the fragmentation and globalization of production, which stimulates the
proliferation of subsidiaries, parent companies and intermediaries with multiple layers of
management and administrative bodies with no recognizable legal relations and
obligations. In general, the nature of the global banking system and global business
structures facilitate illegal operations and the emergence of black-markets, making it
easier for a sanctioned nation-state to break a sanctions regime.
The high cost of enforcement versus the problem of funding also helps nations to
evade sanctions regimes. Two different trends conflict here: while nations promoting a
sanctions regime are not always willing to commit enough funds to enforce sanctions,
nations under a sanctions regime tend to commit themselves to economic survival at any
cost. Monitoring and enforcing sanctions regimes depend on the funds that nations
commit for the task. Not to mention that sanctions regimes also affect finances and
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economies of nations promoting the sanctions, mainly those already affected by global
competition and other features of globalization. As result, it is not unusual to see nations
and corporations resenting sanctions regimes, against which they lobby governments and
international institutions with all kind of arguments, from environmental to humanitarian.
On the other hand, sanctions regimes actually benefit some nations and corporations,
which find it advantageous to maintain economic contacts with the sanctioned nation.
This became a serious issue in the case of Iraq as Russia, France, Germany and other
nations were frequently accused of having business interests there.
Finally, the size of the market also affects monitoring and enforcement of a
sanctions regime. Flow of money, goods and services occur more frequently in larger
markets than in smaller ones. Hence, I would argue that the larger the market, the harder
it is to monitor and enforce a sanctions regime. Also, monitoring and enforcing sanctions
regimes become sensitive in nations such as North Korea, Libya and Iraq due to their
centralized political and economic systems, and closed societies.

Testing the Hypothesis
A key aspect of this dissertation is how to test the hypothesis, namely how to
establish that globalization allowed Iraq to circumvent the UN sanctions and rebuild its
economy and military infrastructures.
First, I define globalization as high, intense interrelations and interdependencies
among agents and means of globalization. Agents of globalizations are nation-states and
non-state actors. Whereas nation-states’ actors include governments, states’ agencies and
states’ officials, non-state actors refer to corporations, financiers, interest-groups, NGOs,
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empowered individuals and others. For their part, the means of globalization are: global
access to raw materials, global trade (the import-export industry), the global banking
system, corporate models, the global manufacturing system and/or global assembly line.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the two groups.

Figure 1.1 – Agents and Means of Globalization

GLOBALIZATION

AGENTS OF GLOBALIZATION

-states
-non-state actors

NATION-STATES

-governments
-state actors

MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION

NON-STATE ACTORS

-corporations, banks,
financiers, interestgroups, NGOs ,
empowered individuals

-global access to raw
materials
-global trade
-global civic society
-corporate models
-global banking
-global manufacturing

Second, I find that six key features of globalization jeopardize the efficacy of
sanctions regimes as instruments of foreign policy. They are: 1) intense global
competition among nation-states for strategic raw materials; 2) the nature of global trade,
or the import-export industry, fragmented by regional and bilateral trade blocs and/or
agreements; 3) the emergence of a global civic society and proliferation of global non-
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state actors such as NGOs, religious denominations, interest-groups, and empowered
individuals equipped with -and interrelated through- global means of communication,
mass media, and transportation; 4) the nature of the global banking system built on
transnational capital and credit, electronic money, offshore accounts, and other financial
instruments conceived to move capital at high speed throughout global markets; 5)
proliferation of global corporate models such as joint ventures, subsidiaries, dormant,
shell, and parent companies; 6) the global production process, reconfigured around a
global assembly line linked to contract manufactures (CMs) and regional manufacturing
centers.
Those six features of globalization create a high level of interrelation and
interdependency among nation-states and their actors, and between them and non-state
actors. Thus, I study each one of them but separately, in six chapters structured as follow.
In chapters II and III, I focus on nation-states. In Chapter II, I explain how global
demand for oil affects national security. This is not arbitrary. Oil is a key commodity for
world superpowers, to the point that they have defined it as a national security issue. But
Iraq holds one the largest oil reserves in the world. It has so much oil that it built its
national security on it. Still, the UN sanctions regime specifically targeted Iraqi oil,
creating a conflict of interest among the world superpowers and triggering competition
for access to Iraqi oil. I explain in Chapter II that both securitization and competition for
oil allowed Iraq to circumvent the UN sanctions regime. Then, in Chapter III, I analyze
nation-states within the context of global, regional and bilateral trade. I argue that global
trade is in fact fragmented into multiple regional trade zones and bilateral trade
agreements. This fragmentation allowed Iraq to access global markets where it purchased
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not only goods and services for civilian ends but also components, equipment and
technologies to rebuild its military infrastructure, including its WMD Program.
After that, I move away from nation-states to focus on global non-state actors, on
how they interact in a global civic society and affect global politics. Thus, in Chapter IV,
I analyze NGOs, interest-groups, religious organizations, exiled communities, political
parties and empowered individuals. I study how they facilitated circumvention of the UN
sanctions regime. In Chapter V, I focus on financiers, speculators, banks and global
banking. Here, the underlying assumption is that whereas global banks and financiers
finance global trade, the global banking industry guarantees the rapid circulation of
money in a secured and efficient manner throughout global markets. I argue that Iraq
utilized regional banking to access global banking and conceal it from the UN.
Afterwards, in Chapter VI, I examine yet another non-state actor and a means of
globalization. I analyze the corporation and corporate models. Corporations design
corporate models to go global, evade states’ laws, avoid accountability and maximize
profits. I discuss how nation-states, non-state actors and Saddam Hussein employed
corporations and global corporate models to circumvent the UN sanctions regime.
Lastly, in Chapter VII, I study another feature of globalization: global productions
for local assembly lines. I recreate the strategy Saddam Hussein employed to rebuild its
military apparatus and WMD Programs. I show how Saddam went around the world
purchasing technologies and components of all sorts to assembly them in Iraqi and nonIraqi military plants. Saddam’s strategy was so novel that the UN had to conceive and
enforce a second sanctions regime, known as the embargo on goods of dual use, meaning
goods designed for one purpose but that could be used for other ends, in the Iraqi case for
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military weapons.
In all, my findings should explain the hypothesis of this dissertation: that agents
and means of globalization undermine a multilateral sanctions regime. How they do it is
represented in Figure 1.2.

Figure 1.2 – Circumvention of a Multilateral Sanctions Regime under Globalization
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Globalization
Means of
Globalization

Multilateral
Sanctions
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Globalization

Globalization
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The Research Methodology
Another important aspect in this dissertation is the research methodology. I
employ two methods: the follow the money approach and the comparative approach.
In the follow the money approach, I research three bodies of sources: the UN, the
US, and independent sources. I examine the entire sanctions regime, but I pay special
attention to the so called “UN Oil-For-Food Program.” Several credible sources found
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that some states, non-state actors and even Saddam Hussein utilized “the Programme” to
circumvent the UN sanctions regime, profiting hundreds of billions of dollars. Following
this money is essential to determine how it was done, where the money originated and
where it ended up. Thus, I follow transactions and wire transfers. I review bank accounts,
statements, and ledgers. In addition, I employ the comparative method to compare data
and sources. I utilize two main sources of data. One source is the Volcker Report,
prepared by the IIC. The other is the Duelfer Report, prepared by the CIA. The goal here
is threefold: analyze the organizational coherence of UN sanctions, examine mechanisms
for enforcing them, and detect potential contradictions between both the Volcker and the
Duelfer Reports.
The Volcker Report owes its name to Mr. Paul Volker, Chairman of the IIC. The
U.S. Congress mandated and sponsored the IIC, but independent institutions collaborated,
including the Anglo-American Security Policy, the Institute for International Peace
Studies, University of Notre Dame, and the Middle East Research Institute. The objective
of the IIC was to investigate violations of the UN sanctions regime. Alternatively, the
Duelfer Report compares the Iraqi economy before and during the UN sanctions regime
as well as the structures of the Iraqi government and its multiple agencies. The Duelfer
Report also analyzes how Iraq purchased components and technologies to rebuild its
weaponry, including its WMD Program. The Report discusses cases of money laundering
in Iraq by banks, corporations, and other non-state actors.
Next, I use several independent sources as part of the comparative research. For
instance, the Stanley Foundation financed various research projects on sanctions regimes
as instruments of foreign policy. It held two conferences that explicitly discussed the
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Iraqi case and how American corporations and banks at times jeopardize American
economic sanctions against targeted nations. Panels included representatives from
Microsoft Corp., Caterpillar Corp., Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank One, Conoco Inc,
Exxon-Mobil, and others. Also, I include investigations from the British and Australian
Parliaments, the Heritage Foundation, the Michigan Project, and the Iraq Watch Project.
Finally, it is imperative to assess and compare Iraq’s weapon arsenals before and
after the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The goal is to survey Iraq’s military hardware
and weaponry, as well as goods with weapons-related utility that Iraq acquired during the
sanctions regime. I want to trace their manufacturing origins, determine how they were
obtained and smuggled into Iraq. For that end, the U.N. and its several agencies are
important sources. Among them are the International Atomic Energy Agency Iraq Action
Teams, also known as Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO), the UN Special
Commission (UNSCOM), which consists of multinational teams responsible for
inspecting chemical, biological, and nuclear arsenals in Iraq, and the UN Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Also, taking into account that the
state of Israel is a key ally of the U.S. and arguably the most threatened of all Saddam
Hussein’s enemies, it will be potentially informative to study what Israeli’s intelligence
agencies have to say about Iraq’s attempts to circumvent the sanctions regime in order to
acquire and/or develop nuclear capabilities and WMDs. The rationale is that Israel’s
intelligence services are among the most effective and credible in the world, so their
findings could be a reference to compare with findings form UNMOVIC and intelligence
service agencies of other nations.
One important aspect to observe is that, in the years to come, I should expect
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more independent investigations on the topic being conducted by universities, academic
institutions and even journalists from different parts of the world. The fact that there were
so many violations of the UN sanctions against Iraq and that no weapon of mass
destruction were there makes this kind of research an attractive one, appealing to scholars
of all schools and tendencies. Moreover, “the problem of Iraq” is being replicated in the
case of Iran as I speak, presenting a new challenge to the UN in terms of how to inspect
Iran’s arsenals, how to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear materials and technologies
from other nations, and whether or not a UN’s embargo will be enough to deter Iran from
acquiring and/or developing nuclear capabilities. Again, these kinds of questions will
probably trigger an array of research and analysis about the topic in the years to come.
In conclusion, in this dissertation I examine the overall effectiveness of sanctions
regimes in today’s global economy. I analyze whether or not sanctions regimes are
enforceable and how efficient they are as instruments of foreign policy, chiefly when
trying to prevent the acquisition, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and
WMDs. I study national and transnational interests and how they affect, and are affected
by, non-state actors, institutions and multilateralism. This is of great relevance for
international relations since, as I speak, the UN, the U.S. and other world powers attempt
to cope with Iran’s ambitions for nuclear technologies. Some policymakers are already
proposing a sanctions regime against Iran led by the UN. Some scholars see sanctions
regimes as the main mechanism to prevent Iran from acquiring and developing nuclear
technologies. Others consider that globalization is an obstacle. The debate will remain
open for years to come, and this dissertation could shed some light on it.
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II. AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: NATIONS, NATIONAL
SECURITY, GLOBAL DEMAND OF RAW MATERIALS AND SANCTIONS
REGIMES
“The real culprit in the Oil-for-Food scandal is not the UN but members of the Security Council such as
the United States, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia… Most of the oil smuggling was condoned
by the United States and other Security Council members”.
Mr. Mark M. Brown, Kofi Annan’s Chief of Staff
“At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the five permanent members and foment international public
support of Iraq at the UN and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaign and an extensive
diplomatic effort”.
The Duelfer Report
“…the billions which went missing were because of that kind of realpolitik calculation by governments”.
The Volcker Report
“In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized trough politicized
to securitized, meaning that the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures”.
Buzan, Waever and Wilde

Introduction
In this chapter, I examine a key agent and an important means of globalization:
nation-states and their quest for global access to raw materials under globalization. I
argue that there is a fundamental contradiction between globalization and the security
interests of nation-states imbedded in the concept of securitization. This contradiction too
often leads to geopolitical tensions when states attempt to come together to enforce
multilateral foreign policies such as a multilateral sanctions regime. This is particularly
problematic when it comes to natural resources like oil. Oil is so important for national
economies that most nations have defined it as a national security issue. If globalization
triggers global demand for oil, national security interests restrict access to it. In this
chapter, we will see that such a contradiction allowed Iraq to circumvent the UN
sanctions and allocate large quantities of oil in regional and global markets.
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The problem is that Iraq possessed so much oil that the Iraqi regime built its
national infrastructure on revenues obtained from the sale of oil. Then, there were the
world superpowers, five of which sit permanently at the UN Security Council. They had
securitized, or defined, global access to oil as a national security issue due to two main
factors: 1) their high imbalances between oil consumption, production, and reserves; 2)
the importance of oil for their economies and defenses. For its part, the UN conceived the
sanctions regime against Iraq around restricting Iraq’s oil sales, hoping that it would
prevent Iraq from rearming and resuming its WMD program. But such a rationale failed.
Instead, it created a conflict of interests among the five nations sitting at the UN Security
Council and between them, Iraq and UN itself.
To illustrate my argument, I divide this chapter into two parts. In the first section,
I discuss the concepts of sectorization and securitization. I discuss how nation-states
attach issues such as demand for oil to national security. The discussion has two
perspectives: one is from the world superpowers’ perspectives; the other is Iraq’s
perspective. In the second section, I explain how nation-states performed under the UN
sanctions regime against Iraq in terms of oil purchases. I explore how macroeconomic
features such as GDP and oil consumption influenced oil purchases from Iraq. I also
examine how non-macroeconomic features such as geopolitics, regional trade, and
traditional trade relations affected the overall efficacy of the sanctions regime. Chiefly, I
explore how the American unilateral political position with respect to Iraq clashed with
the economic interests of world powers such as France, Russia, Germany, and China. For
the discussion, I rely on the IIC, GAO and Duelfer Reports.
Sectorization and Securitization
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The concept of national security is not rigid but flexible. As Katzenstein argues,
“The domain of national security issues is variable” (Katzenstein, 2006, p.10) and
policymakers often redefine it according to the interests of the state and the always
changing demands of global politics. Still, I would argue that, in general, there are two
main approaches to national security: one is narrow, and the other is broad.
Realists and Liberals have a narrow definition of national security (Buzan, Waver
& Wilde, 1998, p. 2). Realists like Gilpin (1981) focus on material capabilities, what
some scholars call hard power or tangible resources such as the military and the
economy. Liberals too toy with the Hobbesian Doctrine, the base of security studies.
They do not ignore material capabilities since, according to Grotius’ approach to it,
“Material power matters, but only within a framework of normative expectations
embedded in public and customary international law” (Japperson, Wendt & Katzenstein,
2006, p. 44). Both Realists and Liberals, some more than others, look at institutions,
cooperation, international law, and diplomacy as collateral to military power. Conversely,
a broad definition of national security would include culture, norms, religion, language
and national identity among others in the national security agenda. According to this
broad definition, the concept of statehood implies a notion of national identity, a people
united within a territory by a common history, language, culture and norms. It is a
concept born out of the Westphalia statehood system and reinforced under the post-Cold
War globalization process. This approach measures power in terms of intangible
resources such as culture, ideology, identity and others. Either way, narrow or broad, the
definition of national security is directly related to two concepts: securitization and
sectorization.
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For Realists and Neorealists, security is inherently related to the nature of global
politics. They measure security in terms of power, meaning vulnerabilities vs. capabilities
(Buzan, 1991, p. 19-20; Weaver, 1993, p. 21; Katzenstein, 1996, p. 2-6; Huntington,
1991, p. 7; Wendt, 1996, p. 31-36.) Liberals, Structuralists and Constructivists take a
broader notion to include systems, structures, religion, norms, culture, identity, language,
and other unconventional factors (Buzan, 1991, p. 19-20; Weaver, 1993, p. 21;
Huntington, 1991, p. 7; Wendt, 1996, p. 31. But they all accept that security is about
surviving and existing despite manifested existential threats, vulnerabilities, uneven
capabilities and unbalanced power in an unstable world (Buzan, Waver & Wilde, p. 27).
Security concerns arise when a threat is directed to the very existence of the state, to
society in general and to a government explicitly. Security threats justify the use of
special security measures, which include –but are not limited to- the use of force.
Security measures focus on preparing for war, the very first step to deterring one. In fact,
deterrence begins with sectorization and securitization.
Sectorization is, more than a method, a practical approach to analysis. It aims at
simplicity through disaggregation of a system from the top to the bottom. The core
assumption is that we can dismember the whole into pieces, the system into subsystems,
units into sub-units, and so on. The idea is to “Confine the scope of inquiry to more
manageable proportions by reducing the number of variables in play” (Buzan, Waver &
Wilde, 1998, p. 8). Sectorization looks for patterns, differentiations, similarities and
relations. Yes, there is a bit of Waltz’s systemic theory and structuralism in this concept,
but the focus is on sectors because “Sectors are views of the international system through
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a lens that highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all
its constituent units” (Buzan, Jones & Little, 1993, p. 31).
There are five main sectors according to Buzan, Waver and Wilde (1998). The
first is the military. It deals with national security and the ability to defend the nationstate in case of aggression. The second is the political sector. It focuses on issues related
to sovereignty. It deals with existential questions like survival, legitimacy, recognition,
and authority. The third sector is the economy. Here, it is important to say that economic
and political sectors often converge because the economy is politically strategic when it
comes to national security. For instance, the defense industry is politically important for
national defense. Whereas a strong defense industry is central for deterrence, dependency
on foreign oil makes nations vulnerable to global political instability. The fourth sector is
the environmental. Its advocates claim that a healthy natural environment is vital for the
existence of any state. Pollution, exhaustion of natural resources, poor quality of water,
worn-out land and other environmental issues could eventually lead to health crisis,
political instability and mass migration. It can affect, at the long run, not only national
security but the very existence of the state.
Finally, there is the societal sector, which deals with questions of national
identity, of what constitutes a nation-state. It includes religion, race, culture, history and
even language. Indeed, Hitler’s Germany defined the German state in terms of common
blood and language. Israel calls itself the Jewish state while Iran is the Islamic state. Both
Israel and Iran define religion as a raison d’ eta. In Germany, Israel and Iran national
identity led to strong states, but in Spain religion, language and culture have fragmented
the state into various autonomous regions, each having its own government and even
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national flag. Presumably, national identities are vulnerable to external influences, chiefly
to new religious and cultural trends. Still, a “well managed” national identity can unite a
people in case of a foreign aggression. It is a very good reason for securitizing national
identity.
Sectorization assumes, first, that each sector has distinctive characteristics and
values, so we should not treat them equally. Second, each sector is vulnerable to specific
threats, so survival must be approached differently across sectors. Securitization is a
further measure. It is a complement, an escalation of sectorization (Buzan, Waver &
Wilde, 1998). Securitization is the process by which governments declare an issue a
concern of national security. Securitization means that an “Issue is presented as an
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the
normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan, Waver & Wilde, 1998, p. 23-24.) For
Katzenstein (2006), securitization aims at maximizing capabilities and minimizing
vulnerabilities. The process can be ad hoc or institutionalized, depending on the severity
and urgency of the threat relative to national security. Some threats come and go. In those
cases, security measures can be temporary. But some threats are recurrent, and in time
they become permanent. Those are institutionalized. They have priority in the national
security agenda. They absorb large portions of the military and economic sectors.
The concept of securitization can be manipulated to respond to prefabricated
ideological, economic and political interests. Securitization is “A self-referential practice
in which the issue becomes a security issue not necessarily because a real existential
threat exits but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan, Waver & Wilde,
1998, p. 24). In that sense, securitization is basically “A more extreme version of

32

politicization” (Buzan, Waver & Wilde, 1998, p. 25). As Buzan, Waver and Wilde put it:
it is “Either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan, Waver & Wilde,
1998, p. 24). It means that once an issue belongs to the realm of national security, it is not
political anymore but a security issue. It is a raison d’ eta. Based on this rationale,
Realists and Neorealists emphasize the securitization of the economy and the military.
They do it to fortify the physical integrity of the state.
For their part, Liberals and Constructivists securitize issues that may weaken the
physical integrity of the state, including social unity, religion, ethnicity, culture, tradition
and even language. For instance, minority groups keep challenging traditional national
identities in Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and other European nations. As result,
national identity has been moved to the national security agenda in those nations. In
Spain, separatism constitutes a direct threat to the Spanish state and Kingdom. Lacking a
cohesive national identity, Spain has moved national unity to the top of the list of the
national security agenda.
The problem is that “Securitization creates a scale of chain reactions” (Buzan,
Waver & Wilde, 1998, p. 25), meaning that securitizing an issue often leads to the
securitization of other issues. It could mean the securitization of issues across sectors
and/or an entire one. The classic case is the securitization of oil by world superpowers
early in the 20th century. It drove world superpowers to securitize access to oil far beyond
their natural borders. It triggered competition for oil wells across the world, a new wave
of Western expansionism, an armaments race, political polarization of entire regions, and
interventionism.
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In the end, it all has made oil not only the most expensive but also the riskiest
commodity politically speaking. For example, Mexicans related oil to American
interventionism, so they nationalized oil and declared it a national security issue, defined
as such in the Mexican Constitution. Mexico expelled all foreign oil companies,
especially Americans, from its territory. In Iran, oil was the reason for deposing the proAmerican regime of the Shah, expelling American oil corporations from Iranian
territories, and declaring oil a national security issue. In Iraq too, oil was used as the
reason for expelling American and British oil firms from Iraqi territories. Oil was
nationalized and securitized. We will see in coming sections of this chapter that the Iraqi
regime used oil to circumvent the UN sanctions regime, and as a means of survival.
In sum, securitization and sectorization link national security to “Intersubjective
threats with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (Buzan, Weaver &
Wilde, 1998, p. 25). In this dissertation, I relate it to global trade, global civic society,
global banking industry, transnationals, and the global production line. In this chapter, I
argue that sectorization of oil and securitization of global access to it created political
disagreements among nation-states, mainly between world powers, affecting the efficacy
of the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq. In the next section, I discuss how the oil industry
became a strategic sector, how access to global oil wells became a national security issue,
and how it all affected the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq.

Sectorization of the Oil Industry and Securitization of Access to Oil Wells
The turning point in the geopolitics in the Middle East was the discovery of oil
around 1908 in Persia, specifically in the territories of what is Iran and Iraq today (Klare,
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2004). By then, oil was already a solid, profitable industry in the West, crucial for
Western economies and armies. In fact, the sectorization of oil had began in the early
1900s when the armies of the world superpowers –U.K., France, and Germany in
particular- started to use it as energy to move their tanks, planes, and warships (Klare,
2004). Securing access to oil became a national security issue, the foremost reason for
further Western intervention in the Middle East.
The British and French governments conceived the Sykes-Picot Agreement to
basically partition and control the Middle East. In an act legitimized by the League of
Nations, France took control over Syria and its coastal lands, known as Lebanon, and the
U.K. took over Iraq and Palestine. The U.K. kept a stronghold on most of the Arabian
Peninsula, leading to the creation of Saudi Arabia and what are today the states of Persian
Gulf. Soon, oil was found there too, mobilizing even more Western attention toward the
region. By the end of WWII, the U.S. too had made access to global oil wells an issue of
national security and declared the Middle East a strategic region. According to Klare
(2004), it was the rationale for the meeting between President Roosevelt and Ibn Saud,
King of Saudi Arabia, in 1945. There, President Roosevelt stamped what became the
Roosevelt Doctrine, the core of the American foreign policy post-WW II toward Saudi
Arabia and the entire Middle East.
The end of WWII brought a new structure to global politics. On one hand, there
were the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the two new world superpowers immersed in a cold
war. On the other hand, there was the end of Colonialism, through which colonies
became sovereign nations-states. The new nation-states rapidly allied to either the Soviet
Union or the U.S., engaging in proxy politics and wars (Ray & Kaarbo, 2005, p. 72). The
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Soviets attempted to influence nations around the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean
basin, mainly Turkey, Greece and Iran where they had historic and strategic interests.
Wary about the Soviets’ intentions, the U.S. legitimized Roosevelt’s policy toward the
Middle East with a series of presidential doctrines.
President Truman issued the first Doctrine. For Klare (2004), it was twofold; 1) in
tune with Kennan’s doctrine of Containment, the U.S. must support political regimes in
Greece, Turkey and Iran to contain Soviet expansionism in the region; 2) the U.S. must
provide military assistance to Saudi Arabia, so it could defend itself from foreign and
domestic threats.
Next, President Eisenhower’s Doctrine went a step further. It authorized
American Presidents to use military force to protect American interests, namely access to
oil, in the Middle East. The American Senate and House of Representatives approved it
in a joint resolution. Under the Doctrine, President Eisenhower sent American troops to
Lebanon. Later, the Nixon Doctrine constituted a shift in American policy toward the
Middle East by authorizing a greater flow of military aid to American allies in the region,
so they could protect the flow of oil to the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. was committed,
more than ever, to the Middle East. After all, the U.S. was by then importing more oil
than what it produced. It had become dependent on Middle East’s oil. Yet, the U.S.
restrained itself from directly engaging in armed conflicts in the region.
The West learned the hard way about its dependency on foreign oil. First, oil
producers in the Middle East united themselves under OPEC and boycotted production
and deliveries; then, the Shah of Iran fell and Iranians assaulted the American embassy in
Tehran; next, oil prices became volatile and Western economies fell into hyperinflation,
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stagnation and political instability. In sum, those events showed the inadequacy of the
Nixon Doctrine, so President Carter expanded the number of American military bases in
the Middle East and increased military aid to “friendly” regimes there. More notably, he
recommitted American combat forces to conflicts in the Middle East. President Reagan
ratified the Carter Doctrine and pledged to protect not only Saudi Arabia but the Saudi
Royal family too. Lastly, President George H. Bush claimed all those Doctrines, from
Roosevelt’s to Reagan’s, to legitimize the American led invasion of Iraq in 1990.
The unexpected collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991 created a new world order
based on two new features: unipolarism and globalization. In geopolitical terms, the
world became unipolar; in economic terms, capitalism consolidated itself as global
capitalism, or globalization. In both, the U.S. was hegemonic. Most of the Soviets’
political “satellites” were up for grab and the U.S. seized the occasion to shape the new
world order according to its geopolitical interests, oil included.
The invasion of Iraq in 1991 was an advance of what came thereafter: the
consolidation of American military presence in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain,
United Arab Emirates and Oman; the expansion of NATO toward Russian frontiers; the
establishment of long-term American military bases in Bosnia, Rumania, and Kosovo;
and American military expansion to Central Asia, mostly Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. By
2003, the U.S. had almost completed its military expansion toward the Caspian Sea,
dominating the Russian-European and the Russian-Central Asian borders and completing
what Klare calls the “encirclement” of Iran, a key oil producer in the Middle East from
where, as I stated, American and European oil firms were expelled. Figure 2.1 illustrates
the American military presence in the Middle East and encirclement of Iran.
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Figure 2.1 – U.S.’s Military Encirclement of Iran

Source: Centre for Global Research on Globalization

Note that the U.S. has flanked Iran with military bases in Afghanistan and
Pakistan from the west, Turkey, the Kurdistan and Iraq from the East, Kuwait, Qatar and
the Arabic Peninsula from the south, and Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from the
north. The Map also indicates that the distribution of American military bases in and
around the Middle East coincides with the distribution of oil reserves in the region, as
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shown in Chart 2.1.

Chart 2.1 – Largest Oil Reserves per Nation Relative to World’s Oil Reserves

Source: “Blood and Oil” by Michael T. Klare

Chart 2.1 shows nations that hold the largest oil reserves in the world. The red
bars indicate their proven oil reserves. The blue bars indicate the percentage of oil
reserves they hold with respect to world total oil reserves. Red and blue bars use barrels
of oil as their measure.
Chart 2.1 reveals that five Middle Eastern nations hold the largest oil reserves in
the world, including Iraq and Iran. The U.S. ranks seventh and the Caspian Sea states
ranks eighth. These states include Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which are chiefly
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important because: 1) they have borders with Iraq and Iran; 2) they have historically fell
under the geopolitical interests of Russia, but the U.S. has manifested strategic interests
in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union; 3) the U.S. has established several
military bases in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Yet, the main observation here is the
following: overall distribution of American military bases in the Middle East coincides
with distribution of oil reserves in the region. The U.S. has military bases in the oil rich
nations of South Arabia, the EAU, Kuwait, Iraq, and some of the Caspian Sea States. Not
to mention that it is in the Gulf state of Bahrain where the U.S. houses its Fifth Fleet. The
U.S. had accomplished two strategic goals by establishing military bases in the Middle
East during the 1990s: a) it controls access to oil wells in the Middle East; 2) it had
encircled Iran and Iraq.
Some scholars see the so called encirclement of Iran from two angles. One group
argues that the American presence in the Middle East is to contain Iran. Another group
speculates that the U.S. needs to control oil reserves in the region not for its own
consumption but to beef up its hegemonic status.
Henry Kissinger, a balance of power Realist, leads the first approach. He proposes
“A more plausible alternative explanation which would assign greater significance to the
regional context and American actions in the Middle East” (Kissinger, p. 1). Kissinger
refers to Iran and three events that lessened American influence in the region: the fall of
the Shah, the invasion of the American Embassy in Iran in 1979, and Iran’s nuclear
ambitions. Yet, the U.S. led invasion of 1991 and the UN sanctions regime left Iraq too
weak to counterbalance Iran. Kissinger implies that deposing Saddam Hussein was a
geopolitical error because Iraq was the one nation in the region strong enough to deter
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Iran. Kenneth Pollack agrees with Kissinger when suggesting that once Saddam was
removed, the balance of power shifted toward Iran and “Security problems in the Persian
Gulf are likely to get more challenging instead of less” (Pollack, 2003, p. 27). Kissinger
and Pollack argue that Iran’s nuclear ambitions and continued threats to Israel legitimize
the long term American presence in region. They see the U.S. as the balancing power in
the region.
The second approach comes from the hegemony school. It states that the
American attempts to control oil riches in the Middle East is not for the American own
consumption but to beef up its power. There are three points here. First, the U.S. utilizes
oil as a geopolitical tool in world politics. Second, the U.S. must secure the flow of oil for
its allies in Europe and East Asia. Third, the U.S. must restrict Chinese and Russian
access to Middle Eastern oil.
For instance, Joseph Gerson sees that “The American presence in the region has
military and geostrategic objectives; the motive of oil is not meant for the U.S. market but
rather as an instrument of power and control” (Gerson, 2007, p. 4). Klare adds that “By
remaining the dominant power in these areas, the United States can achieve more than
just the safety of its future oil supply; it can also exercise a degree of control over the
energy supply of other oil-importing countries” (Klare, 2004, p. 150). For their part,
Chalmers Johnson (2003) and Ikemberry (2006) support such a hegemony-based
rationale as an analytic outline, only that they define it in malign-benign terms.
For Johnson, the U.S. is a malign empire still fighting the Cold War. He says that
“What the U.S. wanted in Iraq was the deployment of some more permanent military
bases there to prevent Russia from establishing a stronghold in the region. The fall of the
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Soviet Union did not mean the end of Russia as a world superpower. Russia’s economic
and political crisis of the 1990’s was temporary; Russia would eventually rebound as a
key geopolitical player” (Johnson, 2003, p. 24). Johnson, as well as Klare (2004) and
Grossman (2002), points to the fact that by 1998 Russia was already rebuilding its
military in the Caspian basin and Central Asia. In contrast to Johnson, Klare and
Grossman, Ikemberry sees American hegemony as “Benevolent, institutionalized and
infused with reciprocal processes of political interactions, quail-rule-based and open”
(Ikemberry, 2006, p. 145). Europe and East Asia were “Attached to the exercise of
American power in the 1940s when the U.S. sought to build an order that would avoid the
return to the antagonist regional blocs of the 1930s” (Ikemberry, 2006, p. 152).
Controlling those two blocs “Required the building of an elaborate system of forward
bases in Asia and Europe” (Ikemberry, 2006, p. 152). It became part of the containment
policy, which, as Robert Gilpin argues, was built on two pillars: “The American military
and the American dollar” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 32). The U.S. provided security to Western
Europe and East Asia and allowed them to prosper at the expense of huge trade and fiscal
deficits.
Noam Chomsky sees it in a curious way. He states that “Since the 1940s we know
that one of the best ways to control your enemies is by controlling their access to oil. The
main enemies of the United States are in Western Europe and East Asia, the two world
regions that could move toward economic and political independence; one of the best
ways to prevent it is by controlling oil wells around the world” (Chomsky, 2005, p. 14).
Indeed, the European Union and East Asia are highly dependent on oil. To
explain it, Nile Gardiner led a congressional commission sponsored by U.S. Congress
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and the Heritage Foundation in 2004. The study found, first, that the European Union was
gravely reliant on foreign oil, especially from Russia. In fact, the EU is the world largest
importer of oil and gas. It imports 82% of oil and 57% of gas and expects to increase
them in 93% and 84% respectively in the next 25 years (Gardiner Commission, 2004, p.
61). The EU imports 25% of oil and 25% of gas from Russia (Gardiner Commission,
2004, p. 61). In contrast, Russia holds 27% of the world's oil and gas reserves. Gazprom,
a Russian state owned-company, owns 25% of the world’s gas reserves and produces
16% of the global output, just behind Saudi Arabia and Iran, and ahead of Iraq and
Kuwait; Gazprom produces 94% of Russia’s gas and 60% of Russia’s oil. Russia exports
7 million barrels daily, of which 85% goes to the EU through Ukraine and Belarus’
pipelines (Gardiner Commission, 2004, p. 63).
This dependency on Russian oil goes back to the 1980s when, at the peak of the
Cold War, Europe and the former Soviet Union saw in oil and gas supplies a means to
cooperation and constructive politics. Western Europe financed and provided the
technology to build the pipes while the Soviet Union carried on the construction and
guaranteed steady supplies. Cooperation continued and consolidated during the 1990s,
and by 2003 Europe found itself highly dependent on Russian’s oil and gas supplies.
During the Ukraine-Russian political crisis of the 2005, Russia threatened the EU with
cutting off oil and gas supplies if it sided with Ukraine. Russian oil and gas pipes cross
through Ukraine toward Europe, and Russia could either raise the price of deliveries of
just cut them off completely. After it, as the price of energy rose, President Putin began to
use oil and gas as a political instrument against the EU, just what the U.S. had been trying
to prevent.
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East Asia presents serious issues as well. First, there are unsettled disputes in the
region. There are disputes between North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, China and
Vietnam, China and Japan, Japan, South and North Korea, and between Japan and
Russia, just to mention a few. Also, we should not ignore the unsolved nuclear issue
between the U.S. and North Korea, which threatens American allies and makes the entire
region more volatile. Second, East Asia has a population of 1.5 billion. It is 40% of the
Asian population and a quarter of the world (Gardiner Commission, 2004, p. 127). In
terms of economics, East Asia constitutes the fastest growing economy in the world. In
2006, it had a combined GDP of $8,433,888 million dollars, the third largest in the world
just after the EU and U.S. (Gardiner Commission, 2004, p. 127). East Asia has a cheap
well-trained labor force and a high-tech approach to productivity, making it a very
attractive market for the European and American firms. Third, East Asia confronts a
major energy dilemma: it depends on foreign oil for 90% of its energy needs. China and
Japan are now the second and third largest oil importers in the world, but the economies
of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore rank 12th, 22nd, 36th and 44th,
which, along with the economies of Indonesia and Thailand, are among the strongest in
the world (Gardiner Commission, 2004, p. 134). They all have taken regional oil
demands to new historic highs. This is essential since East Asia has two main sources of
oil: Russia and the Middle East. According to Ji Guoxing, of the Shanghai Institute of
International Strategy Studies, “The Asia-Pacific region’s dependency on Middle Eastern
oil may exceed 90% by 2010, and while oil fields in Russian Siberia and Central Asia do
offer some short-term energy relief, the lack of existing infrastructure to facilitate the
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transport of this oil poses costly political and economic challenges” (Guoxing, 2005,
p.4).
The issue is that American control over Middle East’s oil makes the East Asian
Bloc dependent not only on foreign oil but also on American dollar. Five nations form
this bloc: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. The bloc has close
economic, military and geopolitical relations with the U.S. It, along with China, pays for
their oil imports with American dollars and Treasury securities, de facto financing the
American federal deficit. It is more problematic as the value of the Nikkei and other East
Asian currencies increase while the American dollar weakens. Chart 2.2 shows the
amount of American currencies held by East Asia Bloc.

Chart 2.2 – American Currency Held by Nations of East Asia Bloc
702

194
93

59

59

53

Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, 2003
According to the Chart, in 2003 those six nations alone held $1,163 billion dollars
in American securities. Japan led the group, but China had already surpassed South
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Korea and Taiwan, two key American allies. On the other hand, the rest of the world held
$1,960 billion. Comparatively, it held less than the East Asia Bloc, revealing the
influence that the East Asia Bloc has for the American economy. The East Asia bloc must
prevent the U.S. from defaulting. Otherwise, it will collapse, jeopardizing the political
stability of the region. In fact, it is in that sense that we should interpret China’s approach
to its currency and investments in oil fields around the world, in Africa in particular
(Klare, 2004, p. 161-169). Oil has become a matter of national security for China, which
must secure the flow of it into its voracious economy. China must secure access to global
oil wells if it is to become independent in terms of oil consumption. It must secure access
to global oil wells if it is to challenge American hegemony over Asia’s economy and
politics.

France, Russia and China
The fall of the Soviet Union meant the end of the bipolar world and the beginning
of American hegemony over world politics. The two events raised key questions related
to global politics. For example, how do other world powers counterbalance American
hegemony? Could France, Russia and China challenge it in the Middle East? In Iraq, why
did the U.K. side with the U.S. while France, Russia and China did not?
Klare explains it through the context of oil. He argues that “The United States,
France, Russia China are competing for the energy riches of these areas” (Klare, 2004,
p. 147). Some events on the ground seem to confirm it. For example, in September 2007,
France announced the opening of a branch of its Saint Cyr Military Academy to train
Qatari army officers (The New York Times, March 6th, 2006). In March, 2008, France
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declared that it was establishing a permanent military base in UAE with about 500
military troops stationed there permanently (New York Times, March 6th, 2008). It was
the first Western, non-American military base established in the region since the British
gave up its military presence there in 1971. France has also been conducting military
exercises in the Persian Gulf since 1995 when it signed a defense agreement with UAE.
Among other things, the agreement called for conducting 25 simulated maneuvers per
year and engaging in at least one actual military maneuver every two years. Actual
maneuverings were conducted in 1996, 2000, 2005, and 2008. They have consistently
been expanded to the point that in 2008, 4000 French troops took part and Qatari soldiers
were invited (New York Times, March 6th, 2008). The maneuvers always take place at
UAE's western region, near the Saudi border and the Persian Gulf where 40% of the
world's oil is shipped (New York Times, March, 6th, 2008). Also, France is a leading
military supplier to the UAE, Qatar, Arab Saudi and other nations in the region. France’s
arm sales to Middle East nations amount to $20 billion dollars annually (New York
Times, March, 6th, 2008). France also signed a deal to develop peaceful nuclear energy
with UAE, Qatar and other Arab nations. With respect to Iraq, France challenged the U.S.
by pulling out from the enforcement of the two-no fly-zones over Iraq, opposing “smart
sanctions” in the UN, and opposing the invasion to Iraq in 2003. Even under the UN
sanctions regime, France negotiated oil deals with Iraq such as the Majnoon and Nahr
Umar oil field projects. The fields hold 25% of Iraqi oil reserves, nearly 26 billion barrels
and $650 billion dollars in revenues to France (New York Times, March 6th, 2008).
Like France, Russia had challenged the sanctions regime that the U.S. proposed
against Iraq in the UN. Despite the sanctions regime, Russia signed a 23-year contract in
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1997 to revitalize the 15 billion barrel oil field of West Quarna (www.iraqiwatch.com).
This oil field holds the comparable of all proven oil reserves of Exxon-Mobil, the largest
oil company in the world. In 1997 too, Gazprom, a state-owned Russian conglomerate,
signed a contract for $18 million dollars to repair gas stations in Iraq. In 1998, the
Russian-Belarus conglomerate Salvneft negotiated a $52 million dollar contract to drill at
Tuba oil field in Southern Iraq (www.iraqiwatch.com). In 2000, Russian companies
Zaruezhneft and Tatneft obtained contracts to drill Saddam, Kirkuk and Bai Hassan oil
fields. The deal was for $13.2 million, not much, but it had a collateral contract for $900
million to explore for new oil wells in Iraq (www.iraqiwatch.com). If oil was found, the
two companies would exercise full ownership for 10 years. The contract included: 1) 67
new oil-related projects in southern Iraq and its Western Desert, including Suba, Luhais,
West Qurna, and Rumaila; 2) reconstruction of the pipeline that runs from southern to
northern Iraq; 3) drilling gas wells throughout Iraq. Curiously, the U.S. cancelled all
those contracts in June 2007, alleging that they violated the UN sanctions regime against
Iraq (New York Times, April 8th, 2007).
China is, as Klare (2004, 2006) states, already a rising world superpower and a
new actor in the Middle East. Its voracious demand for oil has pushed it into world
economics and politics with resources committed to it only comparable to the
American’s. China has successfully invested in nations such as Kuwait, Egypt, Yemen
and Saudi Arabia, not to mention Latin America, traditional “partners” of the U.S. In
keeping with its increasing involvement in “conflict zones” for oil, China ranked second
in oil purchases and exports to Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. In terms of arms
sales, China has consistently increased its exports to the region. According to IraqiWatch,
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from 1995 to 2002, China sold $1.6 billion in arms, and by 2006, China had sold $27
billion, including war planes and missile technologies. Some of them had American
technologies (www.iraqiwatch.com).
In contrast, the American and British’s oil shares in Iraq were not as solid as
France, Russia and China’s. American and British oil companies dominated three-quarter
of the Iraqi oil production until 1972, when Iraq nationalized its oil industry. But the U.S
and U.K. were forced out while the French and Russians managed to stay in. American
companies did not sign any oil contract with Iraq until 2003, and Iraq was only the sixth
largest oil provider to the U.S. from 1980 to 1990 (www.iraqiwatch.com). Likewise, the
U.K. did not sign any oil contract with Iraq from 1972 on, but it did obtain Iraqi oil
through investments made in oil traders or subcontractors which, from 1972 to 1991,
represented 7.4% British oil purchases. U.K.’s commitment to have a presence in the
Middle East sharply increased during the 1990s (www.iraqiwatch.com).
In all, the historical evidence suggests that there is a contradiction between
globalization and demand for access to oil, securitization of oil by world superpowers,
and enforcement of the UN sanctions against Iraq. The contradiction led to geopolitical
conflicts among world powers. It led them to intervene in oil rich nations, in the Middle
East in particular. Their acts still resonate in world politics. The UN sanctions regime
upon Iraq illustrates it.

The Iraqi Response
Securitization almost always has political consequences across regional and
global levels. When a nation-state securitizes an issue, it is basically sending a message to
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neighboring nations. Securitization constitutes a shift in terms of policy for it alters the
balance of power among neighboring nation-states (Buzan, Waver & Wilded, 1998, p.
27). For Realists like Carr (1939) and Kissinger (1957), it is the typical security dilemma,
in which security actions in one nation constitute existential threats to others. Hence, we
can argue that the securitization of the oil industry in oil rich nations created security
concern in nations of high oil consumption, which in turn securitized access to oil and
their relations with oil rich nations.
The sectorization and securitization of Iraqi oil began in 1970 when Iraq
nationalized its oil industry. This was done in the name of Iraq’s sovereignty, its right to
self-determination, and its will to control its national resources. It was a bold move to end
almost 60 years of Western control over Iraqi oil, which often translated into corruption,
abuses, and political control over Iraqi political institutions and processes. Iraq expelled
all foreign companies from Iraqi soil. It then established criteria to grant oil contracts
based on Iraq’s priorities, arguably its national interests. Under the new regime, Iraq
granted most contracts to Soviet and French companies since the Soviet Union and
France were the main economic partners to Iraq at the time. Conversely, Iraq denied any
participation to American and British oil Firms. There were some contacts between Iraq’s
Oil Ministry and American companies at some point during the Iraq-Iran War, but for the
most part American and British companies were forced out of Iraq’s oil riches.
Sectorization and securitization of Iraqi oil took a new meaning with the UN
sanctions regime for it presented a direct threat to Iraq’s national security. Saddam argued
that “The UN sanctions regime undermined the sovereignty and security of Iraq” (Meyer
& Califano, 2006, p. VIII). The CIA agreed by stating that “UN sanctions hindered his
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ability to rule Iraq with complete authority and autonomy. In the long run, the UN
sanctions also interfered with his efforts to establish a historic legacy. According to
Saddam and his senior advisors, the UN, at the behest of the US, placed an economic
strangle hold on Iraq. The UN controlled Saddam’s main source of revenue (oil exports)
and determined what Iraq could import” (Dulfer Report, Regime & Finance, p. 3).
In turn, the Heritage Foundation affirmed that “Saddam considered UN sanctions
as a form of economic war and the UN’s OFF program and Northern and Southern
Watch Operations as campaigns of that larger economic war orchestrated by the US and
UK” (Heritage Foundation, Report On Iraq, 2005, p. 61). In fact, we should not ignore
that UN sanctions included: a) occupation of northern and southern Iraq by American and
British armed forces; b) autonomy for Kurds, de facto fragmenting and debilitating Iraq’s
territorial integrity; c) two no-fly-zones over Iraqi skies; d) the presence of UN’s
inspectors on Iraqi soil; e) control over Iraqi ports, roads and borders to inspect the Iraqi
import-exports operations. I must add a dozen military bases that the U.S. had around
Iraq, which made of Iraq a besieged nation. All those measures constituted direct security
concerns to Iraq. They all threatened Iraq as a nation-state.
Still, Iraq did not limit its security concerns to the UN sanctions regime and
“Western threats.” Iraq feared others. And I am not talking about Israel, which for many
Muslims and Arabs it is just another American military base in the region. Rather, I am
talking about Iran, Iraq’s strong neighbor to the East and archenemy. In that regard, the
CIA found that “Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability —in an incremental
fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks— but he
intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.
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Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials
considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel
and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also in considerations, but
secondary” (Dulfer Report, Regime Strategic Intent, p. 1). The FBI confirmed Saddam’s
concerns about Iran in a report published in The New York Times. The FBI reported that
“In a series of interrogations before his execution, Saddam Hussein told a F.B.I agent
that, on the eve of the 2003 American invasion, Iraq was trapped between United
Nations’ orders to demonstrate that it had disarmed and a fear that appearing too weak
would invite attacks from its powerful neighbor and foe, Iran” (New York Times, July
3rd, 2009). Saddam went on to reveal that “He was more concerned about Iran
discovering Iraq’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions in the United
States for his refusal to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq” (New York Times, July 3rd,
2009). Saddam thought that “UN inspectors would have directly identified to the Iranians
where to inflict maximum damage to Iraq” (New York Times, July 3rd, 2009).
For those reasons, the UN sanctions regime posited a security concern to Iraq, a
threat that required urgent security measures. Iraq’s response was the securitization of oil
to new levels. Oil was Iraq’s main commodity for “Oil accounted for more than 60% of
the country’s GDP and 95% of foreign currency earnings” (Dulfer Report, Regime &
Finance Procurement, Sources of Revenues, Annex D, p. 3). Given the high global
demand for oil, it became Iraq’s main weapon. Oil became a means to circumvent the UN
sanctions regime. Oil and evading the UN sanctions regime became a national security
measure of high priority for the Iraqi state.

52

Indeed, the CIA, the IIC and the Michigan Project found that Iraq securitized the
sanctions regime. The CIA stated that “Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to
have UN sanctions lifted while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to
balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections — to gain support for lifting
sanctions” (Dulfer Report, Regime Strategic Intent, p. 1). For its part, the IIC confirmed
that “Throughout the Sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisors to formulate
and implement strategies, policies, and methods to terminate the UN’s sanctions regime
established by UNSCR 661. The Regime devised an effective diplomatic and economic
strategy of generating revenues and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi
intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nations’
member states and other international players’ resolve to enforce compliance, while
capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis” (IIC, p. 227). And the Michigan
Project noted that “Saddam’s security measures included unhinging the UN’s sanctions
against Iraq, centered on Saddam’s efforts to influence certain UN permanent member of
SC such as Russia, France, and China and some nonpermanent (Syria, Ukraine)
members to end UN sanctions. Under Saddam’s orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at these UNSC members and public
opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent OFF
program by diplomatic and economic means” (www.iraqiwatch.com).
Those findings corroborate my argument here, that Iraq sectorized and securitized
its oil industry as a reaction to the UN sanctions regime to strengthen its national security
and to guarantee the survival of the Iraqi state. Nonetheless, several events gave Iraq
some comparative advantage in that sense: Iraq had enough oil reserves to meet global
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demand for oil. First, there was an intense, growing global demand for oil during the
1990s as result of intense global economic growth. On one hand, Western industrial
economies, the U.S. in particular, demanded more oil to satisfy their high oil
consumption and dependency on foreign oil. On the other hand, there was China, India,
South Africa and other “emergent” nations, which demanded more oil to sustain their
intense economic activities. Most of them turned to the Middle East as a potential
supplier of oil. The second event was the collapse of the oil industry in former Soviet
Republics, on which European economies depended for oil and gas. Declining oil exports
from ex Soviet Republics meant that European nations had to seek new suppliers. They
too turned to the Middle East, intensifying competition in the region, and competition
among nation-states usually carries a great deal of political confrontation. But what is
relevant here is that those events increased the demand of oil across the world, especially
from the Middle East. It guaranteed some sound business opportunities for Iraq.
In all, new trends in global supply-demand for oil represented a sound source of
revenues for Iraq and its regime. The globalization process of the 1990s constituted,
among other things, intensification of global trade resulting from rapid economic growth
in numerous nations. Oil was a key commodity, and access to oil supplies a prerequisite
for economic growth and political instability. Therefore, global demand for oil opened
the doors for the Iraqi oil industry. It allowed Iraq to sustain its economic, military and
political infrastructures to acceptable levels. And here “acceptable” refers to Iraq’s image
as a sovereign, independent, strong, aggressive nation-state, a leader in the Arab world. It
was the image that Saddam Hussein wanted to expose to the rest of the world in order to
straighten Iraq’s national security. As Buzan states, “We should not ignore that, when it
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comes to securitization, image is crucial” (Buzan, Waver, and Wilded, 1998, p. 32). It is
vital how nation-states see a particular nation in terms of vulnerabilities and capabilities.
The CIA argued that “Throughout the 1990s and up to March 2003, Saddam focused on
one set of objectives: the survival of himself, his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those
objectives, Saddam needed to exploit Iraqi oil assets, to portray a strong military
capability to deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab
leader” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 3).
It is worth noting that image is limited by reality and perception by facts. For
despite all Iraqi oil, Iraq suffered the crushing impact of the UN sanctions, to the point
that it almost collapsed, mainly during the first 3 years of the sanctions. Yes, oil allowed
Iraq to boost its image as Iran’s strong counterbalance and America’s challenger. Both oil
and image allowed Saddam to prolong his regime for a few more years. The U.S. led
invasion proved that Iraq was a weak nation, and its regime was in decay.

How Iraq Circumvented Sanctions
In this section, I present evidences of how both global demands for oil and
securitization of global access to oil were important factors that motivated the
circumvention of the UN sanctions regime by Iraq. Explicitly, I explore how nations
reached Iraqi oil wells and how Iraq reached global markets. I also study economic
factors such as GDP relative to oil purchases and oil consumption per nation. I discuss
traditional trade relations, geopolitics, and how politics among the members of the UN
Security Council affected the sanctions. But first I present Table 2.1, which summarizes
Iraq’s total oil sales under UN sanctions. The Table has three blocks, each with three
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columns. In Block I, column I shows nation-states that purchased oil from Iraq under the
UN sanctions. Column II contains the number of contracts that those nations received
from Iraq. Column III includes percentages of number of contracts received. Block I is
sorted by number of contracts. In Block II, Column I includes nation-states that
purchased oil from Iraq under the sanctions regime. Column II represents the number of
oil barrels those nations actually lifted, and Column III shows the percentages of oil
barrels lifted per nations with respect to total oil sales per nation as well. Block II is
sorted by number of barrels of oil lifted. For its part, Block III reproduces the total value
of contracts that nation-states received from Iraq. The contracts are represented in US
dollars. Column I tally all nation-states that obtained contracts from the Iraq. Column II
shows the value of all contracts obtained. Column III accounts for percentages of oil sales
per nation with respect to total Iraq’s oil sale.

Table 2.1 – Iraqi Oil Sales
Block II

Block I
Countries

# of

% of

Countries

Contracts contracts

Block III

barrels

% of barrels

lifted

countries

lifted

Barrels

% barrels

lifted

lifted

Russia

244

21.57 Russia

1,011,356,506

29.70 Russia

19,300,618,432

30.70

France

69

6.10 France

252,001,935

7.40 France

4,248,213,159

6.62

Switzerland

62

5.48 T urkey

182,814,102

5.37 Switzerland

3,434,083,024

5.35

Italy

58

5.13 UK

170,559,574

5.01 UK

3,350,739,850

5.22

T urkey

55

4.86 Switzerland

165,115,918

4.85 T urkey

3,343,252,936

5.21

UEA

40

3.54 Italy

143,777,071

4.22 Italy

2,718,083,135

4.23

Spain

38

3.36 China

127,991,479

3.76 China

2,624,806,812

4.09

UK

38

3.60 Liechtenstein

120,025,880

3.32 Liechtenstein

2,467,770,768

3.84

China

35

9.00 Spain

87,723,077

2.58 Spain

1,643,749,098

2.56

Syria

32

2.83 Malaysia

73,558,738

2.16 Malaysia

1,485,199,149

2.31

Jordan

28

2.48 UEA

71,215,261

2.09 Vietnam

1,405,961,742

2.19

Pakistan

22

1.95 Vietnam

68,901,134

2.02 UEA

1,371,407,184

2.14

Ukraine

22

1.95 Argelia

62,155,862

1.83 Syria

1,134,317,406

1.77

Liechtenstein

20

1.77 Monaco

54,734,724

1.61 Argelia

1,109,337,575

1.73
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Panama

20

1.77 Syria

52,981,902

1.56 Cyprus

Cyprus

19

1.68 Cyprus

50,959,316

1.50 India

1,048,437,558

1.63

872,678,344

1.36

Malaysia

18

1.59 Aruba

47,888,047

1.41 Morocco

742,838,933

1.16

Vietnam

18

1.59 India

45,415,198

1.33 Jordan

735,728,580

1.15

United States

15

1.33 Morocco

42,392,022

1.24 Aruba

713,492,385

1.11

Belarus

14

1.24 Jordan

35,351,738

1.04 Panama

703,170,873

1.10

South Africa

14

1.24 Netherlands

34,180,002

1.00 Belarus

613,877,735

0.96

Argelia

12

1.06 Panama

32,424,699

0.95 Ukraine

538,411,832

0.84

Austria

12

1.06 United States

29,675,585

0.87 Netherlands

532,184,460

0.83

Egypt

12

1.06 Bulgaria

29,178,829

0.86 Egypt

506,657,165

0.79

India

12

1.06 Belarus

28,289,438

0.83 Pakistan

490,181,751

0.76

Indonesia

12

1.06 Ukraine

26,264,430

0.77 United States

482,825,657

0.75
0.62

Morocco

12

1.06 Egypt

24,189,974

0.71 South Africa

397,692,624

Lebanon

11

0.97 Pakistan

23,503,987

0.69 British Islands

394,853,212

0.62

Yemen

11

0.97 British Islands

22,284,374

0.65 Greece

347,836,069

0.54

Greece

10

0.88 Hong Kong

21,513,207

0.63 Bulgaria

333,739,464

0.52

Nigeria

10

0.88 South Africa

17,569,792

0.52 T hailand

330,192,170

0.51

Qatar

10

0.88 Austria

16,840,773

0.49 Belgium

301,953,188

0.47

T hailand

10

0.88 Greece

16,161,428

0.47 Austria

262,883,339

0.41

T unisia

10

0.88 Belgium

15,713,607

0.46 Singapore

262,123,492

0.41

Aruba

8

0.71 Singapore

13,548,632

0.40 Indonesia

255,138,745

0.40

Netherlands

8

0.71 T hailand

13,319,531

0.39 Yemen

251,116,047

0.39

Bulgaria

7

0.62 Indonesia

13,266,555

0.39 Bermuda

247,261,893

0.39

Kenya

7

0.62 Yemen

11,917,999

0.35 Lebanon

241,763,377

0.38

Other nations

7

0.62 Other nations

11,830,982

0.35 Hong Kong

227,838,241

0.35

Belgium

6

0.53 Lebanon

10,752,535

0.32 Cayman Island

207,859,782

0.32

Canada

6

0.53 Bermuda

10,218,507

0.30 Other nations

197,127,047

0.31

Hong Kong

6

0.53 Qatar

8,390,797

0.25 T unisia

180,361,361

0.28

Oman

6

0.53 Cayman Island

8,104,258

0.24 Nigeria

179,040,409

0.28

Namibia

4

0.35 Kenya

8,016,945

0.24 Sudan

173,784,987

0.27

Singapore

4

0.35 Namibia

7,975,587

0.23 Qatar

161,646,541

0.25

Ireland

3

0.27 Sudan

7,812,818

0.23 Oman

149,377,008

0.23

Japan

3

0.27 Nigeria

7,394,498

0.22 Romania

138,376,912

0.22

Romania

3

0.27 T unisia

7,170,739

0.21 Brazil

137,860,626

0.21

Sudan

3

0.27 Canada

6,589,991

0.19 Namibia

132,363,487

0.21

Bahamas

2

0.18 Oman

6,104,617

0.18 Kenya

123,891,238

0.19

Bermuda

2

0.18 Romania

6,023,119

0.18 Finland

107,331,748

0.17

Cayman Island

2

0.18 Bahamas

5,673,263

0.17 Japan

105,587,299

0.16

Finland

2

0.18 Japan

5,518,277

0.16 Venezuela

103,313,147

0.16

Germany

2

0.18 Ireland

4,925,580

0.14 Bahamas

102,326,624

0.16

Portugal

2

0.18 Finland

4,426,915

0.13 Ireland

92,406,127

0.14

Slovakia

2

0.18 Venezuela

4,005,435

0.12 Canada

78,252,230

0.12

Venezuela

2

0.18 Gambia

3,967,591

0.12 Gambia

72,112,479

0.11

Yugoslavia

2

0.18 Slovakia

2,832,863

0.08 Monaco

54,734,724

0.09

Brazil

1

0.09 Portugal

2,815,877

0.08 Denmark

52,933,910

0.08

British Islands

1

0.09 Denmark

2,257,853

0.07 Portugal

34,118,051

0.05

Denmark

1

0.09 Germany

1,890,657

0.06 Germany

33,288,119

0.05

Gambia

1

0.09 Hungary

999,529

0.03 Slovakia

30,544,942

0.05

Hungary

1

0.09 Yugoslavia

990,745

0.03 Philippines

27,858,288

0.04

Monaco

1

0.09 Philippines

982,692

0.03 Hungary

17,476,765

0.03

Philippines

1

0.09 Brazil

717,374

0.02 Yugoslavia

17,102,041

0.03

1,131

100.00 T otal

3,405,152,370

64,183,493,296

100.00

T otal

Source: IIC and FMI
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100.00 T otal

I draw several conclusions from Table 2.1. First, 64 nations purchased Iraqi oil
under the UN sanctions regime. If we consider that they were rich and poor nations, oil
exporters and importers, of large and small populations, and of all sorts of political and
economic systems, then we can say that UN sanctions had a global, multilateral character.
But the UN has 192 members, so 64 accounts for just 33.3% of UN’s membership
(www.un.org). It is way below 50%. Thus, I argue that the sanctions regime was not so
multinational in terms of participation by nation. Second, Bloc I shows the number of
contracts obtained per nation. Iraq granted a total of 1,131 oil contracts under the UN
sanctions regime. By comparing Blocs I and II, we see that large numbers of oil contracts
did not always translate into large numbers of oil barrels lifted. It was so because oil
contracts varied in terms of amounts of oil barrels. So in Bloc I, Switzerland ranked third
in terms of number of contracts obtained, above Turkey and U.K., but in Bloc II
Switzerland ranked fifth, right behind Turkey and U.K. Although Switzerland obtained
more contracts than Turkey and U.K., it actually lifted less oil barrels than the other two
nations. The same discrepancies arise in Bloc III. In Bloc II, the UEA obtained more oil
barrels than Vietnam, but in Bloc III Vietnam surpassed the UEA, profiting more from
the total value of its contracts. The same occurred with Switzerland, Turkey and other
nations. In Bloc II, Switzerland obtained fewer contracts than Turkey, but in Bloc III it
outperformed Turkey for its contracts had more value in terms of US dollars.
Also, demand for oil per nation did not justify their oil purchases. If not, then how
to explain that, as Bloc I shows, rich industrial nations, highly dependent on oil imports,
purchased less oil than nonindustrial, smaller nations? Bloc I shows that the U.S., Japan
and Germany, the most industrialized nations in the world, purchased less oil than Syria,
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Jordan, Panama, and Cyprus. And in Bloc II nonindustrial nations like Liechtenstein,
Panama, Cyprus, Monaco and Aruba lifted more oil barrels than the U.S., Germany, and
Japan! Similarly, in Bloc III, Russia, France and Switzerland ranked first, second and
third respectively while the U.S. fell to the 19th position, far behind Syria, Algeria,
Vietnam and Morocco. The case of Russia is notable. Russia ranked first in all Blocs; yet,
its GDP is smaller than the GDP of the U.S., UK, and France. Russia is the 7th largest oil
producer in the world. Russia holds 7.4% of the world’s oil reserves, which means that it
does not need to import oil, not the quantities it imported under the UN sanctions regime.
Besides, Russia was under an economic crisis during the period I analyze, so its oil
consumption dropped to a 0.84 GDP-oil consumption rate. That is, Russia required 0.84
barrel of oil to produce $1000 dollars of its GDP while the U.S. and UK produced $1000
with 1.65 and 3.75 barrels of oil daily during the same period (www.energy.gov).
Why using GDP as a comparative measure? There are two main ways to measure
oil consumption per nation: population and GDP. The measure by population assumes
that large populations consume more energy than smaller ones, but this assumption is not
always true for it does not account for macroeconomic factors. GDP is more reliable in
that regard. GDP is one of the most researched macroeconomic indicators. GDP refers to
the total output of goods and services in a nation. GDP accounts for macroeconomic data
like efficiency, industrial and agricultural outputs, employment and investment among
others. Most economists agree that economies of larger GDPs require more oil to output
more goods and services. Since the economies of the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Japan
and China are dependent on oil imports, I expect them to have purchased large volumes
of oil under the sanctions regime. I test that assumption in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2 – Oil Purchases by GDP
Bloc I
Countries

Average GDP

Bloc II
Barrels lifted

Countries

1992-2003

Average GDP

Barrels lifted

1992-2003

% barrels
lifted

USA

5,776,984,615,385

482,825,657

Russia

200,521,192,308

19,300,618,432

Japan

2,609,043,615,385

105,587,299

France

911,806,923,077

4,248,213,159

30.46
6.70

Germany

1,321,445,846,154

33,288,119

Switzerland

168,780,315,385

3,434,083,024

5.42
5.29

France

911,806,923,077

4,248,213,159

UK

897,155,538,462

3,350,739,850

UK

897,155,538,462

3,350,739,850

Turkey

117,111,376,923

3,343,252,936

5.28

Italy

754,663,692,308

2,718,083,135

Italy

754,663,692,308

2,718,083,135

4.29

China

733,042,869,231

2,624,806,812

China

733,042,869,231

2,624,806,812

4.14

Canada

422,199,107,692

78,252,230

1,780,000,000

2,467,770,768

3.89

Liechtenstein

Spain

397,681,161,538

1,643,749,098

397,681,161,538

1,643,749,098

2.59

Brazil

383,365,623,077

137,860,626

Malaysia

Spain

56,140,118,462

1,485,199,149

2.34

India

285,186,946,154

872,678,344

Vietnam

18,921,695,385

1,405,961,742

2.22

Netherlands

262,389,930,769

532,184,460

UEA

38,904,620,000

1,371,407,184

2.16

Russia

200,521,192,308

19,300,618,432

Syria

10,865,513,846

1,134,317,406

1.79

Switzerland

168,780,315,385

3,434,083,024

Argelia

32,845,419,231

1,109,337,575

1.75

Belgium

158,395,000,000

301,953,188

Cyprus

6,056,231,385

1,048,437,558

1.65

Austria

132,536,369,231

262,883,339

India

285,186,946,154

872,678,344

1.38

Turkey

117,111,376,923

3,343,252,936

22,173,945,385

742,838,933

1.17

Indonesia

111,173,834,615

255,138,745

Jordan

5,188,421,231

735,728,580

1.16

Denmark

108,524,361,538

52,933,910

Aruba

2,250,000,000

713,492,385

1.13

Hong Kong

101,042,161,538

227,838,241

Panama

6,956,038,462

703,170,873

1.11

South Africa

83,725,600,000

397,692,624

Belarus

8,749,721,538

613,877,735

0.97

Thailand

82,679,707,692

330,192,170

Ukraine

25,382,237,692

538,411,832

0.85

Finland

80,705,923,077

107,331,748

Netherlands

262,389,930,769

532,184,460

0.84

Greece

80,214,423,077

347,836,069

Egypt

53,065,439,231

506,657,165

0.80

Portugal

75,439,438,462

34,118,051

Pakistan

42,274,733,846

490,181,751

0.77

USA

Morocco

Ireland

63,148,556,923

92,406,127

Venezuela

58,452,143,846

103,313,147

5,776,984,615,385

482,825,657

0.76

South Africa

83,725,600,000

397,692,624

Malaysia

56,140,118,462

1,485,199,149

0.63

Virgin Islands

1,570,000,000

394,853,212

Singapore

54,842,733,846

262,123,492

Greece

0.62

80,214,423,077

347,836,069

Egypt

53,065,439,231

506,657,165

0.55

Bulgaria

8,281,049,308

333,739,464

Philippines

47,343,123,846

0.53

27,858,288

Thailand

82,679,707,692

330,192,170

0.52

Pakistan
UEA

42,274,733,846

490,181,751

Belgium

158,395,000,000

301,953,188

0.48

38,904,620,000

1,371,407,184

Austria

132,536,369,231

262,883,339

0.41

Hungary

33,390,502,308

17,476,765

Singapore

54,842,733,846

262,123,492

0.41

Argelia

32,845,419,231

1,109,337,575

Indonesia

111,173,834,615

255,138,745

0.40

Nigeria

25,956,688,462

179,040,409

Yemen

5,102,082,308

251,116,047

0.40

Romania

25,453,282,308

138,376,912

Bermuda

4,500,000,000

247,261,893

0.39

Ukraine

25,382,237,692

538,411,832

Lebanon

10,442,206,923

241,763,377

0.38

Morocco

22,173,945,385

742,838,933

Hong Kong

101,042,161,538

227,838,241

0.36

Vietnam

18,921,695,385

1,405,961,742

1,93,000,000

207,859,782

0.33

Cayman Island

Slovakia

14,045,603,846

30,544,942

197,127,047

0.31

Tunisia

12,659,013,846

180,361,361

Tunisia

Other nations
12,659,013,846

180,361,361

0.28

Oman

10,971,586,923

149,377,008

Nigeria

25,956,688,462

179,040,409

0.28

Syria

10,865,513,846

1,134,317,406

Sudan

7,751,802,615

173,784,987

0.27

Lebanon

10,442,206,923

241,763,377

Qatar

9,323,203,846

161,646,541

0.26

Qatar

9,323,203,846

161,646,541

Oman

10,971,586,923

149,377,008

0.24

Belarus

8,749,721,538

613,877,735

Romania

25,453,282,308

138,376,912

0.22

Bulgaria

8,281,049,308

333,739,464

Brazil

383,365,623,077

137,860,626

0.22

Kenya

8,107,111,538

123,891,238

Namibia

2,164,295,077

132,363,487

0.21

Sudan

7,751,802,615

173,784,987

Kenya

8,107,111,538

123,891,238

0.20

Panama

6,956,038,462

703,170,873

Finland

80,705,923,077

107,331,748

0.17
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Cyprus

6,056,231,385

1,048,437,558

Japan

2,609,043,615,385

105,587,299

0.17

Jordan

5,188,421,231

735,728,580

Venezuela

58,452,143,846

103,313,147

0.16

Yemen

5,102,082,308

251,116,047

Bahamas

2,883,384,615

102,326,624

0.16

Bermuda

4,500,000,000

247,261,893

Ireland

63,148,556,923

92,406,127

0.14

Bahamas

2,883,384,615

102,326,624

Canada

422,199,107,692

78,252,230

0.12

Aruba

2,250,000,000

713,492,385

Gambia

536,513,985

72,112,479

0.11

Namibia

2,164,295,077

132,363,487

Monaco

986,000,000

54,734,724

0.09

Cayman Island

1,930,000,000

207,859,782

Liechtenstein

1,780,000,000

2,467,770,768

Virgin Islands

Denmark

108,524,361,538

52,933,910

0.08

Portugal

75,439,438,462

34,118,051

0.05

1,570,000,000

394,853,212

Germany

1,321,445,846,154

33,288,119

0.05

Monaco

986,000,000

54,734,724

Slovakia

14,045,603,846

30,544,942

0.05

Gambia

536,513,985

72,112,479

Philippines

47,343,123,846

27,858,288

0.04

Hungary

33,390,502,308

17,476,765

0.03

16,995,280,595,141

64,183,493,296

Other nations

197,127,047

Yugoslavia
T otal

17,102,041
16,997,210,595,141

Yugoslavia

64,183,493,296 T otal

17,102,041

0.03
100.00

Source: the IIC and FMI

Table 2.2 contains two blocs. Bloc I has two columns and Bloc II has three. In
Bloc I, column I records nations that purchased oil under the sanctions regime. Column II
reports average GDP per nation from 1992, when the sanctions regime began, to 2003
when it ended. Column III accounts for oil barrels lifted under the sanctions regime. Bloc
I was sorted by GDP. Bloc II contains the same columns and data as Bloc I, with the
exception of column IV, which shows the percentage of oil barrels lifted per nation with
respect to Column III, number of barrels lifted in USD. Bloc II was sorted by Column III.
Table 2.2 shows mixed results. First, the size of a GDP did not really influence oil
purchases under UN sanctions. For instance, In Bloc I, U.S., Japan, and Germany have
the largest GDPs; yet, Bloc II shows that the U.S. ranked 26th, Japan 52nd, and Germany
61st in oil purchases. Russia, France and Switzerland ranked 13th, 4th, and 14th
respectively in terms of GDP, but they led oil purchases in Bloc II. Here too the case of
Russia is notable. It purchased 30.7% of the oil Iraq sold, ranking 13th in GDP. The case
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of Switzerland is interesting too for it ranks 14th in GDP and still surpassed Japan,
Germany, UK and Italy despite their higher GDP. The same occurred with Malaysia,
Vietnam, UEA, Syria, and Cyprus. They outperformed the U.S., Japan and Germany, the
three leading industrial and oil consumers in the world. The most striking case is
Lichtenstein, a non-industrial nation with an average GDP of just $1.78 billion. This tiny
nation surpassed the U.S., Japan and Germany by purchasing 3.84% from Iraq. The next
Table shows the same discrepancies but from a different angle. It lists nations that lifted
over $1 billion worth of oil under the UN sanctions and their respective GDPs.

Table 2.3 - Nations That Lifted Over Billion Dollars Barrels of Oil
Block I
Countries

Ave. GDP 1992-2003

Block II
Barrels lifted

Countries

in USD billions

Ave. GDP 1992-2003

Barrels lifted

in USD billions

% lifted
in USD

France

911,806,923,077

4,248,213,159

Russia

200,521,192,308

19,300,618,432

38.08

UK

897,155,538,462

3,350,739,850

France

911,806,923,077

4,248,213,159

8.38

Italy

754,663,692,308

2,718,083,135

Switzerland

168,780,315,385

3,434,083,024

6.78

China

733,042,869,231

2,624,806,812

UK

897,155,538,462

3,350,739,850

6.61

Spain

397,681,161,538

1,643,749,098 Turkey

117,111,376,923

3,343,252,936

6.60

Russia

200,521,192,308

19,300,618,432

Italy

754,663,692,308

2,718,083,135

5.36

Switzerland

168,780,315,385

3,434,083,024

China

733,042,869,231

2,624,806,812

5.18

117,111,376,923

3,343,252,936 Liechtenstein

134,000,000

2,467,770,768

4.87

397,681,161,538

1,643,749,098

3.24

Turkey
Malaysia

56,140,118,462

1,485,199,149

UAE

38,904,620,000

1,371,407,184 Malaysia

56,140,118,462

1,485,199,149

2.93

Argelia

32,845,419,231

1,109,337,575 Vietnam

18,921,695,385

1,405,961,742

2.77

Vietnam

18,921,695,385

1,405,961,742 UAE

38,904,620,000

1,371,407,184

2.71

Syria

10,865,513,846

1,134,317,406 Syria

10,865,513,846

1,134,317,406

2.24

6,056,231,385

1,048,437,558 Argelia

32,845,419,231

1,109,337,575

2.19

134,000,000

2,467,770,768 Cyprus

6,056,231,385

1,048,437,558

2.07

4,344,630,667,541

50,685,977,828

100.00

Cyprus
Liechtenstein
Total

4,344,630,667,541

Spain

50,685,977,828 Total

Source: The IIC Report and FMI
Two Blocs form Table 2.3. They contain a list of fifteen nations, their average
GDP from 1992 to 2003, and the amount of barrels they purchased from Iraq. Bloc I was
sorted by average GDP. Bloc II was sorted by barrels lifted. Note that 15 nations lifted
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over $1 billion worth of oil, but the U.S., Japan and Germany are not among them despite
their larger GDPs. Those 15 nations obtained 758 contracts, 67% of all contracts Iraq
granted under the UN sanctions regime. They lifted $50,393,714,531 billion, 78.89% of
the total oil Iraq sold. Note in Bloc I that GDP varies sharply with respect to oil barrels
lifted. France, U.K., Italy, China, Spain, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey are among the
15 highest GDPs. They, with the exception of Spain, are also in Bloc II, as the 15 largest
oil purchasers. In those cases, GDPs correlated with oil purchases, but we cannot say the
same of Liechtenstein, Cyprus, Syria, Vietnam, Algeria and Malaysia. They lifted over 1
billion worth of oil although their GDPs were much smaller. Once again, Russia led oil
purchases with 30.07% and a GDP rather small. Here, demand for oil did not justify oil
purchases. But let us see from a different perspective.

Table 2.4 – Fifteen Largest Oil Purchasers and Fifteen Highest GDPs
Block I
Countries

Ave. GDP 1992-2003

Block II
Barrels lifted

in USD billions

% lifted Countries
in USD

Ave. GDP 1992-2003

Barrels lifted

in USD billions

% lifted
in USD

Russia

200,521,192,308

19,300,618,432

30.07

U.S.

5,776,984,615,385

482,825,657

0.75

France

911,806,923,077

4,248,213,159

6.62

Japan

2,609,043,615,385

105,587,299

0.16

Switzerland

168,780,315,385

3,434,083,024

5.35

Germany

1,321,445,846,154

33,288,119

0.05

UK

897,155,538,462

3,350,739,850

5.22

France

911,806,923,077

4,248,213,159

6.62

Turkey

117,111,376,923

3,343,252,936

5.21

UK

897,155,538,462

3,350,739,850

5.22

Italy

754,663,692,308

2,718,083,135

4.23

Italy

754,663,692,308

2,718,083,135

4.23

China

733,042,869,231

2,624,806,812

4.09

China

733,042,869,231

2,624,806,812

4.09

134,000,000

2,467,770,768

3.84

Canada

422,199,107,692

78,252,230

0.12

397,681,161,538

1,643,749,098

2.56

Spain

397,681,161,538

1,643,749,098

2.56

Malaysia

56,140,118,462

1,485,199,149

2.31

Brazil

383,365,623,077

137,860,626

0.21

Vietnam

18,921,695,385

1,405,961,742

2.19

India

285,186,946,154

872,678,344

1.36

UAE

38,904,620,000

1,371,407,184

2.14

Netherlands

262,389,930,769

532,184,460

0.83

Syria

10,865,513,846

1,134,317,406

1.77

Russia

200,521,192,308

19,300,618,432

30.7

Argelia

32,845,419,231

1,109,337,575

1.73

Switzerland

168,780,315,385

3,434,083,024

5.35

1.63

Belgium

Liechtenstein
Spain

Cyprus
Total

6,056,231,385

1,048,437,558

4,344,630,667,541

50,685,977,828

78.96 Total

Source: the IIC Report and FMI
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158,395,000,000

301,953,188

0.47

15,282,662,376,925

39,864,923,433

62.72

Table 2.4 compares the 15 largest oil purchasers with the 15 highest GDPs in the
world. Two Blocs form Table 2.4. Bloc I shows a list of 15 nations that purchased over
$1 billion dollars worth of oil from Iraq. It also shows their average GDP from 1995 to
2003, the amount of barrels lifted expressed in USD billions, and the percentage of
barrels they purchased with respect to the total Iraq sold. Bloc I is sorted by Column III.
On the other side, Bloc II shows the 15 highest GDPs in the world, the amount of oil
barrels they lifted, and the percentage they represented with respect to all oil purchases
under the Program. Bloc II is sorted by Column average GDP.
Now, observe in Block I that that only seven nations that purchased over $1
billion of oil barrels made it to Bloc II as nations with largest GDPs. They were Russia,
France, Switzerland, U.K., Italy, China, and Spain. But Liechtenstein, Cyprus, Syria,
Vietnam, Algeria and Malaysia spent over $1 billion in oil despite their smaller GDPs. It
would be worth finding what Liechtenstein did with so much oil because Liechtenstein is
a nation with a population of just 35,322, with a service oriented economy, no heavy
industry and no even intense agriculture. Why would it need so much oil? Conversely,
the U.S., Japan and Germany did not make it to Bloc I although they led Bloc II with the
highest average GDPs. Why did they not purchase much more oil from Iraq under the UN
sanctions regime?
Whatever the reasons, it seems that GDP did not drive oil purchases under the UN
sanctions regime against Iraq, and that further testing from different perspectives is
essential. For instance, Table 2.5 shows members of the European Union, the second
largest economic bloc in the world but highly dependent on oil imports, mainly from
Russia, the leading oil purchasers under the UN sanctions regime.
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Table 2.5 – European Union Bloc
Bloc I
Countries

Bloc II

Ave. GDP 1992-2003

barrels lifted

Countries

USD millions
Germany

Ave. GDP 1992-2003

barrels lifted

% of

USD millions

1,321,445,846,154

33,288,119 France

barrels

911,806,923,077

4,248,213,159

27.78

France

911,806,923,077

4,248,213,159 UK

897,155,538,462

3,350,739,850

21.91

UK

897,155,538,462

3,350,739,850 Italy

754,663,692,308

2,718,083,135

17.77

397,681,161,538

1,643,749,098

10.75

6,056,231,385

1,048,437,558

6.86

262,389,930,769

532,184,460

3.48

80,214,423,077

347,836,069

2.27

Italy

754,663,692,308

2,718,083,135 Spain

Spain

397,681,161,538

1,643,749,098 Cyprus

Netherlands

262,389,930,769

532,184,460 Netherlands

Belgium

158,395,000,000

301,953,188 Greece

Austria

132,536,369,231

262,883,339 Bulgaria

8,281,049,308

333,739,464

2.18

Denmark

108,524,361,538

52,933,910 Belgium

158,395,000,000

301,953,188

1.97

Finland

80,705,923,077

107,331,748 Austria

132,536,369,231

262,883,339

1.72

Greece

80,214,423,077

347,836,069 Romania

25,453,282,308

138,376,912

0.90

Portugal

75,439,438,462

34,118,051 Finland

80,705,923,077

107,331,748

0.70

Ireland

63,148,556,923

92,406,127 Ireland

63,148,556,923

92,406,127

0.60

Hungary

33,390,502,308

17,476,765 Denmark

108,524,361,538

52,933,910

0.35

Romania

25,453,282,308

138,376,912 Portugal

75,439,438,462

34,118,051

0.22

Slovakia

14,045,603,846

30,544,942 Germany

1,321,445,846,154

33,288,119

0.22

Bulgaria

8,281,049,308

333,739,464 Slovakia

14,045,603,846

30,544,942

0.20

Cyprus

6,056,231,385

1,048,437,558 Hungary

33,390,502,308

17,476,765

0.11

Czech Rep.

-

-

Czech Rep.

-

-

Estonia

-

-

Estonia

-

-

Latvia

-

-

Latvia

-

-

Lithuania

-

-

Lithuania

-

-

Luxembourg

-

-

Luxembourg

-

-

Malta

-

-

Malta

-

-

Poland

-

-

Poland

-

-

Slovenia

-

-

Slovenia

-

-

-

Sweden

Sweden
Total

5,331,333,833,771

15,294,295,894 Total

5,331,333,833,771

15,294,295,894

100.00

Sources: the IIC Report and FMI

The Table has two blocs. Bloc I accounts for members of EU, average GDP from
1992 to 2003, and their oil purchases. Bloc I is sorted by average GDP. Then, Bloc II
shows the same data only that it has a fourth column to reflect percentages of barrels
lifted with respect to the total of oil sold under the sanctions regime. Bloc II is sorted by #
of barrels purchased.
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Table 2.5 indicates that France, U.K., Italy and Spain have the four largest GDPs
in the EU, and they ranked first, second, third and fourth in oil purchases under the
sanctions regime. The Netherlands ranked 6th in oil purchases, but it then fell behind
Cyprus, a nation of much smaller GDP. Belgium, Austria and Denmark have large GDPs;
however, they purchased less oil than Cyprus, Greece and Bulgaria. Germany, the leading
GDP in the E.U, ranked 16th. Germany purchased less oil than nations of much smaller
GDPs such as Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania, which are the poorest nations in
the E.U. Consequently, in Table 2.5, GDP did not predict oil purchases under the UN
sanctions regime. Let us then test the third largest economic bloc in the world, the East
Asia Bloc.

Table 2.6 - East Asia Bloc
Bloc I
Countries

Bloc I

Av. GDP 1992-2003

# barrels lifted

In USD millions

in USD millions

Countries

Av. GDP 1992-2003

# barrels lifted

% Barrels

In USD millions

in USD millions

lifted

Japan

2,609,043,615,385

105,587,299 China

733,042,869,231

2,624,806,812

49.35

China

733,042,869,231

2,624,806,812 Malaysia

56,140,118,462

1,485,199,149

27.92

Indonesia

111,173,834,615

255,138,745 Thailand

82,679,707,692

330,192,170

6.21

Hong Kong

101,042,161,538

227,838,241 Singapore

54,842,733,846

262,123,492

4.93

Thailand

82,679,707,692

330,192,170 Indonesia

111,173,834,615

255,138,745

4.80

Malaysia

56,140,118,462

1,485,199,149 Hong Kong

Singapore

54,842,733,846

Philippines

47,343,123,846

262,123,492 Japan
27,858,288 Philippines

S. Korea

S. Korea

Taiwan
Total

Taiwan
3,795,308,164,615

5,318,744,196 Total

101,042,161,538

227,838,241

4.28

2,609,043,615,385

105,587,299

1.99

47,343,123,846

27,858,288

0.52

0

0

0

0

3,795,308,164,615

5,318,744,196

100.00

Source: the IIC Report and FMI
Table 2.6 is divided into two blocs. In Bloc I, Column I accounts for nations from
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South East Asia. Column II shows their GDPs, and Column III accounts for their oil
purchases under the UN sanctions regime expressed in USD. Bloc I is sorted by average
GDP from 1992-2003. For its part, Bloc II has the same columns as Bloc I, but I added
Column IV to reflect percentages of oil purchases. Bloc II is sorted by number of barrels
lifted expressed in American dollars.
In the Table, we can see that nation-states in East Asia have a total GDP of
$3,795,308,164,165, second only to the European Union. Yet, they imported just
$5,318,744,196 million worth of Iraqi oil. A large percentage of it went to China, which
led purchases with $2,624,806,812 million. Malaysia outperformed Japan, Indonesia and
Hong Kong. Japan performed poorly in terms of oil purchases, behind Hong Kong and
only better than the Philippines. However, Japan invested $660 million dollars in oil
infrastructures in Iraq from 1996 to 2000, and it signed several “protocols of intention”
for further investments in the Iraqi oil industry. Japan also had investment interests in
three oilfields: the East Baghdad camps, which are said to hold reserves of 18 billion
barrels; and Gharraf and Tuba, both located in southern Iraq. They have oil reserves for
2.6 billion barrels. So in terms of oil investments, Japan outperformed all other East Asia
nations, including China. Taiwan and South Korea did not purchase oil from Iraq.
Consequently, Table 2.6, like previous Tables presented here, shows that GDP did
not justify oil purchases under the UN sanctions regime. Perhaps non-macroeconomic
factors like religion, ethnicity, family and tribal relations, illegal trade and geopolitics
played a more important role. Examining performance of Middle East nations may lead
to new findings.
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Table 2.7 – Middle East Nations
Bloc I
Countries

GDP1992-2003 Barrels
in USD millions lifted
Turkey
342.0 3,343,253
Saudi Arabia
289.0
UAE
112.0 1,371,407
Syria
26.4 1,134,317
Oman
23.0
149,377
Lebanon
22.1
241,763
Qatar
15.0
161,647
Jordan
13.5
735,729
Yemen
12.7
251,116
Total
855.7 7,388,609

Block II
Countries
Turkey
UAE.
Syria
Jordan
Yemen
Lebanon
Qatar
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Total

GDP 1992-2003
in USD millions
342.0
112.0
26.4
13.5
12.7
22.1
15.0
23.0
289.0
855.7

Barrels
% barrels
lifted
lifted
3,343,253
45.25
1,371,407
18.56
1,134,317
15.35
735,729
9.96
251,116
3.40
241,763
3.27
161,647
2.19
149,377
2.02
7,388,609 100.00

Source: IIC Report and FMI

Nine nations in the Middle East purchased oil from Iraq despite UN sanctions. In
five cases –Turkey, UAE, Syria, Jordan, and Yemen-, GDP correlated with oil barrels
lifted. Lebanon, Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia did not perform according to their GDP.
Turkey led GDP and oil purchases. Turkey itself is not rich in oil, which may explain its
performance here. Turkey houses most of the pipelines that pump oil from the Middle
East to Europe. Turkey has borders with the Kurdistan, the richest oil region in Iraq. So it
may be that Turkey purchased the Iraqi oil not for itself but to resell it in European
markets. Lastly, Saudi Arabia did not purchase oil at all despite its high GDP. Saudi
Arabia is one of the largest oil producers in the world, for which it does not need to
purchase any. Syria ranked 3rd in oil purchases and 4th in GDP. On the contrary, the case
of Jordan is interesting because, having the 2nd smaller GDP in the region, it ranked 4th in
oil purchases. Why? The reasons may be found in the CFIJ and IIC Reports. First, the
CFIJ stated that “Iraq evaded UN sanctions by means of “Protocols” or government-to-
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government economic trade agreements. Protocols allowed Saddam to generate a large
amount of revenues outside the purview of the UN; protocols or government to
government agreements generated over $7.5 billion for Saddam” (CFIJ, p. 54). Here, the
CFIJ refers to the trade protocols Iraq signed with Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon and
Syria, and the IIC accused those same nations of: 1) hiring front companies and
intermediaries to trade with Iraq; 2) allow their banks to conceal and laundry Iraqi profits;
3) smuggle oil out of Iraq and into the global market. The IIC found that “Saddam made
about $990 million from oil cash sales or smuggling” (IIC, p. 17). I discuss the protocols
in the next Chapter, but for now, let us study the data in the next table.

Table 2.8 – Iraqi Profits from Smuggling with Middle East Nations
Nations

Jordan
Turkey
Iran
Private Sales
Total
Jordan
Turkey
Syria
Egypt
Iran
Kurdistand
Private Sales
Total

Coallition for
International Justice
1992-1996
$
699
$
99
$
117
$
70
$
985
1997-2002
$
1,654
$
2,126
$
2,234
$
$
1,714
$
$
595
$
8,323

ISG
U.S. Senate
Report
PIC
1992-1996
$ 2,220
n/a
$
n/a
$
n/a
$
180
$ 2,400
n/a
1997-2003 1997-2002
$ 2,226
$
710
$ 2,814
$
33
$
$
$
45
$ 1,022
$ 6,805 $
45

Source: IIC, CFIJ, ISG Report, and U.S. Senate

The Table shows profits Iraq made from oil smuggling through nations in the
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Middle East. I collected the data from the IIC by the CFIJ, the ISG, and the U.S Senate,
its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations-Committee on Governmental Affairs. The
data show that Iraq engaged in oil smuggling through Jordan, Turkey and Iran from 1992
to 1996. The CFIJ reported $985 million of dollars while ISG reported $2,400 million.
From 1997 to 2003, smuggling expanded to Syria, Egypt and Kurdistan, increasing to
$6,805 million dollars. It is true that the data vary from source to source, but the most
relevant finding is not the volume of oil smuggled but rather the participation of Middle
Eastern nations in the smuggling, which raises very important questions. For example,
why would those nations allow smuggling from and to Iraq, a nation embargoed by the
international community, a nation that threatened its neighbors, those very same nations?
To respond the question, perhaps I should analyze non-macroeconomic factors
such as traditional trade, ethnic, religious and even family relations, which, according to
Fukuyama (2006), are the base of good business and trade relations. Iraq and its
neighbors have traded for centuries. The region was united under an empire for hundreds
of years, enough to forge long-lasting trade relations and customs. So it is understandable
that those relations remained strong even under a sanctions regime. After all, sanctions
regimes affect embargoed and not embargoed nations. Sanctions regimes are prompt to
cut off trade relations among nations, but they are slow in finding new sources of
commerce for the nations affected, mainly for nations of limited resources and incomes,
like Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Still, I should further ask, how did geopolitics
among world superpowers affect the sanctions regime? Specifically, how did the
Permanent members of UN Security Council performed under the UN sanctions regime
against Iraq?
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Table 2.9 – Permanent Members of UN Security Council

Bloc I
Country GDP 1992-2003
in USD millions
U.S.

5,776,984,615,385

Bloc II
T otal Imports

Country

in USD millions

GDP 1992-2003

T otal Imports

in USD millions

in USD millions

482,825,657 Russia

200,521,192,308

19,300,618,432

%
64.32

France

911,806,923,077

4,248,213,159 France

911,806,923,077

4,248,213,159

14.16

Uk

897,155,538,462

3,350,739,850 Uk

897,155,538,462

3,350,739,850

11.17

China

733,042,869,231

Russia

200,521,192,308

T otal

8,519,511,138,463

2,624,806,812 China
19,300,618,432 U.S.
30,007,203,910 T otal

733,042,869,231

2,624,806,812

8.75

5,776,984,615,385

482,825,657

1.61

8,519,511,138,463

30,007,203,910

100.00

Source: IIC Report and FMI

See in Table 2.9 the performance of permanent members of UN Security Council
in the UN sanctions regime. Here too, GDP did not correlate with oil purchases. Russia
and France lifted more oil than the U.S. and UK. The U.S. led GDP, but it ranked last in
oil purchases. In contrast, Russia ranked last in GDP, but it led oil purchases. The case of
UK is interesting for it ranked fourth in barrels lifted, in tune with its GDP but not with
its overall political attitude toward Iraq and the sanctions regime. That is, the UK, along
with the U.S., led the fight against Saddam in the UN Security Council. The UK cosponsored the two no-fly-zones over Iraq and the American led invasions of Iraq in 1991
and 2003. For their part, France and China had a balanced attitude France ranked second
in both GDP and oil purchases. China ranked fourth in oil purchases, consequent with its
political opposition to the UN sanctions and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In all, as Meyer
and Califano argue, “Iraq steered nearly half of its oil sales to companies from three
permanent members of the UN Security Council –Russia, China, and France- that it
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believed were most sympathetic to lifting the sanctions against it” (Meyer and Califano,
2006, p. 145). Moreover, the CIA argued that “Iraq’s “sticks” included not only
redirecting those contracts to other more “pro-Iraqi” companies, but held the threat of
forfeiture of foreign debts – totaling between approximately $116-250 billion; Saddam
expressed confidence that France, Russia and China would support Iraq’s efforts to
further erode the UN sanctions regime” (Dulfer Report, Saddam Strategic Intent, p. 12).
There is yet another way of testing performance under the UN sanctions regime.
The IIC stated that “Iraq preferred to sell its oil to companies and individuals from
countries that were as friendly to Iraq, and in particular, if they were permanent
members of the Security Council in a position potentially to ease the restrictions of
sanctions” (IIC, Manipulation of OFFP, p. 2). The quote implies that political interests in
UN Security Council, not GDP, explain the overall performance of members of UN
Security Council in regard to the UN sanctions since Saddam obtained two key
concessions from the UN Security Council: 1) he was allowed to choose companies that
he wanted to trade with; 2) he was allowed to negotiate prices and contracts. As Meyer
and Califano put it, “The ill-fated decision to allow Saddam to choose his contracting
partners unwittingly empowered him with political and economic leverage to advance his
broader agenda; Saddam used this leverage to build and maintain political support for
his efforts to overturn the sanctions regime and to circumvent the sanctions” (Meyer and
Califano, 2006, p. 18).
Indeed, Saddam lobbied the Security Council, which then eased their tough stand
toward Iraq and the sanctions. The IIC stated that “Saddam Hussein, in exercising his
ability to designate both buyers and sellers, did favor companies registered with those
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permanent members of the Security Council most reluctant to maintain strong sanctions,
specifically Russia, France and China; conversely, there was strong bias against
potential U.S. or U.K. contractors” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 19).
France, Russia and China opposed the UN sanctions regime in various ways.
First, they used their veto power to propose UN resolutions to: 1) reschedule debates for
renewal of the sanctions from one every six month to once a year; 2) expand the scope of
the sanctions or the list of goods and services allowed into Iraq; 3) oppose smart
sanctions; 4) oppose British and American resolutions to block humanitarian contracts; 5)
end the sanctions regime; 6) oppose the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Second,
they lobbied the Iraqi regime to sign long-term contracts to explore new oil reserves and
drill untapped oil wells. For instance, prior to the regime change in April 2003, French
and Russian oil firms signed long-term oil contracts with Iraq that covered roughly 40%
of Iraq’s wealth (New York Times, March 6th, 2008). France negotiated with Iraq oil
deals such as the Majnoon and Nahr Umar oil field projects. Located in southern Iraq, the
fields hold 25% of Iraqi oil reserves, approximately 26 billion barrels, representing about
$650 billion in revenues for France (New York Times, March 6th, 2008). Russia signed a
23-year contract with Iraq to revitalize the West Quarna oil field and drill in Saddam,
Kirkuk and Bai Hassan oil fields. Russian companies also signed contracts for 67 new
oil-related projects in Suba, Luhais, West Qurna, and Rumaila (The New York Times,
March 6th, 2008). Lastly, China did not sign any oil deal with Saddam Hussein, but as we
will see in coming chapters, Chinese firms were very active trading with Iraq.
On the other hand, the U.S. and U.K. collaborated to enforce two non-fly-zones
and the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq. The price tag was $921 and $270 billion dollars
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respectively (IIC, Summary, p. 9), which included the creation of “smart sanctions,” the
blocking of humanitarian contracts, and the blocking of delivery of goods of ‘dual use’.
Nevertheless, British and American tough stand against Iraq did not prevent American
and British firms from accessing Iraqi oil wells. The hitch is that governments and firms
had different goals. In other words, while British and American governments promoted
and enforced the sanctions, American and British firms evaded and profited from them.
Chart 2.3 illustrates Iraqi oil sales to firms from around the world under the UN sanction.

Chart 2.3 – Iraqi Oil Sales under the UN Sanctions Regime
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Source: The Duelfer Report (CIA)

The Chart shows Iraqi legal and illegal oil sales to two main groups of firms. The
first group includes American and British oil firms, in red bars. The second group
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consists in firms from 37 “other nations,” represented by the blue bars. The data cover
from the year 1994 to 2003. The quantity of oil is expressed in USD million of barrels.
At first glance, it seems that American and British corporations purchased less oil
than corporations from all other nations. However, that is not accurate if we take into
consideration that American and British corporations were competing against firms from
37 nations. Above all, I find that American and British corporations did benefit from the
sanctions regime that the UN imposed against Iraq, and that they did not follow the
policies that the American and British governments had enacted toward the Iraqi regime.
Specifically, I found that firms usually sold their contracts to other companies regardless
of their nation of origin, and that this practice allowed American corporations to acquire
oil contracts without declaring their nations of origin to Iraqi authorities and UN. Table
2.10 shows a relation of two groups of nations: contractual and non-contractual nations.

Table 2.10 – Contractual and Non-contractual Nations
Bloc I
Contractual Noncontract
Nations

Nations

Bloc II
Barrels
transferred

Bloc III

Contractual Noncontract

Barrels

Nations

Nations

transferred

Contractual Nonctractual
Nations

Nations

Barrels
transferred

Algeria

Switzerland

2,041,000

Lebanon

Austria

2,006,000

France

Switzerland

36,975,000

Austria

UAE

1,023,000

Libya

Austria

5,407,000

Jordan

Switzerland

28,381,000

Bangladesh

Russia

22,285,000

Lebanon

Cyprus

3,049,000

Iran

UK

27,983,000

Bangladesh

Jordan

8,613,000

Libya

Cyprus

4,927,000

USA

Cyprus

26,257,000

3,435,000

USA

22,285,000

Belarus

Russia

Brazil

Lebanon

Cyprus

26,257,000

Bangladesh

Russia

Various natio Cyprus

1,002,000

Jordan

Spain

Brazil

Italy

14,105,000

1,481,000

Russia

Denmark

2,258,000

France

Netherlands

13,201,000

Cyprus
Chad

Panama

7,291,000

Qatar

Egypt

2,927,000

UAE

1,047,000

Syria

Egypt

997,000

500,000

Liechtenstein

11,732,000

Switzerland

10,751,000

Egypt

Jordan

1,995,000

Syria

Finland

Yugoslavia

UK

10,219,000

Egypt

Switzerland

7,625,000

Jordan

France

5,278,000

Palestine

Syria

10,126,000

Egypt

Pakistan

2,078,000

Lebanon

France

4,549,000

Bangladesh

Jordan
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492,000

India
France

8,613,000

Egypt

Jordan

France

Switzerland

France

Jordan

France

1,000,000 Spain

France

1,351,000 Egypt

Switzerland

7,625,000

France

4,450,000 Cyprus

Panama

7,291,000

3,360,000 Brazil

Italy

1,481,000 India

Switzerland

6,985,000

Netherlands

13,201,000 Lebanon

Italy

1,764,000 UK

Jordan

6,681,000

France

Lichtenstein

2,027,000 Portugal

Italy

2,568,000 Jordan

Panama

6,035,000

France

Switzerland

10,751,000 Yugoslavia

Italy

3,164,000 Qatar

UAE

5,954,000

Hungary

Rumania

Jordan

8,613,000 Libya

Austria

5,407,000

India

Liechtenstein

11,732,000 Egypt

Jordan

1,995,000 Ukraine

Russia

5,318,000

India

Switzerland

6,985,000 Egypt

Jordan

1,000,000 Jordan

France

5,278,000

Iran

UK

27,983,000 France

Jordan

3,360,000 Palestine

Jordan

5,188,000

Italy

Switzerland

2,055,000 Palestine

Jordan

5,188,000 Libya

Cyprus

4,927,000

Italy

UAE

2,049,000 Portugal

Jordan

1,578,000 Yemen

Panama

4,713,000

Jordan

Pakistan

2,826,000 UK

Jordan

6,681,000 Lebanon

Switzerland

4,594,000

Jordan

France

5,278,000 Brazil

Lebanon

France

4,549,000

Jordan

Turkey

2,002,000 France

Lichtenstein

2,027,000 UK

France

4,450,000

Jordan

South Africa

1,047,000 India

Liechtenstein

11,732,000 Syria

Panama

4,430,000

Jordan

UAE

1,902,000 Spain

Liechtenstein

2,076,000 Syria

UAE

4,112,000

Jordan

Spain

14,105,000 UAE

Liechtenstein

1,955,000 Palestine

Qatar

4,080,000

Jordan

Switzerland

28,381,000 Various nations Malaysia

1,949,000 Russia

Switzerland

3,988,000

Jordan

Panama

6,035,000 Portugal

Monaco

1,996,000 Belarus

Russia

3,435,000

Lebanon

Italy

1,764,000 France

Netherlands

13,201,000 France

Jordan

3,360,000

Lebanon

Spain

995,000 Egypt

Pakistan

2,078,000 Yugoslavia

Italy

3,164,000

Lebanon

Switzerland

4,594,000 Jordan

Pakistan

2,826,000 Lebanon

Cyprus

3,049,000

Lebanon

France

4,549,000 Morocco

Pakistan

797,000 Qatar

Egypt

2,927,000

Lebanon

Cyprus

3,049,000 Palestine

Pakistan

2,016,000 Jordan

Pakistan

2,826,000

Lebanon

Austria

2,006,000 Cyprus

Panama

7,291,000 Syria

Switzerland

2,824,000

Libya

Austria

5,407,000 Jordan

Panama

6,035,000 Morocco

Switzerland

2,574,000

Libya

Cyprus

4,927,000 Pakistan

Panama

1,022,000 Portugal

Italy

2,568,000

Morocco

Switzerland

2,574,000 Palestine

Panama

966,000 Romania

UAE

2,560,000

Morocco

Pakistan

797,000 Syria

Panama

4,430,000 Slovakia

Russia

2,520,000

Pakistan

Panama

1,022,000 Syria

Panama

2,049,000 Russia

Denmark

2,258,000

Palestine

Spain

1,200,000 Turkey

Panama

892,000 Egypt

Pakistan

2,078,000

Palestine

Syria

10,126,000 Yemen

Panama

4,713,000 Spain

Liechtenstein

2,076,000

Palestine

Jordan

5,188,000 Palestine

Qatar

4,080,000 Italy

Switzerland

2,055,000

Palestine

Qatar

4,080,000 Romania

Qatar

753,000 Italy

UAE

2,049,000

Palestine

Panama

966,000 Hungary

Panama

2,049,000

Palestine

Pakistan

2,016,000 Bangladesh

Russia

22,285,000 Algeria

Switzerland

2,041,000

Palestine

Russia

1,550,000 Belarus

Russia

3,435,000 France

Lichtenstein

2,027,000

Portugal

Jordan

1,578,000 Palestine

Russia

1,550,000 Palestine

Pakistan

2,016,000

Portugal

Italy

2,568,000 Slovakia

Russia

2,520,000 Lebanon

Austria

2,006,000

Portugal

Monaco

1,996,000 Ukraine

Russia

5,318,000 Jordan

Turkey

2,002,000

Qatar

UAE

5,954,000 Jordan

South Africa

1,047,000 Portugal

Monaco

1,996,000

Qatar

Egypt

2,927,000 Jordan

Spain

Jordan

1,995,000

Romania

UAE

2,560,000 Lebanon

Spain

Switzerland

1,983,000

Romania

Qatar

753,000 Palestine

Spain

1,200,000 UAE

Russia

Denmark

2,258,000 Algeria

Switzerland

2,041,000 Various nations Malaysia

1,949,000

36,975,000 UK

1,101,000 Bangladesh

Rumania

500,000 Lebanon

1,101,000 Syria

14,105,000 Egypt
995,000 Ukraine

Liechtenstein

1,955,000

Russia

Ukraine

1,940,000 Egypt

Switzerland

7,625,000 Russia

Ukraine

1,940,000

Russia

Switzerland

3,988,000 France

Switzerland

36,975,000 Jordan

UAE

1,902,000

Slovakia

Russia

2,520,000 France

Switzerland

10,751,000 Yugoslavia

UAE

Total

418,110,000

418,110,000

Source: IIC
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1,840,000
418,110,000

Basically, Table 2.10 illustrates the nations that in the end executed the oil
contracts obtained from the Iraqi regime. The Table has three blocks. Each has three
columns. In all Blocks, Column “contractual nations” means nations that obtained oil
contracts from Iraq. Column “non-contractual nations” means nations that ultimately
executed the contracts. Column “barrels transferred” means the amount of barrels that
contractual nations transferred to non-contractual nations. Bloc I is sorted by “contractual
nations. Bloc II is sorted by “no contractual nations”. Bloc III is sorted by “barrels
transferred”.
The data show one important finding: most contractual nations transferred their
oil contracts to “non-contractual nations”, which then executed the contracts and sold the
oil in the global market. That is, in Bloc I, we see that Algeria transferred $2,041,000
million worth of oil to Switzerland. Bangladesh transferred $22,285,000 million to Russia
and $8,613,000 to Jordan. Jordan and Syria led Bloc I as they transferred eight contracts
respectively, only that Jordan’s contracts were worth $61,576,000 million while Syria’s
were worth $13,855,000 million. The case of Palestine is interesting because it received
seven contracts worth $25,126 million dollars, but it transferred them to no contractual
nations. This is rational considering that Palestine does not even have oil refineries to
refine crude oil. Palestine actually satisfies its energy needs by importing energy from
Israel.
In Bloc II, Austria received $2,006,000 million dollars worth of oil from Lebanon
and $5,407,000 million from Libya. Cyprus obtained $3,049,000 from Lebanon,
$4,927,000 million from Libya, $1,002,000 from various, not identified nations, and
$26,257,000 million from the U.S. This last transfer is meaningful because the U.S. does
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not export oil; instead, it depends on foreign oil for economic growth. In fact, bloc II
shows that the U.S. did not receive any transfer. But why would the U.S. transfer oil
contracts to a small nation like Cyprus? Lastly, France led bloc III with the largest
transfer, worth $36,975,000 million dollars. Jordan followed through with $28,381,000
million. In turn, Switzerland received both transfers to actually lead with 13, worth
$112,571,000 million dollars, as shown in bloc II, “no contractual nations”.

Conclusion
From the analysis, first I infer that despite its macroeconomic importance, GDP
was not the leading motive for oil purchases under the UN sanctions regime. Instead,
non-macroeconomic factors such as regional and illegal trade may have influenced oil
purchases among nations in the Middle East. Second, geopolitics among permanent
members of the UN Security Council influenced the effectiveness of the UN sanctions
regime. The UN Security Council was divided into two blocs: the U.S. and U.K. on one
side, and France, Russia and China on the other. This division affected the scope of the
Program, assignment of contracts and oil purchases, as well as overall enforcement of the
sanctions regime. Third, corporate practices such as speculation, third party
intermediation and transfer of contracts may have also played relevant roles in terms of
financing oil purchases and oil flows.
One important finding is that nations and oil firms approached the UN sanctions
regime in different and opposite ways. That is, even though the U.S.’s oil purchases were
low, American companies were among the leading beneficiaries under the Program. For
its part, Iraq utilized disagreements in the UN Security Council to circumvent the UN
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sanctions regime. Iraq managed to sell $64,183,493,296 million dollars in oil, plus
another $26 billion that the IIC affirmed Iraq bartered or exchanged for goods and
services. The CIA calculated that “Iraq earned an additional $12 billion from kickbacks
and surcharges associated with the UN OFF program, $19 billion from oil “cash sales”
or smuggling, and another $230 million from other surcharge impositions” (Duelfer
Report, p.217). The entire operation amounted to about 100 billion dollars in ten years. It
would be fair to ask: What did Iraq do with so much money? After all, Iraq was an
embargoed nation, supposedly with no access to global markets, financing and
investments. In the next chapter we will see that Iraq utilized revenues from its oil sales
in two ways. First, Iraq utilized portions of its revenues to purchase goods and services
around the world so it could feed its people and sustain its political regime. Second, Iraq
utilized another portion of its revenues to revitalize its economy and its military apparatus
so it could defend itself. How did Iraq do it? Did Iraq access global markets?
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III. AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: NATION-STATES, GLOBAL
TRADE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIMES
“The question is whether regional trade blocs are building blocs or stumbling blocs to the global trade
system”.
J. Bhagwati
“The highest levels of the government, including the President and the Presidential Secretary, used trade
Protocols and other cooperative agreements after 1991 as vehicles to circumvent UN sanctions and to
facilitate the economic recovery of Iraq”.
Coalition for International Justice
“Iraq’s bilateral trade Protocols with neighboring states provided Saddam with his largest source of illicit
income during UN sanctions. Just the protocol with Jordan ensured the Regime’s financial survival”.
The Duelfer Report
“France questions bilateral trade unions that the US engaged in the region. We mean to say Egypt, Turkey
and Jordan; for they were Saddam’s trade darlings during this period. Even the Office of the US Trade
Representatives acknowledges that American exports to Jordan grew 90% between 1999- 2003 alone”.
Statement by the French Ministry of Foreign Affair, Paris, July 22, 2003

Introduction
The critical question in this dissertation is whether globalization helps circumvent
sanctions regimes. The key question for Iraq was how to get around the UN sanctions
regime and access the global market to engage in trade relations with nations and
corporations. I argue that the nature of the global trade system helps circumvent sanctions
regimes. Global trade is so competitive, antagonistic and unmanageable that it creates
what Bhagwati calls “The building and stumbling blocs of the multilateral trading
system” (Bhagwati, 1993, p. 32). Global trade is not monolithic. Global trade is rather
fragmented, built on numerous regional and bilateral trade blocs that can either straighten
or weaken its foundations.
In this chapter I present evidences indicating that Iraq circumvented UN sanctions
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regimes through regional and bilateral trade blocs. Iraq accessed global trade through
bilateral trade agreements that it signed with numerous nations, but mainly with its
neighbors Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey and Syria. Those nations opened up their
markets to Iraq, and almost instantly numerous nations from around the globe followed
through. It was a two-way trade route: Iraq exported oil to global markets through Jordan,
Egypt, Turkey and Syria. In turn, Iraq purchased goods and services from all around the
world by using those nations as its trade headquarters. In part, it explains why Jordan,
Egypt, Turkey, Syria attracted so much trade during the 1990s. Above all, it calls our
attention the fact that the U.S. also signed bilateral trade agreements with Egypt in 1999,
Turkey in 2000, and Jordan in 2001, while the UN sanctions regime was still being
enforced. It prompted the French Minister of Foreign Affair to emphasize in July 23,
2003, what the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (www.ustr.gov) had reported:
American exports to Jordan grew by 90% between 1999 and 2003; the year that the U.S.
led military coalition ousted Saddam Hussein.
Consequently, as in chapter II, I use nations-states as the level of analysis, only
that I focus on trade, one of the main means of globalization. First, I analyze how nationstates approached global trade with Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. Second, I
examine how the nature of global trade allowed Iraq to circumvent the UN sanctions
regime. For that purpose, I rely on data collected from the IIC, CFIJ, GAO, and the
Duelfer Reports.

Global Trade
Global trade has historically been the cause of geopolitical conflicts among
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nation-states. David S. Landes explains in “The Wealth and Poverty of Nations” that the
quest for dominance over global trade led to the emergence of the Spanish, French, and
British empires and the creation of the colonial system (Landes, 1999). Most colonial
wars of the 1700s and 1800s aimed at securing the seas for commercial navigation and
new markets. In “Imperialism, the Last Stage of Capitalism”, Lenin argues that disputes
over trade cause wars (Lenin, 1996). He saw competition over trade as an intrinsic trait of
global capitalism, which would in time produce an all-out war among world powers.
President Wilson too saw in unfair trade one of the causes of wars. He argued that
protectionism (closed markets, export quotas, and high tariffs among others) were among
the causes of WWI. He thought that freedom of the seas and freedom from trade barriers
were the basis for a lasting peace among nations, so he included them both in his
Fourteen Points Plan for Peace. But protectionism prevailed and, for many, led to the
collapse of global banking in 1929 and the economic depression that followed afterwards.
In fact, the Bretton Woods Accords enacted during the last years of WWII tried to
correct the malpractices incurred in global trade during the 1920s and 1930s. Ikemberry
(2006) argues that free global trade was what American officials had in mind when they
conceived the European and Asian blocs after WWII. He quotes American officials as
saying that “Long-term American prosperity required open markets, unhindered access
to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much – if not all- of Eurasia along liberalcapitalist lines” (Ikemberry, 2006, p. 151).
For his part, J. Bhagwati (1999) states that right after the Cold War the tendency
was to build global trade on bilateral and regional trade blocs. Examples are regional
trade blocs such NAFTA, Mercosur, EU and hundreds of bilateral trade agreements that,
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according to the WTO, have been signed by nations during the last 20 years, a trend that
remains to this day.
In effect, Ikemberry points out that the current global trade system “Is really an
American order built on four pillars: open markets, social bargains, intergovernmental
institutions and cooperative security” (Ikemberry, 2006, p. 145). Global trade “Is
organized around American-led regional security, alliances in Europe and Asia, open
and multilateral economic relations, several layers of regional and global multilateral
institutions built around American power” (Ikemberry, 2006, p. 145).
The two quotes imply that: a) global trade can be unstable and create global
conflicts; b) cooperation and regionalization by trade blocs can lead to common security.
The quest for free trade is so challenging that nation-states often link it to domestic
political stability. Some nations even link it to national security and survival, as it was the
case of Iraq. Iraq engaged in bilateral trade with its neighbors as a means to engage in
regional trade, reach global markets and secure its survival as a nation. Thus, trade and
security complement each other. By the same token, integration vis-à-vis cooperation
aims at both trade and national security. That is, bilateral and regional integration beefs
up national security vis-à-vis cooperation in issues such as bilateral and regional trade.
The rationale is that bilateral and regional trade has domino effects: they change
trade patterns, which then lead to integration of production and labor across borders,
which ultimately lead to negotiated trade policies. It all leads to a common market in
which common security is the guarantor of stable trade.
Two theories are vital to explicate the sudden collaboration among Iraq and its
neighbors, mainly Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Egypt and Iran under the UN sanction regime.
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The two theories are interdependency theory and trade theory.
The Lessons of Interdependency Theory
Interdependency theory states that nations are interconnected through multiple
and complex linkages, which include political, economic, technological, legal, religious,
ideological, ecological and others (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Nations are so interconnected
that policies enacted in one nation could cross boundaries and trigger social, economic,
and political reactions in other nations. Second, interdependence theory relies on two
basic points. For one, states are not the sole unit of analysis. Various non-state-actors
(NSAs) shape global agendas, among which are corporations, NGOs, and international
institutions such as the UN and WTO. Actors behave according to their interests. They
make decisions based on cost-benefit analysis aimed at securing the best outcomes for
themselves. But there are multiple channels of relations among actors. Keohane and Nye
(2001) call them interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational channels of relations.
Since there are also NSAs, we must pay attention to non-state channels as well. Another
mark of interdependency is the lack of hierarchy in a global agenda (Keohane & Nye,
2001). Global politics implies diversity of issues, from security and trade to governance,
finance, drug trafficking, the environment, and many others. Yet, their priority in the
global agenda depends on factors such as severity of the issue, media attention, coalitions
forming, negotiation capabilities, and other variables. In an interdependent world, nonstate and state actors clash over agenda setting. An issue in a particular nation may lead
to a regional and even global crisis, redefining regional and global political agendas.
Lastly, interdependence theory does not assign much weight to the role of the military,
mainly when dealing with trade (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Military confrontation does not
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fix the problems of bilateral, regional and global trade. In the case of Iraq, enforcement of
the UN sanctions regime was a priority for both the U.S. and U.K., so they assigned it to
their armies. The U.S. and U.K. had military control over Northern and Southern Iraqis
territories, enforced by a naval blockade and two no-fly zones. Yet, Iraq kept trading with
its neighbors. Iraq managed to rebuild its economy and resist 13 years of sanctions.
Two examples illustrate how interdependency among the U.S. and nations in the
Middle East undermined the UN sanctions against Iraq. They are Turkey and Lebanon.
First, the UN sanctions created a political dilemma for the U.S. and Turkey.
Turkey is a member of NATO. As such, the U.S. used its territories to invade Iraq in
1991. Now the U.S. was using Turkish military bases to enforce the no-fly zone in
Northern Iraq. Even so, for its geographic position, Turkey had for centuries been a vital
trade route between Europe and the Middle East. The UN sanctions cut off the route and
halted trade along the Iraqi-Turkey border, affecting the economies of Turkey, Kurdistan,
Jordan and Lebanon, three American allies in the region. The economic crisis led to the
rise of a huge black market along the Turkish-Iraqi border. Trade along the Turkish-Iraqi
border was so good that even the PKK benefited from it. The U.S. and U.K. tried to look
the other way, but Turkey did not allow it. The CFIJ summed it up by stating that
“Turkey claims that the impoverished and rebel-ridden southeast is enjoying a boost from
the $300 million diesel trade. The trade has been tolerated by the U.S. and UK in part for
this reason, in part because it has been brokered by and has handsomely benefited the
Iraqi Kurds, but it is benefiting Kurd rebels as well who use the money to launch a
guerrilla type offensive against Turkey” (CFIJ, 2002, p. 28).
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The CFIJ was referring to the Iraqi-Kurds and Turkish-Kurds. Turkey had no
problem with Iraqi-Kurds, but it did have serious issues with Turkish-Kurds organized
around the PKK. Turkey views the PKK as a terrorist group. The PKK claimed a piece of
Turkish territory for itself, so Turkey treated it as threat to its national security. It became
a political dilemma for the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. had to offer a solution to Turkey
without affecting Iraqi-Kurds and without benefiting the Turkish Kurds. The solution
was: 1) allow Turkey to go after the PKK without crossing the Iraq border; 2) allow
trade, namely smuggling, of oil and other goods along the Turkish-Iraqi border for it
benefitted a key protégés of the U.S. in the zone: the Iraqi Kurds and their KDP; 3) allow
Turkey to open a free trade zone along its border with Iraq. In all, the American plan had
mixed results. The plan mostly legalized contraband along the Turkish-Iraqi borders. The
CFIJ argued that “The Iraq-Turkey trade agreement was a rationalization and expansion
of preexisting private-sector contracts along the Turkish-Iraqi border” (CFIJ, 2002, p.
32). The Plan did alleviate the economic conditions of Iraqi-Kurds and increased Turkish
trade opportunities in the region to make up for losses of revenues to truckers and
smugglers. However, Saddam Hussein took advantage of it and began to pay Turkish and
Iraqi-Kurds for smuggling. The CIA estimated that smuggling represented about $1
billion yearly for Iraq (Duelfer Report, Saddam Strategic Intent, p. 12).
Second, the case of Lebanon is as telling. Lebanon benefitted from the UN
sanctions regime against Iraq vis-à-vis Syria, a political enemy of both the U.S. and Iraq.
But Syria allied to Iraq to upset the U.S., which in turn needed Syria to: a) cooperate with
the Israel-Palestinian peace negotiations; b) keep under control Hezbollah and other
guerrilla groups in southern Lebanon but without upsetting Lebanon’s political stability.
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To return the favor to Syria, the U.S. allowed illicit trade along the Syrian-Iraqi border.
The CFIJ noted that “The US recognized that cooperation is critical to succeed in
negotiating peace for the Middle East, including stability in Lebanon, and has therefore
been reluctant to demand that President Bashar Assad make good on his year old
promise that he would crack down on his country’s illicit trade with Baghdad… these
included moving Iraqi oil to Lebanon and, in return, facilitating the transshipment
though Syria of Lebanese goods” (CFIJ, 2002, p. 32). Such political maneuverings shows
the level of interconnection between geopolitics and economics, and among nations.

The Lessons of Trade Theory
Like interdependency, trade theory explains unexpected cooperation of Middle
Eastern nations with Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. Trade theory in fact explains
the level of economic interconnections among nations in the Middle East, mainly among
political archenemies like Iraq and Iran, all which jeopardized the UN sanctions regime.
Krugman, (1979), Lancaster (1980) and Helpman (1981) introduce trade theory to
explain global trade after World War II. Explicitly, they look at three features of global
trade: a) trade among industrialized nations; b) trade among non-industrialized nations; c)
the ratio of trade relative to GDP. Trade theory builds on David Ricardo’s comparative
advantage theory, which states that nations maximize trade when they produce goods
with resources available to them. But Ricardo’s theory led some scholars to assume that
nations without natural resources are naturally unfitted for global trade. Scholars like
Ohlin and Samuelson think differently. They argue that factors of proportions like labor,
capital, industrial capacity and the size of a market can lead to a comparative advantage.
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Then, Krugman elaborates on Ohlin-Samuelson’s model to include “unconventional”
factors such as geography, namely the distance from production to consumption markets.
For Krugman, geography is essential for decreasing the cost of trade. First, geographical
proximity between production and consumption markets decreases transportation costs,
mainly between nations of common borders. Geographical proximity is also central for
factors such as movement of capital and people. Krugman argues that “When people and
capital can move, however, factor proportions are themselves something to be explained”
(Krugman, 1991, p. 491).
Free movement of capital and people within a specific geography or region brings
down the cost of transportation and labor. In fact, cheap transportation and labor helped
Iraq engage in smuggling with Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Iran. Transportation
and labor were so cheap that although Iraq imposed all sorts of taxes and fees, smuggling
was among the main sources of revenue for Iraq, and trucking became one of the most
lucrative industries under the UN sanctions regime. Trucking brought about $600 million
dollars every year into the Kurdish economy only. I present two examples, one is Turkey
and the second is Iran.

Table 3.1 – Oil Smuggled into Turkey by Iraq
# of oil
Barrels per
Day

100,000
110,000
110,000
110,000
110,000

Iraq's Sales
Price in USD

21
21
22
22
22

Transportation
Fees in USD

3
3
3
4
5

Price at Global Global
Iraq's Final
Markets in
Market's Final
Sales in USD USD
Sales

2,400,000
2,640,000
2,750,000
2,860,000
2,970,000
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25
25
25
26
27

2,500,000
2,750,000
2,750,000
2,860,000
2,970,000

Sources: IIC, CFIJ and Duelfer Reports
In Table 3.1, I explain the price of Iraqi oil smuggled into Turkey by Iraq. Note
that Iraq had ample room for maneuvering. Iraq could manipulate: a) production of oil
per day (Column I); b) sell price (in Column II); c) transportation fees (in Column III). I
bold Iraq’s tree choices for better understanding. Now, note that Iraq can keep its sell
price (in Column II) below the price in the global market (Column V) by a $3 or $4
dollars. It would not affect Iraq’s revenues. Iraq can even charge $3 to $4 dollars more to
make up for transportation costs since its final sales (in Column IV) do not go over sales
in the global market (Column VI). Iraq can do so due to three comparative advantages: 1)
Iraq has plenty of oil, but Turkey does not; 2) Iraq has a border with Turkey, securing
low transportation costs; 3) Kurds transported Iraq’s oil to Turkey, and the Kurdish
economy relied on Iraq’s trade with Turkey. Iraq in fact controlled Kurdish labor costs.
Yet, Iraq has two other advantages: a) Turkey’s excellent infrastructures to refine Iraqi
crude oil; b) Turkey’s geographical position with respect to Europe, the second largest oil
consumer of imported oil. As I explained in Chapter II, most of the oil Iraq smuggled
ended up in European markets. Still, the next example is more telling for it involves Iran,
Iraq’s political archenemy.

Table 3.2 – Diesel Smuggled into Iran by Iraq
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# of Oil
Barrels per
Day

Iraq's Sell
Price in
USD

Price at
Global
Transportation Iraq's Final
Markets in
Fees in USD
Sales in USD USD

Global
Market's
Final Sales

100,000

11

3

1,400,000

16

1,600,000

110,000
110,000

12

3

1,650,000

17

1,870,000

13
14
15

3

1,760,000

18

1,980,000

4
5

1,980,000
2,200,000

19

2,090,000

20

2,200,000

110,000
110,000

Sources: IIC, CFIJ
Like in the previous example, here Iraq had three choices. Iraq can increase: a) oil
production per day (Column I); b) sale price (Column II); c) transportation fees (in
Column III). In all, the increases never lead to final sales (Column IV) higher than final
sales at global markets (Column VI). But this case is relevant for four main reasons. First,
Iraq and Iran are oil rich nations, but they do not have infrastructures to convert it into
gasoline; second, Iraq and Iran have common borders; thirdly, Iraq and Iran have a
common enemy: the U.S. On the other hand, Iraq has a comparative advantage over Iran.
Iraq has borders with Turkey, and Turkey does have industrial capacity to refine crude
oil. Note that at the time, Iran could not get gasoline from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both
Iran’s neighbors and the two largest gasoline producers in the region. Iran, a political
enemy of the U.S., does not have good political relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
two key American political allies in the region. Iran, to this date, does not have refinery
capacity. It subsidizes and rations its gasoline.
Accordingly, Iraq and Iran have good reasons to work together to circumvent the
UN sanctions against Iraq. Cooperation here consists in Iraq using Iraqi-Kurds to ship its
oil to Turkey, which then converts it into gasoline. Iraqi-Kurds smuggled the gasoline
into Iran via Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi regime. Here, low transportation and labor
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costs guarantee low gasoline prices for Iran. Iraq itself makes a profit by taxing truckers
for crossing Iraqi territories, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of dollars that
Kurd truckers spend in Iraqi goods and services while crossing Iraqi territories. In total,
the gains illustrate how geographic proximity between production and consumption
centers can decrease transportation and labor costs, which in turn lead to a comparative
advantage as explained by trade theory.
All those factors can certainly contribute to the “natural” emergence of a regional
trade blocs. In fact, it is Krugman who coins the notion of natural trade blocs, which he
ironically defines in terms of a governmental policy. Krugman states that “The low cost
of transportation at regional levels makes regional trade blocs a natural and beneficial
policy” (Krugman, 1991, p. 485). That is, policy makers can build bilateral and regional
trade blocs by using factors of proportions such as geography, culture, language and
others as means to comparative advantages. It helps explain trade relations between Iraq,
Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Egypt under the sanctions regime. Table 3.3 illustrates how
those relations weakened the UN sanction against Iraq.

Table 3.3 – Trade Contracts under the UN Sanctions Regime
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Block I
Nat ions

Block II

Cont ract s Percent

Export s in

Percent

Nat ions

Cont ract s Percent

USD millions

Export s in
USD millions

Jordan

2515

13.78

2,548,005,219

7.2800

Russia

1205

6.60

3,669,047,718

France

2149

11.78

3,132,610,302

8.9500

France

2149

11.78

3,132,610,302

T urkey

1280

7.01

1,649,514,851

4.710

Egypt

847

4.64

2,962,660,858

It aly

1249

6.84

1,091,074,655

3.110

Jordan

2515

13.78

2,548,005,219

Russia

1205

6.60

3,669,047,718

10.480

Aust ralia

68

0.37

2,336,339,178

UAE

1070

5.86

1,944,219,047

5.550

Viet nam

205

1.12

1,951,470,213

847

4.64

2,962,660,858

8.460

UAE

1070

5.86

1,944,219,047

Egypt
India

847

4.64

1,176,830,860

3.360

China

China

810

4.44

1,839,790,132

5.250

T urkey

810

4.44

1,839,790,132

1280

7.01

1,649,514,851

Syria

648

3.55

1,544,681,993

4.410

Syria

648

3.55

1,544,681,993

Lebanon

550

3.01

770,030,253

2.200

India

847

4.64

1,176,830,860

Germany

516

2.83

535,821,022

1.530

It aly

1249

6.84

1,091,074,655

Belgium

422

2.31

269,062,223

0.760

Swit zerland

331

1.81

660,038,383

1.8800

T unisia

329

1.80

1,056,700,795

Lebanon

550

3.01

770,030,253

T unisia

329

1.80

1,056,700,795

3.0100

T hailand

59

0.32

717,959,615

Spain

287

1.57

280,446,290

0.8000

Swit zerland

331

1.81

660,038,383

Malaysia

242

1.33

581,161,511

1.6600

Saudi Arabia

165

0.90

654,764,093
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Indonesia

232

1.27

230,831,644

0.6596 Malaysia

242

6.19

581,161,511

10.9942

Austria

226

1.24

327,446,260

0.9357 Germany

516

13.20

535,821,022

10.1365

UK

223

1.22

153,819,313

0.4395 Algeria

154

3.94

442,324,147

8.3678

Vietnam

205

1.12

1,951,470,213

5.5762 Austria

226

5.78

327,446,260

6.1945

Saudi Arabia

165

0.90

654,764,093

1.8709 Spain

287

7.34

280,446,290

5.3054

Algeria

154

0.84

442,324,147

1.2639 Belgium

422

10.79

269,062,223

5.0900

Sri Lanka

152

0.83

84,078,140

0.2402 Morocco

80

2.05

262,928,365

4.9740

Cyprus

147

0.81

87,946,799

0.2513 Belarus

76

1.94

251,127,327

4.7508

Denmark

134

0.73

150,734,159

0.4307 Netherlands

78

1.99

235,312,350

4.4516

Oman

134

0.73

160,733,569

0.4593 US

41

1.05

234,105,616

4.4287

Sweden

110

0.60

186,404,505

0.5326 Indonesia

232

5.93

230,831,644

4.3668

Morocco

80

0.44

262,928,365

0.7513 Sweden

110

2.81

186,404,505

3.5263

Yemen

80

0.44

101,257,783

0.2893 Oman

134

3.43

160,733,569

3.0407

Netherlands

78

0.43

235,312,350

0.6724 UK

223

5.70

153,819,313

2.9099

Belarus

76

0.42

251,127,327

0.7176 Denmark

134

3.43

150,734,159

2.8515

Australia

68

0.37

2,336,339,178

6.6759 Pakistan

66

1.69

102,606,433

1.9411

Pakistan

66

0.36

102,606,433

0.2932 Yemen

80

2.05

101,257,783

1.9156

South Korea

63

0.35

49,304,315

0.1409 Japan

43

1.10

98,080,939

1.8555

Thailand

59

0.32

717,959,615

Greece

47

0.26

41,920,115

Japan

43

0.24

98,080,939

US

41

0.22

234,105,616

Finland

33

0.18

6,686,514

Canada

28

0.15

33,798,631

2.0515 Cyprus

147

3.76

87,946,799

1.6638

0.1198 Sri Lanka

152

3.89

84,078,140

1.5906

0.2803 South Africa

27

0.69

59,742,802

1.1302

0.6689 Brazil

21

0.54

51,367,238

0.9718

0.0191 South Korea

63

1.61

49,304,315

0.9327

0.0966 Greece

47

1.20

41,920,115

0.7930

Romania

28

0.15

37,879,449

0.1082 Sudan

13

0.33

39,404,573

0.7454

South Africa

27

0.15

59,742,802

0.1707 Romania

28

0.72

37,879,449

0.7166

Ireland

25

0.14

14,596,678

0.0417 Yugoslavia

19

0.49

34,901,480

0.6603

Bahrain

21

0.12

10,080,214

0.0288 Canada

28

0.72

33,798,631

0.6394

Brazil

21

0.12

51,367,238

0.1468 Qatar

8

0.20

19,847,964

0.3755

Bulgaria

19

0.10

13,354,097

0.0382 Ireland

25

0.64

14,596,678

0.2761

Ukraine

19

0.10

10,740,679

0.0307 Libya

Yugoslavia

19

0.10

34,901,480

0.0997 Bulgaria

6

0.15

13,846,445

0.2619

19

0.49

13,354,097

0.2526

Liechtenstein

14

0.08

8,865,457

0.0253 Ukraine

19

0.49

10,740,679

0.2032

Hungary

13

0.07

8,691,371

0.0248 Bahrain

21

0.54

10,080,214

0.1907

Slovenia

13

0.07

3,757,494

Sudan

13

0.07

39,404,573

Cuba

12

0.07

2,598,541

0.0074 Hungary

13

0.33

8,691,371

0.1644

8

0.04

1,424,021

0.0041 Finland

33

0.84

6,686,514

0.1265

Croacia
Iran

8

0.04

6,317,729

Qatar

8

0.04

19,847,964

0.0107 Myamar
0.1126 Liechtenstein

4

0.10

9,915,821

0.1876

14

0.36

8,865,457

0.1677

0.0181 Singapore

7

0.18

6,331,519

0.1198

0.0567 Iran

8

0.20

6,317,729

0.1195

Singapore

7

0.04

6,331,519

0.0181 Macedonia

1

0.03

6,196,213

0.1172

Libya

6

0.03

13,846,445

0.0396 Luxembourg

2

0.05

5,692,990

0.1077

Poland

5

0.03

4,229,195

0.0121 Poland

5

0.13

4,229,195

0.0800

Myamar

4

0.02

9,915,821

0.0283 Kenya

1

0.03

3,908,984

0.0739

New Zealand

3

0.02

744,366

0.0021 Slovenia

13

0.33

3,757,494

0.0711

Argentina

2

0.01

119,185

0.0003 Cuba

12

0.31

2,598,541

0.0492

Luxembourg

2

0.01

5,692,990

0.0163 Bangladesh

1

0.03

2,426,485

0.0459

Portugal

2

0.01

613,791

0.0018 Monaco

1

0.03

1,995,014

0.0377

Slovakia

2

0.01

1,401,378

0.0040 Croacia

8

0.20

1,424,021

0.0269

Source: IIC
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Table 3.3 shows the largest nation-exporters to Iraq. The Table has two blocs
divided into five columns, which are nations, contracts and percentage of contracts per
nation, exports in USD million, and percentages of total exports per nation. In the Table,
first note that the number of contracts does not always render large volumes of exports.
Jordan, Turkey and Italy rank first, third, and fourth respectively in Bloc I, but they rank
fourth, ninth and twelfth respectively in Bloc II. Russia and Egypt rank fifth and seventh
in Bloc I. Russia accounts for 10.6% of all contracts, leading exports under the UN
sanction regime. Egypt jumps from seventh to third with contracts worth nearly $3
billion, 8.7% of all exports. The case of Vietnam is as notable for it goes from twenty
first in Bloc I to sixth in Bloc II. Yet, the main finding is that Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and
Syria are among the top ten in both blocs. They are Iraqi neighbors, and they have
historically had good trade relations with Iraq. I argue that their common trade relations
and geography facilitated the signing of bilateral trade agreements, which d’ facto created
a regional trade bloc. To illustrate it, I present Table 3.4.

Table 3.4 – Trade Performance of Middle East Nations under UN Sanctions Regime
Countries
S. Arabia
Turkey
Egypt
UEA
Syria
Lebanon
Qatar
Jordan
Total

Bloc I
Ave. GDP
1992-2003 in USD
154,469,346,725
117,111,376,923
53,065,439,231
38,904,620,000
10,865,513,846
10,442,206,923
9,323,203,846
5,188,421,231
399,370,128,725

Exports in
USD
654,764,093
1,649,514,851
2,962,660,858
1,944,219,047
1,544,681,993
770,030,253
19,847,964
2,548,005,219
12,093,724,278

Countries
Egypt
Jordan
UEA
Turkey
Syria
Lebanon
S. Arabia
Qatar

Source: IIC Report
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Bloc II
Ave. GDP
1992-2003 in USD
53,065,439,231
5,188,421,231
38,904,620,000
117,111,376,923
10,865,513,846
10,442,206,923
154,469,346,725
9,323,203,846
399,370,128,725

Exports in
USD
2,962,660,858
2,548,005,219
1,944,219,047
1,649,514,851
1,544,681,993
770,030,253
654,764,093
19,847,964
12,093,724,278

Table 3.4 summarizes exports of Middle East nations to Iraq under the UN
sanctions. The Table has two blocs. Bloc I has two columns. One is for GDP. The other is
for exports. Whereas Bloc I is sorted by GDP, Bloc II is sorted by export volumes. Note
that I include Turkey and Egypt in this table although one is located in Europe and the
other in North Africa, but not far from Iraq. Egypt is a Muslin nation. Its trade relations
with Iraq are as old as their culture and religions. When the sanction regime was enacted
in 1991, Egypt was Iraq’s main trade partner after Russia and France. For their part,
Turkey and Iraq have common borders. They are both Muslim nations with a large
population of Kurds. Their trade relations date back to ancient times, long before they
were part of the Persian and Ottoman Empires. Still, Table 3.4 also shows that, in most
cases, nations with borders with Iraq scored higher exports. Note that GDP does not
correlate with exports. Egypt has the third largest GDP in the region and leads in exports
per nation. The UAE has the fourth largest GDP and ranks third in exports. Syria and
Lebanon occupy the same positions in terms of GDP and exports. However, Saudi Arabia
has the largest GDP but ranks sixth in exports. Jordan has the smallest GDP, but it
exports more than Saudi Arabia. Turkey has the second largest GDP but ranks fourth in
exports. Lastly, consider that nations from the EU exported about $8 billion to Iraq, $4
billion less than what all nations in Table 3.4 exported even though they have smaller
GDPs. Middle Eastern nations outdid the members of the UN Security Council by nearly
$3 billion. In all, based on Tables 3.3 and 3.4, I argue that, as the CIA put it,
“Geographic proximity, cultural affinity, and historical economic relationship explain
why Turkey, Jordan, and Syria reached formal trade Protocols with Iraq in contravention
of UN resolutions” (Duelfer Report, Saddam Strategic Intent, p. 9).
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Krugman (1979, 1991) and Samuelson (1949, 1983) explain it better than the
CIA. Krugman treats geography, culture, and ethnicity not as mere factors but as
determinants in regional trade. He incorporates what he calls determinants in his intercontinental trading costs versus regional trading costs model, from which he infers that
nations of common determinants form a natural regional bloc (Krugman, 1991, p.490).
Krugman would argue, I think, that such was the case of Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran,
and even Lebanon and Egypt under the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. For his part,
Samuelson would argue that trade among Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Syria was
endogenous, that it consolidated after hundreds of years of economic interactions due to
common borders, cultures, customs, language and other historic patterns. Samuelson adds
that, “When patters are endogenous, small initial differences can make big effects in
terms of costs and profits” (Samuelson, 1983, p. 57). I think that it is in that sense that
Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq constitutes one common market, and as Samuelson
states, “Trade costs shape the pattern of trade…, and costs are well explained by
geography and a set for regional trade patterns” (Samuelson, 1983, p. 74).
Of course, the Middle East was not the only regional trade block that Iraq utilized
to circumvent the UN sanctions and reach global markets. Iraq also used the former
Communist Bloc, in particular the bloc of nations that formed former Soviet Union. Here
I define the Communist Bloc not only for its political and social configuration but also in
terms of an economic system highly independent from the rest of the global market. The
former Soviet Union brought Eastern European communist nations into the Soviet
economy and a trade treaty known as the CAMECON. The problem is that those nations
developed close trade relations with Iraq during the 1970s and 80s. The Soviet Union
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invested heavily in Iraq’s oil, construction and military industries. As I showed in
Chapter II, the Soviet Union alone was the second most important trade partner to Iraq
before Gulf War of 1991. When the Soviet Union fell and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Byelorussia emerged as independent republics, they did not break trade relations with
Iraq. They were under such an economic crisis that they needed as many trade partners as
possible. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Byelorussia took over the trade relations and
contracts that the Soviet Union had with Iraq. For Iraq, it was a fortunate confluence of
historic circumstances. Iraq could not afford to lose one trade partner under the UN
sanctions. Certainly, it did not lose Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and other ex Soviet
republics. In this Dissertation, Chapters V and VI in particular, we will see that ex Soviet
republics continued to trade with Iraq until the final fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003.
All in all, regional economies make up the global economic system. They are the
base of the global economy and the strongest link to global trade. Both global and
regional trade is built on interconnected, interdependent transnational and corporate
relations. They aim at opening markets, tearing down trade barriers, and enacting fairer
trade policies at regional levels. Some scholars see regional trade as a desertion from
global trade. But for Krugman, global and regional trade can function in harmony. He
sees regional trade as “Improving in nature and likely to have a positive impact on the
global trade system” (Krugman and Obstfel, 2003, p .77). The question is, as Bhagwati
summarizes it, “Whether regional trade blocs are building blocks or stumbling blocks to
the global trade system” (Bhagwati, 1993, p. 42). For Iraq, regional trade under the UN
sanctions regime was a building block aimed at circumventing the UN sanctions regime
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and reaching global markets. For Iraq’s regional trade partners too, regional trade was a
building block to counterbalance the effects of UN sanctions on their economies.

The Politics of Bilateral Trade
The UN sanctions against Iraq had a malign and benign domino effect in the
Middle East. It had malign effects because Iraq’s neighboring economies suffered as
much as Iraq’s. It had benign effects because as Iraq’s economy improved, Iraq’s
neighboring economies resurged and the entire region enjoyed a relative economic boom.
The Iraqi economy became more interconnected to its neighbors through a series of trade
protocols which in turn led to more solid political interconnectness. The result was a new
political map for the Middle East in detriment to the UN sanctions regime, the UN, and
the U.S. and its allies.
Bilateral trade protocols are a means to more bilateral trade. Bilateral trade
protocols are biding contracts between two nations of common commercial interests. The
two nations agree to discuss and implement a set of common goals related to bilateral
trade (Bhagwati, Krishna & Panagariya, 1999, p. 64). The goal is to promote bilateral
trade by minimizing undesirable bilateral competition between each other while
maximizing comparative advantages. Each nation agrees to give each other some sort of
special treatment in terms of tariffs, export-imports quotas and discounts among other
benefits. For example, in the bilateral trade protocols that Iraq signed with Syria and
Egypt, Iraq agreed to increase crude oil supplies to Syria and Egypt only after those two
nations accepted a drastic decrease in taxes to agricultural and construction products that
Iraq purchased from them (CFIJ, p. 55). Iraq agreed to sign a bilateral trade protocol with
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Turkey only after Turkey agreed to meet one key Iraqi demand: lift the embargo on
jewelry and other high ticket items that the Iraqi regime needed, so it could reward its
most loyal servicemen (CFIJ, p. 55).
In general, bilateral trade protocols do not cover all economic sectors, goods and
services, which are limited to the rules and items of the protocols. Also, bilateral trade
protocols are limited by time, meaning that they are valid for one, two or three years,
after which the two parties can either renegotiate the terms of the Protocol or just opt out
of it. For instance, Iraq signed its first trade protocol with Jordan in 1983 (CFIJ, p. 57). It
was the largest trade protocol Iraq ever signed although it was limited to the trade of Iraqi
oil for Jordanian grains. It contained a clause to allow both parties to amend it, include
more goods and increase trade quotas (CFIJ, p. 57). The Protocol became inactive in
1991, but in 1992 Iraq and Jordan renegotiated it based on that Clause. By 2003, it
became a full Trade Agreement valid for 10 years and renegotiable every 2 years. The
Agreement accounted for 94 Jordanian goods and 27 Iraqi products, of which 21 were oil
derivatives (CFIJ, p. 57). The new Iraqi government has not ratified the Agreement.
Note that bilateral trade can have positive effects on political relations between
bilateral trading partners. Bilateral trade usually translates into political cooperation on
wider range of issues. For example, by 1998, the good trade relations between Iraq and
Jordan began to translate into good political relations. Relations improved so much that
Iraq invited Jordanian Prime Minister Ali Abdul Ragheb to visit Iraq, the first visit to Iraq
of any Arab Prime Minister since the enactment of the UN sanctions regime (CFIJ, p. 58;
Duelfer Report, p. 88).
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In November 2000, the Prime Minister landed in Bagdad. He carried a message
from the King of Jordan that read: “Jordan would no longer comply with UN Resolution
867” (CFIJ, p. 58). To confirm it, he publicly declared that “Jordan’s expansion of trade
with Iraq was the government’s prime objective” (CFIJ, p. 58), and for that purpose “A
Jordan-Iraqi company examines expanding land transport fleet, and that the General
Assemble of Iraqi-Jordanian land Transport Company would meet in Bagdad” (CFIJ, p.
58). In February 16, 2001, Iraq News Agency and the Jordan Times reported in
headlines: “King, Crown Prince meets with Iraqi transport minister.” Two weeks later,
Jordan expelled Lloyd’s Register, the company that UN had designated to monitor and
audit the enforcement of the UN sanctions against Iraq (CFIJ, p. 59). On the other hand,
to show that Jordan was still a moderate nation, King Abdullah travelled to Kuwait where
he made a conciliatory speech. The King also sent a note to Israel and Saudi Arabia, two
key Jordan trade partners but Iraqi rivals. He declared to the Jerusalem Post that “Iraqi
exports to Israel are not out of the question.” He was responding to rumors that “Israel
had made a tentative agreement to import oil from Iraq via Jordan (CFIJ, p. 59). In the
case of Saudi Arabia, he offered subsidized oil for Jordan. But oil was not a concern to
Jordan; after all, it was getting cheap oil from Iraq. Jordan’s real concern was its
agricultural and agro-industrial exports to Iraq, which accounted for near 34% of Jordan
GDP (CFIJ, p. 59).
The U.S. did not like what Jordan was doing, so it accused Jordan of violating the
UN sanction regime against Iraq and took over enforcement of the sanctions in Jordan
territories. The U.S. and UK began to patrol and inspect Jordan ports, prompting a
Jordanian official to declare that: “What we are experiencing is a blockade against a
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non-sanctioned nation” (CFIJ, p. 58). U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher
travelled to Amman on two occasions to demand “Effective enforcing of the sanctions,
only them the US would recall its patrols from Jordan ports” (CFIJ, p. 58). Yet, Jordan
resisted the pressure and joined the large group of nations that by the year 2000 were
openly opposing the UN sanctions against Iraq. High level Jordanian officials voiced
Jordan’s position, and some of them travelled to Bagdad to show public support for Iraq.

Global Trade with Iraq during the Sanctions Regime
Global trade is about trade as much as it is about politics. It is so because there are
many parties involved. Nations, corporations, states’ agencies, civic organizations and
individuals, they all have some interests vested in trade. So they all, one way or the other,
participate in trade politics. That is why trade politics is not monolithic but fragmented
according to trade interests. For its part, global trade is divided into regions, sub-regions,
blocs and sectors, resembling the world’s political map. If 20 years ago there were a first,
second, and third world, today there are developing and developed nations. If 20 years
ago there were a couple of trading blocs, namely nations allied to the U.S. and nations
allied to the former Soviet Union, today there is about a dozen of them. Trade blocs act
and interact under the umbrella of globalization. They are interconnected and
interdependent. Despite all the grouping and subgrouping, there is just one global
economic system, namely the capitalist system. It all undermines a sanctions regime,
even if it is multilateral, enforced by the UN with the support of the U.S., namely the
most powerful nation in the world.
Indeed, in chapter II, I explained how Iraq obtained about $75 billion from oil
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sales. Evidences suggest that those revenues allowed Iraq to: 1) access and engage in
trade relations in the global economy; 2) increase purchases in global markets; 3)
reactivate its economy; 4) increase its expenditures. Chart 3.1 shows Iraq’s budgetary and
expenditures under the UN sanctions regime.

Chart 3.1 – Budget and Expenditure
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Source: the Duelfer Report

The Chart is a representation of Iraq’s budget and expenditures from 1991 to
2003, the timeframe of the UN sanctions against Ira. The blue line represents Iraq’s
budget while the red represents Iraq’s expenditures. Notice that Iraq’s budget fell sharply
from 1991 to 1992, right after the Gulf War, and that it stagnated between 1993 and
1994. The GDP per capita fell from $2,304 to $495 dollars. The dramatic decline was due
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to two main factors: 1) UN sanctions were in fact effective; 2) Saddam Hussein was still
preparing a plan to evade the sanctions. But observe in the Chart how the budget began to
pick up by the end of 1994 and grew steadily until 2000 when the Iraqi economy slowed
down and its budget shrunk once again, losing nearly $4,000 million by 2003. It was in
1994 when Iraq finally adopted a plan to circumvent the UN sanctions regime.
In contrast, the red line shows that Iraq’s expenditures grew noticeably. Note that
the Iraqi budged stayed below the $10,000 million from 1991 to 1998, but Iraq spent
roughly $20,000 million during the fiscal year 1997-1998, twice its budget. This trend
continued until 2003 although the Iraqi budget began to shrink once again in 2000. This
relation between budget and expenditure suggests three points. First, Iraq was making
enough money as to afford sharp budgetary increases during the UN sanctions regime.
Second, Iraq showed no intention to slow down expenditures, living beyond its means for
most of the UN sanctions regime. Third, it shows the intensity of Iraq’s trade. During the
Gulf War, Iraq’s infrastructures were basically destroyed, its industries paralyzed, its
agriculture unproductive. Iraq needed to import all kind of goods and services, from food,
cloth and medicines to industrial parts, hardware and machineries. Iraq’s lucrative oil
sales allowed it to afford those purchases. But the question remained: How did Iraq
circumvent the sanctions? For Iraq, the answer was twofold. Iraq would focus on regional
markets as a means to reach global trade, and regional trade to engage in global trade.
Second, in order to ensure regional trade, Iraq sought trade agreements with its neighbors.
After all, Iraq knew its neighbors very well. It had been trading with them for centuries.
Evidences suggest that Iraq used geography as a comparative advantage. Iraq
utilized regional and bilateral trade to evade UN sanctions and reach global markets. Iraqi
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commerce rested on several bilateral trade protocols that Iraq signed with about 30
nations, including North Korea, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, China,
South Africa, Thailand, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Yet, the bulk of Iraqi trade fell on a dozen
nations in the Middle East, mainly on Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Egypt, and Lebanon. The
Chart below shows the main sources of income for Iraq under the UN sanctions regime.

Chart 3.2 – Main Sources of Income for Iraq under UN Sanctions Regime
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Sources: CFIP, the Duelfer Report

The Chart shows that trade agreements rounded 70% of all Iraqi revenues under
the UN sanctions regime. It was well ahead of bribes and kick-backs, which Iraq utilized,
along with the protocols, for political and economic purposes.
In terms of politics, Iraq first used trade agreements to gather support against the
UN sanctions. Iraq did an excellent job showing the world the wrongs that the sanctions
caused on Iraqi people. In the age of global media, pictures and videos of Iraqi children
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and women dying due to hunger and malnutrition circulated around the world, causing
great sympathy toward the Iraqi people. As years passed, support for the sanctions regime
eroded, and it became more difficult for UN and the U.S. to prevent nations from trading
with Iraq. Second, UN and American officials did not take into account advices from
economists like Bhagwati who argue that bilateral and regional trade constituted the
foundation of the global economy, so Iraq could well utilize bilateral and regional trade
to reach the global market. Third, the sanctions had a domino effect in the entire region.
For example, Jordan and Syria fell into a deep recession right after UN began to enforce
the sanctions because they could not export their agricultural products to Iraq, and Iraq
could not sell its oil and derivatives to them. Turkey lost a vital source of income:
charging the E.U. and Iraq for using Turkish transcontinental oil pipes to move Iraqi
crude oil from Northern Iraq to European markets. And Egypt and Lebanon had to buy
oil from Libya and Saudi Arabia at a higher price.
Lastly, Iraq used trade as means to political integration via trade integration with
the Middle East. The CFIJ quoted the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affair as saying that “The
free market agreements are steps on the road of Arab economic integration and unity.
This is Iraq’s principled stand. Unlike some of the industrialists, we do not view every
stage and every step that we take in this regard from the angle of loss on profit. This is a
huge strategic action. Any pan-Arab step has gains and may have losses although we do
not considerer them as losses from our principled and pan-Arab perspective” (CFIJ, p.
74). The CIA was well aware of the political implications of the protocols for the region.
In a Memo dated May 1998, the CIA stated: “Iraq stands to gain from these agreements
on several fronts. First, it gets the immediate political benefit of publicizing agreements
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that can demonstrate domestically and internationally the ongoing erosion of sanctions.
Second, the agreements enable Iraq to increase its presence in the Arab world, which has
ongoing trade negotiation both among Arab nations and with other key partners,
particularly under the EU-Mediterranean free trade pact. Iraq’s apparent objective here
would be to solidify its standing with regard to a future Arab Common Market. Third,
these agreements, once ratified, and so far, only the UAE and Tunisia have done so – will
guarantee Iraq preferential trading access as soon as sanctions are lifted” (Duelfer
Report, p. 264). The CIA got it right because, by 2003, 14 Muslim and Arab nations had
openly signed trade agreements with Iraq. Table 3.5 lists them.

Table 3.5 – Muslim and Arab Nations that Signed Trade Agreements with Iraq

Egypt

1997, 1999, 2001

Syria

1997, 1999, 2000

Tunisia

February-01

Yemen

August-01

Algeria

October-01

UAE

November-01

Sudan

March-01

Bharain

March-01

Oman

April-01

Lebanon

1999, 2001, 2002

Qatar

June-02

Jordan

1998, 1999, 2002

Saudi Arabia

1999, 2002

Morroco

June-01

Sources: CFIJ, the Duelfer Report
First, observe in the Table that Egypt and Syria signed protocols with Iraq as early
as 1997. In the case of Jordan, although it signed its first Protocol in 1998, it had been
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negotiating it since 1995. Second, note that some nations signed Agreements in several
years. The parties meet to renegotiate terms of contracts, expand lists of products or just
adapt trade relations to realities on the ground. This was chiefly true of Iraq, which varied
its business dealings according to the political demands of the U.S. and UN, not to
mention that Iraq kept testing American influence in the UN with respect to the sanctions
regime. Such was the case, just to mention one, of the Jordan-Iraqi Special Protocol to
allow Muslim pilgrims to visit Iraq’s most revered shrines. Jordan was to manage the
Protocol, but Iraq not only wanted to charge $2,000 per pilgrim, it also demanded that the
money be deposited at the Iraqi Central Bank (CFIJ, p. 57). The U.S. and UK opposed it.
France, Russia and China went for it. Then, Iraq asked for more. It asked to raise the
number of pilgrims from 10,000 to 30,000 per year. The CIA calculated that so many
pilgrims would bring to Iraq about $100 million dollars. So the U.S. fiercely lobbied
France, Russia and China, which this time voted against Iraq’s request (CFIJ, p. 57).
The most relevant here is that the Agreements became the most important source
of revenues for the Iraqi regime. The CIA stated that ‘The protocols allowed Saddam to
generate large amounts of revenues outside the purview of the UN” (Duelfer Report, p.
29). The Heritage Foundation found that “Iraq’s bilateral trade Protocols with
neighboring states provided Saddam with his largest source of illicit income during UN
sanctions. Jordan, Egypt and Turkey welcomed it but OPEC hated Saddam” (Heritage
Foundation, p. 15). And the IIC concluded that “Trade protocols earned Saddam over
$800 billions of revenues that he did not have to account for to UN. His trade partners
knew it all along” (IIC, Illicit Trade, p. 8). It led Mr. Volcker, Chairman of the IIC, to
declare to Congress, in frustration, that “It is particularly important to state for the
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records, Mr. Chairman, that this is more than six times as much as he was able to skim
off the Oil for-Food Program. This is massive trade, Mr. Chairman; tremendous amount
of trade to the gates of Europe, Asia and North America and we didn’t see it Mr.
Chairman, we didn’t” (Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality,
House of Representatives, 108th Congress).
Indeed, Iraq’s trade relations with its neighbors were the gates to global markets.
Yet, Mr. Volker failed to note some key facts. First, nations like Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, France and even the U.S. were at the other end of Saddam’s
scheme, for they all had some kind of trade agreements with Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and
Turkey. Therefore, purposely or not, they all engaged in trade with Iraq. Second, the U.S.
and UN actually endorsed and promoted some of those trade agreements to amend
“unexpected” side-effects of UN sanctions against Iraq. As I stated earlier, the Iraqi
economy was so interconnected to its neighbors that UN sanctions almost bankrupted the
economies of Jordan, Turkey, and the Kurdistan, which happened to be political allies of
the U.S. On the other hand, the sanctions were benefiting US enemies like Iran. I next
present four case studies to explain how Iraq utilized bilateral trade agreements with its
neighbors to evade the UN sanctions regime and reach the global market.

Case Studies
In this section we present four cases of trade agreements that were instrumental in
the circumvention of UN sanctions. They are: Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Turkey. We
selected those cases based on the following rationale. First, they all are Middle Eastern
nations, and three of them have borders with Iraq. This is very important because
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geographical proximity between trade partners seems to have helped Iraq tremendously
in reducing transportation costs, time and resources. Also, knowing the terrain was
crucial for smuggling, and we will see here that smuggling was a key means to evade UN
inspectors and US military patrols, not to mention that it was also one of the most
essential sources of revenue for Iraq. Second, the cases of Syria, Jordan and Turkey had
several secondary effects. They ended up benefiting third parties such as Lebanon, Iran,
Cyprus and the Kurds. The trade agreements between Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Turkey are,
indeed, illustrative of the multiplicative effects that bilateral trade can have on regional
and global trade. Lastly, the trade protocols were the most lucrative for Iraq. Chart 3.3
shows estimates of revenues through the protocols with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt.

Chart 3.3 - Iraq’s Trade Protocols
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Source: Duelfer Report, IIC, CFIJ, Michigan Project
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I obtained the data from four main sources. Although they did not coincide 100%
in their findings, the numbers were close enough. I added them up and determined an
average, so I can utilize just one measure to simplify the comparative analysis. I sorted
the cases according to revenues. In other words, I discuss first Syria because it had the
lowest revenues. And I end with Turkey for it had the highest revenues.

Syria
Syria-Iraqi trade was not as profitable as others. Yet, I discuss it here because it
brought Syria and Iraq together, two nations that had had serious political disagreements
since their foundations. Syria-Iraq trade also had key implications for Jordan and, mainly,
Lebanon, a nation within the sphere of influence of Syria.
Syria and Iraq always had good trade relations. They are natural markets. They
share borders, culture, language, religion, tribal and family relations, and even the same
food diet. As I stated in Chapter II, the entire territory once constituted just one people. It
was partitioned by the British first and later by the UN. In 1991, Syria dominated 21% of
the Iraqi market, but the trade was rather informal due to the shaky political relations the
two nations have had since their foundation (Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p.12).
Political tension escalated when Syria sided with Iran during the Iraq-Iran war and with
Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion of that nation. Syria thought that one day Saddam would
invade it. Still, in 1994, the two nations began to talk about ‘a new era’ and, particularly,
about ‘reviewing’ their trade relations. In 1995, they agreed to reopen an oil pipeline that
had been shot down in 1980 (CCFIJ, p. 41). In 1995 too, they established border posts to
allow commercial trucks to move freely between the two nations. The trucks belonged to
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Syrian and Iraqi smugglers hand-picked by their respective governments to do the
smuggling, and the so called border posts were in fact military patrols purposely created
to protect smugglers and their cargoes from UN inspectors (CFIJ, p.41). Then, in 1996,
Syria and Iraq created several free trade zones along the Syria-Iraq border. They were
opened not only for smugglers but also for Syrian and Iraqi merchants. According to the
CFIJ, “It all occurred so fast that Iraqi and Syrian merchants thought that it was one of
Saddam’s political moves to crack down on his political enemies” (CFIJ, p. 42).
Indeed, commerce picked up, and in 1997 the two nations began to announce a
series of trade protocols which the media from the two nations celebrated with fanfare
and headlines. For example, Iraq News Agency announced in July 10th, 1997 that “Iraq
and Syria sign joint cooperation minute”, and the Syria Live commented that “Syria and
Iraq sign transport agreement” (CFIJ, p. 39). But perhaps the most important agreement,
at least for Iraq, was the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed to reopen the oil
pipeline that had been closed in 1980. This time, the Syria Live headlined the event with
some exaggeration for it affirmed, on February 23, 1997, that “The new Syrian-Iraqi oil
pipeline will carry 1.4 million barrels per day” (CFIJ, p. 39). According to most experts
on the field, the pipeline could not handle such an amount of barrels per day, but work to
repair the pipeline still began almost immediately. By July 1998, Syria had repaired its
portion of the pipe although it was having technical issues with some pumping posts.
Syria called French engineers for help. The French not only repaired the pumps but also
redesigned a 12 mile expansion of pipe. Oil began to flow from Iraq to Syria in 2001.
Reopening of the pipeline was a great momentum for the trade relations between
the two nations. The British newspaper The Guardian highlighted its importance in
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March 26thst, 2001 by stating that “Syrian economic rehabilitating is in the pipeline”.
The Iraqi Press celebrated it by stating on July 20th that “Iraq’s trade with Syria booms
despite UN embargo”. The CFIJ noted that “The oil flow accelerated the thaw in
bilateral relations for it led to a series of important economic events” (CFIJ, p. 40).
Indeed, Syria repaired and re-inaugurated the Aleppo-Mosul rail-tracks in about nine
months. The reopening was crucial because, with train-tankers now moving oil to
Aleppo, Syria was able to reopen an electricity plant it had there. The plant consumed
nearly 30,000 barrels of Iraqi oil per day (CFIJ, p. 42). Iraq corresponded by repairing the
pipeline that ran from Kirkuk, Northern Iraq, to Bania, a port at the Syrian Mediterranean
coast. It motivated Syria to rapidly set aside $34 million to repair and expand the port of
Tartous. The Arabic News celebrated the announcement by reporting, on February 23,
2002, that “With the investment Iraq increases its imports through Syrian ports”, but the
Sunday Telegraphs editorialized on February 27th that “It was another Saddam’s set up of
smuggling to beat sanctions”.
Iraq opened another 4 border crossings, and Syria reciprocated by creating the
National Trucking Company, which converted its trucking industry into small private
fleets. It allocated $9 million to build posts and repair roads along the Syrian-Iraqi border
(CFIJ, p. 42). It also built new roads to connect seven free trade zones along their
common borders. The Iraqi regime sent 25 diplomats to its Embassy in Damascus, and
the Syrian government crated a new office at the Syrian Embassy in Bagdad. The office
had a status of trade attaché, and it had 17 employees who participated in trade meetings
with Iraqi delegates and companies (CFIJ, p. 42). Then, in 2000, Syria and Iraq
consolidated their trade protocols and signed a trade agreement. The Duelfer Report
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stated that “The protocol was augmented to the category of Free Trade Agreement”
(Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 13). The agreements stated that Syria was to
acquire oil at a discount. In return, Syria was to allow the use of its oil pipelines to ship
oil out of Iraq to Lebanese ports, from where it would ship it to Turkey and then Europe.
The Duelfer Report found that “From November 2000 until the fall of Saddam’s
Government, Iraq made an estimated —and these estimates differ— $2.8 billion by
smuggling oil through Syria. As much as 250,000 barrels per day flowed through Syria at
cut-rate prices, allowing the Syrians to refine the oil for domestic use and sell reserves of
their own oil on the world market” (Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 13). For its
part, GAO reported that “According to estimates from Iraq’s State Oil Marketing
Organization, known as SOMO, from June 2000 until July 2003, the Iraq-Syria Trade
Protocol generated approximately $3.4 billion from the sale of illicit Iraqi crude oil and
Iraqi petroleum products” (GAO Report, p. 61).
Also, the Duelfer Report stated that “Syria acted as Iraq’s banker, and some of its
highest officials brokered military deals for Iraq and profited from these military deals”
(Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 9). American investigators from the Treasury
Department detected some Iraqi accounts at Commercial Bank of Syria where “about
$850 million had been left behind by the Iraqi regime. The Syrian Government, without
authentication or authorization from SOMO, had deposited an estimated $580 million to
pay out outstanding claims by Syrian and Iraqi companies, leaving $266 million as Iraqi
assets in the Commercial Bank in Syria” (Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 14).
Iraq consistently used the Syria-Iraqi Protocol to collect and make payments. Documents
found at Iraq’s ministry of trade revealed that Infobank, a Belarusian Bank, transferred
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$114 million to an Iraqi bank account in Syria, from where it was transferred to Bagdad.
The documents revealed a stream of payments from different sources, including Russian,
French, and Chinese firms (Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 14). In all, “Syria was
Iraq’s second largest market for smuggled oil, and the Syrian Protocol was Iraq’s
primary illicit income source from 2000 to 2003 when US and its allies invaded Iraq”
(Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 5). The Protocol included contracts for Syrian
companies to buy goods on Iraq’s behalf. Syria also became Iraq’s main route for illegal
trade with Iraq from 1999 to 2003. Just from October 2000 to April 2001, Syria
transported $2 billion worth of goods into Iraq, most of which was purchased in Bulgaria,
Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Goods included machineries and spare parts for transportation
and electrical grids (Duelfer Report, Finance and Procurement, p. 102). Chart 3.4 shows
the distribution of goods imported into Iraq under the Syrian-Iraqi Protocol.

Chart 3.4 - Iraq-Syria Trade Protocol
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Chart 3.4 reveals the overall scope of the Syrian-Iraqi trade protocol. For instance,
it shows that industry ranked second in trade volumes even though Syria and Iraq are not
industrial nations. But above all, it calls to my attention that defense trade reached $1,500
million dollars, and that miscellaneous accounted for almost $1,700 million. Note that the
Iraqi regime usually tallied military hardware as miscellaneous charged it to a NGO.
Therefore, here defense and miscellaneous mean the same thing: military hardware. But
Graph 3.4 does not say it all. For example, it does not reveal the multiplicative effects
trade had over Jordan and Lebanon.

Lebanon
I study the case of Lebanon as part of the Syria-Iraq trade agreements because, as
I stated earlier, this case illustrates how interdependent Syria and Lebanon are and how
such interdependency affected the effectiveness of the UN sanction regime against Iraq.
Syria has for many years shown great geopolitical interests in Lebanon. Lebanon
does not have oil in abundance. It depends on oil imports from Libya and Northern Iraq
via Turkey. Lebanon consumes about 50,000 barrels of oil per day, and it imports close to
$1 billion worth of oil and its derivatives every year (CFIJ, p. 53). For its part, Syria has
for long tried to control the flow of oil into Lebanon for political reasons and because it
would add a billion dollars annually to its budget. Then, there is Iraq, which needed to
export as much oil as it could, and to do so it had to circumvent UN inspectors. The Iraqi
regime had at that point two standing routes. It had the Turkish-Kurd route and Iranian
territorial waters, which I will discuss shortly. Nonetheless, the Iraqi regime reasoned that
having a third route would increase its oil exports without saturating the other two routes.
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A Syria-Lebanon pipeline would do it. It was a good route to Europe too. Therefore, Iraq,
Syria and Lebanon struck a deal to repair a pipeline that ran from Iraq to Syria and then
to Lebanon. They agreed to do it within the marks of the Syria-Trade trade agreement.
They also brought in Libya to: a) provide technical support; b) provide infrastructure; c)
provide ship-tankers under Cypriots flag from Lebanon to North Africa and Southern
Europe (CFIJ, p. 53). As for Lebanon, the deal brought million of dollars not only for
using its territory for the pipeline but also all the commerce that Iraq smuggled back from
Europe and northern Africa. The following table shows the volume of trade between Iraq,
Syria and Lebanon from 1999 to 2002.

Table 3.6 – Trade Volume between Iraq, Syria and Lebanon from 1992 to 2002

1999

2000

2001

2002

Iraq

$110 millions

$113 millions

$119 millions

$125 millions

Syria

$165 millions

$172 millions

$121 millions

$129 millions

$88 millions

$91 millions

$97 millions

Lebanon $121 millions

Sources: The Duelfer Report, the CFIJ

Table 3.6 shows that trade between the three nations was voluminous. But the
main point here is how trade and political relations between two nations can affect other
nations within the same region. In this case, trade between Iraq and Syria benefitted
Lebanon. Yet, trade between Iraq and Syria affected American politics toward Iraq, Syria
and Lebanon. First, Iraq was capable of linking its economy to a market it did not have
before: Syria. It translated into low costs, more commerce, and more revenues. Second,
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economic gains eventually translated into political gains. Iraq hoped that, as Syria’s
economic gains increased, Syria would become active against the sanctions regime.
Moreover, the two economies would be so linked that Syria would have no choice but to
violate the UN sanctions. Third, Iraq also expected that other neighboring nations would
ultimately imitate Syria. In particular, the Syrian-Iraqi deal pushed Jordan to compete
with Syria for Iraqi trade. Iraq hoped that such competition would force Jordan to relax
its stand on smuggling.
It actually occurred. I explained earlier that, by the year 2000, Jordan’s King was
traveling to Bagdad and that Jordan was openly breaking with the UN sanctions regime.

Jordan
Like the Syrian-Iraqi case, Jordanian-Iraqi trade has for long been based on tribal
and family relations. Jordan usually exported agricultural products and foodstuffs to Iraq,
controlling 45% of the Iraqi food market. In 1991, Iraq imported 70% of the food it
consumed from Jordan. In exchange, Iraq exported oil to Jordan, meeting Jordan oil
needs. Jordan depends on Iraq for about 85% of its oil consumption. To facilitate their
trade, Jordan and Iraq never taxed their trade zones along their borders.
The UN sanctions regime disrupted the trade between the two nations. It affected
Jordan so much that Jordan protested numerous times before the UN Security Council.
Jordan based its claims on Article 50 of the UN Charter (CFIJ, p. 35). This Article states
that a nation-state whose economy is affected by economic sanctions that the Security
Council imposes on another nation “Shall have the right to consult the Security Council
with regard to a solution of those problems” (CFIJ, p. 35). Jordan argued that the UN
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sanctions regime led to “Extreme economic hardships, including a direct financial loss of
approximately $1.5 billion dollars per year and even the total collapse of the Jordan
economy” (CFIJ, p. 35). Jordan took its case to the 661 Committee. There it stated that
“Finding a continuous and secure source of oil was almost impossible since Iraq was a
regional supplier and Jordan’s cheapest trade partner” (CFIJ, p. 35). Then, Jordan
approached UN Security Council. It proposed that Iraq funded oil deliveries not with cash
or credit but with the money Iraq owed to Jordan. Jordan promised to submit a monthly
report that would account for quantities, value, schedules of deliveries and their costs.
The 661 Committee and the U.S. accepted it. The 661 Committee allowed Jordan
to sign a first bilateral trade agreement with Iraq based on oil-for-debt-reduction. Jordan
would get oil from Iraq in exchange for a reduction of Iraq’s debt with Jordan. Once the
debt was paid off, Jordan would exchange oil for foodstuffs. In addition, the U.S. granted
to Jordan $2.4 billion dollars in economic aid, the most favored nation status, and it even
signed a bilateral trade protocol with Jordan (CFIJ, p. 36). Jordan utilized those benefits
to trade with Iraq. With the American loans, Jordan purchased American products that it
could then resell to Iraq. The U.S. knew about it but decided to ignore it for geopolitical
reasons. Let us not forget that Jordan is a moderate nation in a volatile region, and it is
one of the few allies the U.S. has in the Middle East. As Meyer and Califano state it:
“Successive U.S. administrations acknowledged that U.S. - Jordan trade undermined the
sanctions but cited its cooperation in other foreign policy objectives and annually
invoked the national interest exception in Jordan’s favor” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p.
117).

118

The new trade eventually led to a new trade agreement, which the two nations
signed in late 1992 and renegotiated in 1996 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p. 144; CFIJ, p. 37). In reality, it did not alter the nature of their trade
relations that much. Like always, Iraq exported oil and its derivatives to Jordan in
exchange for foodstuffs and access to Jordan’s oil pipelines. However, there was a new
component to it: Iraq pumped oil to Jordan, which Jordan then channeled to Lebanon and
Egypt. Lebanon and Egypt shipped the oil to the Balkans, Italy, Spain, France and other
nations in the Mediterranean basin. It was during this period that the UN sanctions
regime had its strongest effects on the Iraqi economy, so this oil sells through Jordan
constituted a huge break for Iraq. The Duelfer Report stated that “Jordan ensured the
Iraqi regime’s financial survival until the UN OFF program began in December 1996”
(Dulfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 143). The Report also stated that
“Iraq’s earnings amounted to about $400 million annually from 1992 through 1995. This
estimate includes trade under US-Jordan Protocol averaging about $200 million
annually and Iraq’s debt to Jordan increasing by $1 billion, which accounts for
additional Iraqi imports averaging another $200 million a year” (Dulfer Report, Regime
Finance and Procurement, p. 144.)
Iraq also smuggled about $2.4 billion worth oil into Jordan during the same
period. The IIC detailed the operation as follow: “Iraq trucked both crude oil and oil
products—fuel oil, gas oil, LPG, base oil and gasoline—to Jordan under the agreement,
according to SOMO records. Then Jordan trucked and piped the crude to ports in the
Mediterranean. Lebanon and Egypt led the trade; Italy, Spain, Cyprus and the Balkans
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were their customers” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 148). Chart
3.5 summarizes Iraq-Jordan exports under the Protocol.

Chart 3.5 – Iraq-Jordan Trade Protocol
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Sources: Duelfer Report, CFIJ, ICC, Michigan Project

We can see in the Chart that trade between Iraq and Jordan covered multiple
industries, even immigration, which is understandable since they are neighbors of
common tribal and religions heritage. We can also see that their trade was a multimillion
dollar operation. Ironically, Jordan exported to Iraq about $2,300 million in food, which
was much more of what Jordan could actually produce, considering its agricultural
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capabilities. By 1995, the volume increased by $300 million annually, and Jordan’s
agriculture produces only about $200 million per year. Also, note that defense scored
high levels of trade as well. Of course, it does not mean that Jordan manufactured arms
for Iraq because Jordan does not have an arm industry. Rather, it means that Jordanian
intermediaries and Iraqi firms based in Jordan purchased components and spare parts for
the Iraqi military industry, as I will explain more in Chapter VII. For now, observe that
most of the Jordan-Iraqi trade was done by trucking. That explains the large amount of
revenues in term of transportation. It is another evidence of the importance that the
trucking industry had for commerce under the UN sanctions regime.
For its part, Iraqi oil deliveries were so voluminous that Iraq almost saturated the
Jordanian market. As result, in 1997, Jordan and Iraq began to talk about renegotiating
the trade agreement. They signed a final draft in 1998, and they amended it in November
1999 and December 2001 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 146;
CFIJ, p. 37). They agreed to meet yearly to discuss trade volumes, prices, types of
products, delivery schedules and other trade issues. According to Iraqi officials, the
negotiations were rough and lasted long hours. Saddam questioned every aspect of the
agreement and always demanded more. Jordan limited itself to accept Iraqi conditions for
it needed Iraqi oil. For example, Jordan had to accept an increase in oil delivery from
65,000 barrels per day to 110,000 when Jordan only needed about 50,000 for its
economy. About 300 trucks full of Iraqi oil per day entered Jordan (Duelfer Report,
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 146; CFIJ, p. 37). The Overland Transport
Company managed the operation. Both Jordan and Iraq owned the company in a jointventure since 1980. Yet, Iraq managed to force Jordan to pay between $50 and $80
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million per year for transportation (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p.
148; CFIJ, p. 37). But perhaps the most important accord was the building of an oil
pipeline from Iraq to Jordan and then to Lebanon. Work on the pipeline began in 2001,
with a planned capacity for 350,000 barrels of oil per day, part of which was to be
redirected to Palestine and Israel. In the end, construction was put on hold due to the USled invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 146;
CFIJ, p. 37). Table 3.7 below shows trade volumes from 1995 to 2002.

Table 3.7 – Trade Volume between Iraq and Jordan

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Protocol in bpd

82000

84000

90000

96000

96000

96000

100000

110000

Actual bpd

83000

88000

87000

94000

91000

94000

125000

135000

Imports in USD millons

$ 220.00 $ 220.00 $ 255.00 $ 200.00 $ 300.00 $ 450.00 $ 260.00 $ 310.00

Iraq in USD millons

$ 317.00 $ 185.00 $ 249.00 $ 199.00 $ 162.00 $ 190.00 $ 430.00 $ 424.00

Jordan in USD millions

$ 442.00 $ 502.00 $ 510.00 $ 330.00 $ 414.00 $ 677.00 $ 734.00 $ 646.00

Sources: Duelfer Report, CFIJ

This trade protocol was exuberant, excellent for Iraq, but it had two undesirable
consequences for Jordan. First, Iraq was saturating Jordan oil market, and Jordan did not
have storage capacity for so much oil. Second, Iraq was literally forcing Jordan to sell the
surplus in the black market, something that Jordan wanted to avoid, so it could keep in
good standing its political relations with the UN and the U.S. Nevertheless, some
evidence shows that Jordan did sell oil in the black market. For example, the CFIJ found
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that “Jordan sold the excess at a discount, believed to be $5-6 below market price. The
value of which has ranged from $200 million in the early 1990s to $450 million in 2001”
(CFIJ, p. 38). But according to the Arab Oil and Gas Directory, “Jordan works hard to
accommodate the money from oil surplus. Jordan deposits payment for the cut-rate oil
into an Iraqi –controlled account at the Central Bank of Jordan. Iraq can use these funds
to purchase Jordanian goods. It practice, these funds could be used to purchase anything,
including items imported into Jordan that are otherwise banned by UN sanctions” (CFIJ,
p. 38).
It is revealing the way Jordan and Iraq worked together to laundry the money that
Jordan made though illicit oil sells. For instance, in reality Iraq never received any money
from Jordan. I stated earlier that Iraq had a commercial attaché in its embassy in Jordan.
This attaché would show up at a branch of the Central Bank of Jordan and hand in an
invoice stamped by the Iraqi government. The Bank would then transfer the value of the
invoice to the company or nation that purchased the goods on behalf of Iraq. The issue
was that nations like Russia, Egypt and Jordan itself purchased goods on Iraq’s behalf in
the global market. The CFIJ explains that “The modus operandi is far from new: using
the Central Bank of Jordan to provide funds, ostensibly to subsidize Jordanian-produced
goods, but in fact to help powerful Jordanian firms move foreign goods to Iraq, was a
technique employed by Bagdad to evade UN sanctions and obtain access to foreign
commerce” (CFIJ p. 35).
The Iraq-Jordan trade protocol was profitable for both nations. The Jordan Times
made the math and reported in November 1st, 2000 that “The $600 million per year oil
Protocol with Iraq weights in the Kingdom’s economic balance sheet”. For Iraq, the
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Protocol represented about 2,000 million per year, but above it helped to the survival of
the Iraqi regime.

Egypt
Iraq signed a trade protocol with Egypt. The CIA acknowledged that “We do not
have access to documents outlining this agreement,” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance
and Procurement, p. 162) for which little is known about the Protocol. Most of what is
known was obtained after the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and it is not
abundant. Nonetheless, I found that the protocol lasted about five years, from 1998 to
2003, and that Egypt was among a handful of nations that kept illegally trading with Iraq
after September 11 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 168).
That is, as the U.S. began to make plans to invade Iraq, Iraq lost most of its
customers and its oil sales fell dramatically. But Egypt seized the opportunity, stayed in
and profited handsomely from Iraq’s few customers, very low oil prices, and high oil
supplies. I also found that the Egyptian-Iraqi protocol “Was 60-percent credit and 40percent cash. The credit account was under SOMO’s name at the National Bank of Egypt
and the cash proceeds were deposited in the Ahli Bank (Jordan National Bank) in
Jordan” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 163). It involved the Iraqi
Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), an Iraqi front company with subsidiaries in
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Egypt itself.
I also found that Iraq trucked its oil and delivered it to Aqaba, Jordan, then
shipped it to Yemeni ports, and then to Egypt. The final destination was East Asia, in
particular Taiwan and China. The smuggling included crude oil and its derivatives. Iraq
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charged $7 dollars per barrel to Egypt, half less than the price of crude oil in the global
market and much less than what UN allowed Iraq to charge, which was between $16 and
$20 dollars per barrel (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). The
CIA estimated that oil sales under the Protocol amounted to $21 billion dollars in three
years (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). In exchange, Egypt
provided Iraq with steel, copper, aluminum, chemicals and electrical wiring. All those
materials were strictly prohibited by the UN sanctions regime since they could be used
for military purposes. Egypt also sold Iraq acid nitric. This chemical was specifically
prohibited by the UN sanctions regime because it is widely used in the making of WMDs
although it is a basic component for pesticides as well, useful in the agriculture in the
Middle East.
In total, Egypt shipped back to Iraq about $150 million dollars annually from
1993 to 1997 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). During the first
half of 1999, Egyptian exports to Iraq increased by $570 million dollars, a 50% higher
than in 1998 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). In 2000, just
one Egyptian company, Ginza, exported $300 million dollars to Iraq (Duelfer Report,
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 167). It motivated the Egyptian Prime Minister to
declare to AFP that “Egypt’s exports to Iraq will reach three billion dollars by the end of
2002” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 168). Whether the Egyptian
Prime Minister was exaggerating of not, the number gives us a rough idea of the volume
of trade between Egypt and Iraq at the time. I would have expected that the sanctions
regime should have brought that number down to much lower levels.
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Chart 3.6 – Iraq-Egypt Trade Protocol
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Source: the Duelfer Report

As a whole, the trade agreement provided Iraq with about $8 billion dollars over
10 years. Additionally, it provided about $75 million in fees, $28 million from kickbacks,
$990 million from oil “cash sales” or smuggling; and $230 million from other surcharge
impositions (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). Still, the most
significant finding here is that Chart 3.6 omits revenues for transportation, unlike in the
cases of Syria Jordan and Turkey and Iran. Of course, it means that there were no
transportation revenues in the case of Egypt, but it also means that trade between Egypt
and Iraq was so expensive that revenues were not significant. It explains why the overall
trade between Iraq and Egypt was less voluminous than with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and
Iran. Iraq does not have border with Egypt. It does with Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran.
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This is exactly what I would expect to find based on Krugman’s trade theory as applied to
circumvention of the UN sanctions against Iraq.
The Iraqi-Egypt Protocol was not the most profitable for Iraq. It was not the most
significant for the UN sanctions regime. Surely, it is not the most important for this
dissertation. The most relevant case study is the Iraqi-Turkey trade agreement. We will
next see why.

Turkey
The Turkey-Iraq trade protocol was vital for Iraq’s survival because, as the
Duelfer Report put it, “Turkey provided Iraq with significant revenue streams that
permitted the Iraqi Regime to fund its illicit procurement activities” (Duelfer Report,
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 163). But the Turkey-Iraq trade protocol was the
most interesting of all Iraqi protocols for one main reason: its multiplicative effect
benefitted not only Turkey and Iraq but also Kurdistan, Cyprus, and even Iran. I will
study those nations separately for they have unique features and political impact.
The first free trade zone opened for business in 1994, and it was an immediate
success for Turkey, Kurdistan, and Iraq since legal trade amounted to $1 billion dollars in
the first 2 years (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). The trade
resembled what it had been for decades. Iraq sold crude oil to Turkish companies which
then refined it and shipped a portion, in the form of diesel oil, to Europe and another
portion back to Iraq and Iran (CFIJ, p. 27). Kurds from both sides of the border
transported crude and diesel oil by truck (CFIJ, p. 27). Turkish small companies brought
all sorts of goods from Europe, from clothing and food to industrial machinery, trucks,
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cars and spare parts (CFIJ, p. 28). They sold them throughout the Middle East. Since they
crossed Iraqi territories, Iraq taxed their cargoes and even purchased portions for itself
and for resale. Turk and Iraqi Kurds did not mind paying taxes to the Iraqis (CFIJ, p. 27).
Trade was still good enough. Besides, they had no more opportunities for they were being
discriminated against and deprived of almost all rights under the Saddam’s regime.
Trade was booming. Turkish, Kurds and Iraqi intermediaries were smuggling
about 70,000 barrels of oil per day. TUPRAS, the largest Turkish refinery, had so much
oil to refine that it outsourced some to its clients (CFIJ, p. 28). TUPRAS was the second
largest recipient of illegal Iraqi oil from 1992 to 1997, a period of intense contraband in
the zone. In fact, trade was so booming and contraband was so rampant that by 1996
Turkey proposed a trade protocol to the Iraqi government (CFIJ, p. 28). They decided to
cooperate because they both were losing money to contraband. UN sponsored the
Protocol, and the U.S. served as an observer (CFIJ, p. 28).
According to the Protocol, Iraq was to reserve 21% of its market for Turkey’s
exports. In return, Iraq was to sell crude oil to just 4 Turkish private companies. They
were: OZ Ortadobgu, Ram Dis, Tekfen and the state-owned company Turkish Petroleum
International Company (TPIC). TUPRAS was to refine the crude and convert it into
diesel. The Protocol also authorized “Turkey to pay roughly $6 less than the authorized
price for crude under the UN OFF Program; the low price served as an incentive for
Turkey to participate in the scheme as a guarantor of the UN sanctions regime against
Iraq” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 162). In addition, the deal
stipulated that Iraq could increase oil sales in 3 million barrels per day to Turkish
Petroleum International Company, a subsidiary of the state-owned Turkish National Oil
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Company (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 163). It is worth noting
that TPIC was also a subsidiary of Erdem, which traded oil on behalf of Mobil Corp, a
parent company of Exxon-Mobil (CFIJ, p. 28). Both Mobil Corp and Exxon-Mobil are
American companies. In Chapter V, I will explain how corporations utilized corporate
models such as subsidiaries and parent companies to evade UN sanctions against Iraq.
For now, let me state that the CIA and the CFIJ showed ample evidence of how the TPIC,
Mobil Corp and Exxon-Mobil lobbied for Turkey-Iraq trade protocol (CFIJ, p. 28). It is
yet another case of how private firms influenced bilateral and regional trade agreements.
Suddenly “an army” of intermediaries emerged in Turkey. They rushed to
Turkish-Iraqi border to grab a piece of the Iraqi market. They purchased cloths,
foodstuffs, medicines, furniture, school and medical supplies, and spare parts for
construction and the oil industry in European markets to sell them in Iraq. The CIA cited
some captured documents to reveal that “Turkish intermediaries exported to Iraq 10,000
generators, Mitsubishi pickup trucks, cranes and assorted construction materials”
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 106). The CFIJ argued that
“Turkish merchants played a leading role in reactivating agriculture in Kurdish lands by
selling tractors, equipments, seeds and pesticides to Kurdish farmers” (CFIJ, p. 31).
Indeed, Turks purchased most of the Kurd’s harvest at preferential price, which they then
resold in European markets. In Chapter VII, I will explain how some of those
intermediaries even sold military equipment and hardware to Iraq. At the request of Iraq,
Turkish intermediaries purchased equipment in Europe and utensils to be used in research
projects that the Iraqi government sponsored. Some projects had civilian ends, but some
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had both civilian and military use as they dealt with biochemical research. This evidence
led the CIA and UN investigators to believe that Iraq was working on a WMD program.
Still, I would argue that the Turkish-Iraqi trade agreement was a political solution
to a problem that the UN sanctions created along the Turkish-Iraqi border. For the CFIJ,
“Trade agreement between Turkey and Iraq is a political deal. Although shortsighted, it
will curb unexpected effects of UN sanctions in this strategic region. The arrangement
involves first direct contacts between the Turkish and Iraqi governments, and second the
KDP and Turkish Kurds acting as middlemen between Iraqi ‘private sellers’ and Turkish
entrepreneurs. Turkey is going after the PKK and Saddam won’t interfere” (CFIJ, p. 31).
Two factions de facto occupied the Iraqi-Turkish border. On one hand, there
were the Iraqi-Kurds and their militia known as Peshmerga. With the support of the US,
they established a stronghold on the Iraqi side of the Iraqi-Turkish border. On the other
hand, there were the Turkish-Kurds and their KDP. They too had a stronghold along the
Iraqi-Turkish border, but on the Turkish side. Both the Iraqi and Turkish-Kurds noted the
business opportunities that the UN sanctions regime against Iraq had created for them.
The sanctions automatically created a black market along the border. On top of it,
coalition forces had bombed the pipelines that transported Iraqi oil from Iraq to Turkey
(CFIJ, p. 32). It meant that transporting oil, and all cargoes, had to be by truck and
truckers had to cross Kurdish lines. The Kurds realized that they could control trade in
the zone, and they did so. They first imposed a sort of “tax” to pay for security in the
zone. But soon they began to serve as intermediaries between Iraqis and Turks. They
arranged contracts, financed operations, transported the cargo, collected fees, and even
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policed the region. The CFIJ stated that “The Kurds came to develop a modus Vivendi out
of the UN sanctions regime” (CFIJ, p. 28).
For the KDP, it was a means to survival as an Iraqi minority under Saddam’s
regime. Iraqi-Kurds even set a mission for themselves by claiming that they were the
intermediaries between Iraqis and Turks. As early as 1993, the KDP’s representative in
Ankara publicly stated that “The diesel trade is tying the economy of the KDP’s territory
close to that of Turkey. Almost all the goods that Kurdish businessmen purchase with
their profits from the diesel trade come from Turkey. And Turkish entrepreneurs are
beginning to take an interest in the KDP’s market; so far, that has spawned several joint
ventures in hotels and the opening of the first private supermarket in Dahuk” (CFIJ, p.
29). The KDP created a corporation named Asia to manage trade along the Iraqi-Turkish
border on Turkish side. The Financial Officer of Asia was Massoud Barzani, the leader of
the KDP. According to the CFIJ, the KDP was making $1 million daily just for taxing oil
that was crossing its territory from Iraq (CFIJ, p.28). As one official from the State
Department noted, “The Kurds are getting a lot of money through the oil trade, and we
like the Kurds. Two American presidents appear to have calculated that Baghdad’s
profits from the Turkish oil trade were a tolerable cost for the above mentioned benefits
to other participants in that trade. The argument put forward has been that, as long as
the Turks took care to inspect and interdict materials that would support Saddam’s
development of weapons of mass destruction, US policy was being implemented” (CFIJ,
p. 29).
Turkey had no problem with that either. They actually wanted the Kurds to
prosper, hoping that they would not turn against the Turkish government and engage in
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guerrilla warfare. A Turk-Kurd legislator, arguing in the Turkish parliament in favor of
illicit trade, affirmed that “If people were not offered employment, they would have no
alternative but to take their guns and go to the mountains” (CFIJ, p. 30) And Prime
Minister Bulent Ecevit argued that he would “Increase, not curtail the illicit trade with
Iraq” (CFIJ, p. 28). Two months later, he declared that the Turkish government intended
to increase imports of crude oil to 80,000 barrels per day. The CFIJ suggested that “The
United States and the UN Sanctions Committee have allowed trade to flourish with only
nominal protestations. With the northern no-fly zone patrolled from Turkish airbases, the
US and UN are not eager to press the Turkish authorities to shut down the smuggling.
Moreover, Western governments see some advantage in allowing the trade to go on to
benefit the Turks and Kurds” (CFIJ, p. 28).
There was a problem, though. By 1996, the Turkey began to suspect that the
Kurds were channeling money to the PKK, the military arm of the Turkish-Kurds
separatists that the Turkish government classified as terrorists. In 1997, Turkish oil
traders handed a Report to the Turkish National Security Council with evidences of how
the Kurds transferred money to the PKK. In the same year, the Turkey took over a
contract that a suspected PKK-linked company had won in an open bid (CFIJ, p. 28).
Turkey complained to the U.S. and UN, and the U.S. allowed Turkey to take control over
trade along its border with Iraq. In 1998, Turkey passed several laws to regulate trade in
its border with Iraq. The Turkish government defended the regulations in an editorial that
it published in the Turkish Daily News, March 7, 1998. The editorial informed that “The
government tightened border trade regulations to avoid tax losses” (CFIJ, p. 30).
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The new regulations centralized the oil trade with Iraq. The CFIJ argued that the
measure “Effectively legalized the sanctions-busting trade in diesel with Iraq” (CFIJ, p.
30). It created a Turkish Petroleum International Corporation, a subsidiary of Turk Petrol,
a corporation that the Turkish government owned, and as I will argue in Chapter VI,
governments and corporations utilized corporate models like subsidiaries as means to
circumvent the UN sanctions regime. Still, Turkish Petroleum created an oil deposit near
the Turkish-Iraqi border where all crude and diesel traders had to dump their cargoes for
auditing (CFIJ, p. 31). Trucks and truckers had to obtain a special license for a fee. They
had to sell their loads to just 15 Turkish companies, previously designated by the Turkish
government. In reality, those 15 companies were part of SILOPI A.S, an auditing firm
that the Turkish government had created to manage trade with Iraq under the UN
sanctions regime. The new system began to operate in 1998 (CFIJ, p.31).
The printed media reported the events as they developed. For example, the
Turkish Daily News reported in July 28, 1998 that “Silopi A.S. established for Habur
diesel trade”. The Los Angeles Times reported in August 4, 1998 headlines: “Turkey
Shrugs off UN blockade of Iraq commerce as it lets truck drivers openly import, sell
diesel from Kurdish-controlled areas”. For its part, Reuters revealed in September 3,
1998, that “Turk takes control of illicit Iraqi diesel”. The New York Times denounced in
March 30, that “At Iraq’s backdoor, Turkey Flouts UN sanctions”. The CFIJ concluded
that “The involvement of the Turkish government has also further politicized the diesel
trade: as the Turkish government now has a direct financial stake in each transaction,
the Iraqi government enjoys new leverage” (CFIJ, p. 33). Ironically Iraq, an embargoed
nation, donated 500,000 barrels of oil to Turkey (CFIJ, p. 33). It did not mind that Iraqi
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people were starved. Saddam wanted to show “solidarity” to the Turks in light of the
earthquake that had hit Turkey two weeks earlier.
Turkey profited handsomely from the trade as it made $74 million dollars during
the first three months of the new Plan, just in taxes. It made $324 million in the first year
(CFIJ, p. 33). By then, bottlenecks had been forming along the Turkish-Iraqi border. Such
a massive traffic could not go unnoticed. The UN calculated that, at some point, TurkishIraqi trade employed about 45,000 Turkish truckers, mechanics, retailers and other
personnel along the Habur-Kirkuk route. This trend continued until right before the
American led invasion of 2003 (CFIJ, p. 33).
The Kurds benefited as well from the Iraqi-Turkish trade. The CFIJ summed it up
in this way: “For the Kurds, the Iraq-Turkey oil trade is a mixed blessing. The wholesale
and retail trade in Iraqi Kurdistan of Turkish and European goods has flourished due to
this arrangement, and estimates of revenues run as high as $3 million a day; the trade in
oil, diesel and other commodities is the most significant source of funds for the
embargoed areas, amounting to $11 million per day” (CFIJ, p. 33). Table 3.8 below
shows Kurds’ profits for moving oil out of Iraq and diesel back to Iraq and Iran.

Table 3.8 – Kurds’ Profits for Moving Oil and Diesel
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Diesel

$ 27 $ 98 $ 121 $ 553 $ 830 $ 1,078 $ 2,005 $ 1,648 $ 1,170 $ 598

Crude

$ 112 $ 117 $ 237 $ 648 $ 897 $ 1,210 $ 2,115 $ 1,781 $ 980 $ 321

Diesel-Crude $ 63 $ 67 $ 214 $ 596 $ 553 $ 830 $ 2,005 $ 2,126 $ 1,151 $ 1,006
Total

$ 202 $ 282 $ 572 $ 1,797 $ 2,280 $ 3,118 $ 6,125 $ 5,555 $ 3,301 $ 1,925

Sources: The Duelfer Report, IIC, CFIJ
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The numbers explain three main points. First, they explain the intensity of Iraq’s
crude oil sales under the sanctions regime. The trade was so intense that UN inspectors
estimated that, at some point, 5000 Kurd truckers were engaging in illegal oil trade along
the Turkish-Iraqi border. The data account just for Iraq’s sales to the Kurds. It does not
include sales to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Turkey. Second, the numbers also
explain Iraq’s consumption levels of diesel-crude. Iraq utilizes most of its oil to produce
oil derivatives. Third, Iraq profited too. For example, note in Table 3.8 that most of the
crude oil the Kurds moved out of Iraq came back to Iraq in the form of diesel. A portion
of it was for Iraq’s consumption, and another portion went to Iran. Eventually, Iraq found
in diesel a steady source of income. The CIA, the Michigan Project, the IIC and other
sources agreed that the portion of diesel meant for Iraq decreased over the years as Iraq
repaired some of its refineries. Conversely, the portion that Iraq shipped to Iran increased
steadily to satisfy Iran’s demand for subsidized diesel.
Iraq also gained access to foreign goods that Turkish-Kurds brought with them
when they came to dump the diesel and collect crude oil. Turkish-Kurds left a lot of
money in Iraq for goods they purchased and services they consumed in Iraqi territories.
The CFIJ cited CIA’s findings to explain the nature of the Turkey-Iraqi trade. It noted
that “The busting traffic is two-way, with truckers and traders bringing in many types of
consumer goods for sale. The truckers often spend up to a week in Iraq and hence spend
money in restaurants, hotels, and on vehicle maintenance. The Turkish-Kurd truckers
thus provide spin-off economic benefits to those northern regions of Iraq under
Baghdad’s control, such as Mosul and Kirkurk” (CFIJ, p. 33).
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The CIA calculated that Iraq generated about $12 billion from 1996 to 2000, just
from its trade protocol with Turkey (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement,
p. 162). The CFIJ set the amount at $9 billion in a six-year period (CFIJ, p. 29), and the
IIC put it at $14 billion from 1992 to 2003 (IIC, p. 89). The Duelfer Report found that
“Some of these funds were transferred to interest bearing accounts. As of January 2004,
SOMO held $157 million in these accounts and had earned almost $7.7 million in
interest since October 2000” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 162).
Chart 3.8 summarizes Iraqi revenues from its trade protocol with Turkey but by industry
from 1995 to 2002.

Chart 3.8 – Iraq-Turkey Trade Protocol
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Source: The Duelfer Report, IIC, CFIJ

136

Chart 3.8 shows an average of revenues per industry calculated from three main
sources: The Duelfer Report, the IIC, and the CFIJ. First, the Chart shows the diversity of
trade between Iraq and Turkey. Note that some industries were not included for two
reasons: a) lack of dates; b) conflictive, not reliable sources. I did not include revenues
from kickbacks, artificial fees, and illegal taxes. When I say illegal, I mean according to
the UN sanctions. Iraq was a sovereign nation and as such it could impose any tax it
considered pertinent. Second, defense was the second largest source of revenues. This is
important because Turkey actually granted permission to the U.S. and UN to use Turkish
territories to manage the UN sanctions regime from Turkey, not to mention that a large
number of UN inspectors were stationed in Turkey to monitor Iraq’s rearmament and
WMD programs from there. Still, Iraq managed to import goods and services for its
defense industry via the Iraqi-Turkish border. And I do not mean here that Turkey, as a
nation-state, sold military equipment and hardware to Iraq. I did not find any evidence of
it. What I am saying is that Turks, Kurds, and intermediaries from other nationalities sold
military equipment to Iraq, and that Iraq utilized its trade agreement with Turkey and
Turkey’s territory for that purpose. In Chapter VI, I will explain the extent of such a
trade. For now note that oil was not the largest source of revenue for Iraq. There was a
reason for that. Most Iraqi oil exports to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and other Iraqi neighbors
were through oil pipelines. In the cases of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, Iraq
shipped the oil by sea. However, in the case of Turkey, oil trade had to be by truck
because, as I stated earlier, the American led Coalition Forces had bombed the two oil
pipelines that connected Iraqi oil fields to Turkish refineries. In fact, that is the reason
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why the trucking industry flourished so much in Turkey, Iraq and Kurdistan. The Table
below shows revenues drawn from oil trade under the Iraqi-Turkish trade protocol.

Table 3.9 – Iraqi Revenues Drawn from Iraq-Turkey Protocol

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Iraqi Gov't

17

19

24

27

27

46

92

68

75

27

11

Udai's Corp.

21

27

22

72

55

55

247

243

73

38

14

Iraqi-Kurd Gov

20

22

37

56

56

93

186

139

56

28

9

Iraqi-Kurd Corp

22

22

61

108

82

82

370

365

109

57

14

74

185

74

37

1036

648

259

130

Turkish Gov't
Turkish Corp

57

81

119

333

333

555

19

Sources: Duelfer Report, CFIJ

Note that all parties, except Turkey, seem to have started oil smuggling in 1993,
two years after the sanctions regime was implemented. The Turkish government started
only in 1999. Second, Udai’s Corp means front companies that belonged to Udai
Hussein, Saddam’s son. Udai’s companies made more money than the Iraqi government
every year except in 2001 when it beat Udai by just $2 million. I could not determine
whether or not Udai’s money went to his personal savings or to the Iraqi government. I
did find, though, that Udai had a fleet of 50 tankers for his oil trade. Evidence shows that
he wanted to purchase 250 smaller, rapider tankers from Japan and South Korea. Finally,
both the Iraqi-Kurdish government and Iraqi-Kurds consistently made money, only outperformed by Turkish corporations. It was a remarkable performance if we take into
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account that only as recently as 1991 Iraqi-Kurds had been gassed by the Iraqi
government and only in 1992 won autonomy of their territories.

Cyprus
Cyprus too signed a trade agreement with Iraq. The uniqueness of this agreement
derives from two main features: 1) Cyprus signed it on behalf of Turkey; 2) Turkey used
the agreement to smuggle goods, cigarettes and liqueur in particular, into Iraq.
The Cyprus-Iraq trade agreement included agricultural, fishery, agro-industrial,
and oil industries, but that is not new. Most Iraqi trade agreements included those same
industries. Therefore, what is really new here is that Turkey made of Cyprus the
operational center for the largest contraband ring of cigarettes that ever occurred in
Europe. The CFIJ summed it up: “In reality the Cyprus-Iraq trade agreement was an
effort by the Turkish to exploit Iraq’s fascination with cigarettes” (CFIJ, p. 55). Indeed,
Iraq is a lucrative market for cigarettes as Iraqis consume about 18 billion cigarettes
annually, of which they imports 10 billion (CFIJ, p. 55). Iraq also imports about 2000
tons of tobacco leaves. For its part, Cyprus has an excellent cigarette industrial
infrastructure for it produces about 26.5 billion of cigarettes per year while it consumes
just about 3.5 billion (CFIJ, p. 55). Cyprus is famous for smuggling cigarettes to Europe.
According to the EU, Cyprus also smuggled cigarettes into Iraq. It found that “Iraq
became a prime market for cigarettes smuggled via Cyprus” (CFIJ, p. 56), and the EU
was not happy about it. Note that taxing cigarettes constitutes a sound source of revenues
for EU nations (CFIJ, p. 56).
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In effect, the EU had for many years been trying to dismantle cigarette smuggling
via Cyprus. For example, the EU sued American firms in American Courts for using
Cyprus as a platform for cigarette smuggling in Europe. The EU filed a lawsuit against
RJ Reynolds and Phillip Morris in November 2001 for violating the RICO Laws (the Act
of 1970), but U.S. Courts dismissed the charges and the contraband continued (CFIJ, p.
55). So it was kind of ironic that just two months later the U.S. asked the EU for help to
crack down on cigarette smuggling in Iraq. The EU responded with an “I told you so”
and passed on to the U.S. the evidences it had of how Cyprus, the PKK, Iran and Iraq
engaged in cigarette smuggling. In addition, the British Foreign Office produced
evidences of cigarette and alcohol smuggling to Iraq through Cyprus and Kurdistan. The
Office argued that, “In the last 6 months, and these figures incidentally have been
provided through the United Nations Security Council, Saddam Hussein has imported
over 300 million packs of cigarettes, 38,000 bottles of whisky per month, 230,000 cans or
115,000 liters of beer per month, over 120,000 cans or 40,000 of vodka per months and
almost 19,000 bottles of wine a month” (CFIJ, p.56). The British Foreign Office accused
Cyprus of ignoring, as it put it, “an epidemic in Cypriot territory” (CFIJ, p. 55).
The results of the American investigation alarmed American officials. The
contraband included cigarettes and liquor but also furniture, appliances, cars,
motorcycles, cloths and even perfumes. Saddam distributed those products among high
ranking officials, closest allies and soldiers who excelled in their duties and obligations.
Yet, the U.S. could do no more than take the case to UN Security Council and propose a
resolution to warn Cyprus. After all, Cyprus was acting on behalf of Turkey, a member of
NATO and key ally of the U.S.
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Iran
Iran was yet another beneficiary of both the UN sanctions regime against Iraq and
the Turkish-Iraqi trade protocol. It was not unexpected because some common factors
unite Iran and Iraq. On one hand, Iran and Iraq had a common enemy: the United States.
An old geopolitical proverb goes: the enemy of my enemy is my friend, and sticking to
the proverb, Iran and Iraq found in the U.S. a good motive for cooperation. On the other
hand, Iran and Iraq have common borders by land and sea, and according to Krugman’s
theory, this is very advantageous for trade. For instance, for Iraq, one way of cooperating
with Iran was by smuggling diesel into Iran by truck. Another way was to use Iranian
waters to ship out crude oil. For its part, Iran itself has oil in abundance, but it does not
have refining capacity to convert it into gasoline or diesel. Even today Iran imports 89%
of the gasoline and diesel it consumes (CFIJ, p.43). Iran reasoned that it could balance
out its disadvantage by cooperating with Iraq in violating the UN sanctions regime. Iran
could: a) get free gasoline from Iraq in exchange for allowing Iraq to ship crude oil
through its waters; b) charge Iraq for using Iranian waters for smuggling; 3) charge all
foreign ships for using Iranian waters to get cargoes into Iraq. This was especially true for
ships navigating under Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and French flags (CFIJ, p. 43;
Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 166). Those nations had good
political and trade relations with Iraq and Iran.
Iran did all of the above. Conscious of the political and even military risks, Iran
charged hefty fees to any foreign ship crossing its waters in route to Iraq (CFIJ, p .44;
Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 167). Iraq did a lot of trade by
trucking, especially though Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. But it was slow, costly, and
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risky. To be fair with UN inspectors, plenty of evidences show that they did intercept
thousands and thousands of trucks trying to get in and out of Iraqi territory full of goods
CFIJ, p.45; Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p.166; IIC, p.114).
Smuggling was so rampant that it was not really hard for UN inspectors to catch some
violators of the sanctions. Even intercepted violators, once put back to the streets, would
get back to smuggling for it was one of the most profitable jobs around at the time.
The point is that Iraq preferred smuggling by sea, mainly oil, and Iranian waters
were the route to go through. For example, the CFIJ describes operations as follow:
“Smaller tankers fill up at the Shatt al-Arab ports of al-Muftiya and Abu al-Flus, north
and south of Basra respectively, cross to the Iranian side and then travel along the
Iranian coast, all the way to the islands of Qesh or Qeshim. Along the way, naval patrols
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, particularly from the Revolutionary Guard’s
maritime station just north of the mouths of the Shatt al-Arab, record, facilitate and
charge for the transit. These vessels, each with carrying capacities in the range of
15,000-50,000 barrels, are often overloaded and listed. Iran furnishes its own pilots to
navigate the shallow waters close to shore and to help prevent accidents and spill outs
that could leave evidences of smuggling behind. At Qeshim, at the Strait of Hormuz, the
smugglers may acquire Iranian certificates of origin for their cargo. For all these
services the Iranians reportedly charge a fee of approximately $7 a barrel. The oil is then
either transferred into larger vessels or, bearing the new documentation; the barges
proceed to Pakistan, India or cross the Strait of Hormuz to the port of Fujairah or Dubai
where the oil enters the world market system and is reloaded for onward shipment.
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During the UN sanctions regime, 100,000 bpd transited this route almost daily” (CFIJ,
p.45).
Foreign ships coming into Iraq took a riskier route in terms of exposure to UN
inspectors as well as to patrols from U.S. and UK. First, they utilized Iranian waters, and
then they moved into Kuwaiti, Bahraini and Qatari waters, down to the UAE (CFIJ, p.
44; Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 168). The risk consisted in that
all those nations were allies of the U.S., and as such they allowed UN, American and
British patrols all along their coasts to enforce the UN sanctions. For that reason,
stopping in Iranian ports to later sail toward Iraq was the most common option for all
parties. The ships got to their destinations. Iran collected its fees. And Iraq got their
cargoes.
It worked. The Duelfer Report noted that the Iraqi Ministry of Industry, Mr.
Hussein Kamel al-Majid, at first commanded the Iraqi-Iranian maritime route (Duelfer
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 171). Mr. Kamel broke a deal with Russian
tankers to operate under Bahamian and Honduran flags, which is a common practice in
global trade and, as we saw in Chapter II, Iraq successfully employed it to circumvent
UN inspectors. So through the Iraqi-Iranian route, Mr. Kamel exported about 60,000 bpd
in 1993, just two years into the sanctions regime (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p. 168). In 1994, Mr. Kamel exported 30,000 bpd to Pakistan. In return,
Pakistan sold about $240 million dollars worth of North Korean long-range missiles to
Iraq, which Mr. Kamel shipped back to Iraq through Iranian waters. But Mr. Kamel did
not last long in his post. Suddenly, the Iraqi government dismissed him, arguing that at 57
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he was too old for the job that demanded a lot of traveling and risky operations (Duelfer
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 168).
The job went to Saddam’s son Udai (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p.168). It is said that Mr.Udain broke a deal with the Iranian President
Rafsanjani’s son to expand diesel trade to 70,000 bpd by truck and smaller and rapider
boats. No one exactly knows how much diesel Udai trucked into Iran. Most sources set
the volume at 100,000 bpd since mid 1995 to 1997 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p. 168; IIC, p. 171). The CFIJ argued that the volume increased drastically
in 1998 when UN inspectors left Iraq and then decreased in 2000 when UN inspectors
came back (CFIJ, p.46). In fact, when UN inspectors came back, they found a rail track
connecting the port of Bash’ra in Southern Iraq with Khorramshar, an Iranian port also in
the South (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 168; CFIJ, p. 46). Table
3.10 shows some estimates of the Iraqi-Iranian oil trade under Udai’s command.

Table 3.10 – Estimates of Iraq-Iran Oil Trade under Udai’s Command

1995
Avg bpd

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

25,000 49,000 70,000

90,000

75,000

52,000

45,000

Iraq

$ 117 $ 222 $ 314 $ 402 $

336 $ 235 $

205

Iran

$

144 $ 107 $

89

53 $

97 $ 135 $ 172 $

Source: The Duelfer Report; the CFIJ
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Of course, the U.S. knew about the trading. The U.S. Navy actually intercepted
numerous shipments. I can cite a couple of examples. In 2000, the U.S. Navy detained
two Russian tankers on Iraq-Iranian waters (CFIJ, p. 44). The first tanker, Volgoneft-147,
belonged to SovFinAmTrans (SFAT) a Russian firm in joint venture with Transcisco, an
American company. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
financed the operation. UN inspectors found that EBRD had loaned the money to
Transpetro-Volga, a subsidiary of SFAT, but the cargo belonged to Primestar, an oil
trading firm based in British Virgin Islands. The Volgoneft-147 had given 40 trips
between Iraq and Iran by the time U.S. intercepted it (CFIJ, p. 44). The second tanker
was Novorossisk Shipping. It was navigating under Russian flag, in route to Singapore.
The cargo belonged to Royal Dutch/Shell, and UN fined Shell for $250,000 dollars
(CFIJ, p. 44). But then why would the U.S. allow Iran to engage in illegal trading with
Iraq?
There was much speculation among observers in that regard (CFIJ, p. 46).
However, the consensus is that the US wanted to improve relations with the Iranian
President. This President, Khatami, was a moderate. He was sending ‘signals’ to the U.S.
about his interests in improving U.S.-Iran relations. In fact, during this period, the U.S.
eased unilaterally the U.S sanctions regime against Iran, so Iran could import some
agricultural and industrial products (CFIJ, p. 46). Iran reciprocated by intercepting
smuggling that was not meant for Iran. In April 2000, the Iranian Navy, in a surprising
move, blockaded Iraqi waters and confiscated ships and cargos coming from Iraq (CFIJ,
p. 46). However, two factions opposed President Kathami’s actions. One faction was
Russian and French lobbyists representing Russian and French corporations with large
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interests in both the Iraqi and Iranian economies. They approached the Iranian hard-liners
and threatened to withdraw from the Iranian market if President Khatami did not lift the
blockade (CFIJ, p.46). The second faction was Iranian hardliners. They argued that
President Khatami was giving in to American pressure and affecting Iran’s good
economic relations with France and Russia. After all, the U.S. had a sanctions regime
against Iran, and France and Russia were Iran’s best trade partners. In the end, the hardliners prevailed. They went after the Iranian moderates, and President Khatami had no
choice but to lift the blockade and allow the smuggling to go on (CFIJ, p.46).

Trade Fairs
Iraq promoted its trade agreements with trade fairs it held in Bagdad. These trade
fairs were very important because they enabled Iraq to circumvent the UN sanctions
regime. Specifically, the fairs allowed Iraq to: a) obtain immediate much needed
revenues; b) obtain access to global markets; c) rally political support again the UN
sanctions regime.
First of all, the international trade fairs enabled Iraq to immediately raise huge
revenues. Each fair brought about $100 million to Iraqi balance sheets (CFIJ, p. 50). For
example, the Iraqi government charged $1000 fee per person and per company just for
participating in the Fair. It charged for processing passport, custom and other
bureaucratic documents. Then, Iraq charged participants for everything they used and/or
consumed, from water to food, telephones, fax machines, office supplies, etc. It certainly
charged for air conditioning, electricity and even security. Estimated expenditures per
person were about $3000 dollars over a five days stay in Iraq (CFIJ, p. 50). Note that
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18,000 people attended the Annual Fair Trade of Bagdad of 1998, including merchants,
journalists, diplomats and their bodyguards, members of NGOs, etc (CFIJ, p. 50). In
2001, 65,000 people attended the Bagdad trade fair (CFIJ, p. 50). Third, Iraq charged
between $50 and 100 dollars per square meter of floor space, depending on location,
exposure, and visibility among other factors. Minimum allotment was $2000 per
exhibitor (CFIJ, p. 51). In 2001, Iraq rented out almost 28,000 square meters of indoor
floor space and 18,000 square meters of outdoor space. Besides, construction and
furnishing of cubicles was mandatory, and Iraq charged $30 dollar per square meter
(CFIJ, p. 51). Of course, all those fees increased over time as Iraq gained in experience,
attracted more participants, and more companies and nations were willing to participate
in the fairs. Consequently, if Iraq made about 4.5 million dollars in the first fair it held in
Bagdad, by 2002 it was making $400 million dollars per year (CFIJ, p. 51). Iraq could not
have done better. After all, it was under a multilateral sanctions regime.
Second, international trade fairs enable Iraq to get access to global markets and
attract trade partners from around the world. Iraq held its first fair in 1995, three years
into the UN sanctions regime. Iraq called it Baghdad International Fair (CFIJ, p. 52).
The use of the word international was intentional. Words have meaning, and here Iraq
meant that the fair had an international character: 400 companies from 15 nations had
accepted invitations to participate (CFIJ, p. 52). In fact, in the end 421 companies from
17 nations travelled to Iraq and showed their products to Iraqi companies, and Iraq signed
about 900 contracts in that Fair (CFIJ, p. 52). It was such a success that Iraq decided to
organize at least two fairs per year. It even created a state-owned company for that
purchase. Iraq called it State Company for Iraqi Fairs. The Company hired the German

147

firm IMAG for consulting and marketing, and it also opened a bank account at the
Baghdad branch of Rafidain Bank-Al-mansour, which had branches in most Middle
Eastern nations (CFIJ, p. 52). In 1996, Iraq celebrated three trade fairs. This company
hired the German firm IMAG for consulting and marketing (CFIJ, p. 52).
Iraq celebrated its second international trade fair in 1997, attracting 800
companies and 20, 000 people from 31 nations (CFIJ, p. 52). In 1999, it attracted 1,210
companies and 29,000 people from 35 nations. The international trade fair celebrated in
Bagdad in 2001 brought 1,650 companies and 65,000 people from 48 nations from
almost all continents (CFIJ, p. 52. It was a true global event, although European, North
African and Middle Eastern nations dominated it. Companies from Germany, Sweden,
Denmark, Italy and Austria sent representatives. About 200 Russian and French
companies sent delegates. And about 150 firms from Egypt and Turkey participated.
Even Palestine produced 325 small companies to participate in the fair (CFIJ, p .52).
Absent from the fairs were always Kuwait, the US and UK. However, it does not
mean that companies from those nations missed out business opportunities. They did
obtain contracts but though intermediaries, subsidiaries, parent companies and other
corporate models. Indeed, in Chapter VI, I will examine how companies utilized
corporate models to obtain contracts and circumvent the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq.
Here, it is worth noting that British companies complained to the British government.
This time British companies argued that trade was rampant in Iraq anyway, and that they
were missing out on great business opportunities. They reminded the British government
that British firms had been absent from the Iraqi market since the 1970s, and that the
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sanctions regime was a good opportunity to return to it. A few months later, the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the House of Commons concluded that “The “the Baghdad Trade
Fair is not in itself a breach of sanctions. The UN Oil for Food humanitarian program,
with revenues of about 14 billions, offers considerable opportunities for legitimate trade
with Iraq. We are supporting British companies in their efforts to win a share of this
trade” (CFIJ, p. 54; www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk).
Third, perhaps the most important gain for Iraq was that it got access to the global
market. Indeed, by year 2000, numerous nations were holding trade fairs to, as Saddam
put it, “honor the Iraqi people” (CFIJ, p. 53). In 2000, Morocco, Syria, Lebanon,
Algeria, the UAE and even the Philippines held trade fairs in which Iraq was the main
honoree (CFIJ, p. 53). In 2001, Ukraine went so far as to sponsor a trade fair (CFIJ, p.
53). The main exhibitors were the Ukraine Ministry of Defense and Iraq’s Military
Industrial Commission, by then Iraq’s most important military procurement agency. This
is very relevant because in Chapter VII we will see that Ukraine played a pivotal role in
procuring components, spare parts and machinery for Iraq’s missile programs. But in
November of the same year, during the Bagdad Trade Fair, Tunisia and Morocco
announced that they were opening free trade zones where Iraqi companies could sell their
product (CFIJ, p. 53). Two days after, Lebanon and Iraq were signing their 2nd trade
agreement in three years (Daily Star Beirut, Nov., 6, 2001.) Still, the following year was
even better for Iraq. In May 4, 2002, the Iraqi News Agency announced with much
fanfare that the French government had invited Iraq to participate in the Paris
International Fair (Iraqi News Agency, May 4, 2002). In May 21 of the same year, the
Agency announced that Germany too was inviting Iraq to the 4th International
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Commercial Fair (Iraqi News Agency, May 21, 2002). In August 2001, Egypt invited
Iraq to its international trade fair. This was important because Iraq had invested a lot of
political and financial capital to improve political and trade relations with Egypt
(RFE/RL, August 24, 2001, and October 12, 2001). Iraq sent 2000 representatives and,
more important, two Ministries. Then, in August 2002, Turkey invited Iraq to participate
in the Izmir International Fair (CFIJ, p. 50). Even Saudi Arabia invited Iraq to the trade
fair that it celebrated in September 2002.
Finally, most analysts agreed that Iraq scored huge political gains from the trade
fairs. It did it in two main ways: a) Iraq granted contracts to companies that publicly
declared opposition to the UN sanctions regime; b) eventually, state actors began to
personally participate in the trade fairs, which Iraq used for political advantage.
Indeed, the CIA acknowledged that “The Iraqis have become very effective at
using the annual Trade Fairs for their wider purposes” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance
and Procurement, p. 171). The CIA was referring to how Iraq was utilizing trade fairs for
political gains and propaganda as much as for commercial purposes. In a trade fair held in
Bagdad n 1999, the Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan publicly declared that
“The sanctions are a terrorist weapon responsible for the deaths of over a million Iraqi
children” (RFE/RL, Nov. 5, 1999). He then went on to “Grant the best prices and
contracts to those who denounce the horrors of UN sanctions against the Iraqi people”
(RFE/RL, Nov 5, 1999). Indeed, participants in the fairs soon learned that, as Dania Saadi
from the Daily Star of Beirut put it, “Competitive prices without sound political stands
will not tempt Iraqi authorities to strike business deals”. Dania Saadi went on to warn
that “Opposing sanctions will secure deals” (Daily Star, Nov 6, 2001). Eventually,
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governments joined companies in their public opposition to the UN sanctions regime. At
the beginning, most governments published conciliatory statements. For example, the
Saudi government defended a trade fair it held to honor Iraq by stating that “Your
Majesty was honoring the warm relations between the peoples of Iraq and Saudi
Arabia,” and the government of Jordan stated that “We are helping our own families, for
Iraqis are our blood” (CFIJ, p. 54). But other governments were more explicit and
directly condemned UN sanctions. Such was the case of France, Russia, Egypt, and even
Turkey. Still, by the year 2000, some governments not only spoke but also acted. They
began to utilize the trade fairs to visit Iraq. As the CFIJ put it, “Fair attendees witnessed
a parade of Prime Ministers, Vice-Ministers and foreign dignitaries flying into Baghdad
airport; we should note that those flights in themselves were violations of the sanctions
regime” (CFIJ, p. 54). They usually met with Iraq and made public condemnatory
remarks against the sanctions regime, like in the Prime Minister of Lebanon. During the
trade fair of Baghdad in 2002, he remarked that “Lebanon is here to help Iraqis break
unjust sanctions” (Daily Star, Nov 6, 2001).

Conclusion
This Chapter tests whether or not global trade allowed Iraq to circumvent the
UN sanctions regime. Based on the evidence presented here, we conclude that the
fragmented nature of global trade allowed Iraq to circumvent UN sanctions. Iraq accessed
global trade through a number of trade agreements it signed with about 25 nations,
particularly with Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and Syria. The trade agreements opened two-way
trade routes: Iraq shipped its oil to global markets through Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and
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Syria. In turn, those nations attracted trade from all around the world, which Iraq
accessed through its trade protocols.
Altogether, the protocols allowed Saddam to feed his people and postpone the fall
of the regime for a few years. For the most part, and based on the evidence collected, we
can conclude that: 1) the UN embargo was circumvented; 2) instruments of globalization
such as front companies, intermediaries and the international banking system were
utilized to circumvent the embargo 3) when it comes to Middle East nations, any
relationship between GDP, exports and oil imports under the UN Oil for Food Program is
illusive, unless we utilize it to argue that, more than GDP per nation, geography, history
and traditional trade ties played an important role in the performance of Middle East
nations in the UN Oil for Food Program and their consequent violations of the UN
embargo. Those nations share the following characteristics: geographical proximity, long
standing trade routes and markets, centuries of trade partnerships, common local trade
costumes and business trends, a common language, a shared animosity toward the West,
the United States in particular, and, consequently an opposition to the UN embargo
against Iraq. As third world economies, they needed trade, jobs and money, and the UN
embargo, just like all embargoes, offered sound economic opportunities, in particular to
companies losing global competition, to companies from the developing world. That
explains their performance in the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.
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IV. AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND
NON-STATE ACTORS
“The first [era of Globalization] lasted from 1492….until around 1800. I would call this era Globalization
1.0. This era was about countries. In this era, countries and governments (often inspired by imperialism or a
combination of both) led the way in breaking down walls and knitting the world together, driving global
integration. The second great era [of] Globalization lasted roughly from 1800 to 2000. In globalization
2.0, the key agent of change, the dynamic force driving global integration, was multinational companies.
These multinationals went global for markets and labor, spearheaded first by the expansion of the Dutch
and English joint-stock companies and the Industrial revolution”.
Thomas L. Friedman
“Arguably Christopher Columbus was a non-state actor, were Vasco da Gama and Martin Luther and
Henry Hudson, a subcontractor for West Indian Company and discoverer of the Hudson River as were the
East India Company, the Hudson Bay Company, the French revolutionaries, and nationalist movements of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”.
Fred Halliday
“The UN once dealt only with governments. By now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be
achieved without partnerships involving governments, the business community and civil society”.
Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General

Introduction
This chapter examines non-state actors (NSAs) in relation to a multilateral
sanctions regime under globalization. I posit that NSAs undermine the overall
effectiveness of sanctions regimes, and that globalization facilitates their activities. In the
case of Iraq, I specifically argue that a large number of NSAs formed alliances among
themselves and with nation-states for the sole purpose of circumventing the UN sanctions
regime against Iraq. That is, individuals, NGOs, political and religious groups, banks and
businesses of all sorts worked together, with state actors and members of Saddam’s
regime, to evade UN sanctions and conceal their profits.
To better illustrate my argument, I have divided this chapter into two sections. In
the first section, I review the literature on NSAs. In the second section, I present and
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discuss evidences of how NSAs, as agents of globalization, facilitated the evasion of UN
sanctions regime. I gathered the evidence from multiple sources, among which are the
IIC Report, the Duelfer Report, a report from the CFIJ, the Michigan Project, and the
Heritage Foundation. I also utilize reports from Western and Middle Eastern newspapers.

NSAs and Global Politics
Most scholars of international politics accept as a fact the presence of NSAs in
global politics, but some still hold mixed opinions about how NSAs affect it. As Josselin
and Wallace put it, “The debate no longer focus on whether NSAs play a role in world
politics, but rather on how they do so” (Josselin & Wallace, 2001, p. 12). In this section,
I discuss the nature of NSAs and their relations with states and world politics.
First, NSAs like to distance themselves from state actors. They may act as
autonomous entities, but they are not completely autonomous. There are well defined
relations between NSAs and states, and I mean here legal, administrative, procedural and
financial practices and relations. Josselin and Wallace argue that “Defining non-state
actors chiefly by their independence from states and state authority would be misleading
for both in domestic and international politics the theoretical purity of these opposing
ideal types –state and nonstates- is muddied by the complexities of praxis” (Josselin &
Wallace, 2001, p. 2). That is, NSAs and states are opposing categories interconnected
through what Keohane and Nye (1971) define as governmental, national and
transnational relations. NSAs grow so interconnected with respect to state actors that in
time they lose autonomy, blurring political spaces between them. NSAs and states
become interdependent, and according to Krasner (1983, 1995), as interdependence
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consolidates, it at some point leads to a new regime type, a sort of partnership among
them. Josselin and Wallace (2001) call it triangular relationships, whereas NSAs stand
somewhere between states, their agencies and agents. The question is, as Josselin and
Wallace put it, “How far non-state actors, in their triangular relations with states, still
operate within the constraints of national and international politics” (Josselin and
Wallace, 2001, p. 7). In the case of Iraq, many NSAs went really far in their interactions
with state officials. This was the case for NGOs like Qandil and Diakonia from Sweden,
Peace Winds of Japan, and Handicapped International of Belgium (IIC, 2005, p. 78;
CFIJ, 2002, p. 19). In an effort to carry out their duties, those NGOs maintained a close
relationship with the Iraqi regime. They not only lobbied Saddam for a license to operate
in Iraq but even paid a hefty annual “fee” that Saddam demanded for those licenses. But
Saddam needed more than money. Saddam needed public solidarity and political support.
So he asked NGOs to publicly denounce the hardships that UN sanctions inflicted upon
Iraqi people (IIC, 2005, p. 18; CFIJ, 2002, p. 19). Saddam cautiously courted not only
NGOs but also corporations, scientists, universities, European political parties and
religious denominations for their political support (IIC, 2005, p. 18; CFIJ, 2002, p. 19).
Indeed, the Iraqi case illustrates some of the problems that NSAs must confront in
order to exist and operate. NSAs must deal with financial, legal, political, climatic,
religious and even cultural limitations. But according to Smith (2001), Josselin and
Wallace (2001), above all there are two concepts that limit the actions and nature of
NSAs. They are: raison d’ eta and national security. Those two concepts are directly
related to the very nature of nation-states. According to Smith, the two concepts became
the motive of domestic politics as states emerged and struggled with NSAs to establish
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the best approach toward neighboring states and world politics (Smith, 2001, p. 51). For
Smith, “The two concepts neither mean nor imply that NSAs are enemies of nation-states
and that those NSAs necessarily oppose states’ interests” (Smith, 2001, p. 51). Yet, I
would state that raison d’ eta and national security define, to this date, the nature of
relations between states and NSAs. In the name of raison d’ eta and national security,
states try to keep NSAs away from national and global politics. Nation-states set legal
jurisdictions to prevent NSAs from accessing states’ information, which state actors
conceal and manipulate, arguably to protect the interests of the state. Nation-states outlaw
some of NSAs’ activities which, according to state actors, could affect national security.
Some nation-states outlaw and persecute religious groups, political parties and activists.
For instance, I explained in Chapter II how states used the concepts of
securitization and sectorization to define which issues constituted a raison d’ eta and of
national security. Securitization and sectorization allow nation-states to overuse raison d’
eta and stretch out the notion of national security as a means to limit the activities of
NSAs. In the case of Iraq, NSAs had to navigate through a political scenario that
included: a) politics among permanent members of UN Security Council; b) US and
UK’s foreign policies toward Iraq; c) Iraq’s own notion of national security, given the
fact that it was a nation isolated politically and economically, and threatened militarily.
Opposition to NSAs such as political activists and NGOs mainly came from the US, UK,
and Iraq itself (CFIJ, 2002, p. 19).
They blocked NSAs by: 1) harassing them politically and legally; 2) denying
them visas to travel to Iraq; 3) revoking their operational licenses; 4) imposing on them
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unbearable taxes, fees and other financial obligations; 5) denying them access to financial
resources and logistics (CFIJ, 2002, p. 19).
Again, by using national security as an excuse, Saddam banned many NSAs from
ever entering Iraq. Saddam sectored the oil industry and declared it an issue of national
security. But then he granted oil contracts to NSAs according to raison d’ eta and
national security interests. Especially, he granted contracts to NSAs that publicly
denounced UN sanctions (IIC, 2005, pp. 78-87). For their part, both the US and UK
favored NSAs that condemned the Iraqi regime. The US and UK publicly condemned, in
some cases harassed, NSAs who opposed the sanctions against Iraq, like Mr. Oscar
Wyatt, an oil tycoon from Texas and, for many years, the only American that Saddam
trusted. Mr. Wyatt publicly opposed the UN sanctions against Iraq from the beginning. In
2001, the Bush administration opened an investigation against Mr. Wyatt and his oil
corporations. In 2003, Mr. Waytt was indicted for conspiracy and racketeering under the
RICO Act (New York Times and Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2006).

Types of NSAs
There are many types of NSAs. There world is so diverse that most scholars
define them according to their interests, the nature of their work, and their political
affiliation. But according to Colomonos (2000), Smith (2001), and Josselin and Wallace
(2001), most NSAs are: 1) independent from states and/or state actors; 2) relatively
autonomous; 3) domestic actors but their politics and operations seldom transcend
transnational networks; 4) affect foreign policy agendas and relations among states.
Based on those parameters, in this Chapter I focus on seven NSAs. They are:
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transnational corporations, political parties, NGOs, religious organizations, Diaspora,
political activists, and empowered individuals. They all demonstrated a high level of
engagement in the UN sanctions regime against Iraq
The first NSA I want to analyze is transnational corporations due to their active
role in shaping globalization, circumventing a sanctions regime, and in international
politics in general. I dedicate Chapter VI to examine the role of corporations in the
circumvention of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. However, for now let us define
transnational corporations as NSAs. For Josselin and Wallace (2002), as for Colomonos
(2000), transnational corporations are basically corporations that operate in more than
one nation. Such corporations can be private or public, or a combination of both. They
can also be state-controlled through partial or total ownership. Their main goal is to
produce goods and services, but they also engage in domestic and transnational politics.
As Halliday states, “You do not have to be a Marxist to write the history of international
relations in terms of political activities by transnational corporations” (Halliday, 2000,
p. 31). Transnationals are not isolated entities. They are part of a global civil society. Yes,
they are rich and powerful. I would argue that they are the strongest and most influential
of all NSAs, but they do not dominate global politics as they used to. Transnationals must
share power and influence with other NSAs who have their own interests and goals.
Global trade, traditionally the main concern of transnationals, no longer dominates the
global agenda. First, transnational have gradually moved away from trade issues to focus
more on obtaining investment privileges across nations. Second, many NSAs see global
trade as just one among many issues, among which are the environment, human rights,
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nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. In fact, limiting the powers of transnational
corporations is a key issue in global politics and a goal of many NSAs.
In order to cope with other NSAs and their initiatives, transnational corporations
have adopted two main approaches. The first is to avoid global regulations by relocating
their operations to nations where governments are weaker, laws are flexible and
enforcement lousy or nonexistent. Some governments facilitate relocations and grant
incentives as part of their quest for foreign investment, itself a policy that transnational
corporations defend and lobby for. Stephen F. Cohen argues in “Failed Crusades” that the
case of Russia is a good example because, on the one hand, transnational corporations
almost took over the Russian state through the privatization process that occurred there in
the 1990s. On the other hand, Russia became a critical destination for corporations
seeking to evade UN sanctions against Iraq. In Chapter II, I showed that Russia, an oil
producer itself, ranked second in oil purchases from Iraq under the UN sanctions regime.
But in chapters V and VI we will see that Russia did not really consume that oil. Rather,
transnational corporations hired nascent Russian corporations as intermediaries to
circumvent the UN sanctions against Iraq.
The second approach that corporations use is to invest in trade regimes favorable
to them. Transnationals lobby for and against regulations that affect their bottom lines.
They influence norms and procedures embedded in the GATT, the WTO, and various
bilateral, regional and global trade organizations. Not surprisingly, they invest against
sanctions regimes. As Colomonos points out, “transnational corporations lobbied
heavily against the promulgation of the Helms-Burton and Iran-Libya Sanctions (ILSA)
Act. They fought the UN sanctions regime against Iraq and they have emerged at the
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forefront of protest against commercial embargoes imposed by their own country”
(Colomonos, 2000, p. 85). In their quest against sanctions regimes, transnational
corporations often seek support from NSAs that oppose sanctions regimes. Colonomos
explains that “Corporations have contacted think-tanks specializing in international
economics and sponsored studies highlighting the cost of American sanctions for US
companies and the American economy” (Colomonos, 2000, p. 85). Referring to British
transnationals, the CFIJ noted that “The British too appear to be eager for their piece of
the action” (CFIJ, 2002, p. 24). In all, I find that in order to trade with Iraq under the UN
sanctions regime, transnational corporations allied with NSAs like NGOs, political
parties, activists, scientists and even universities to evade UN sanctions and inspectors.
The second group of NSAs related to this dissertation is NGOs. The beginning of
NGOs dates back to the early 1900s. For instance, the Rotary International, known as the
Rotary, was created in 1904. The Red Cross was created around the same time. By 1940,
there were about 1,500 NGOs (www.un.org). But NGOs only became popular with the
creation of UN which, in its Charter, Article 71, called for the creation of “Organizations
that are neither governments nor member states” (www.un.org). A second definition
drew from Resolution 288 of ECOSOC, the UN’s Agency that regulates and attends
NGOs’ affairs. The Agency defined NGOs as “Any international organization that is not
founded by an international treaty” (ECOSOC, www.un.org; Josselin and Wallace, 2001,
p. 26). It was a broad definition. It was the early days of the Cold War, and UN members
wanted to attract resources from all nations despite their ideology, religion, political
affiliation and economic system. Later, the UN elaborated a more specific definition. It
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stated that an NGO was a “Legally established non-for profit organization with no
relation to any government” (www.un.org; Josselin and Wallace, 2001, p. 27).
A few years after that, the UN once again amended it to invite more governments
to cooperate in the promotion of NGOs. The Amendment limited governments to funding
NGOs, which should remain self-sufficient and unbiased even if they received resources
from nation-states. State actors should not participate in the daily operations, planning
and decision-making of NGOs (ECOSOC, www.un.org). Now, it is very important to
note that I utilize here the definition of NSAs as stated by UN statutes. There are three
main reasons for it. First, based on such a definition, UN granted and denied licenses to
NSAs that sought to operate in Iraq under the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. Second,
based on UN’s definition of NGOS, the U.S., UK, Germany, India, Australia, New
Zealand and other nations reprimanded and in some cases prosecuted NSAs that violated
the UN sanctions against Iraq (IIC Report, p. 181; CFIJ, 2002, p. 19). In sum, there are
other, perhaps more scholarly, definitions of NSAs, but they lack the legal and
institutional frameworks as to explain violations of a UN sanctions regime by NGOs.
Violating UN sanctions is a legal matter, not a political one.
The numbers and significance of NGOs were limited throughout the Cold War.
The politics of the bipolar system impeded their work as the two leading superpowers,
the U.S. and the USRR, limited their free movement and access to needy people,
particularly in third world nations where proxy wars provoked poverty, diseases,
starvation and exodus. Americans and the Soviets wanted to show the superiority of their
political, social and economic systems. As Josselin and Wallace (2001) argue, they both
wanted to hide their systemic failures, so they accused each other of using NGOs for
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propaganda, proselytism, spying, and in some instances of breaching sovereignty. Right
after the end of the Cold War, there seemed to be an ideological “consensus” about
NGOs and their work. Most nations began to recognize that governments had limits on
what they could do. Also, global crisis such the spread of HIV in poor nations, the war in
Bosnia, and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda created a new spirit of cooperation among
nations and NGOs. The intensification of globalization during the 1990s brought people
together through greater transnational communication, traveling and global mass-media.
People began to take note of what NGOs were doing to fight diseases, illiteracy, poverty,
and other issues in poor nations. Today, NGOs are in all continents delivering social
work under labels such as independent sector, civil society, grassroots organizations,
transnational social movements, private voluntary organizations, self-help organizations
and others. There are also the “mega” or “super” NGOs that emerged during the 1990s,
owned and managed by philanthropists-entrepreneurs like Bill Gates, George Soros,
Warren Buffet, Richard Branson, and other powerful individuals.
Most nations greet NGOs, but they are also suspicious about their intentions.
Some nations accuse NGOs of corruption and proselytism. For many, NGOs have
become a way of life, a source of influence and fame. In Afghanistan, the Afghan
government has repeatedly accused some NGOs of driving luxury cars, living in fancy
houses and partying too much (WSJ, June 17, 2007). In Latin America, some
governments have accused NGOs of engaging in prostitution and drug trafficking, and
there the Catholic Church keeps accusing some NGOs of promoting abortion and
executing it illegally. (El Pais, September 7, 2007). Other governments find NGOs taking
political positions, siding with opposition parties and leaders. In the 2009 political crisis
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in Honduras, ten NGOs publicly supported the removal by force of the Honduran
President (El Pais, October 21, 2009). Some nations go as far as directly financing NGOs.
The ten largest NGOs in Honduras are funded by the U.S. State Department to this day
(WSJ, September 28, 2009). In the case of Iraq, I found concrete evidence of NGOs
acting as intermediaries to Iraqi and non-Iraqi corporations. NGOs took contracts from
the Iraqi regime and sold them to Russian, American, and Ukrainian corporations among
others.
The forth NSA to argue is religious denominations. They have historically had a
visible presence in global politics, mostly through the Catholic Church. As Ryall argues,
they are “One of the oldest and largest transnational actors of all. [] … and Jesuits can
claim to be prototypes of globalization” (Ryall, 2001, p. 41)
At least in the West, the Church dominated global politics since the fall of the
Roman Empire through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, Reformation and
Counterreformation up to the Peace of Westphalia (Cantor, 1994, p. 181). The rise of the
Westphalia System represented a major loss of power to the Church for it brought two
key assumptions: 1) the State was the supreme authority within a demarcated territory
and over a people; 2) the State held a monopoly over the use of force (Ryall, 2001, p. 42).
Thus, religious denominations became NSAs, often opposing the authority and actions of
the State. As religious NSAs, they attempted to address questions related to the nature of
the state and their monopoly over the use of force against civilians (Ryall, 2001, p. 42). In
the case of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq, religious NSAs directly challenged not
only the legitimacy of the sanctions but also the morality of imposing them (ICFJ, 2001,
p. 20). Like corporations, NGOs and other NSAs, religious NSAs denounced the UN

163

sanctions regime against Iraq. Unlike corporations, NGOs and other NSAs, religious
NSAs were more prepared, in theory and praxis, to challenge the overall legitimacy of a
sanctions regime as an instrument of force and foreign policy. For them, the question
was: how moral and practical is it to starve millions of powerless women and children in
the name of national security, regime change and international relations.
Religions NSAs are not powerless. As Ryall argues, they are as transnational and
global as corporations (Ryall, 2001, p. 41). They own schools, universities, newspapers,
radio and TV stations, think-tanks, interest groups, and NGOs around the world. They
have the support of millions of believers around the world. In the case of Catholic
organizations, they have the financial, legal and political support of the Vatican, a state in
itself. This is very important for two reasons. First, we must be cautious when defining
Catholic organizations as NSAs for their actions can respond to specific policies and
interests of the Vatican. Second, numerous Catholic NSAs publicly opposed the UN
sanctions regime against Iraq. Later in this chapter we will discuss the case of a Catholic
priest who in connection with the Central Bank of the Vatican violated the UN sanctions
regime against Iraq. We must not ignore that the Central Bank of the Vatican has on
numerous occasions been accused of money laundering and racketeering.
The fifth NSA relevant here is Diasporas. The term Diaspora refers to the exile of
Jews in Egypt in 70 AD. Today, it refers to “A victimized exile group unable to return to
their homeland for political reasons” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 1999, p. 220) and to “Any
group with a territorially discontinuous relationship with a group settled elsewhere”
(Marientrans, 1989, p. 120). The term implies a legal status, a political stand and a social
condition. Diasporas are voluntary or involuntary, but both hold some degrees of
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persecution to a large number of its members. A Diaspora usually settles in several
nations. It is why Ostergaard-Nielsen argues that “Diasporas are transnational per
definition” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 1999, p. 220). They settle mostly in nations willing to
welcome them as political refugees, a status with some sense of stability or “permanent”
security. In this dissertation, Diaspora refers to Iraqis living in exile due to: 1) opposition
to Hussein’s regime; 2) born in exile; 3) self-imposed exile. Those three groups had many
differences, mainly with respect to Saddam’s regime and the UN sanctions against Iraq.
But most of them played key roles in violating the sanctions regime.
Diasporas tend to remain in touch with their homeland emotionally and
economically. Diasporas are exceptionally active politically. Ostergaard-Nielsen observes
that “Their emotive, social, economic and not least political cross-border networks with
their homeland – or with other segments of the diasporas- constitute one of their main
resources for political influence” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 1999, p. 220). They have two
main goals. For one, they aspire to one day return safely to their homeland, for which
they lobby parliaments, international institutions and whoever likes to hear their case. As
Ostergaard-Nielsen points out, “A Diaspora has no government or state, it is the agenda
devoted to obtaining one which mobilize the Diaspora” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 1999, p.
220). Second, since they cannot guarantee their return to their homeland, they must work
to secure a place to live and prosper. Diasporas tend to create a community for
themselves in their adoptive nation. Such a situation is “Related to its (often troubled)
relationship with its host country as well as its continued identification with is
homeland” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 1999, p. 220). It is that troubled identity deficit what
makes Diasporas unique NSAs. Diasporas mobilize, raise funds, and lobby for foreign
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policies directly related to their motherland. For example, the Cuban-American Diaspora
based in the U.S. is largely responsible for the 50 years of unilateral American sanctions
against Cuba. For its part, the Iraqi Diaspora lobbied heavily against Saddam’s regime in
France, UK, the U.S and other nations (IIC, p. 324; ICFJ, 2001, p. 22). They asked the
UN, the EU and other international organizations for support. The American government
employed members of the Iraqi Diaspora to “build” the case for the invasion to Iraq in
2003. Many Iraqis in exile engaged in violations of the UN sanctions against Iraq.
The final NSA to discuss is empowered individuals (Josselin and Wallace, 2001)
since they played important roles in regard to the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. I
mean here individuals with direct access to the means of power, namely politics,
finances, and public opinion. As Josselin and Wallace state, “Globalization allows them
to globalize their messages and expose themselves to global multitudes through means of
globalization such as mass media” (Josselin and Wallace, 2001, p.19). Examples of
empowered individuals are Bill Gates, George Soros and Bono. They attract global
audiences. They shape public opinion through a global media interested in selling their
public images and life styles. They are political assets for they have an audience. They
use their political capital to lobby politicians, governments and international institutions.
So George Soros is an investor who spends his money promoting civic societies around
the world. Bono, a singer, is a recurrent participant in WTO meetings where he lobbies
Presidents and Prime Ministers for fair trade. In Iraq, the politics around the UN
sanctions attracted empowered individuals of diverse social, political and professional
stratums. I present five models of how NSAs worked together to evade the UN sanction
against Iraq. They are: a) empowered individuals - UN associates - corporations; b)
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individuals - religious organizations - corporations; c) individuals - political activismcorporations; d) individuals - civic organizations - corporations; e) individuals –
international organizations - corporations. Note that individuals and corporations are the
common denominators. Figure 4.1 represents the relations among NSAs.

Figure 4.1 – Relations among NSAs
empowered
individuals

political, religious,
international
organizations

corporations

I infer from Chart 4.1 three main points. First of all, individuals are responsible
for the actions of NSAs because, in the end, individuals manage and lead religious,
political and international organizations and corporations. Individuals set and execute
their agendas. They donate money and write grants in the name of numerous causes. In
the Iraqi case, it was individuals who facilitated access to the Iraqi regime and its
contracts. Second, corporations are the means to evade the UN sanctions against Iraq.
Most NSAs relied on corporations to execute the contracts they obtained from Saddam’s
regime, and most corporations employed NGOs, religious groups, and empowered
individuals to obtain contracts from Saddam’s regime. Third, most individuals fallow
almost the same modus operandi. They first seek access to Iraq’s governmental agencies
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and agents. They then convert access into influence, paying special attention to agenda
setting and policy-making. Lastly, they turn influence into marginal gains, then into
power and finally into political leverage. The process requires funding, public relations,
media coverage, and favorable public opinion among other capacities. In the next section,
I show how NSAs worked together to evade the UN sanctions against Iraq.

Overview of NSA Activities during the UN Sanctions Regime
The IIC found that “Saddam Hussein, beyond favoring companies from Russia,
China and France, also decided to furnish allocations of oil to friendly political figures
and organizations had political positions favorable to Iraq” (IIC, p. 334). The CIA
agreed. I draw Chart 4.1 with data from the CIA’s Report on violations of UN sanctions.

Chart 4.1 – Nationality of Individuals and Organizations
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Source: The Duelfer Report (CIA)

The Chart shows individuals and organizations of different nationalities that
illegally obtained about $18,000 million worth of contracts from Iraq. NSAs had never
engaged in trade operations of such a magnitude under a sanctions regime. In the graph,
we can see that individuals and organizations from “other nations,” about 41, accounted
for $4,000 million worth of contracts. Russia, French, Chinese and Swiss ranked second,
third, and fourth respectively. They obtained about $6,000 million worth of contracts.
Syrians, Turks, Jordanians and Egyptians ranked seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth
respectively, accounting for nearly $1,200 million. Still, individuals and organizations did
not have resources and expertise to execute their contracts. Also, Meyer and Califano
argue that “Most political figures who received oil allocations from Iraq […] had no
desire to have their name appear on a contract with SOMO. For this reason, political
beneficiaries often nominated companies to exercise their allocation rights, and these
companies were named to sign formal contracts with SOMO to buy the oil” (Meyer and
Califano, 2006, p. 75). In their investigations, the IIC and CIA defined as beneficiaries
those individuals and organizations that sold their contracts to corporations (IIC, p. 334;
Duelfer Report, p. 451). I will discuss individuals and organization separately to better
examine their role in the circumvention of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.

Individuals
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To better explain the role of individuals under the UN sanctions regime against
Iraq, I present Table 4.1. The Table shows a sample of individuals and their beneficiaries
under the UN sanctions regime as they appear n the IIC and CIA’s Report.

Table 4.1 – Individuals-Violators of UN Sanctions Regime
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Individual

Proffesion/Type

Nation

Beneficiary Company

Beneficiary

of Non-state Actor

Contracts
In USD

Adel Al-Dzhilaui

Business & political activist

Iraqi Exile

Pitkin Lmt.

Cyprus

2,925,000

Ali Ballout

Religious leader

Lebanon

Galaxy Management S.A.

Italy

1,764,000

Ali Ballout

Religious leader

Lebanon

Primacosa Enterprises Ltd.

Cyprus

1,002,000

Ali Ballout

Religious leader

Lebanon

Amosta S.L.

Spain

995,000

Ahmed Saeed Al-Otaiba

Business & political activist

UAE

Emirol Est.

UAE

3,984,000

Ahmed Saeed Al-Otaiba

Bussines & political activist

UAE

Loyoil LLC

UAE

2,441,000

Ahmed Saeed Al-Otaiba

Business & political activist

UAE

Benzoil

UAE

2,004,000

Benon Sevan

UN affiliate

France

Impexoil LLC

Russia

3,913,000

Benon Sevan

UN affiliate

France

African Middle East Petroleum

Panama

7,291,000

Burhan Al-Chalabi

Business & political activist

Iraqi in Exile

Fortun Oil And Gas OY

Finland

3,935,000

Enrica Benniti

Political activist

Italy

Finasi SPA

Italy

1,113,000

Father Benjamin

Priest

Italy

Zyria Management Serv. Ltd

Switzerland

2,055,000

George Galloway

ex Member of UK Parliament

UK

Middle East Semiconductor

Jordan

6,681,000

Hamad Bin Ali Jabr

Political activist

Qatar

Emiroil Est.

UAE

5,954,000

Hamad Bin Ali Jabr

Political activist

Qatar

Int'nal Petroleum Services

Egypt

2,927,000

Jean Bernard Merimee

Retired Diplomatat

France

Fenar Petroleum Ltd

Lichtenstein

2,027,000

Khalifa Al-Nahyan

Political & religious leader

UAE

Fenar Petroleum Ltd

Lichtenstein

1,955,000

Mohammad Helmi

Al-Sahwah newspaper

Egypt

Antemina International LLC

Jordan

1,000,000

Mohammed Al-Houni

Journalist

Libya

K.T.G. Kentford Globe Ltd.

Cyprus

3,929,000

Mohammed Al-Houni

Journalist

Libya

Gulf Erdolhandels GMBH

Austria

5,407,000

Mohammed Al-Houni

Journalist

Libya

Arcmed Energy Ltd

Cyprus

998,000

Mr. Mousinikov

President of Ukraine Soc. Party

Ukraine

Inves Co. Ltd

Ukraine

899,000

Mr. Persenkov

Chairman of Social Dem. Party

Ukraine

Commercial Council Deal

Ukraine

3,392,000
2,280,000

President Lahhoud' son

Son of President of Libanon

Lebanon

Fadi Oil International Sal

Lebanon

Riad El-Taher

Friendship without Borders

Iraqi in Exile

Perenco PLC

UK

Russian Embassador's son

Son of Russian Embassador

Russia

RAO Mes Int'nal Econ. Co.

Russia

13,071,000

Serge Boiedeevaix

Retired Diplomatat

France

Vitol S.A.

Switzerland

29,525,000

Solidarity for Iraqi People

Russia

Hyperborey Company

Ukraine

1,940,000

Bussinessmen

Jordan

Aredio Petroleum S.A.R.L

France

3,253,000

Sergei Rudassiev
Shaker Bin Zaid

960,000

Shakir Al-Khafaji

Assoc. Solidarity/Iraqi People

Iraqi in Exile

Omni Oil

S. Africa

2,070,000

Son of a President

President / Republic of Kalmykia

Russia

Kalmyk Oil & Gas Company

Russia

1,563,000

Wafa Tawfiz Butrus

Professor and Political activist

Palestine

National Oil Well Maint.

Qatar

2,050,000

Wafa Tawfiz Butrus

Professor and Political activist

Palestine

B.C. International PVT Ltd.

Pakistan

1,000,000

Zia Ja'far

Religious leader

Iraqi in Exile

Cressent Petroleum Ltd

UAE

1,389,000

Ziad al-Hadi

Businessmen & political activist

Iraqi in Exile

VTT Vulcan Petroleum SA

Switzerland

1,766,000

Total

129,458,000

Source: The Duelfer Report; the IIC
The Table shows, in Column I, 35 names of participants, the largest recipients of
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oil and procurement contracts, in the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. Column II shows
their professions or “type” of non-state actors as they appeared in Iraqi official
documents. Column III reveals their nationalities. Since they sold their contracts to
“beneficiaries,” Column IV shows the names of beneficiaries, and Column V their
nations of registration. Column VI includes the value of the contracts that individuals and
their beneficiaries exchanged. The data show three main aspects: a) dominance of Arab
and Russian NSAs; b) Middle Eastern individuals living in Europe; c) contributions of
Russian and Ukrainian politicians, consistent with what Califano and Meyer found:
“Among the most favored beneficiaries were politicians and political parties from Russia
and Ukraine” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p.76).
The participation of NSAs from the Middle East is understandable. In political
terms, the UN sanctions regime against Iraq constituted an insult to most Muslims and
Arabs. They considered it an aggression to Islam and the Arab world. I would argue that,
for Muslims and Arabs, violating the UN sanctions was just a reaction to an aggression, a
political statement, and an expression of solidarity with respect to the Iraqi people.
Nonetheless, not all was about politics for, in economic terms, the UN sanction regime
created good business opportunities for many Arabs and Muslims. After all, they had a
comparative advantage in terms of geography, culture, customs, and historic trade
relations. In Chapter III, I explained that the UN sanctions regime could not disrupt the
historic trade relations that Iraq had with its neighbors, especially Syria, Turkey, Jordan,
and even Iran, Iraq’s historic enemy. On the contrary, the UN sanctions brought them
together. I also argued in Chapter III that those nations in fact increased their trade
through bilateral trade agreements as a means to maximizing their comparative
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advantages. It explains the participation of Arabs and Muslim NSAs in the circumvention
of UN sanctions against Iraq. From corporations and banks to scientists and universities,
churches and religious activists, politicians and political parties, they all profited from the
business opportunities that UN sanctions created not only in Iraq but in the region. UN’s
inspectors could not prevent NSAs from engaging in the intense economic activity that
UN sanctions created in Iraq and the region. UN and US’ officials could not comprehend
the magnitude of the issue. Yet, Western NSAs understood it so well that they hired Arab
and Muslims NSAs to evade UN inspectors and access the Iraqi market. It explains: a)
the low number of Western NSAs that violated the UN sanctions against Iraq; b) the high
number of Arabs and Muslims that violated the UN sanctions.
A bit more complex is the participation of NSAs from ex-Soviet societies.
Political and economic reforms that occurred in ex-Soviet republics after the collapse of
the Soviet Union created opportunities for consolidating trade, commercial relationships
that ex-Soviet republics had with Iraq. Cohen (2001) argues in his “Failed Crusades” that
the reforms created a civic society composed by Russian and foreign NSAs that took
advantage of the new economic opportunities in Russia. But some Ukrainian, Belarusian,
and Russian NSAs, like the conglomerate Gasprom and the Russian National Party, took
advantage of the traditional economic relations Iraq had with former Soviet Union. As
previously noted, the Soviet Union had been Iraq’s main business partner for almost 40
years. NSAs from ex-Soviet republics will be the focus of discussion all throughout this
dissertation due to their presence in Iraq under the UN sanctions.
Second, according to the CIA, individuals declared 27 professions when they
introduced themselves to Saddam’s bureaucrats (IIC, Committee Tables, Table IV). They
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included doctors, politicians, businessmen, ex-legislators and ex- ambassadors, and even
priests and professors. I can cite a few examples from Table 4.1. For example, according
to the IIC, CIA and CFIJ, Father Benjamin was a priest who received about 21,000
barrels of oil from Saddam’s regime, which he sold to Zyria Management Service Ltd., a
Swiss corporation. Another example was Serge Bojedeevaix, a French ex-diplomat who
obtained almost 30,000 barrels of oil, only to sell them to African Middle East Petroleum.
Ironically, the Firm was based neither in Africa nor in the Middle East but in Panama.
For his part, Benon Sevan, an ex French diplomat too and UN official for almost 20
years, received almost 12,000 barrels of oil. According to the IIC, CIA and CFIJ, he
passed his vouchers on to Vitol S.A, a Swiss company, and to Impexoil, from Russia.
Note that both Mr. Bojedeevaix and Mr. Sevan retired from their diplomatic posts early
into the UN sanctions regime and rapidly began to travel to Iraq as private citizens.
Politicians were among the most visible violators of the UN sanctions. Table
4.1 shows 13 individuals who one way or another made a living out of politics. Table 4.1
shows that Arab and Middle Eastern politicians were the largest recipients of contracts.
Russians and Ukrainians participated in larger numbers, but they received fewer
contracts. Also, note that the data only include oil contracts. It does not include
construction, industrial, educational and health contracts, over which, French, Russians
and Ukrainians largely dominated. According to the IIC, Saddam’s regime granted $6
billion in contracts to Russian and Ukrainian individuals within a five-year period (IIC,
Chapter III, p. 39). Some were executed, but some were not. Again, Saddam’s regime
granted contracts based on political criteria, and most of those individuals had no
resources and expertise to execute those contracts.
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Iraq also granted contracts to sons, daughters and relatives of ambassadors,
political leaders, prime ministers and heads of states. Table 4.1 above shows that
Saddam’s regime grated 2,280,000 barrels of oil to the son of the President of Lebanon,
who then sold his oil to Said Oil International Sal, a Lebanese oil corporation. The Table
indicates that the Iraqi regime granted 1,563,000 million barrels to the son of the
President of Kalmykia, a small ex-Soviet Republic. He sold the contracts to Kalmyk Oil
& Gas Company, an oil company owned by the state of Kalmykia. The son of the
Russian ambassador to Iraq received 13,071,000 barrels, which he sold to RAO Mes
International Economic Company, of Russia. All told, Table 4.1 shows that 36
individuals obtained a total of 129,458,000 barrels of oil. It accounted for 29% of all oil
contracts granted to individuals under the sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter III, p. 39).

Organizations
The UN issued 259 licenses to 172 NGOs, including political and religious
organizations, from 1996 to 2002, so they could carry out humanitarian work in Iraq (IIC,
Chapter III, p. 44). Some of those NGOs were very vocal when denouncing the impact
that the UN sanctions had on Iraqis. Others focused on lobbying governmental agencies,
politicians and UN officials to ease the sanctions or create “smart sanctions.” But others
decided to profit from the sanctions regime. Like individuals did, they allied to oil
traders, financiers and export-import firms to execute the contracts they obtained from
Saddam’s regime. The IIC reported 73 religious NGOs as violators of the UN sanctions
(IIC, Chapter III, p. 79). The CIA reported 84. Table 4.2 shows a group of 29 violators
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selected according to the size of the business they accrued (CIA, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p. 211). They obtained contracts for 1,000,000 million barrels of oil.

Table 4.2 – Organizations-Violators of the UN Sanctions Regime
Organization

Nationality Beneficiary Company

Nationality Barrels Lifted

Russia Communist Party

Russia

Monaco JSC

Russia

110,618,000

Russia Peace and Unity Party

Russia

Rossbulneft Ad

Russia

87,281,000

Russian Liberal Democratic Party

Russia

Sindanco

Russia

62,068,000

Mujahedeen Khalq Organization

Iraq

Century Marketing Associates

UK

27,983,000

Yugoslavia

Eurol Int'l (based in Bermuda)

UK

19,392,000

Socialist and Radical Parties (50%ea)
Amities Franco-Irakiennes

France

Aredio Petroleum S.A.R.L.

France

11,140,000

Iraqi-Ukraine House

Ukraine

H.I.U. Ltd

Ukraine

10,318,000

Ukraine Communist Party

Ukraine

Hyperborey

Ukraine

7,393,000

Liberal Democratic Party

Belarus

Belmetalenergo, Inc

Belarus

6,552,000

Belarus Communist Party

Belarus

ACTEC

Russia

6,435,000

Yugoslavia

4,056,000

UAE

3,984,000

Yugoslavia Radical Party

Yugoslavia Pitkin Ltd

Socialist Party of Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia Emiroil EST

Palestine Economic Institute

Petrolina Oil Ltd

Jordan

3,688,000

Russian Political Science Academy

Russia

Zerich GMBH

Russia

3,635,000

Gubkin University of Oil And Gas

Russia

Zarubezhneft

Russia

3,337,000

Bulgaria Socialist Party
India-Congress Party
Union of all Russian Officers

Palestine

Bulgaria

Vassilevy Brothers Ltd

India

Masefield AG

Russia

Bulgaria

3,023,000

Switzerland

2,937,000

Tatneft

Russia

2,708,000

Romania Labor Party

Romania

Petroline FZC

UAE

2,275,000

Palestinian Liberation Front

Palestine

Awad Ammora Co. & Partners

Syria

2,051,000

National Press Association of Algeria

Algeria

Zyria Management Services

Switzerland

2,041,000

Iraqi-Bulgaria Co. Ltd

Bulgaria

Vassilevi Brothers Ltd.

Bulgaria

2,039,000

Russia

2,016,000

Russia for Benefit of Government
Yugoslavia Left Wing Party

Russia

Zarubezhneft

UAE

1,840,000

Hungary-Welfare Party

Hungary

Rompetrol S.A.

Rumania

1,101,000

Romania Communist Party

Romania

Petroline FZC

UAE

1,038,000

Arab-Austrian Friendship Society

Austria

Al-Hoda Int'l Trading Co.

UAE

1,023,000

Ukraine Socialist Party

Ukraine

Zerich GMBH

Russia

1,001,000

Yugoslavia

1,000,000

Yugoslavia Kostunica Party

Yugoslavia Petroline FZC

Yugoslavia Gromig Export-Import

Total

393,973,000

Source: Duelfer Report, IIC Report
There are several findings here. First, see in Column I that political parties,
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universities, academies, unions and civic associations are among the NSAs that illegally
approached Saddam’s regime for contracts. Political organizations led the trend. Second,
there is a notable presence of political parties from nations of the former communist bloc.
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and ex-Soviet republics led this tendency. I
argued earlier that the UN sanctions coincided with the disintegration of the communist
bloc and the economic crisis that followed there. Also important is the sweeping political
reforms that occurred in those nations. The reforms brought about a multiparty system
with no financial support from the state. Political parties had to fund themselves. They
had to raise money from their constituencies or other sources. Evidences suggest that the
UN sanctions regime became a source of funding
Indeed, Table 4.2 reveals that twelve political parties obtained over a million
barrels of oil. The three leading beneficiaries were Russian political organizations, and
that the leading recipient was the Russian Communist Party. This may be the result of the
long standing relations between the Russian Communist Party and the Iraqi regime,
dating back to the days when the Soviet Union was among the main political and
economic allies of the Iraqi regime. Now observe in the Column IV the number of
Russian companies. There are nine in total, acting as beneficiaries. It was the result of the
privatization process that took place in Russia during the 1990s, which only in the oil
industry led to the creation of hundreds of oil companies. Russian political organizations
and Russian oil firms worked together to circumvent the UN sanctions regime. In fact,
later in this dissertation I explain that banks, companies and businesses of all sorts
preferred Russian companies to execute their contracts. Among other things, it illustrates
how rapidly Russian political parties and businesses transitioned from a closed society
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and market to the open global society and economy.
It is important to emphasize the role of two Palestinian organizations: the
Palestinian Liberation Front (PLO) and the Palestine Economic Institute, in
circumventing the sanctions regime. These organizations had no experience in the oil
business. In fact, Palestine is not a state, and there are no oil firms and refineries in
Palestinian territories. The Palestinian people actually meet 100% of its energy demands
through Israel (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 188). What then did
Palestinian organizations do with those oil contracts? The answer is straightforward: they
resold them to finance their political activities, just like most political organization did.
As Table 4.2 shows, the PLO resold 2,016,000 million barrels to Awad Ammora Co. &
Partners, a Turkish Firm registered and based in Syria. The Palestine Economic Institute
resold 3,688,000 million barrels to Petrolina Oil Ltd, an Italian petroleum conglomerate
with numerous refineries in Jordan and other nations in the Middle East.
Overall, Table 4.2 shows that 29 organizations received a total of 421,022,000
barrels of oil within an average period of 3 years (IIC, Chapter III, p. 79). The IIC
estimated that the contracts were worth about $550 million dollars (IIC, Chapter III, p.
79). The CIA reported that, in total, Saddam’s regime granted about $3 billion dollars
worth of oil to NGOs, political parties, religious organizations and other civic entities
from all around the world (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 190). In
the next section, I discuss examples of how individuals and organizations worked with
corporations and banks to evade the UN sanctions and to conceal their profits.

Case Studies
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In this section, I present eight case studies to explain how NSAs evaded or helped
evade the UN sanctions in Iraq. The cases are: 1) Mr. Kojo Annan and Cotecna; 2) Mr.
Benon Sevan and AMEP; 3) Mr. Jean Bernard Mérimée; 4) Father Benjamin; 5) Mr.
George Galloway, Mariam Appeal, Fortum and Delta Services; 6) Mr. Vladimir
Zhirinovsky, his son Mr. Igor Lebedev, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and the
three companies: Bayoil, Sidanco, and Plasco Shipping Co.; 7) the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation, the Foundation for Friendship with Peoples of Arab States, the
Council for Trade and Economic Cooperation with the Middle East and North African
Countries, and Glencore International AG, a transnational corporation; 8) the African
National Congress, the South Africa-Iraq Friendship Association, the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) and two corporations: Montega Trading Ltd and Imvume
Management Ltd. Again, corporations are the common denominator here. It is so because
most NSAs confronted the same key issue: they did not possess the “know-how” to
execute business contracts they obtained from Saddam’s regime; therefore, they allied to
corporations that did have the capabilities to execute the contracts. But above all, these
case studies illustrate: a) how NSAs interact within the context of a global civic society;
b) how vulnerable multilateral sanctions regimes are to a global civil society.

Kojo Anan and Cotecna
The first case involves the model individual-UN associates-corporations. The
model typifies how individuals lobbied UN associates on behalf of corporations
interested in trading with the Iraqi regime under the UN sanctions regime. The case
focuses on Kojo Annan, the son of Kofi Annan, UN’s Secretary General at the time the
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UN conceived and enforced its sanctions regime against Iraq. Strong evidences suggest
that Kojo Annan utilized his contacts at UN to win, among other contracts, perhaps the
most important contract under the UN sanctions regime: the contract to inspect importexport operations in Iraqi. Kojo won the contract for Cotecna Inc.
Cotecna was a family-owned business, registered and based in Geneva,
Switzerland (IIC, p. 480). The company belonged to Elie Massey, an Egyptian old friend
of Boutros-Ghali, a former UN Secretary General (IIC, p. 480). The CIA and IIC
assumed that thanks to the friendship, Cotecna obtained several contracts from UN
during Ghali’s tenure, to the point that Cotecna became a multimillion dollars business
and UN’s main subcontractor in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria.
But once Boutros-Ghali’s Secretariat was over, Cotecna began to lose influence at UN
and, as result, numerous contracts. Cotecna even faced a corruption scandal in Pakistan,
which involved the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 48). It
was during this period of crisis for Cotecna that Kojo Annan sought to work for the
company. Kojo applied for a job there through his old friend Michael Wilson, Cotecna’s
Vice President for Marketing Operations in Africa. Cotecna hired Kojo as a consultant.
Meyer and Califano affirmed that that “Cotecna decided to hire Kojo because of his
connections and standing. Though not yet Secretary-General, Kofi Annan was already a
prominent UN functionary serving under the Secretary-General and a strong candidate
to substitute Boutros Ghali. The United States saw in Annan a reformer and supported
his candidacy from the very beginning” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 48).
Kojo became a consultant for Cotecna in 1995, and Cotecna became the sole
inspection company of import-export operations in Iraq in 1996 (IIC, p. 481; Meyer and
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Califano, 2006, p. 48). The contract itself was not lucrative for it was worth just $6
million per year, but Cotecna began to impose hidden fees and surcharges, accepted
briberies, and paid kickbacks to Saddam’s regime. Cotecna paid its way into Saddam’s
bureaucracy, which eventually translated into more lucrative contracts. Cotecna obtained
39 procurement contracts (IIC, p. 482; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 48). Through its
auditing work, it absorbed contracts that included construction projects, transportation,
and even in the health care sector. The CIA and IIC calculated that Cotecna made about
$120 million dollars per year through illegal deals and operations. Their activities had
multiplier effects of about $800 million dollars per year for the Iraqi economy (IIC, p.
481; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 48).
Cotecna paid Kojo a salary of $2,500 per month for seven days of work per week,
and it also paid Kojo $500 dollars per day in allowances and issued a credit card for him.
Cotecna paid Kojo about a $3 million dollars in “consulting fees” for a period of two
years (IIC, p. 482; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 48). Cotecna’s bank records revealed a
trail of transactions from its accounts to Kojo’s. For example, the IIC found that Cotecna
paid $195,000 dollars through Confiner and Meteor, two dormant companies owned by
Mr. Massey, Kojo’s friend and mentor. The trail of proof shifted toward Westexim by the
year 2000. Westexim was a shell company registered in Switzerland but with P.O. Box in
London. Cotecna issued seven money transfers of $118,000 dollars through Westexim,
but there were another two payments of $130,000 to Kojo from an offshore account
Cotecna had in Jersey Island (IIC, p. 483).
What is important here is that Kojo Anan utilized his influence as the son of
UN’s Secretary General to attain a lucrative UN contract for Cotecna, which was a
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private enterprise. Cotecna paid Kojo for his services, and it paid itself handsomely. Yet,
it failed to inspect and detect violations of sanctions. Under Cotecna’s watch, NGOs,
individuals, political parties, banks, companies and Iraq profited hundreds of millions of
dollars through kickbacks, overcharges, surcharges, money laundering, and other illegal
operations. Thus, I would safely argue that Cotecna was largely responsible for the
failures of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.

Benon Sevan
The second case explains the model UN bureaucrats - corporations, namely
how bureaucrats working for an international institution such as UN can affect a
multilateral sanctions regime. The case study is about Mr. Benon Sevan, one of the most
visible individuals in the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. Mr. Sevan was the Executive
Director of OIP, the very office responsible for overseeing the UN sanctions regime. Mr.
Sevan’s actions contributed to violations of the UN sanctions.
Mr. Sevan began to work for UN in 1965. He was promoted to Assistant
Secretary General and Secretary-General’s Personal Representative in Afghanistan and
Pakistan from 1989 to 1997 (IIC, p. 213). He was then appointed Executive Director of
the OIP in 1997, an office explicitly created to oversee the sanctions regime. It was a
powerful post in bureaucratic and political terms. From his office, Mr. Sevan supervised
daily operations of the sanctions regime during the period 1997-2003 (IIC, p. 213; Meyer
and Califano, 2006, p. 182). The office established administrative rules and policies, set
agendas, conducted periodic audits, gathered statistical and financial data, and prepared
reports for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Sevan’s office had
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an adjacent division responsible for overseeing the execution of contracts. It had
hundreds of auditors monitoring compliance of contracts and sanctions. In addition, it had
a third office, this one “on the ground,” on Iraqi soil, to coordinate enforcement of
sanctions throughout Iraq and its borders. In other words, under the right leadership, Mr.
Sevan’s office could have been an effective instrument of the UN sanctions regime. On
the wrong hands, it could have led to mismanagement, corruption and nepotism. The
latter prevailed.
Right after his appointment at the UN, Mr. Sevan started lobbying against the
very sanctions regime he was supposed to enforce and oversee. He travelled 16 times in
one year to Iraq, always as a UN representative; yet, while there, he spoke against the UN
sanctions regime (IIC, p. 213; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 182). He traveled across the
world to speak to prime ministers, politicians, religious leaders and human right groups.
He spoke of relaxing the sanctions, rebuilding the Iraqi oil industry, and increasing sells
of Iraqi oil. Meyer and Califano noted that “Mr. Sevan became the unofficial ambassador
and voice of the Oil for Food Program” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 183).
It is plausible that Mr. Sevan truly felt the need for relaxing the sanctions regime
after witnessing the suffering of Iraqi people at first hand. However, evidences show that
he illegally accepted oil vouchers from the Iraqi regime and sold them to AMEP, an oil
trader registered in Panama (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 183). I showed in Table 4.1
that Mr. Sevan illegally obtained vouchers for 11 million barrels of oil. IIC’s records
indicated that Mr. Sevan sold the vouchers to AMEP, and Sevan’s bank statements
revealed “Regular deposits of thousands of dollars of cash – usually in the form of onehundred-dollar U.S. banknotes- to their New York bank accounts at the UN Federal
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Credit Union and Chase Manhattan Bank” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 183). Chart I
right below shows deposits in Sevan’s personal bank accounts.

Chart 4.2 - Benon Sevan’s Personal Bank Account during the UN Sanctions Regime

Source: IIC, Duelfer Report
Chart 4.2 shows deposits from $7,000 to $18,000 thousand from December 1998
to April 2002 even though Mr. Sevan had just one legal source of income: the salary he
received from the UN. Curiously, “Bank records for accounts used by Sevan and his wife,
Micheline Sevan, who was also a UN employee, showed that… their accounts went into
overdraft status almost two hundred times. But after AMEP’s first oil sale at the end of
1998, all of it changed as a mysterious chain of cash deposits emerged” (Meyer and
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Califano, 2006, p. 183). The IIC linked Mr. Sevan’s bank deposits to AMEP’s bank
withdrawals. The deposits coincided with the first oil voucher the Iraqi regime assigned
to Mr. Sevan, coinciding with AMEP’s first oil sale under the UN sanctions regime.
AMEP tallied its payments to Mr. Sevan “as commissions that ranged between 5 to 10
cents per oil barrel” (IIC, p. 215; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 183). Mr. Sevan and his
wife made their last large deposit in April 2002. Coincidently, AMEP executed its last oil
sale just a month earlier. I found evidences of Mr. Sevan and AMEP’s illegal activities
through records that Shell Corporation made public upon subpoena by the IIC. Shell’s
records revealed that AMEP resold Mr. Sevan’s vouchers to Shell Corporation (IIC, p.
215; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 183).

Jean Bernard Mérimée
This third case also involves the model individuals - UN associates -corporations.
The case is about Mr. Jean Bernard Mérimée. This case is significant because Mr.
Mérimée was the French Ambassador to UN from 1991 to 1995, and as such he
conceived and negotiated UN Resolution 986, which established the UN sanctions regime
against Iraq. Let us not forget that France has veto power as one of the permanent
members of the UN Security Council, which gave Mr. Mérimée authority and a lot of
power with respect to the UN sanctions regime and in UN in general.
Mr. Mérimée began to oppose Resolution 986 soon after UN approved it. To be
fair, he “Advocated for lifting the sanctions once Iraq satisfied its obligations concerning
its weapons program pursuant to United Nations resolutions” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 49;
Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 77). He favored the “smart sanctions” initiative, which
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eventually became France’s policy toward the Iraqi question. Yes, I would argue that it
was France’s policy and not Mérimée’s. Yet, it all seems suspicious because Mérimée
ended his ambassadorship to UN in 1995, and soon afterwards he became the Special
Advisor to UN Secretary General on European Affairs, from where he voiced his support
for “smart sanctions” as an alternative to the UN sanctions regime against Iraq (IIC,
Chapter II, p. 49; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 77).
It turned out that Mr. Mérimée had forged a friendship with Tariq Azid, Iraq’s
Foreign Minister. “To show his pleasure for Mr. Mérimée’s fair negotiations,” Tariz Azid
granted $2 million barrels of oil and a dozen procurement contracts to Mr. Mérimée, who
then sold them to Fenar Petroleum Ltd; a Firm based in Liechtenstein and subsidiary of
Taurus Group, a Swiss oil trader (IIC, p. 49; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 77). Mr.
Mérimée hired Mr. Elias Firzli to manage the operations. Mr. Firzli was an intermediary
who “Often helped beneficiaries based in France to sell contracts received from
Saddam’s regime” (IIC, Chapter II p. 51; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 78). Mr.
Mérimée, Mr. Firzli and Fenar utilized BMCE Bank of Morocco to conduct their
financial transactions. The idea came from Mr. Mérimée himself. He declared to the IIC
that “He was careful not to involve a French entity in the transactions” (IIC, p. 51;
Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 78). The obvious plan was to use Morocco’s flexible
banking system to avoid French and UN auditors. The IIC estimated that Mr. Mérimée
pocketed about $2 million dollars, the result of his illegal business deals under the UN
sanctions regime against Iraq (IIC, Chapter II; p. 52; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 78).
Father Benjamin
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The fourth case study involves the formula individual-religious activismcompanies. It is about Father Jean-Marie Benjamin, a priest who used humanitarian work
and a private enterprise as a façade to evade sanctions.
Father Benjamin worked as Assistant to the Vatican Secretary of State from 1991
to 1994 (IIC, Chapter II, p. 99). Once his assignment ended, he began a public relations
campaign against the sanctions regime. He produced the documentary “Iraq: The Birth of
Time” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 99). It was his personal account of the negative effects that the
sanctions had upon Iraqi population. The documentary was well-acclaimed in Europe,
motivating a passionate debate about the morality of sanctions regimes as instruments of
foreign policy, given their negative impact on civil population. Father Benjamin also
created “Benjamin Committee for Iraq,” a NGO to raise money, cloths, medicines, and
school supplies for Iraqi children (IIC, Chapter II, p. 100). In April 2000, Faher Benjamin
became the center of media frenzy as he, and another 200 activists, boarded an illegal
flight to Baghdad in defiance of UN sanctions. In fact, he visited Iraq and met Saddam on
various occasions. He even invited Tariq Aziz, a Christian, to pay a visit to Pope John
Paul II at the Vatican (IIC, Chapter II, p.100; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 88).
It was during one of those meetings that Father Benjamin asked Tariq Aziz for oil
vouchers and procurement contracts (IIC, Chapter II, p. 100; Meyer and Califano, 2006,
p. 88). He argued that selling the contracts would have raised capital to fund his public
relations campaign against the sanctions regime. Tariq Aziz accepted the proposal, and
Father Benjamin proceeded to contact Alain Bionda, a Swiss oil trader, owner of Zyria
Management Services (IIC, Chapter II, p. 100, Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 88). Mr.
Bionda had been seeking business opportunities in Iraq without success, so he rapidly
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accepted and proceeded to hire several companies to execute the contracts. The most
notable was Taurus Group and its subsidiaries. Bank records show that Zyria and Taurus
shared transactions for about $25 million per year from 1997 to 2001 (IIC, Chapter II, p.
101; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 88). They transferred about $7 million dollars in the
form of bank notes to Father Benjamin’s accounts at UBS Geneva and Vatican Bank,
Istituto per le Opere di Religione. The companies described the transfers as “donations.”
The IIC calculated that Father Benjamin received vouchers for about 6 million barrels of
oil and procurement contracts worth $20 million dollars (IIC, Chapter II, p. 101; Meyer
and Califano, 2006, p. 88).

George Galloway
The case, like the fourth, illustrates how NSAs evaded the UN sanctions regime in
the name of charitable work, only that this case involves a legislator using a NGO as a
façade. The case fits the formula individuals- political activism – corporations. It entails
Mr. George Galloway, his charity foundation Mariam Appeal, and corporations Fortum
and Delta Services.
Mr. Galloway was a British MP well-known for his opposition to the UN
sanctions regime. He reasoned that the sanctions affected the Iraqi people, not the Iraqi
regime. To illustrate his argument, he visited Iraq on several occasions and documented
the effects that the UN sanctions were having on Iraqi civilians. He even brought a four
year old Iraqi girl to Great Britain for medical treatment. Her name was Mariam. In her
honor, Mr. Galloway founded the charitable foundation Mariam Appeal, whose mission
was to mobilize public opinion, lobby the UN and governments, and raise money to
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purchase medicines, food, and school supplies for Iraqi children. Mr. Galloway toured ten
nations in a double-decker British bus, including Iraq. He voiced his message wherever
he went. Below is a record of his visits to Iraq in violations of the UN sanctions.

Table 4.3 – George Galloway’s Visits to Iraq during the UN Sanctions Regime

George Galloway's Visits to Iraq from 1993 to 2002
Date

Meeting

Oct-02

Deputy Prime Minister tariq Aziz

Aug-02

Saddam Hussein and T ariq Aziz

May-02

T ariq Aziz

Jan-02

Information Minister, Muhammad Said al-Sahhaf

Nov-01

T ariq Aziz

Oct-01

Agriculture Minister, Abd-al-Ilah Hamid Muhammad

Feb-01

T ariq Aziz

Jan-01

T ariq Aziz

Nov-00

T ariq Aziz

Oct-00

T ariq Aziz

May-00

Culture Minister, Humam Abd-al-Khaliq

Mar-00

T ariq Aziz

Dec-99

Vice Chairman, Revolution Command Council Izzat Ibrahim

Nov-99

T ariq Aziz and Foreign Minister Muhammad Said Al-Sahhaf

Aug-99

T ariq Aziz

Jun-99

Mariam Appeal Convoy

Oct-98

T ariq Aziz

Apr-98

T ariq Aziz

Mar-98

T ariq Aziz

Jan-94

Saddam Hussein and T ariq Aziz

May-93

Speaker of the National Assembly, Sadi Mahdi Salih

Source: IIC, Meyer and Califano
Mariam Appeal received many donations. Among others, it received $500,000
from the UAE government, $150,000 from the King of Saudi Arabia, $6,750 from
Fortum Oil and Gas, and $375,000 from Fawaz Zureikat (IIC, Chapter II, p. 79; Meyer
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and Califano, 2006, p. 78). But Mr. Galloway was using Mariam Appeal as a façade to
receive contracts from the Iraqi regime. Galloway adopted the pseudonym Abu Mariam.
With it, he channeled to Mariam Appeal 39 contracts, worth $50 million dollars, to
export British foodstuffs and medicines to Iraq (IIC, Chapter II, p. 79; Meyer and
Califano, 2006, p. 78). In addition, he channeled between 18-20 million barrels of oil for
a value $80 million in a three year period (IIC, Chapter II, p. 79; Meyer and Califano,
2006, p. 78). The scheme worked as follow: Mr. Galloway appointed Fawaz Zureikat as
co-Chairman of Mariam Appeal and his liaison in Baghdad. Mr. Zureikat was a Jordanian
businessman, owner of a dozen small companies throughout the Middle East. The Iraqi
regime granted contracts to Mariam Appeal as “donations for Iraqi women and
children.” Mariam Appeal then passed the contracts on to Mr. Zureikat’s various
companies. Zureikat used his companies to provide business logistics, sell the oil in
European markets, and channel payments to Mr. Galloway. In turn, both Galloway and
Zureikat worked with Mr. Al-Chalabi, an Iraqi businessman living in Great Britain and
owner of Fortum and Delta Services, two import-export Firms (IIC, Chapter II, p. 81;
Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 79). The role of Al-Chalabi was to move money from Mr.
Zureikat to Mariam and then to Galloway’s bank accounts at Citibank. Al-Chalabi
referenced its transfers as “funding for medical supplies.”
For example, the IIC revealed that Delta Services sold oil contract M/07/83 in
January 2000 (IIC, Chapter II, p. 81; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 79). Soon after, it
made a series of electronic transfers of $120,000 thousand to Mr. Zureikat until totaling
$472,228, who then transferred the money to Mariam in the form of “donations for
medical supplies” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 81; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 79). Ms.
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Galloway’s bank records showed a series of deposits for $472,228 thousand during the
same period of time (IIC, Chapter II, p. 81; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 79). Fortum
made a series of transfers of 70,000 thousand dollars to Mr. Zureikat as well (IIC,
Chapter II, p. 82; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 78). Coincidently, Ms. Galloway’s bank
records accounted for seven consecutive deposits of $70,000 during seven consecutive
weeks (IIC, Chapter II, p. 82; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 78).

Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Liberal Democratic Party
The sixth case study follows the model individual-political parties-corporations.
This case is involves a legislator, a state-actor, who employed his son, a NSA, to
circumvent UN sanctions. Father and son used a political party as a means to access
Saddam’s regime and obtain contracts.
This case is about Vladimir Zhirinovsky, co-founder of the Liberal Democratic
Party of the Soviet Union. Mr. Zhirinovsky consolidated his political career during the
1990s with the emergence of Russian nationalism. He founded the Liberal Democratic
Party of the Russian Federation (LDPR), and almost overnight he became the most
visible face of Russian nationalism and right-wing politics in Russia. Mr. Zhirinovsky ran
for President in 1991, 1995 and 2000. He always lost although scoring large numbers of
votes. For instance, he won 23% of votes during the Russian elections of 1993, ranking
third among a large number of political candidates (IIC, Chapter II, p. 30). It was not
enough to win the Russian Presidency, but it was large enough to legitimize his political
persona and control 12% of the Russian Duma.
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The rise of Zhirinovsky’s political career coincided with the consolidation of the
UN sanctions regime. Mr. Zhirinovsky visited Bagdad a dozen times, not as a legislator
but as a leader of the LDPR. On one occasion, he led a delegation of 50 Russian political
activists and businessmen to Baghdad where he “Called for the immediate end to UN
sanctions against Iraq and the end of American occupation of Iraqi territories” (IIC, US
Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8). He also met “With Saddam
Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and Speaker of the National Assemble Saadi
Mehdi Saleh” (IIC, US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8). They
signed “An agreement of cooperation between the parliament of Iraq and the LDPR
faction; in addition, he signed an agreement on “inter-party ties” between the Husseincontrolled Baath Party and the LDPR” (IIC, US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, p. 8). He promised Saddam that “He and the LDPR will stand firmly
against the enforcement of the United Nations economic sanctions against Iraq... and
that in order to balance the political situation in the world, the LDPR will use our
influence on the Duma to adopt resolutions that will facilitate the economic cooperation
between our countries” (IIC, US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p.
8).
The Iraqi government rewarded Mr. Zhirinovsky for his services. The IIC and the
US Senate estimated that the Iraqi government illegally granted 78.8 million barrels of oil
to Mr. Zhirinovsky, and that he made about $9 million in a two-year period (IIC, Chapter
II, p. 31; Meyer and Califano, 2006, 2006, p. 76-77). The Iraqi government also granted
32 procurement contracts to Zhirinovsky, so he could export industrial parts and
machinery to Iraq. The contracts were worth about $20 million (IIC, Chapter II, p. 31;
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Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 76-77). Mr. Zhirinovsky obtained a contract to repair three
Iraqi oil refineries that had been damaged during the Persian Gulf War. The contract was
worth $600 million dollars, but he lost it (IIC, Chapter II, p. 31; Meyer and Califano,
2006, p. 76-77). He could not find a subcontractor, a company willing to execute the
contract at the prices he had set forth.
The IIC and the U.S. Senate concluded that it was impossible to estimate exactly
how much Zhirinovsky made through violations of the UN sanctions. The problem was
that most Russian individuals, organizations and companies used cash, among other
reasons, for lack of credit history. In fact, in the following chapters I will explain how the
use of cash was a common practice to evade the sanctions, but for the moment I will cite
the IIC, which stated that “Some surcharge payments were partially or fully satisfied
through cash payments at the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow,” and that “Diplomatic bags,
which could hold up to $1.5 million in $100 bills, were used to transport the money”
(IIC, US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8). Still, the IIC did trace
some of the money back “to an account in the Bank of Cyprus with the reference in favor
of Igor Lebedev” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 32; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 77).
Igor Lebedev was too a member of the LDPR, but he also was the son of Mr.
Zhirinovsky. It turned out that the IIC and CIA linked Mr. Lebedev’s account at Bank of
Cyprus to accounts owned by Bayoil, Sidanco, and Plasco Shipping Co. Ltd (IIC,
Chapter II, p. 32; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 77). It all suggests that Igor Lebedev was
the intermediary between Zhirinovsky (his father) and those companies.
Bayoil was an oil trading company based in Bahamas and a parent company of
Bayoil Inc., based in Houston, Texas. Bayoil Inc. was a financier of oil, coal and other
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forms of energy (IIC, Chapter II, p. 32; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 88-89). For its part,
Sidanco was a Russian company specialized in the extraction and refining of oil, and
Plasco was a Liberian company specialized in the transportation of oil and linked to
Bayoil Inc. as a subcontractor (IIC, Chapter II, p. 32; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 8889). The three companies helped Mr. Zhirinovsky finance, lift and transport oil from Iraqi
oil wells to world markets by using Igor Lebedev as their intermediary. Their operations
went undetected for about seven years of multilateral sanctions, until Zhirinovsky
defaulted in his “kickbacks” to the Iraqi government and Saddam banned him from doing
business with Iraq.

Communist Party of the Russian Federation
This case is about the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF.) It
shows how a political organization aligned to an NGO and a private corporation with the
goal of evading a sanctions regime. They followed the model individuals – political
activism – corporations.
The KPRF was founded in 1993 after the disintegration of the Soviet Union (IIC,
Chapter II, p. 27). The Party was largely recognized as the heir of the Communist Party
of the USRR, which had solid ideological, political and commercial relations with
Saddam and his regime. Their relations go back to the days when the Communist Party
was the sole spiritual, ideological, political leader of former Soviet Union and its
satellites.
In Chapters II and III, I showed evidences of how Saddam’s regime was one of
the most important commercial and military partners the Soviets had in the Middle East
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during the Cold War. The partnership continued after the end of the Cold War through
the UN sanctions regime. The KPRF was powerless and penniless, and Saddam’s regime
was doomed to collapse. Thus, they needed each other. The KPRF needed money and
international recognition in a time when most communist parties, and their ideology,
were considered dead. Saddam, for his part, needed support against the UN sanctions
regime and the multilateral coalition led by the U.S. and UK, which occupied half of the
Iraqi territory. Saddam thought that the KPRF and Mr. Zyuganov could be a useful voice
in the Russian Federation and around the world (IIC, US Senate, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 22). From 1996 to 2000, Gennady Zyuganov came
second in the Russian Presidential election, and the KPRF held an important number of
seats in the Russian Duma (IIC, Chapter II, p. 27; IIC, US Senate, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 22). Above all, consider that Russia was a permanent
member of the UN Security Council.
For those reasons, the KPRF had no problem obtaining oil and procurement
contracts from Saddam’s regime. After all, it publicly opposed the sanctions and military
actions against Iraq. It even submitted a public letter to the UN calling for lifting the
inhuman embargo against Iraq. Its problem, however, was executing those contracts for,
as a political organization, it had no business experience whatsoever. The KPRF found a
solution in the global civil society.
First, the KPRF found a partner in the Foundation for Friendship with Peoples of
Arab States (FFPAS), a relatively well-known political organization with offices in Paris,
London, Amsterdam, Geneva and other European capitals (IIC, US Senate, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 22-23). The KPRF was not to receive contracts
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directly from Iraq but rather through FFPAS. The obvious objective was to evade the UN
sanctions regime. Second, the KPRF itself created a non-state actor and named it “The
Council for Trade and Economic Cooperation with the Middle East and North African
Countries” (ACTEC). In its Articles of Incorporation, ACTEC assures us that its main
and sole objective was the promotion of Iraqi trade throughout the Middle East and North
Africa. However, Meyer and Califano stated that “It was merely a nameplate company
that temporarily leased an office space at a Russian foreign services training school in
Moscow” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 103) and the IIC affirmed that “The exact scope
of ACTEC’s business activity is unclear, but it appears to have been established
specifically for Programme-related business projects” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 43-44).
Nevertheless, ACTEC proceeded to hire Glencore International AG as a subcontractor.
Glencore was a holding company specializing in commodity trading (IIC, Chapter II, p.
43-44). It was registered and based in Switzerland, owned by a partnership between its
management and employees. The partnership presented a difficulty to Glencore’s
management though: it feared that employees would oppose engaging in business
relations with ACTEC, a Russian NGO promoting business with Iraq, which was an
embargoed nation.
Glencore reinvented itself to deal with that difficulty. It created Petrogaz
Distribution S.A. and Glencore France S.A. in 1999, and it registered them in France
(IIC, Chapter II, p. 43-44). Then, Glencore approached Al-Khaled Engineering Est., a
Jordanian company specialized in logistics and transportation of crude oil. Next,
Glencore created several layers of bank accounts dispersed at different banks throughout
the global banking system. Bank records show that Glencore deposited $9.1 billion in its
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accounts at Arab Bank Geneva, in Geneva, Deutsche Bank A.G., in Munich, and
Commercial Bank International and Arab Bank Dubai, both in Dubai (IIC, Chapter II, p.
45, Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 104). The IIC traced the money to accounts that Delta
Petroleum Products Trading owned in Geneva, Switzerland. Delta was a dormant
company Glencore created and registered in Switzerland in 1999. Through it, Glencore
paid Scandinavian T. Ltd, which in turn paid ACTEC for its contracts. ACTEC ranked
fourth among all Russian non-state actors, including companies, in oil and procurement
contracts. It ranked eight among all participants in the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.
The money was supposed to go to KPRF, but the CIA and the IIC could only account for
approximately $2 billion dollars in oil contracts and $2 billion for its procurement
contracts in a period of 3 years (IIC, Chapter II, p. 45; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 104).

The ANC, the South Africa-Iraq Friendship, and the Non-Aligned Movement
The last case involves the model individuals - international organizations corporations. This case is about an alliance that a political party, a NGO and an
international institution forged to evade the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. This case
shows one of those ironies in international politics for it involves the African National
Congress (ANC). The ANC violated the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq after benefiting
itself from one: the multinational embargo imposed upon South Africa to eradicate the
apartheid regime. Moreover, one of the pillars of the multilateral embargo against South
Africa was to free Nelson Mandela, the ANC’s most prestigious leader and founder of
Umkhonto we Sizwe, which was ANC’s armed arm. This case study also involves the
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South Africa-Iraq Friendship Association (SAIFA) and the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM.)
This case is relevant for two main reasons: first, the ANC was governing South
Africa when it conceived its scheme to circumvent the sanctions regime. Second, the
ANC negotiated with Iraqi officials in the name of the South African government.
Nevertheless, as soon as the IIC launched its investigation on violations of the UN
sanctions regime, the South African government distanced itself from the ANC, and
South African officials went out to publicly state that the government of South Africa had
nothing to do with ANC’s actions. The government of South Africa never investigated
the allegations, which in the end were ignored and forgotten.
The problem was that the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, was also the
Chair of NAM and the African Union. It appeared that some important members of the
ANC took advantage of NAM to engage in business relations with the Iraqi government.
For instance, in November 1999, members of the ANC organized a delegation to visit
Iraq in the name of the NAM. The ANC did not hide its intentions. It announced that the
objective of the visit was to “Expose South African businesses with already established
interests in the so called oil for food Programme with Iraq to the processes involved in
winning such UN-approved contracts” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 103). According to the IIC, the
ANC pushed for establishing full diplomatic relations between South African and Iraq,
and it even invited Tariq Azid, Iraq’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, to visit South Africa.
Then, the ANC joined the South Africa-Iraq Friendship Association (SAIFA) to welcome
Tariq Azid to South Africa. It turned out that SAIFA had been serving as a business
intermediary between Montega Trading Ltd (Montega), Imvume Management Ltd
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(Imvume), and the Iraqi government. The IIC pointed out that “South African
businessmen formed the companies to take advantage of the oil contract available under
the UN sanctions regime” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 104), and “Mr. Majali used Montega and
Imvume as the contracting companies to purchase the oil” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 104).
Sandi Majali was the Chairman of both SAIFA and SABCETT. A series of letters and
actions showed that he was the ANC’s strong man in Baghdad for the purpose of
organizing ANC’s operations in Iraq.
For example, in a letter to Tariq Azid, the ANC appointed Mr. Majali “As a
recognized representative of the ANC” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 103). Iraqi officials accredited
him as “Advisor of the ANC and to the President of South Africa” (IIC, Chapter II, p.
103). Second, Mr. Majali “Led a delegation to Iraq, which included officials from the
South African Strategic Fuel Fund Association and South African Department of
Minerals and Energy” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 104). The purpose of the trip was to hold
“Discussions on strengthening ties between the ANC and the Iraq Friendship Association
and Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party, as well as building better oil trade relations between the
two countries” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 105). A letter from Mr. Montlanthe, Chairman of Iraq
Friendship Association, stated that “Mr. Majali’s position as Chairperson of SAIFA had
the ANC’s full approval and blessing” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 105). The letter confirmed
“ANC’s approval of Mr. Majali as a designated person to lead the implementation
process arising out of our economic development programme” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 103).
For his part, Mr. Majali “Wrote two letters to Iraqi authorities in which he
referred to a request for oil allocations that had been made to support South Africa’s
political activities in connection with Iraq” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 108). In another letter,
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this one addressed to the President of the Iraqi Friendship Association, Mr. Majali argued
that “A joint effort between the ANC and the Arab Baáth Party will add a lot of value
towards achieving the common political objectives, which will result in an effective
strategy geared toward campaigning for the lifting of sanctions” (IIC, Chapter II, p.
108). In the same letter, he requested 12 million barrels of oil “With particular attention
to the competitive advantage pricing of this transaction for the benefit of both parties in
order to build financial resources to support political programs […] that the ANC and
Ba’ath parties will be implementing and to run seminars, workshops in order to develop
effective political development strategies” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 108). Still, in another letter
Mr. Majali requested another 12 million barrels of oil. He argued that the oil was
“Required by the South African government for its strategic reserves” (IIC, Chapter II, p.
109). He confirmed that the “ANC will be sending a high level delegation” to a
colloquium the Iraqi government was organizing in Baghdad against the UN sanctions
regime.
The correspondence between Mr. Majali and Iraqi officials was abundant. It
went on for almost five years, proving that Mr. Majali did not act alone; rather, he always
appeared as a representative of the African National Congress, the South African ruling
party at the time. The IIC calculated that the ANC illegally made about $80 million
dollars through oil sales and another $120 million through procurement contracts (IIC,
Chapter II, p. 110). It is worth repeating that the ANC itself was a beneficiary of the
multilateral sanctions regime imposed upon South Africa to end racism there. It clearly
shows political and even ideological contradictions within the ranks of the ANC, but as
important as it might be, it is not a determinant. What is primarily relevant here is: firstly,
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the conflicts of interests between states and global non-state actors; secondly, the
diversity of global non-state actors relative to their economic, political, and ideological
interests; thirdly, the complexities of multilateral sanctions regimes, and the difficulty of
enforcing them.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I found that NSAs do affect foreign policies such as multilateral
sanction regimes. For instance, I found that a large number of NSAs allied with each
other and a wide range of other actors for the sole purpose of circumventing the sanctions
regime. Individuals, NGOs, political and religious groups, banks and businesses of all
sorts worked together, and with Saddam’s regime, to evade the sanctions and profit from
them. Their actions undermined UN policy toward the Iraqi regime, affected politics in
the Middle East, and relations among world superpowers. Here, one key finding is that
political and civic activists, NGOs, religions organizations and political parties did not
have the required expertise to finance and carry out the contracts they obtained from
Saddam’s regime. As result, they had to pass those contracts on to banks and companies,
which were ultimately responsible for resuming the operations. This is particularly
important because in the next Chapter I will discuss how banks and creditors, through the
global banking industry, circumvented the UN sanctions regime against Iraq to finance
import-export operations there.
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V. AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: THE GLOBAL BANKING
SYSTEM, BANKS, INVESTORS AND SPECULATORS
“Someone has asked you to make a payment to a third party, and that third party happens to be a bank
owned by a company that is incorporated out of the Cayman Islands, and that is the only thing you know
about it. That seems suspicious”.
Congressman Dana Rohrabaher
“Iraq manipulated its national banking structure to finance illicit trade… Iraq established international
accounts to finance its illegal procurement network. Iraq’s international accounts, mainly located in Jordan,
Lebanon and Syria were instrumental in Iraq’s ability to successfully transfer billions of dollars of its
illicitly earned oil revenues from its various global accounts to international suppliers, front companies,
domestic government and business entities”.
The Duelfer Report
“Some movements of funds, such as large deposits followed quickly by similarly large withdrawals from
the account, combined with other factors, including the identity of the recipient of the funds, are examples
of possible money laundering behavior perpetrated by some of these lesser known companies, which went
undetected by banks engaged in trade with Iraq”.
The IIC Report

Introduction
Globalization is a system formed by subsystems, groups and units. In order to
explain the system, we must study its various components, identify their characteristics
and behaviors, and clarify how they interact and what makes them unique within the
system. In this chapter, I examine a very unique subsystem of globalization, a means of
globalization, a system in itself. I examine the global banking system and its various
agents, namely banks, investors and speculators.
In this chapter, I argue that the current global banking system allows nation-states,
banks, investors, speculators, corporations, and NSAs in general to operate and profit
under a sanctions regime, even if it is multilateral. Specifically, I argue the UN sanctions
regime in Iraq failed in large measure due to a global banking system that, directly and
indirectly, intentionally or not, financed the circumvention of the sanctions. To illustrate
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my argument, I present evidences of how states and global NSAs utilized global banking
to finance purchases of Iraqi oil and its derivatives, to finance procurement contracts and
exports to Iraq, to laundry and conceal money, and evade UN inspectors.
I address three main points in this chapter. First, I study the Iraqi banking system
and its surprising expansion under the UN sanctions regime. Second, I examine the role
of BNP Paribas, the bank that the UN appointed to oversee Iraq’s banking. Third, I
discuss how banks, investors and speculators collaborated to finance the circumvention of
the UN sanctions regime. I have collected most of the evidences from the Duelfer Report,
the IIC Report, the Michigan Project, the Heritage Foundation, and media sources.

Global Banking and Banks
I cannot overemphasize the role that the global banking system plays in the global
economy. For one, global banking guarantees the free exchange of money from banks to
investors, speculators, corporations and nation-states throughout global markets and back
to banks. The World Bank estimates that $1.5 trillion dollars flows into the global
economy every day to finance global trade (imports and exports), transportation, labor,
production, investment and speculation (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 545). Second, most of that
money circulates in the form of credit and electronic money. Most businesses operate on
credit, and electronic money, not cash, is the predominant way money circulates through
global markets. The collapse of the global banking system and the subsequent global
credit crisis during the summer of 2008 illustrates a fact of globalization: global banking
finances global trade and credit in the form of electronic money is its blood.
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To begin with, banks have existed for centuries. I can trace them back to the
Greek city-states and Roman Empire where they financed commerce, construction,
armies and wars (Cantor, 1993, p. 41). And Venetian bankers financed some of the most
expensive projects of the Roman Church, including the Crusades (Cantor, 1993, p. 42).
Venetian bankers sponsored the Renaissance too (Cantor, 1993, p. 44). And Dutch and
British banks funded slavery and colonialism. They financed the textile, tobacco, cotton
and other labor-intensive industries. They also invested heavily in the industrial
revolution, which created large industrial outputs and facilitated the accumulation of
capital, used in turn for reinvestment and for the consolidation of the capitalist system.
Banking was already an international industry by the 1920s, but its contemporary
global characteristics came with the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in 1971
(Burchill, 2001, p. 77; Smith, 2003, p. 57). The “regime” regulated the banking industry
to prevent the speculative excesses of the 1920s that had led to the “crash” of the stock
market in 1929 and the economic depression of the 1930s. Over time, inflation, slow
economic growth, trade barriers and other economic factors caused the collapse of the
American dollar, provoking in turn the collapse of the Bretton Woods Accords.
Deregulation of capital in 1971 coincided with very important innovations like banking
software and electronic money, which facilitated the flow of money throughout global
markets at speeds never realized before. The new Regime linked markets and
consolidated interrelations between banks, producers, consumers, and nation-states, but it
kept in place a key feature of Bretton Woods Accords: it did not allow banks to invest in
the import-export industry (Smith, 2003, p. 54). The rationale was that banks were in
large measure responsible for the misfortunes of global trade during the 1910s, 1920s and
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1930s. But by 1982, the U.S. deregulated banking and the import-export industries,
allowing banks to invest in import-exports if they invested through subsidiaries and
affiliates (the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, the 97th Congress). Soon, American
banks such as Bank of America, Manufacturer of Hanover Trust, Chase Manhattan, City
Bank and others created subsidiaries and affiliates for the sole purpose of investing in
import-export firms. The new American law also mobilized foreign banks, which rushed
themselves into American markets, at the time the largest importer-exporter of goods and
services in the world (Barovic, 1985, p. 4). Today, banking is a true global system
composed of investment and brokerage houses, insurance and security firms, and all sorts
of “funds,” from mutual to edge, to sovereign funds.
Next, data from World Bank indicate that banks currently finance 56% of the
global trade, namely the export-import industry (IIC Report, Chapter IV, p. 545).
Financing refers to pay for investing, insurance, legal advising, account management,
currency exchange, cost and payment processing, and lending. Financing is for the most
part made in the form of credit. There are three main types of credit in the global trade:
consignment, open-account and payment in advance (Smith, 2003, p.13-14).
Trading on consignment means that exporters run with all costs and risks
involved in trading (Smith, 2003, p. 15). Exporters ship their cargo with the required
documentation. Once arrived, importers claim ownership of the cargo, but they pay for it
only when the merchandise is sold out. With open-account, exporters absorb all shipping
expenses, but importers pay for the cargo according to a contract previously agreed upon
(Smith, 2003, p. 15). Payment in advance is a sort of insurance, a fee that exporters
charge to importers for risks involved in shipping operations (Smith, 2003, p. 16). Such
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fees can be large, usually from 50 to 70 percent of the total amount owed. It depends on
the importers’ credit history and years in service. In all instances, the role of banks is to
finance shipping operations for which they charge some fees. Banks finance global trade
through two banking devices: trade bills and letters of credit.
Export-import firms utilize trade bills to curtail risks like damages and loss of
goods, failure to pay on time and/or defaulting on loans (Smith, 2003, p. 17). That is why
most banks operate through intermediaries or third parties. Exporters draft a trade bill for
an intermediary, which is usually a carrier or shipping company. Intermediaries run with
all shipping expenses in advance through a loan they receive from a bank. They issue a
bill of landing to exporters as proof that the cargo was shipped (Smith, 2003, p. 17).
Importers receive and pay intermediaries for the trade bill upon arrival of the cargo.
Finally, intermediaries pay the loan back to the bank. If the cargo is lost, damaged or
never delivered, the intermediary still has to pay for the loan unless it declares
bankruptcy. If it does, the intermediary’s insurance pays for the loan. The bank never
loses its money. On the other hand, a letter of credit is the most common, efficient,
secured mechanism for financing global trade (Slager, 2004, p. 44; Smith, 2003, p. 1314). There are two main types: commercial and standby (Smith, 2003, p. 18). A
commercial letter of credit is the prime payment mechanism. Importers and exporters
utilize it when they do not want -or cannot afford- to run with shipping risks and
expenses. A commercial letter of credit is a contractual agreement between an advising
bank (exporter’s bank) and an opening or issuing bank (importer’s bank) through which
they assume all shipping costs and risks involved in the import-export operation (Slager,
2004, p. 47; Smith, 2003, p. 19). If an exporter does not deliver its cargo as stipulated in
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the contract, the advising bank pays for fees and fines. If the cargo is lost or damaged, the
advising bank also pays for it. If an importer defaults or fails to receive the cargo as
contracted, then its opening bank pays. On the other hand, a standby letter of credit
serves as a secondary payment method to ensure that primary payment is delivered within
the terms of the contract (Slager, 2004, p. 55; Smith, 2003, p. 13-14). The standby letter
of credit is also a back up credit to strengthen the exporters and importers’ credit
worthiness. An opening bank issues a standby letter of credit with an expiration date
attached to it. The exporter holds (or standby) the letters until terms of contracts are met.
If they are, the importer pays the exporter for the cargo, and the advising bank disregards
the letter and ends the contract. In general, commercial and standby letters of credit are
backed up by other documents such as invoices, promissory notes, and insurance.
In all, letters of credits are valuable for banks, exporters and importers (Slager,
2004, p. 77). First, exporters and importers never use their money up front but just credit,
or a promise to pay later in montly amounts. For their parts, banks do not use their credit
but their customers’. Also, by financing trade through credit, exporters-importers do not
need to move large sums of capital. Consider that global trade is expensive for it requires
chartering planes, vessels and large trucks to transport cargoes. It incurs in costs such as
freight, port and airport fees, warehousing, security, insurance, salaries among others.
Global trade also demands that money be moved from account to account and
banks to banks in a rapid, secured and efficient manner. This has largely been
accomplished through a sophisticated global banking infrastructure built on two pillars:
electronic banking and electronic money (Slager, 2004, p. 62; Smith, 2003, p.102).
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Electronic banking refers to banking products and services executed through
electronic channels (Slager, 2004, p. 63; Smith, 2003, p. 107). They include deposittaking, lending, account management, electronic bill payment and electronic money.
Delivery of these products and services occurs through two electronic networks: closed
and open (Slager, 2004, p. 65; Smith, 2003, p. 115). Closed networks restrict access to
participants, meaning to financial institutions, merchants and, more important, third party
service providers or intermediaries who conduct voluminous transactions of investments
and liquidation of capital (Slager, 2004, p. 65; Smith, 2003, p. 115). Conversely, open
networks have no membership requirements, and they are delivered through automatic
tellers, telephones, computers, smart cards and other electronic devices (Slager, 2004, p.
65; Smith, 2003, p. 115). Electronic money refers to prepaid payment mechanisms
executed through direct transfers, from digital debit to digital credit (Slager, 2004, p. 65;
Smith, 2003, p. 115). Electronic money saves time and increases efficiency, but it has
two important disadvantages: it is anonymous, so it lends itself to money laundering and
evasion of regulatory regimes such as sanctions regimes. Collin Powell defined electronic
money as the life-line of terrorism (Collin Powell, Testimony Before Banking
Committee, Houser of Representatives, 2002). It is not a hyperbole. I stated earlier that
about $1.5 trillion dollars moves throughout global markets on a daily basis, making it
too difficult for governments to trace it from account to account and bank to bank. Money
is especially difficult to trace when it is stored in shell companies and offshore banking
(Slanger, 2004, p. 209).
Shell companies have no real business activity. Also known as “aged” or
“dormant” companies, they are not incorporated for three main reasons (Slanger, 2004, p.
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209). First, they carry an aura of corporate longevity. Since some nations require that a
company be in existence for some time before ever obtaining a contract, a shell company
represents a useful tool to overcome such a requirement (Slanger, 2007, p.209). Besides,
longevity facilitates access to letters of credit, cheap credit, and fresh capital. That is why
shell companies are often sold to a company seeking credit (Slanger, 2004, p. 209; Smith,
2003, p. 119). Finally, businesses and individuals use shell companies to avoid taxation
and currency restrictions imposed in some countries. Though, shell companies are usually
linked to financial crimes. Banking officials are often suspicious about large movement
of capital through shell companies for they are usually related to bribery, tax evasion,
money laundering, prostitution, and the finance of terrorism.
Like shell companies, offshore banking is seldom utilized for financial
wrongdoings such as tax evasion, money laundering, and white collar crimes (Slanger,
2004, p. 209; Smith, 2003, p. 124). Yet, it offers some advantages to corporations,
investment firms and individuals seeking flexibility and profitability. Offshore banking
refers to a bank based in a jurisdiction beyond its original residence, meaning beyond the
nation where it was originally created. Under this corporate structure, offshore accounts
enjoy several advantages. First, offshore accounts guarantee great savings in terms of
taxation. Second, they offer privacy and anonymity. Third, they provide easy access for
deposit and withdrawal, facilitating movement of capital for investments or just
emergencies, something so vital in today’s volatile financial markets. Fourth, they offer
asset protection and limited liability against domestic and international laws. And finally,
when coupled with an escrow account, offshore accounts become important sources of
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liquidity and fresh, cheap, reliable credit, especially in the form of letters of credit, so
important in global commerce (Slanger, 2004, p. 209; Smith, 2003, p. 124).
Economists believe that half of global capital, in terms of investments and
savings, is moved to offshore accounts in offshore centers. For the IMF, offshore banking
centers account for 26% of the global financial wealth, which is about $6 trillion dollars
(www.imf.org); yet, offshore centers account for just 1.2% of the world’s population
(www.un.org). The IMF and the World Bank estimate that, of that money, between $500
and $2 trillion can be traced back to money laundering, tax evasion, prostitution, illegal
gambling, arms trafficking and terrorism (www.imf.org; www.wb.org). Money
laundering amounts to $500 billion dollars while tax evasion may reach a trillion.
According to the American Federal Reserve, American corporations redirect 31% of its
profits toward offshore banking centers every year, and the GAO affirms that “59 out of
100 largest publicly-traded federal contractors had established hundreds of subsidiaries
in offshore-tax havens” (Sen. Dorgan, Hearing Before Finance Committee, 2007). Just
recently, the U.S. government and the Swiss bank UBS settled a lawsuit to uncover about
4,450 accounts that American investors own there, and the accounts are worth about $18
billion dollars (www.nyt.com, August 20, 2009). Lynnley Browning, from the New York
Times, states that “The landmark settlement peels back layers of Swiss banking secrecy
and expects to provide a road map for the authorities as they try to crack down on tax
evasion by Americans who, through private banks and other Swiss-based financial
intermediaries, use offshore accounts to go undeclared to the IRS” (www.nyt.com,
August 20, 2009). They use offshore accounts for tax evasion, but the U.S. government is
most concerned about terrorist groups using them for financing terrorist activities.
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Switzerland and Cayman Islands constitute the two most important offshore
banking centers in the world, but The Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong,
Cyprus, Panama, Liechtenstein, Monaco and Andorra are important as well. For example,
the infamous Enron Corporation had 1,300 tax-havens around the world, 441 of which
were located in Cayman Islands. Exxon-Mobil Corporation has 11 tax-haven subsidiaries
in The Bahamas. Halliburton Corporation has 17, including 13 in Cayman Islands,
Panama and Liechtenstein (Uncooperative tax Heavens, www.elpais.es, March 25, 2008).
Recently the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, headquartered in
Paris, labeled Liechtenstein, Monaco and Andorra as “uncooperative tax havens”
(Uncooperative tax Heavens, www.elpais.es, March 25, 2008). In chapters II and III, I
explained that The Bahamas, Cyprus, Panama, and Liechtenstein ranked among the most
active importer-exporter nations under the UN sanctions in Iraq. In this chapter, I explain
why. I argue that banks, companies, investors and other NSAs used banking centers in
those nations to conceal profits made under the UN sanctions regime in Iraq. In fact, the
UN was well aware of those issues, to the point that it mandated the use of an escrow
account to collect proceeds from the UN sanctions regime in Iraq.
An escrow account is a trust account held on a borrower’s name to pay
obligations such as debts, taxes and insurance premiums (Slanger, 2004, p. 127; Smith,
2003, p. 194). Under a contract, a beneficiary deposits cash into an escrow account
managed by a third party, an escrow agent acting as a trustee. Once the cash is deposited,
the escrow agent delivers the payments as the contract mandates (Slanger, 2004, p. 127;
Smith, 2003, p. 194). Escrow accounts are widely used for wire transfers and letters of
credit. Note that both the UN Security Council and Saddam Hussein chose escrow
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accounts to store money, but they did it for two very different reasons. The UN Security
Council sought transparency and reliable oversight while Saddam Hussein sought to
circumvent the UN sanctions regime. An estimated 71% of all corporations that traded
with Iraq chose offshore accounts (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 481), which can be an indication
of their true intentions, that is concealing trade and profits from UN inspectors.

Investors and Speculators
Investors and speculators play a crucial role in both the global banking system
and global trade. They played a key role under the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.
Investors and speculators are financial intermediaries, individuals or entities
acting as financial contacts between two parties, which could be two companies, two
individuals, or a company and an individual (Slanger, 2004, p. 151; Smith, 2003, p. 89).
The intermediation mainly consists in the transferring of funds from one account to
another, and it could involve lending, borrowing, depositing, saving and investing of
different forms (Slanger, 2004, p. 151; Smith, 2003, p. 89). This usually occurs through
regular commercial banks. However, there are larger and more complex business
operations like financing and insuring large volumes of goods and services for global
trade. They involve large amounts of funds, logistics, risks and liabilities. In such cases,
instead of using their own funds, names and licenses, businesses prefer to employ
investors and speculators (Slanger, 2004, p. 151; Smith, 2003, p. 89). They are small, as
in the case of day traders, but they are also large, often linked to brokerage firms, mutual
funds, edge funds, insurers and others financial entities (Slanger, 2004, p. 151; Smith,
2003, p. 89).
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Investors and speculators are expensive due to the fees and interest rates they
charge. Yet, importers and exporters seek their services for several reasons. First of all,
investors and speculators have “easy” access to credit. Second, they assume all financial
risks involved in trade. Third, they offer great solutions to the issue of liquidity. For
instance, when there are losses, investors and speculators assume them all or a portion.
They can even save companies from bankruptcy. Fourth, they contribute to business
diversification and expansion. They help companies to participate in several businesses
and markets at the same time. Finally, investors and speculators are sound substitutes for
banks. They have taken 42% of world commerce from banks during the last twenty years
(Slanger, 2004, p. 153; Smith, 2003, p. 94; www.fmi.org, 2007). They have done it
through the creation of brokerage firms specializing in import-export operations. Some of
them are publicly traded in stock exchanges in global markets. Some are small and
private. Still others are part of mutual, edge and sovereign funds.
Investors and speculators have a lot of critics for some of their practices can
create serious systemic problems. For instance, Slanger and Smith argue that investors
and speculators are responsible for the volatility of global markets. They manipulate the
“invisible hand”, altering the “natural” course of supply and demand (Slanger, 2004, p.
153; Smith, 2003, p. 94). They drive prices up and down for no other reason that quick
profits. In the specific case of global trade, investors and speculators impose high interest
rates, commissions and fees for their services, which, according to Senator Lieberman,
“Are divorced from market realities” (Hearing Before Senate Committee on Finance,
Sep. 26, 2007). It all is reflected in the cost of transportation, labor, warehousing and
other expenses, which drives inflation.
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In sum, the global banking system is a subsystem of globalization. Banks,
investors and speculators are very important NSAs with unique roles in global trade.
Global banking guarantees the free flow of money among banks, investors, speculators,
corporations and nations in the global markets. Banks, investors and speculators are the
main creditors to global trade. They issue credit to importers and exporters alike. Yet,
these actors affect global politics as well. They create trade crises, market volatility, and
affect macroeconomic indexes such as inflation. They lend themselves to tax evasion and
money laundering. They finance illegal arms trade, terrorism, and even wars. Banks,
investors and speculators can be so damaging to international peace that governments and
international organizations like the UN have created international laws such as the
OFAC, SDN’s lists, and the NCS, among others to combat illegal banking practices.

Global Banking and Iraq
I discuss four findings in this section: 1) Iraq entered the UN sanctions regime
with a solid centralized banking system; 2) Iraq used its banking system under the
sanctions regime despite UN Security Resolution 986, which ordered Iraq to utilize an
escrow account at BNP Paribas New York for all its businesses; 3) Iraq expanded its
banking system by opening new banks and branches along with hundreds of new secret
accounts in banking centers throughout the Middle East; 4) Iraq used domestic and
regional banking to reach the global banking system.
The government of Abd Al-Salam Árif nationalized the Iraqi banking system in
1965. The National Banking Law, as it was known, consolidated 65% of all Iraqi banks
into the Rafidian Ban, and it mandated the creation of the Central Bank of Iraq with three
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national jurisdictions: Bagdad, Mosul, and Bashra. The Bank was to “Issue and store
currency of the government, protecting against counterfeit currency and disbursing funds
based on directives from the Minister of Finance” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p. 45). In 1988, the CBI created another state-owned, the Rasheed Bank, to
focus on investments, currency exchange, and trade. The CBI created 4 other banks:
Agriculture Cooperative Bank, Real State Bank, and Social Bank. Chart 5.1 shows the
state of the Iraq’s banking net by 1991.

Chart 5.1 – The State of Iraqi Banking System in 1991

Banks w/ Assets
under 64 millions,
9%

Agriculture
Cooperative
Bank, 3%
Central Bank of
Iraq, 34%

Rasheed Bank,
20%

Rafidian Bank,
34%

Source: the Duelfer Report (CIA)

The data were drawn from the Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement.
Observe that the state-run Central Bank controlled 34% of the Iraqi banking industry,
holding actives worth $770 million. The Rafidian Bank controlled another 34%, with
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actives of about $758 million. Rafidian Bank allocated 60% of its funds to imports,
indicative of Iraqi’s reliance on foreign goods and services. Note that Iraq dedicated 3%
of its banking, just $65 million dollars, to agriculture, which explains Iraq’s reliance on
imports of foodstuff from neighboring nations. One final factor is Iraq’s private banking.
In Chart 5.1, it appears as “banks with assets under 64 million”. Iraq had 19 private
banks in times of Saddam Hussein, accounting for 9% of the Iraqi banking system, worth
$192.70 million. Their share was minuscule, but their impact on the UN sanctions regime
was considerable. Table 5.1 shows all Iraqi banks since 1935.

Table 5.1 – Iraqi Banks since 1935
Bank's Name

Year
Branches

Al-Baraka Bank for Investment
Mosul Bank
Al-Warka Bank for Investment
Gulf Commercial Bank
Babylon Bank
Economic Investment Bank
Summer Commercial Bank
Credit Bank of Iraq
Dar Al-Salam Bank Company of Investment
United Bank for Investment
Al-Ahli Al-Iraqi Bank
Iraqi National Bank
Iraqi Islamic Bank
Iraqi Middle East Investment Bank
Basrah Private Bank for Investment
Investment Bank of Iraq
Baghdad Investment Bank
Commercial Bank of Iraq
Social Bank
Rasheed Bank
Estate Bank

4
3
3
7
6
14
6
10
14
5
4
4
9
11
14
17
20
11
4
170
16

Rafidian Bank

Industrial Bank
Agricultural Cooperative Bank
Total

Active

Established

Capital

2001
2001
2000
2000
1999
1999
1999
1998
1998
1995
1995
1995
1993
1993
1993
1993
1992
1992
1990
1988
1948

815
667
667
880
833
267
533
833
800
1,000
500
500
365
2,160
667
1,280
1,167
1,665
667
1,300
733

164

1941

2,700

5
42

1935
1935

300
400

563

Source: the Duelfer Report
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21,699

I collected the data for Table 5.1 from the Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and
Procurement. The Table reveals three main points. First, Iraq had five large banks in
1991 when the UN enacted the sanctions regime. Though, observe that Iraq created 18
banks from 1992 to 2001 despite the UN sanctions. Second, note that Iraq created six
banks from 1992 to 1995, coinciding, on one hand, with the most severe period of the UN
sanctions, and on the other, with the establishment of trade protocols with Jordan, Syria,
Turkey, Lebanon and Yemen. This is also the period when Iraq intensified trade relations
with former Soviet Republics such as Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Third, observe that
Iraq established yet another 9 banks from 1996 to 2001, coinciding with implementation
of the UN Oil for Food Program. This sudden expansion of the Iraqi banking industry
suggests that commerce was intense, and that there was a new governmental policy
toward investing, funding, and circulation of money. Iraq decentralized its banking
system during this period.
Next, Iraq always enjoyed good relations with the global banking system until the
Gulf War of 1991 and the passing of the UN sanctions regime thereafter. Yet, it does not
mean that Iraq pulled out of the global banking system entirely. As the Dulfer Report
stated, “Before the 1991 Gulf War the Regime had funds in accounts in the U.S., Europe,
Turkey and Japan, but after 1991, the Regime shifted its assets into accounts in Jordan,
Lebanon, Egypt and Syria” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 48).
Iraq used Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria’s banking systems to connect with European
and American banks. In other words, Iraq used regional banking to reach global banking,
corroborating two points that I stated in Chapter III. First, regional trade, more than a
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choice, is a means to reach global trade. Second, custom and traditional trade relations
among neighboring nations help evade a sanctions regime.
After 1991, Iraq opened more than two hundred secret foreign accounts. Iraq
opened a dozen of what the Duelfer Report called bridge accounts (Duelfer Report,
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 40). Also known as numbered accounts, banks use
them to track the flow of money through various accounts, but Iraq used them “To
conceal the fact that foreign companies were making payments to Iraq” (Duelfer Report,
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 46). Iraq had 5 of those accounts but individually
named at Ahli Bank in Jordan. Three accounts were for oil proceeds and two were “A
Protocol trade account set up to receive payments related to the Iraq-Jordanian Protocol
and was opened just a few months before 1996” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p. 40). Under the scheme, 60% of oil proceeds were transferred to
“Protocol” accounts and another 40% went to at least seven accounts at Halk Bank’s
branches at Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the UAE where it gained almost $8 million in
interest rates in just one year (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 42).
Then, 40% of oil proceeds went to the Commercial Bank of Syria. The Duelfer Report
stated that “The Bank was instructed to transfer all extra amounts to the Syrian-Lebanese
Commercial Back account once the proceeds exceeded $1 million dollars” (Duelfer
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 42). In addition, Iraq had two bank accounts
at the Queen Nor Branch of the Jordan National Bank, under the name of the Jordan
Petroleum Refinery Co. Ltd, which had deposits of $7.4 and $3.9 million respectively
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 44).
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The money came from “surcharges” and “service fees”. Still, illegal proceeds
delivered to Iraqi embassies in the Middle East were deposited in three individually
named accounts at Ahli Bank (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 44).
But Iraqi proceeds resulting from oil “surcharges” were deposited in several accounts at
Ahli Bank, Sardar Bank and Fransabank in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, UEA and Turkey
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 45). Iraq kept two accounts at
Fransabank, one in Euros and another in American dollars, so it could convert it into
Euros as needed. Lastly, Iraq had another 24 accounts in Lebanese banks, seven in
Jordanian banks, and one in a Belarusian bank. Iraq used them to deposit cash from
kickbacks, surcharges and other illicit practices (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p. 45). By 1999, Rafidian Bank took over CBI’s management section,
mainly its Foreign Accounts Section, which really was a ring of hundreds of accounts
that Iraq had in banks in the Middle East. By 2003, Iraq had brought most of its assets to
a few banks in the Middle East. Table 5.2 shows Iraq’s deposits as 2003.

Table 5.2 – Iraq’s Deposits as 2003
Bank

Nation

Account Type

Private Sector

State Sector

Ahli Bank

Jordan

Cash

329,155,944.56

9,264,353.00

Fransabank

Lebanon

Cash

48,000.00

44,285,476.00

Jordan National Bank

Jordan

Cash

47,026,041.80

National Bank of Egypt

Egypt

Trade Account

-

19,710,881.00

Commercial Bank of Syria

Syria

Trade Account

-

790,361,517.00

Commercial Bank of Lebanon

Lebanon

Cash

-

251,949,039.00

-

195,697,846.00

Halk Bank

Turkey

Trade Account

Sardar Bank

Lebanon

Trade Account

Total

520,778.00
376,229,986.36

Sources: Duelfer Report, IIC

219

-

1,311,789,890.00

The data for Table 5.2 were collected from the Duelfer and the IIC Reports. In
general, Iraq preferred to utilize Jordanian banks for its operations. Iraq created private
accounts, managed by the Iraqi Trading Office in Amman and the Iraqi embassy in
Jordan. Iraq avoided the use of electronic money for it feared that the U.S. would track its
transactions. Instead, Iraq used cash, vouchers, and intermediaries who “laundered” the
money through the HSBC in collaboration with the Jordanian Ministry of Industry and
Trade and the Central Bank of Jordan. Still, Iraq utilized 16 Lebanese banks to conceal
cash, pay for bribes and receive payments. This money was personally managed by the
Ministers of Trade, Treasury and Commerce, and the governor of the CBI. Next, by
1999, when Iraqi-Jordanian relations came to a stalemate, Iraq moved its operations to
Syrian, Turkish and Egyptian banks. Iraq transferred $500 million to the Commercial
Bank of Syria, $700 million to Egypt, and $200 million to Turkey (Duelfer Report,
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 62). Iraq used Turkey as a gateway to European
financial institutions. Iraq agreed with Turkish Petroleum International Company (TIPC)
to use Turkish oil pipelines to deliver oil to Europe in exchange for keeping a minimum
of 70% of the proceeds at Turkish banks at preferential rates (Duelfer Report, Regime
Finance and Procurement, p. 70; CFIJ, 2002, p. 33)
The two parties shared the profits. Finally, Iraq laundered money through gold
purchases. In 2003, Iraq had four tons of gold reserves, purchased “In relatively small
quantities on a frequent basis from Lebanese banks in which Iraq had large foreign
currency deposits” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 51). For the
operation, Iraq used its embassies in Beirut, Amman, and Damascus. How did Iraq and
banks in the Middle East manage their operations amid the UN sanctions regime?
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For the CIA, the answer is the Arab money transfer system known as hawala.
When the UN 661 Committee conceived the sanctions regime, it ignored, or did not take
into account, the hawala system. Hawala is a credit and payment device used in the Arab
world for centuries. In Arabic, the word hawala means “change” or transform, but in
banking it means “transfer” or “wire”. Today, there are three types of hawalas. First,
bank hawala is money circulating throughout the banking system in the form of a note or
electronic money. Second, there is a hawala for money exchange. This is a licensed and
unlicensed investor who exchanges currencies according to “fluctuations” in the market.
This is very common in the Middle East where there are so many currencies, economies
are rather informal, based on cash and bartering. Finally, there are illegal hawalas too.
The practice is based on an ancient informal banking used throughout South Asia and the
Middle East to send money to distant places with no regard for bureaucratic limits. This
hawala is based on religious norms, tribal values, prestige, and trust above all, which is,
according to Francis Fukuyama, the basis of trade (Fukuyama, 2006, 17). In all, hawalas
are speedy, flexible and cheap. They reduce paperwork and bureaucracy. With hawalas,
there is no need for exchange and interest rates, which are banned by the Koran (Duelfer
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 255).
Hawalas have historically presented serious problems to regulatory regimes in
Arab nations. Since hawalas do not require recordkeeping, they lend themselves to illegal
activities such as tax evasion, black-market operations, money launderings, and drug
trafficking. Such illegal operations have become more sophisticated in today’s global
economy with the “Use of e-mail, faxes, and telephones, which have made these private
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cash transfers almost instantaneous and nearly impossible to trace or regulate” (Duelfer
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 255).
In fact, Saddam Hussein banned the use of hawalas right after he took over
power, but Iraqis continued to use them anyways in the black market to pay for illegal
trade across the Syrian, Jordan, and Turkish and Iranian borders. The CIA found that
“Illegal hawalas were often used by the average Iraqi individual or company to transfer
funds from expatriate communities to the homeland” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance
and Procurement, p. 255). However, Saddam allowed hawalas –without formally
legalizing them- right after the Gulf War of 1991 to fight inflation, stabilize prices, and
keep liquidity in the Iraqi economy (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement,
p.255; CFIJ, 2002, p. 62). In the end, Saddam fully legalized hawalas in 1993 to link the
Iraqi economy with the economies of the Middle East and evade UN sanctions regime.
Rapidly, hawalas became a practice promoted by the Iraqi regime. The CIA addressed
the role of hawala in the circumvention of the UN sanctions. It stated that “In order to
import goods, a letter of credit was normally needed from a bank in Jordan. To get this,
the Jordanian bank would need some cash. Because it was illegal to transfer cash out of
Iraq through the normal banking system, the illegal hawala system was used to move the
money” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 256).

BNP Paribas and Other Banks
When the UN sanctions regime against Iraq was approved, the UN SecretaryGeneral selected BNP New York to manage Iraq’s money and financial resources in
general. BNP is a transnational French bank, a subsidiary of Banque Nationale de Paris
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S.A, registered in Paris and licensed to operate in New York in 1993 (IIC, Chapter IV, p.
433). The UN Resolution 986 enacted the Banking Negotiated Contract Act, which
mandated that BNP Paribas of New York had the right and obligation to: 1) establish and
manage an escrow account to receive proceeds from the sales of Iraqi oil and to disburse
funds so Iraq could purchase humanitarian goods and services; 2) confirm letters of credit
issued from banks and retained by companies interested in buying oil from Iraq; 3) issue
letters of credit to Iraqi companies so they could purchase humanitarian goods and
services (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 433). Based on those mandates, BNP issued 2,234 letters of
credits worth $9.7 billion, of which it issued credit for $6.2 billion to finance purchases of
Iraqi oil (IIC Report, Chapter IV, p. 433). It also extended credit to Iraq for $3.5 billion to
purchase goods and services (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 433). Again, those letters of credit were
legal, in tune with the contract signed between BNP and United Nations. Table 5.3 shows
distribution of letters of credit through BNP’s subsidiaries and affiliates.
Table 5.3 – Distribution of Letters of Credit through BNP

BNP Subsidiaries

Number of L/Cs

Geneva

Value of L/Cs
1,224

$

25,897,061,250

Paris

495

$

9,716,040,616

London

172

$

3,507,013,659

Milan

60

$

856,101,638

Hong Kong

52

$

1,157,795,138

36

$

727,568,006

195

$

3,905,122,639

Basel
Others (13 Branches)
Total BNP

2,234

$

45,766,703,001

Total UN Program

3,120

$

64,181,293,181

% of BNP to Total UN Program

71.6%

% of Other Banks & Firms

28.4%

Source: IIC Report
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First, I must clarify that BNP acquired the Swiss bank United European Bank in
1998, becoming BNP in Geneva; then, it acquired Banque Paribas in 2000, and it became
BNP Paribas S.A (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 433). The timing of the acquisitions was perfect.
The French and Swiss banking systems offered independence and anonymity, two key
desirable features in the banking industry. With the acquisition, BNP had the potential to
control 80% of all Iraqi purchases (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 433). To capitalize on it, BNP
allowed its subsidiaries and affiliates to issue letters of credit to intermediaries not
authorized to trade with Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. The Bank did so in violation
of Article 2 of the 661 Committee, which demanded from BNP that “The United Nations
would be made aware of, and approve, the parties to whom Iraq sold its oil and purchased
humanitarian goods and services” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 440).
Resolution 661 further banned BNP from selling or transferring letters of credit to
any third party. The goal was: first, prevent buyers from reselling and speculating with
Iraqi oil; second, prevent Saddam Hussein from either selling oil at a loss or engaging in
price gauging (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 31). BNP violated both resolutions. It
accepted letters of credits from banks, investment firms, and financiers who then paid
BNP “service fees” for not disclosing their names, clients and terms of contracts, which is
rightly legal in global banking but no in the UN sanctions regime. The IIC stated, “The
opportunity to issue a letter of credit in the first instance rather than simply to confirm a
letter of credit issued by another bank meant that BNP acquired a second customer, and
with it, the possibility for a conflict of interest with its primary customer, the United
Nations” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 433). It all meant that BNP was creating a conflict of
interest for itself. As an escrow agent, BNP was getting involved in two contracts with
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two different conflicting clients at the same time: one was a contract with the U.N.; the
other was letters of credits that BNP extended to private companies, namely violators of
the UN sanctions regime. Still, BNP invested $91 million in credit, which it channeled to
its companies through its subsidiaries, mainly, in Switzerland and Hong Kong. It was a
lucrative business. Table 5.2 below shows BNP earnings related to letters of credits under
the UN sanctions regime from 1998 to 2003. Data are from the IIC Report, Chapter IV,
Report on Manipulations, the Escrow Bank.

Chart 5.2 - BNP Earnings under the UN Sanctions Regime

Source: IIC

The red bars represent fees that BNP imposed on companies that exported to Iraq.
The blue bars account for fees that BNP charged to companies that purchased oil from
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Iraq. As we can see, BNP earned $296 million, $205 million above its initial investment
of $91 million. Yet, this only represents the legal side of the business. Based on the
auditing that both the IIC and CIA conducted, they suspected that BNP engaged in
money laundering or, at least, in illegal banking practices. For instance, the IIC found that
BNP made 403 payments worth $1.5 billion dollars to 30 non-financial institutions,
violating Resolution 986 of the UN Security Council (Role of BNP-Paribas; Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 55-81). Explicitly, the
IIC examined 10 cases in which BNP engaged in illicit banking practices. They were:
ACTEC, Glencore, Gulf-Drilling-Texaco, Belmetalenergo, East Star Trading, Al Douh
Jordanian Establishment, Talfeet Trading Est., Inesfood Group, Telwar International Inc.,
Limpex Trading, and Zahrat Al Riyadh (Role of BNP-Paribas; Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 55-81). Then, the IIC and the
CIA found that only 70% of all companies participating in the sanctions regime financed
their businesses through letters of credit issued by BNP (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 436). The
other 30% obtained funding from other banks, third parties acting as financiers, and
independent investors (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 441).
According to the IIC and the 661 Committee, the scheme worked as follow:
companies created or hired a third party that would serve as an intermediary between the
bank issuing the letter of credit and themselves. The contracting company extended a
power of attorney to the intermediary, so it could execute contracts, request letters of
credit from a bank, and acquire the right to operate as an independent commercial entity.
The practice was so common that intermediaries consumed 75% of all letters of credit
extended under the sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 441).

226

There were three main reasons for utilizing intermediaries. First, most companies
did not have technical support, experience and enough credit to engage in global trade,
especially given the restrictions of the UN sanctions regime. Second, well-established
companies did not want to see their names associated with the Iraqi regime. Such an
association would affect their long-term business interests in nations opposed to the UN
sanctions regime, in Middle Eastern nations in particular, for they regarded the UN
sanctions as cruel and detrimental to their fellow Iraqi Muslims. Lastly, companies
wanted to evade the sanctions and hide their wrongdoings. A front company or a thirdparty acting as an intermediary would work. One important finding is that 81% of banks other than BNP- that issued letters of credit were located in banking centers known as
“offshore,” as shown in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 – Most Used Banking Centers under the UN Sanctions Regime
Bloc I
Banking Center

Bloc II

# of

Balance

Companies

US millions

Banking Center

# of

Balance

Companies

US million

Switzerland

178

1,756 Switzerland

178

1,756

Cayman Islands

142

1,527 Cayman Islands

142

1,527

Bahamas

140

Liechtenstein

137

Monaco

119

Hong Kong
British Virgin Islands
Cyprus

65

942 Cyprus

65

1,373

137

1,272

973 Monaco

119

973

92

659 Bahamas

140

942

78

863 Panama

29

877

78

863

1,272 Liechtenstein

1,373 British Virgin Islands

Bermuda

43

622 Hong Kong

92

659

Panama

29

877 Bermuda

43

622

Total

1,023

10,864 Total

1,023

Source: The IIC Report
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10,864

The Table contains two blocs of data. Bloc I is sorted by # of companies and bloc
II by balance in USD millions. Column # of companies means number of companies
distributed per nation. Column balance in US million refers to the amount of money
companies deposited in banks in those nations. These banking centers hosted 1,023
companies that traded with Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. Together, they deposited
$10,864 million dollars, representing 17.11% of all deposits. Also, note that Switzerland
and Cayman Islands led both blocs as 320 companies chose Switzerland and Cayman
Islands as their banking centers. Companies had, at some point, $3,283 million dollars
deposited in banks in offshore centers. Those nations are well known in the banking
industry for promoting an international banking system that protects customers from
regulatory regimes and governmental oversight. They played a crucial role in the UN
sanctions regime as well. They concealed illicit payments, accounts and the identities of
intermediaries and third parties. For instance, the 661 Committee stated the “The
Committee has been unable to establish the percentage of letters of credit financed by
third parties over the history of the Programmed” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 441). The 661
Committee expressly referred to Swiss banks. They issued large numbers of letters of
credit and refused to reveal their contents based on Swiss laws, which “Prohibited from
disclosing client information to anyone other than its parent, including officials at other
affiliates of the Bank” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 447). Curiously, in 1997 Switzerland enacted
the Money Laundering Act, obligating Swiss banks to comply with International AntiLaundering Law.
In addition, the IIC stated that banks failed to detect “Customers involved in a
high risk business... and report them to the OFAC list or check if it was listed as a SDN”
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(IIC, Chapter IV, p. 545). Note that OFAC stands for Office of Foreign Asset Control,
and SDN stands for Specially Designated Nationals. It all means that although BNP was
doing business with foreign (non-American) customers, it did not report it as it was
mandated by federal laws. The IIC particularly mentioned the case of “Augusto
Giangradi of Italtech as a party involved in legal proceedings in South Florida in
connection with an illegal sale of controlled American technology to Iraq as well as
money laundering activity” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 545). Also, the IIC was alarmed by the
fact that banks did not report movements of large amounts of funds from account to
account and bank to bank. Banks “Failed to scrutinize large unusual transactions or a
series of large incoming deposits, followed shortly thereafter by large disbursements”
(IIC, Chapter IV, p. 553) as mandated by International Anti-Money Laundering Laws.
Explicitly, the IIC cited Alcon Petroleum, Fenar Petroleum, Taurus Group, Japal
Petroleum and Petrocorp since, as it put it, “Their transactions were limited to large,
often six-figure incoming wire transfers; these companies, in turn, disbursed similarly
large sums” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 545). The cases of Jabal Petroleum and Petrocorp were
of more concern because “They were located in Lebanon, which at the time was listed as
a Non-Cooperative Country or Territory (NCCT) in fighting Money Laundering… and
associated with the Iraqi regime” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 546).
The evidences presented so far attempt to explain how the current global banking
facilitated the circumvention of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. On one hand, I
found that Iraq actually expanded its banking industry during the UN sanctions regime
agasint Iraq, particularly throughout the Middle East. Iraq utilized regional banking to
reach global banking. On the other hand, BNP failed to comply with the UN sanctions
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regime. BNP in fact extended credit to companies engaging in illicit practices. BNP
helped companies to move money, conceal malpractice, and evade the UN sanctions.

Investors and Speculators
In this section, I discuss investors and speculators, key NSAs in the global
economy and under the UN sanctions regime. The goal is to explicate an essential feature
of globalization, widely utilized to circumvent regulatory regimes like sanctions regimes.
First, the IIC defined investors and speculators as “Underlying financiers or
established crude oil traders and companies that are involved in the purchase and resale
of crude oil but do not generally process the oil in their own refineries; they often charter
ships and expedite the logistics of getting oil to a refinery” (IIC, Oil Expert Report III, p.
4). The IIC also stated that “Most contract-holders currently fall under this category.
They don’t seem to add any value to the Programme and are just there to earn a risk-free
commission at the expense of the United Nations-Iraq account; it is very difficult to find a
justification for their participation in the Programme” (IIC, Oil Expert Report III, p. 4).
In general, speculation here refers to how speculators usually move contracts throughout
the global market, how contracts are sold and resold, passed on from a contractor to an
investor, then to a company which in turn subcontracts another company, all in matter of
days, even hours. Investors and speculators played a key role under the UN sanctions
regime. They financed companies that had no money and no means to obtain it. They
extended credit to companies created mainly to evade the UN sanctions. Table 5.5 below
shows a list of investors and speculators, or underlying financiers.
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Table 5.5 - Underlying Financiers
Underlying financiers

Nation of Registration

Bayoil

Bahamas (USA)

403,703,074

7,349,738,302

Taurus

Bahamas (USA)

256,213,572

4,970,216,904

Vitol

Switzerland

196,049,893

4,034,320,347

Glencore International AG

Switzerland

149,247,723

3,162,905,704

Chevron Texaco

United States

83,854,714

1,778,799,188

44,023,908

886,104,961

29,633,836

706,687,377

Arcadia Petroleum Ltd

27,962,071

596,389,267

Gunvor Energy Ltd

20,877,957

438,030,217

Scandinavian T. Ltd

13,152,490

309,882,592

11,708,415

265,462,533

11,007,323

293,399,846

10,179,086

265,344,993

10,151,491

186,137,767

9,766,286

223,444,361

9,703,314

229,868,316

9,078,714

251,375,169

8,140,763

164,819,715

Gunvor International Ltd

7,678,745

146,200,291

March Rich & Co. Investment AG

6,915,565

170,572,149

6,746,013

141,683,838

4,995,213

120,987,228

4,875,597

108,869,481

ELF Trading SA

4,840,246

120,036,022

Totsa Total Oil Trading

3,249,753

70,640,672

3,082,784

78,485,902

3,007,534

54,508,916

Betoil Ltd
Sinochem International Oil London

United Kingdom China

Galaxy Energy Intl. Ltd
Total International Ltd

France

Marc Rich
Valero Energy Group

United States

Sonatrach Petroleum Corp BVI

Algeria

Petraco Oil Co Ltd
Shell International Trading
Mednafta Trading Co. Ltd

Trafigura Beheer BV

United Kingdom
Swiss, Cyprus, USA

Netherlands

Crown Resources/ERC Trading
Mitsubishi

NRG Oils SRL Geneva

Japan

Switzerland

Wincor SA
OMV Supply & Trading

Switzerland

Barrels financed in USD

Barrels lifted

2,590,546

68,595,607

2,589,136

68,666,097

ERC Trading

2,085,074

41,163,897

Pedestal Enterprises SA

2,071,083

38,580,826

Naftex Oil Trading Ltd

1,986,991

52,587,704

Koch

1,917,957

46,185,504

1,909,909

39,347,987

Sempra Oil Trading SARL

Masfield

Switzerland

Unipec
Repsol Petroleum SA - London
Petroplus Ref. Intl BV

Spain

39,293,089

1,602,374

44,823,471

1,529,381

44,199,017

Sovoil AG/Nafta Swiss AG

1,099,359

29,765,331

Arcadia/NRG

1,044,890

19,340,583

1,011,684

18,326,976

1,002,505

18,788,766

990,745

17,102,041

FADI Oil International S.A.L

Netherlands

1,668,213

Lebanon

Petroserve Ltd S.A.
Inter INA Ltd
Alexoil

Switzerland

874,862

19,390,669

Mediterranean Oil Supply & Trading

Monaco

620,431

14,726,263

Addax BV, Rotterdam GE

Switzerland

602,272

15,136,300

Iplom International SA

Switzerland

598,593

11,554,803

Nafta Swiss AG

Switzerland

594,788

11,667,956

584,312

15,594,703

1,378,821,185

27,799,749,648

CO.GE.P. SRL Costieri
Total

Source: IIC
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I collected the data for Table 5.5 from the IIC Report, Oil Expert Report III.
The table has four columns. Columns one and two contain the names of underlying
financiers and their nation of registration respectively. The third column represents oil
barrels financed in USD million dollars. Column four accounts for number of oil barrels
actually lifted. Values in column 4 will always be higher than values in column 3. The
data is sorted by “barrels financed.” Above all, observe: 1) money invested versus the
amount of oil purchased with it; 2) the role of underlying financiers in terms of funding;
3) since oil prices fluctuated, underlying financiers invested more money to lift the same
or less amount of oil.
The data show that companies financed $27,799,749,648 million of Iraqi crude,
43.3% of the oil lifted under the UN sanctions. Yet, there are key issues to discuss here.
First, the data show that Chevron-Texaco and Valero were the only American underlying
financiers, but that is incorrect. Bayoil and Taurus were American firms too, only that
they were registered in The Bahamas. Bayoil belonged to a holding company based in
Delaware, and Taurus was a subsidiary of Taurus Group, an oil trading firm based in
Houston, Texas. Thus, when I add up all investments made by Chevron-Texaco, Valero,
Bayoil and Taurus, I obtain that American underlying financiers financed 762,063,614
barrels of oil worth $14,449,711,876 million dollars. Bayoil and Taurus ranked 1st and 2nd
respectively while Chevron-Texaco ranked fifth. What those companies did is totally
legal. It is indeed a common practice under globalization, but it was illegal under the UN
sanctions. Firms from other nations engaged in the same practice. For instance, Sinochen
was not British but a Chinese, and most Swiss underlying financiers were subsidiaries or
parented to companies from other nations. They registered themselves in Switzerland to
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benefit from Swiss advantageous banking laws. As for American underlying financiers,
the decision to operate in such a way is linked to Saddam’s policy of banning American
firms from getting Iraqi oil. As the IIC affirms, “None of these traders had been given the
significant direct access to oil contracts that they sought under the Programme..., so they
approached intermediary entities” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 12). A final point to make is that
American underlying financiers ranked first, surpassing Russians, French and Chinese.
This is essential for we saw in Chapter II that the U.S. ranked 27th in oil purchases while
Russia, France, and China ranked 1st, 2nd and 7th respectively. It means that in terms of
investing in oil purchases, American firms played a vital role, as Table 5.6 shows.

Table 5.6 – American Investors Financing Non-American Firms
Underlying

Cont ract ual Company

Financiers
Bayoil

# of
Cont ract s

Cont ract ual Barrels

Barrels Financed

Nat ion

in USD millions

ACT EC

8

Russia

Alexoil S.A.

4

Swit zerland

Alfa Eco

49

Financed
12,027,284

217,882,341

3,936,639

102,578,122

Russia

76,709,258

1,236,384,917

AL-Hoda Int ernat ional T rading Co

7

UAE

12,171,851

196,556,276

Asmos Lt d

1

Kenya

1,000,000

20,754,000

B.C. Int ernat ional Lt d

3

P akist an

1,426,475

24,656,583

Bashneft

1

Russia

1,237,445

30,804,956

Bayoil

3

Bahamas

5,673,263

102,326,625
106,386,467

Belmet alenergo, Inc

3

Belarus

5,356,326

Benzol

1

UAE

2,003,987

48,636,764

CAMT ECH Manufact uring LLC

1

UAE

500,000

10,353,860

China Nat ional Unit ed Oil Corp

3

China

5,021,626

129,408,470

Consult & T rade

1

Aust ria

1,001,901

16,403,944

Cont inent al Oil Lt d

1

Cyprus

500,000

12,944,026

Delt a P et roleum P roduct s T rading Co

1

T urkey

1,960,561

38,110,819
32,946,142

Emercom Agency

1

Russia

2,105,469

Emiroil Est

2

UAE

3,963,514

84,131,603

Energy Resources P eople's Co

2

Ukraine

2,928,233

56,298,115

Erdem Holding (On behalf of Mobil Corp)

1

UAE

Federally T orgoviy Dom Oil

2

Ukraine

457,000

8,897,207

1,000,000

18,529,772

Hiperborey Company

1

Ukraine

1,940,324

41,206,846

Impexoil LLC

7

Russia

5,487,799

117,949,145

Ives Co. Lt d

1

Ukraine

510,401

13,213,287

Khrizolit

1

Russia

1,979,539

37,136,066

12

Russia

18,000,747

261,401,623

Lukoil
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Machinoimport

7

Russia

10,153,970

238,042,129

Marbel Resources Ltd

4

U.K.

4,679,722

93,499,365

Monaco Trading Ltd

2

Cyprus

2,015,126

39,796,365

12

Russia

16,738,536

262,030,589

NAFTA Moskva
NAFTA Petroleum

2

Cyprus

4,063,279

72,591,407

National Oil Well Maintenance Co

6

Qatar

5,391,876

103,320,379

Oilexco Incorporated

1

Canada

1,887,204

16,507,373

Omni Oil

1

South Africa

2,070,270

38,550,168

13,442,816

309,661,675

Petroleum Technical Services Co

10

Vietnam

Petroline FZC

5

UAE

6,940,742

103,836,511

Petrovietnam Trading Co

2

Vietnam

2,999,696

61,859,886

Primacosa Enterprises Ltd

4

Cyprus

2,286,791

36,784,264

Rosneft

2

Russia

2,584,563

27,877,912

21

Russia

34,265,072

691,907,893

Rosnefteimpex NK
Rossbulneft AD

1

Bulgaria

1,048,863

10,549,464

Shaher Trading Company Ltd

1

Yemen

13,444,448

22,325,035
10,639,704

Sidanco

1

Russia

1,023,836

Slavneft

2

Russia

4,190,373

78,094,990

SOCAP International Ltd

7

France

9,263,222

196,199,013

Surgutneftegas

3

Russia

1,950,000

46,742,850

16

Russia

17,472,724

233,231,641

Total International Ltd

6

France

8,091,086

146,124,804

Trafigura Beheer BV

6

Netherlands

7,844,032

85,608,672

Tyumen Oil Company

20

Russia

25,562,460

483,186,951

Zarubezhneft

2

Russia

3,455,931

79,750,511

Zerich GMBH

1

Switzerland

2,001,702

48,851,537

Chevron/

Anwar Akkad Son's Co. Trade & Ind.

1

Syria

2,059,989

46,247,663

Texaco

Belmetalenergo, Inc

5

Belarus

7,785,947

162,805,369

12,912,021

275,528,739

Tatneft

Erdem Holding (On behalf of Mobil Corp.)

8

Turkey

Fal Oil Company Ltd

2

UAE

4,043,821

79,062,833

Gazprom

1

Russia

2,077,974

44,759,560

H.I.U. Ltd

3

Switzerland

4,988,774

99,814,822

IES-Italiana Energia E Servizi SPA

1

Italy

1,966,345

39,708,866

Jewan Oil

2

UAE

4,069,646

75,399,753

Kalmyk Oil & Gas Company

2

Russia

4,030,754

92,991,316

Lada-OMC Holding SA

3

Belarus

3,483,299

77,909,198

Machinoimport

6

Russia

8,042,738

154,025,921

Mediterranean Oil Supply & Trading

1

Monaco

1,996,475

54,734,724

Naftogas

1

Ukraine

2,004,217

32,330,652

Phoenix International

5

U.S.A.

4,718,552

103,261,121

PT SRI Muktigas Corporation

1

Indonesia

1,025,212

21,240,660

Rao Mes International Econ. Cooperation

2

Russia

1,549,442

34,229,405

Tatneft

1

Russia

1,030,475

13,348,459

Sinochem International Oil London

4

U.K.

4,581,547

115,871,583

Vavilon

2

Ukraine

1,484,710

36,747,557

10,002,776

218,328,853

Zerich GMBH
Taurus

10

A & A Services

1 Pakistan

Alcon Petroleum

34

Arab Trade Development Co.
Aredio Petroleum SARI
Valero

Nafta Petroleum/Mednafta Trading Co.

Total

Switzerland

1

Egypt

25

France

6

Cyprus

305

Source: IIC and Duelfer Report
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Liechtenstein

1,000,000

14,015,455

45,613,620

923,881,529

932,061

16,903,466

24,232,964

499,397,166

10,151,491

186,137,767

411,486,777

76,679,018,176

I collected the data from the IIC Report. Table 5.6 has six columns. The first
column shows four American companies that acted as underlying financiers. The second
column shows companies that received financing from underlying financiers. The third
column shows the number of contracts financed. Column four shows nations of
registration per company. Column five shows barrels financed and column six shows
barrels financed in USD millions.
In total, four American companies acted as underlying financiers. They were
Bayoil, Chevron-Texaco, Taurus and Valero. They financed 390 contracts for
539,552,832 million barrels of oil, worth $9,922,151,501 million dollars. Bayoil led the
practice with 262 contracts, 373,767,982 million barrels worth $6,503,469,064 million
dollars. Chevron-Texaco ranked second with 61 contracts, 83,854,714 million barrels and
$1,778,347,054 million dollars. Taurus came third with 61 contracts too but of
71,778,645 million barrels worth $1,454,197,616 million. Valero came forth with just 6
contracts, 10,151,491 million barrels and $186,137,767 million. The data illustrate the
magnitude of American involvement in financing businesses under the sanctions regime.
The involvement was not massive in terms of “company participation,” but it was
relevant in terms of amounts of money invested. Again, American companies could not
purchase Iraqi oil because Saddam Hussein would not sell it to them. So they opted for
financing purchases for other companies. What's more, observe in the third column the
nationality of companies that American investors financed. It is diverse, but what is more
revealing is how many Russian companies obtained financing from American financiers.
The following table helps see this point. I collected the data for Table 5.7 from the IIC
Report.
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Table 5.7 – American Investors Financing Firms from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine
Underlying

Barrels

# of

Financiers

Lifted

Contracts

Bayoil

ACTEC

8 Russia

12,027,284 $

217,882,341

Alfa Eco

49 Russia

76,709,258 $

1,236,384,917

Bashneft

1 Russia

1,237,445 $

30,804,956

Emercom Agency

1 Russia

2,105,469 $

32,946,142

Impexoil LLC

7 Russia

5,487,799 $

117,949,145

Khrizolit

1 Russia

1,979,539 $

37,136,066

Lukoil

Noncotractual

Barrels

Barrels Lifted

Nation

Lifted

In USD

12 Russia

18,000,747 $

261,401,623

Machinoimport

7 Russia

10,153,970 $

238,042,129

NAFTA Moskva

12 Russia

16,738,536 $

262,030,589

Rosneft

2 Russia

2,584,563 $

27,877,912

21 Russia

34,265,072 $

691,907,893

Sidanco

1 Russia

1,023,836 $

10,639,704

Slavneft

2 Russia

4,190,373 $

78,094,990

Surgutneftegas

3 Russia

1,950,000 $

46,742,850

Tatneft

16 Russia

17,472,724 $

233,231,641

Tyumen Oil Company

20 Russia

25,562,460 $

483,186,951

Rosnefteimpex NK

Zarubezhneft
Total

2 Russia
165

Chevron /Texaco

3,455,931 $

79,750,511

234,945,006 $

4,086,010,360

Gazprom

1 Russia

2,077,974 $

44,759,560

Kalmyk Oil & Gas Company

2 Russia

4,030,754 $

92,991,316

Machinoimport

6 Russia

8,042,738 $

154,025,921

Rao Mes Intnl. Econ. Coop.

2 Russia

1,549,442 $

34,229,405

Tatneft

1 Russia

1,030,475 $

13,348,459

12

16,731,383 $

339,354,661

177

251,676,389 $

4,425,365,021

Total
Grand Total

Source: IIC Report
In its final report, the IIC stated that “According to Iraqi Vice President Taha
Yassin Ramadan… oil allocated to United States companies was given to Russian
companies” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 2), but he failed to mention that, as we see in Table 5.7,
American companies stayed in as financiers of Russian companies. Note that, at the time,
Russia was going through an economic crisis and a privatization process. Russian
companies needed credit and funding. We can see in Table 5.7 that American underlying
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financiers financed 177 Russian contracts, 251,676,389 million barrels worth
$4,425,365,021 million. It represents roughly 23% of all Russian oil purchased in the UN
sanctions regime. Bayoil financed 165 Russian contracts, 234,945,006 million barrels
worth $4,086,010,360 million. Chevron-Texaco financed 12 Russian contracts,
16,731,383 million barrels worth $339,354,661 million dollars.
The case of Mobil Refining illustrates one of the ironies of the corporate world
and globalization. Mobil Corp did not finance oil purchases; rather, it obtained financing
through its archrivals: Chevron-Texaco, Bayoil, Glencore and Shell. But Mobil Corp. did
not do it directly. Instead, it hired a company called Erdem Holding Co., which them
approached Chevron Texaco, Bayoil, Glencore and Shell for financing. Table 5.8 below
shows Mobil Corporation refining purchases. I collected the data for Table 5.8 from the
IIC Report, Oil Expert Report III.

Table 5.8 – Mobil Corporation Refining Oil Purchases
Financier

Contractual
Purchaser

# of

No contractual

Contracts

Purchaser

Barrels

Barrels lifted

Lifted

in USD

Chevron Texaco

Erdem Holding Co.

8 On behalf of Mobil Refining

12,912,921

Bayoil

Erdem Holding Co.

1 On behalf of Mobil Refining

457,000

8,897,207

Glencore

Erdem Holding Co.

1 On behalf of Mobil Refining

2,002,942

41,316,900

Shell

Erdem Holding Co.

Total

1 On behalf of Mobil Refining
11

275,528,739

1,037,812

30,444,343

16,410,675

356,187,189

Source: IIC Report

Knowing that Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are themselves important oil producers
and hold large oil reserves, it is worth asking why companies from those nations
purchased so much oil in violation of the UN sanctions regime.
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The answer is that they were oil speculators. They did not purchase oil for
consumption but to resell it in world markets. Three factors helped them. Iraq stopped
trading with British and American companies, “end-users” or refineries that convert oil
into gasoline and other oil derivatives. Second, Iraq traded with small investors and
trading houses, which did not own refineries and had no capacity to refine oil. As Meyer
and Califano argued “Trade houses are very small in size and seem to have limited credit
facilities…many of which had no equipment beyond a fax machine and a telephone”
(Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 144).
That is, they acted as front companies, as mere speculators. In fact, they were
violating Resolution 986 of the UN Security Council, which stated that “It is expressly
understood that Buyer will process crude oil sold under this contract in its own
processing facilities” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 144). Third, Iraq manipulated oil
prices through discounts and wholesaling. Having so much oil, it could afford to sell it
below the global market price. Iraq could have only done it through speculators, and
Saddam controlled many of them. As Meyer and Califano stated “By controlling which
obscure trading companies win the right to buy that oil, Iraq can direct the flow of these
discounts; it explained why major western refiners have been bumped off the Iraqi buyer
list and replaced by more and more unknown names” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p.
140). According to Meyer and Califano, the scheme worked as follow: “Investors
contacted a number of trading companies to which they proposed to sell oil if the
companies in question agreed to their price (the official sales price plus the premium),
issued them a letter of credit, chartered a ship and paid them” (Meyer and Califano,
2006, p. 145). Table 5.9 illustrates some of those investors.
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Table 5.9 – Independent Oil Investors and Speculators
Contractual party
Or Speculator
Mr. Serge Boiedeevaix

Contractual

No contractual party

Nation

No contractual
Nation

# of

Barrels

Contracts

Lifted

France

Vitol S.A.

Switzerland

8

29,525,000

USA

Nafta Petroleum/Mednafta Trading Co.

Cyprus

4

26,257,000

Turkey

Erdem Holding Co.

Turkey

11

25,754,000

Italy

Costieri Genovesi Petrolferi

Italy

11

24,104,000

Mohammad ABDE Al-Manan

Bangladesh

Lukoil Petroleum Ltd

Russia

5

22,285,000

Mr. Vladimir Zhirinovsky

Russia

Sindanco

Russia

3

18,739,000

Russia

Soyuzneftegaz

Russia

4

18,053,000

Russia

Slavneft

Russia

4

16,961,000

Russia

Nafta Moskva

Russia

1

16,738,000

Mr. Awad Ammora

Syria

Awad Ammora Co. & Partner

Syria

5

16,691,000

Reliance Petroleum Ltd

India

Alcon Petroleum Ltd.

Liechtenstein

3

15,780,000

China North Industries Corp.

China

China Wanbao Engineering Corp

China

6

14,462,000

Mr. Bassim Qaqish

Jordan

Lubna Trading S.A.

Spain

7

14,105,000

Mr. Salvatore Nicotra

Italy

Industria Petrolifera Siciliana I.P.S.

Italy

7

13,787,000

Russia

Tyumen Oil Company

Russia

2

13,498,000

Mr. Patrick Maugein

France

Trafigura Beheer B.V.

Netherlands

2

13,201,000

Mr. Talal Abu-Reyaleh

Jordan

Glencore International AG

Switzerland

1

12,107,000

Mr. Michel Grimard

France

Addax S.A.R.L.

Switzerland

7

11,831,000

Mr. Bashar Nouri

Syria

Nouri For Trading Co.

Syria

5

11,156,000

Amities Franco-Irakiennes

France

Aredio Petroleum S.A.R.L.

France

8

11,140,000

Mr. Charles Pasqua

France

Genmar Resources GMBH

Switzerland

3

10,751,000

Mr. Sokolov

Ukraine

H.I.U. Ltd

Ukraine

4

10,318,000

NIS Yugopetrol

Yugoslavia

Eurol International, reg. in Bermuda

UK

2

10,219,000

Mr. Lotfi Doughan

Turkey

Seta Insaat Petrol Ve Petrol Urunleri

Turkey

8

10,202,000

Thai Rice Trader

Thailand

Chayaporn Rice Co. Ltd

Thailand

5

9,886,000

Mr. Ghassan Shallah

Syria

Ghassan Shallah Co.

Syria

4

9,664,000

Riad El-Taher (live in U.K.)

Iraq

Bula Resources PLC

Ireland

7

8,981,000

Jordan

Petrogaz Distribution SA

Switzerland

1

8,626,000

Bangladesh

Jordan Grain Co.LTD

Jordan

3

8,613,000

Mr. Claude Kaspereit

France

E.O.T.C.

France

4

8,538,000

Mr. Abu Al-Abbass

Palestine

Awad Ammora Co. & Partner

Syria

4

8,375,000

Mr. Mohamed Osman Said

Kenya

Asmos Ltd

Kenya

6

8,017,000

Mr. Leith Shbeilat

Jordan

Petrogaz Distribution SA

Switzerland

3

7,648,000

Mr. Emad El-Said El-Galada

Egypt

Alexoil S.A.

Switzerland

3

7,625,000

Cyprus

African Middle East Petroleum Co.

Panama

5

7,291,000

Mr. Abdallah Al-Sallawi

Morocco

Petrade

Morocco

4

7,190,000

Mr. Muhammad Aslan

Turkey

Emin Dis Ticaret Petrol Ve Petrol

Turkey

4

7,030,000

Russia

Neftegazexport

Russia

2

6,725,000

Mr. George Galloway

UK

Middle East Advanced Semiconductor

Jordan

3

6,681,000

Mr. Agababov

Russia

Rosneftegazexport

Russia

2

6,370,000

Zarubezhneft

Russia

Zarnestservice Ltd

Russia

1

6,203,000

Mr. Zain Al-Abedeen Erdem

Mr. Mikhael Gutseriev

Mr. Benon Sevan

Yemen

ZSA Services Ltd

Yemen

3

6,129,000

Mr. Ahmad Al-Bashir

Jordan

Al-Rasheed International Cooperation

Jordan

3

6,100,000

Asia Public Trading Co.

Iraq

Oil & Gas Services Group Ltd

Pakistan

3

6,084,000

380

874,767,000

Source: IIC and Duelfer Report
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I collected the data for Table 5.8 from the IIC Report. Table 5.8 has six columns.
Column I consists in a list of contractual non-state actors, and Column II lists their
nationalities. Column III lists no-contractual investors and/or speculator. Column IV
shows their nationality while Column V shows the # of contracts they purchased from
contractual non-state actors. Column VI accounts for the amount of barrels they lifted.
First, according to the CIA and the IIC, there were a total of 121 contractual nonstate actors from 40 different nationalities that invested in oil and speculated with it under
the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. However, I included in my analysis only those that
speculated with contracts worth more than a million barrels of oil. Including those that
contracted less than a million would have been redundant and confusing. Still, the high
number of participants and their nationalities explains two points: first, the violation of
the sanctions was massive and violators were diverse.
Second, whereas some contractual actors had more than one nationality, noncontractual actors had just one: their nation of registration. For instance, Serge
Boiedeevaix appears as French and an American, but his real nationality is French. Mr.
Zain Al-Abedeen Erdem is a Turkish national, but he appears as Turk and Italian. Also,
Mr. Salvatore Nicotra was an Italian, and he signed contracts as a Russian. And Mr. Riad
El-Taher was an Iraqi residing in the UK; yet, he accepted contracts as a citizen of Jordan
and Bangladesh. I can mention another 22 cases, but the central point here is that
contractual non-state actors altered their nationalities to evade UN inspectors. Then, noncontractual actors operated under a license issued by their country of registration, which
most of the time differed from the nationality of whoever owned the license. That is, noncontractual actors like Glencore and Vitol had Swiss licenses to operate, but their owners
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were French nationals. There were 67 cases like it under the UN sanctions regime. It is a
common practice under globalization, though.
Third, note that Column I includes individuals, NGOs, universities and other nonstate actors. Most of them appeared in Chapter III as NSAs, and their nations appeared in
Chapters II and III as the largest money-makers under the sanctions regime. Meanwhile,
Column III includes only companies because, as we saw in Chapter III, contractual NSAs
accepted contracts only to sell them non-contractual actors. Contractual actors had no
money and expertise to execute the contracts they took on. Precisely, their “mission” was
to obtain contracts from the Iraqi government and sell them to non-contractual actors.
Conversely, non-contractual actors had the money so that their “mission” was to finance
contracts. They usually financed several contractual actors, and they did not limit
themselves to finance oil contracts. They financed every sort of trade, from construction,
tourism and agriculture to education, health and even public relations.
In fact, some non-contractual actors had never invested in the oil industry. The
UN sanctions regime was their first time because it offered good business opportunities.
Meyer and Califano found that speculators financed 25.68% of the oil traded under the
sanctions (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 145). Finally, observe that selling contracts from
contractual to non-contractual parties almost always involved a change of non-contractual
nations. For example, Mr. Serge Boiedeevaix was a French national who also obtained
contracts as an American. Here, France and the US were the contractual nations. But Mr.
Boiedeevaix sold his contracts to companies registered in Switzerland and Cyprus;
therefore, Switzerland and Cyprus were the non-contractual nations. Perhaps the most
illustrative case involves six contractual actors from Iraq who sold their contracts to six
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non-contractual speculators. It all explains why some nations received more oil than
others and the global nature of such operations.
In sum, based on their modus operandis, we can see why investors, speculators
and investing are such important agents and means of globalizing. They are the drivers of
speculation because they move contracts throughout the global market, from contractor to
investors, to then a company, then a subcontractor, and so on. They play central unique
roles in the circumvention of sanctions regimes as well. In the next section, I present 4
cases to illustrate how banks, investors, companies and even state actors concur in the
market place to invest and speculate.

Case Studies
In this section, I further illustrate the hypothesis of this chapter: global banking
undermines a multilateral sanctions regime; global banking, as a means of globalization,
facilitated the circumvention of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq by providing
financial instruments to the agents of globalizations, namely corporations, NGOs,
political activists and other NSAs.
Circumvention of UN sanctions against Iraq occurred through three main
categories: 1) state-owned banks; 2) private banks, 3) speculators. They all require
participation of third parties or intermediaries, which mostly included state and/or nonstate actors such as speculators, politicians, and political organizations and businessmen.
In order to execute their contracts, intermediaries then sold their contracts to companies.
The Chart below illustrates the most common financing scheme under the UN sanctions
regime.
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Figure 5.1 – Most Common Financing Schemes under the UN Sanctions Regime

state-owned banks,
private banks,
speculators

Intermediaries
(speculators, investors,
and trading firms)

Intermediaries

Intermediaries

(politicians, political parties,
religious organizations, NGOs,
other NSAs)

(state owned and private
corporations))

shipping companies, oil
firms, refinaries,
importers-exporters

shipping companies, oil
firms, refinaries,
importers-exporters

shipping companies, oil
firms, refinaries,
importers-exporters

state-owned and private
banks, investors and
speculators

state-owned and private
banks, investors and
speculators

state-owned and private
banks, investors and
speculators

I present four case studies to explain my findings. The first case is InfobankBelmetalenergo, which involved a state-owned bank and a public company. The second
case is about East Star Trading, Texaco Corp and BNP New York. Texaco speculated
through East Star and BNP to conceal its wrongdoings. The third case is about Mr.
Chalmers, a NSA empowered by his oil trade firm, Bayoil Inc. The fourth case is
Trafigura Beheer B.V, Ibex Energy, and Multi-Prestation S.A.R.L. This case involves an
oil and commodity trader and an oil service company. All cases present three common
denominators: a) the use of multiple layers of offshore bank accounts, of which the IIC
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stated that “Were typical of the financial transactions under the sanction regime” (IIC,
Chapter IV, p. 434); b) the use of wire transfers and cash; c) the use of intermediaries or
third parties to ultimately execute the services.

Infobank-Belmetalenergo
The first case involves a state-owned bank. It explains how nation-states and
banks worked together to circumvent the UN sanctions regime. This case is about
Infobank, Belarus and Iraq.
The Duelfer Report affirmed that “The critical financial element in the illicit
trade process between Belarus and Iraq was Infobank” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance
and Procurement, p. 129). But the model was simple: “Belarus demanded to be paid 75
percent of any contract price in hard currency before delivery of any goods. In return, it
would purchase goods in the world market for Iraq, including military goods. Infobank
agreed to provide bridging funds, including the 75 percent up-front fee, to finance illicit
deals between Belarus and Iraq for a fee of 15 percent of any contract” (Duelfer Report,
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 129)
Infobank was a result of privatization of Soviet Union’s banking industry in 1994
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 129). Infobank became Belarus’
largest bank, taking over 39% of all investments the former Soviet Union had throughout
the Middle East (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 129). Infobank
also acquired 10% of Belmetalenergo, a firm registered in Belarus in 1993 (Duelfer
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 129). Like Infobank, Belmetalenergo
picked 67% of the businesses that the former Soviet Union had in the Middle East.
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Belmetalenergo even took over the office the Soviets had in Bagdad and used it as
headquarter. Belmetalenergo’s businesses consisted in the export of tractors, trucks,
construction equipments, heavy machinery and spare parts, including military spare parts,
all made in Belarus and/or Russia. When the UN sanctions regime was established,
Infobank emerged as the main financier of Belmetalenergo’s businesses in Iraq. The
partnership soon became a trade engine between Belarus and Iraq. The importance of
Infobank was confirmed in a letter from the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture to Iraqi
business nomenclature. The Minister stated that “Guarantees from Infobank are accepted
by all Iraqi companies and ministries; we must be certain that cooperation with Infobank
is never broken” (IIC, Chapter III, p. 337).
Infobank guaranteed Belmetalenergo’s good image in European markets where it
purchased goods to export to Iraq. At some point, most of Belmetalenergo’s businesses
responded to Iraqi needs. It became the 13th largest exporter to Iraq (IIC, Chapter III, p.
337). The IIC found that Belmetalenergo picked 71 contracts worth $349.3 million
dollars in just 2 years of sanctions, all of which was financed by Infobank through 129
letters of credits (IIC, Chapter III, p. 340). The CIA found another 20 contracts that UN
auditors could not detect because Infobank did not keep records of Belmetalenrgo-Iraqi
deals (IIC, Chapter III, p. 340). When the CIA asked why, Infobank’s officials argued
that “It was a practice to destroy all documentations once contracts were satisfied” (IIC,
Chapter III, p. 340). The CIA did identify, however, around $69 million dollars that Iraq
illegally paid to Belmetalenergo through Jordan National Bank and then to Infobank (IIC,
Chapter III, p. 340). Observe that Iraq was not supposed to pay its customers. UN
Resolution 896 mandated that Iraq had to issue payments through BNP New York, the

245

bank that guarded Iraq’s escrow accounts. In 2003, Infobank still held $7 million dollars
that belonged to Iraq (IIC, Chapter III, p. 340).
Although Belmetalenergo was mainly an export oriented enterprise and Infobank
a financier of its exports, they also engaged in oil trading under the sanctions regime.
They purchased 21.6 million barrels worth $464.2 million dollars (IIC, Chapter III, p.
337). Infobank and Belmetalenergo undertook another four oil contracts, which they
insured through Bayoil and Chevron-Texaco, two American oil companies (IIC, Chapter
III, p. 337). Chevron-Texaco kept the oil and paid $1 million dollars to Belmetalenergo
and $2.9 million to Infobank (IIC, Chapter III, p. 337). To conceal its dealings, ChevronTexaco made its payments through an amalgam of front companies that included
Balmorals Ventures, Hanner Tired Trading, Hi-Tech Technology Corp Ltd, and Rouden
Co. LLC (IIC, Chapter III, p. 337). Those firms belonged to Belmoral International and
Trustbank, a parent company of Infobank. Belmoral International and Trustbank were
also funded and registered in Belarus. The linkage between Infobank and Trustbank was
Mr. Victor Shevtsov, Chairman of the Board of Directors of both Infobank and
Trustbank. Belarus’ legislature appointed him, and he supervised Infobank’s operations
(IIC, Chapter III, p. 337).

East Star Trading-BNP Paribas
This second case involves two oil traders and a private bank. This case is
illustrative of how oil traders and banks allied to finance Iraq’s oil exports. The IIC and
GAO cited a total of 14 major private banks as violators of the UN sanctions, among
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which were HSBC of Hong Kong, Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, and Barclays of
London (IIC, Chapter III, p. 341; GAO, Audits, p. 11).
The IIC explicitly accused private banks of: 1) concealing the identities of
violators of the UN sanctions; 2) paying intermediaries and third parties. Specially, BNP
was the target of direct accusations. Congresswoman Rohrabacher accused BNP Paribas
of paying East Star, Al-Douh, Glencore International AG, Belmetalenergo, Texaco Corp.
and other intermediaries for services they did not render. She argued that “They were not
authorized to receive payments as they were not the original party to the transaction, and
this is a third party being paid for what someone else is doing” (The Role of BNP
Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 7).
UN Security Council Resolution 986 stated that “only financial institutions could have
funds reassigned to them” (The Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 7). East Star, Al-Douh, Glencore International
AG, Belmetalenergo and Texaco Corp were not financial institutions, yet, they had funds
reassigned to them through BNP of Geneva, Credit Agricole Indosuez Singapore and
HSBC Bank Middle East among other banks.
East Star Trading was incorporated in the Cayman Islands on February 27, 1990
as an affiliate to Pacific Inter-Link SDN BHD (www.pacificinterlink.comny, 2002). Both
companies belonged to Commodities House Investment Ltd., which in turn was part of
Hayel Saeed Anam Group, an Arab conglomerate formed by about 100 companies.
Pacific Inter-Link was incorporated in Malaysia on June 22, 1988 as the “leader” of a
group of subsidiaries and affiliates specialized in imports-exports. Seven of them traded
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with Iraq under the UN sanctions and made about $270 million dollars (The Role of BNP
Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 7-8).
East Star was just one of them. East Star instructed Al-Riyadh International
Flowers, one of its many affiliates, to establish trade relations with Iraq (The Role of
BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p.
8). Al-Riyadh began to finance exports to Iraq through letters of credit it obtained from
Credit Agricole Indosuez Singapore. Al-Riyadh then reassigned its contracts to a
subcontractor, Investment Trading Industry & Medical Hygienic Services, which actually
executed the exports; then, BNP New York paid Al-Riyadh with Iraqi funds and AlRiyadh repaid its loans to Credit Agricole Indosuez. Any money remaining was actually a
profit for East Star (The Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 7). For its parts, Investment Trading Industry &
Medical Hygienic Services never got paid although it actually executed the contracts.
Investment Trading was just a front company to East Star. Congresswoman Ms.
Rohrabacher called East Star “a shadowy company” (The Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 7).
When Saddam Hussein refused to trade with American companies, some of those
companies proceeded to hire intermediaries in the form of subcontractors. One of them
was Texaco Corp, which in turn hired Bulf, a company registered in The Bahamas but
based in Panama (www.pacificinterlink.com.ny, 2002). Bulf was a subsidiary of Midway
Oil of Reston, a little known oil company based in Virginia. According to the partnership,
Bulf was to obtain contracts from Iraq and execute them, and Texaco was to obtain letters
of credit from BNP to finance Bulf’s operations (The Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing
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before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 11). Texaco’s
outstanding credit history guaranteed the lowest interest rates for Bulf. Texaco even lent
its technologies, equipments and expertise to Bulf. Texaco asked BNP to conceal its
identity and redirect payments to its numerous subsidiaries and affiliates, then to BNP
Geneva, and from it to Chase Manhattan Bank. Texaco also asked BNP to channel the
money in the form of “liquid securities,” so it could convert it back into cash at anytime
(The Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, 2005, p. 11). Midway Oil of Reston too asked BNP not to reveal its
association with Bulf and to channel payments through Bank of America to Panama
Bank, in Panama. BNP agreed in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 986 (The
Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
2005, p. 11).
Bulf obtained 14 contracts from Iraq in a period of two years. It lifted two million
oil barrels per contract, which it later resold in European markets. Bulf profited a total of
$97 million. Iraq paid BNP New York, which then paid Texaco Corp. Yet, BNP claimed
to have no record of Texaco’s involvement in Bulf’s operations (The Role of BNP
Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 12).
GAO and IIC learned about Texaco’s scheme through Panama Bank and Bank of
America.
In all, what is most relevant in this case is the participation of BNP New York in
the scheme. BNP was the bank that UN chose to manage Iraqi finances under the UN
sanctions regime. Congresswoman Rohrabacher harshly criticized BNP for its acts in a
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in the House of
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Representatives of the U.S. Congress. Congresswoman Rohrabacher told BNP’s CEO
that “You were not supposed to deliver these payments to third parties unless they were
banks. But you went ahead and delivered it to that company, which was then owned by
some other company in the Cayman Islands. Really, this smells; this stinks” (The Role of
BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p.
13). Congresswoman Rohrabacher suspected the obvious: that BNP laundered money for
East Star, Al-Douh, Glencore and many other companies that traded with Iraq. In fact,
auditors from GAO found that BNP issued a total of 572 payments to third parties (GAO
Report, p. 9).

David Chalmers and Bayoil
The third case is relevant since it involved an empowered individual, the sort I
explained in Chapter IV. This case is about Mr. David Chalmers and his Bayoil Inc, an
oil trading firm based in Houston, Texas. Mr. Chalmers and Bayoil speculated with about
$600 million dollars worth of oil in about three years. As I stated earlier, oil traders
financed 26% of all contracts under the UN sanctions regime. By 1999, just “Four
traders financed and lifted over 60% of the Iraqi oil under the Program” (IIC, Chapter
II, p. 115). Bayoil was one of them.
Mr. Chalmers opposed the UN sanctions regime from day one, and he made his
position known to President George Bush Sr. through several letters and personal
meetings, hoping that the President, an oil trader himself, would eventually ease the
American position toward Iraq (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 323). Mr. Chalmers also
visited Bagdad and met with Saddam on several occasions. He asked Saddam to accept
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UN conditions for disarmament in exchange for easing UN sanctions against Iraq. Mr.
Chalmers became one of the main negotiators involved in helping to set the terms of the
UN sanctions regime in Iraq. He actively intermediated between the U.S., UN, Saddam
and OPEC. He served as an expert in oil trading, frequently warning about instability in
oil prices and markets. Meyer and Califano pointed out that “Mr. Chalmers let the parties
know that Iraqi oil industry was to be untouched if the Coalition wanted stability in oil
prices in OPEC” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 323). Additionally, Mr. Chalmers
collected money, medicines and school supplies for Iraqi children and women. He even
used his own money to repair an Iraqi hospital and several schools damaged during the
Coalition’s bombing in 1991 (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 323).
For its part, the Bayoil was a conglomerate registered in Delaware but
headquartered in Houston, Texas. Among its many subsidiaries and affiliates were Bayoil
Technologies, Bayoil S.A., and Bayoil Supply and Trading Ltd. Bayoil registered and
based them in Nassau, The Bahamas. Never mind the names of those companies. They
were oil traders, mere speculators.
Bayoil did not engage itself in oil deals under the UN sanctions regime. I found
that Bayoil violated UN sanctions through Italtech SRL, one of its many affiliates.
Italtech was registered in Italy and had been “dormant” for some years. Bayoil revived it
as a front company specialized in oil trading (IIC, Report on Oil Allocations, p. 36).
Then, Bayoil approached several Russian firms and asked them to act as intermediaries
between Italtech and the government of Iraq (IIC, Chapter II, p. 36). The Russian
companies were: Alfa Eco (JSC), Tatneft (OAO), Lukoil, Tyumen Oil Company, Nafta
Moskva (JSC), Zarubezhneft, and ACTEC. Bayoil chose Russian companies for two
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main reasons: 1) Russia was a close ally of Saddam who, in turn, was willing to grant any
oil contract to any Russian company for political support at the UN; 2) during this period
-1998 to 2002- most Russian companies were immersed in a deep financial crisis. They
needed businesses to stay afloat.
Bayoil bridged money to Italtech in the form of letters of credit. Italtech utilized it
to finance Russian companies that ultimately executed the contracts. For that purpose,
Italtech opened a series of bank accounts in banks around the world, including: Merrill
Lynch S.A. in Geneva, Switzerland; UEB in Abu Dhabi in Dubai; and BNP in France,
Brussels, Luxemburg, Cyprus, Singapore and Bangladesh (IIC, Chapter II, p. 36). Right
afterward, Italtech created United Management, an accounting firm to process billing,
payments, and route profits back to Bayoil. Italtech registered and based United
Management in Santiago de Chile (IIC, Chapter II, p. 36). Lastly, United Management
opened bank accounts in Santiago de Chile, Paris, Geneva, and Luxemburg (IIC, Chapter
II, p. 36).
Through that scheme Buyoil purchased and sold $215 million barrels of Iraqi oil
in just 10 months. For instance, in January 8th, 1999, SOMO confirmed the allocation of
contract M/5/50 for $7 million barrels divided in five shipments to J.S.C. and Nafta’s
parent companies in Singapore and Bangladesh (IIC, Chapter II, p. 37). In July 1999,
SOMO amended contract M/6/25 to allocate $10 million barrels to Lukoil, another
Russian company, and Plasco Shipping, a subsidiary of Lukoil, delivered the contract in 6
shipments (IIC, Chapter II, p. 37). Italtech’s records indicate that Plasco delivered a total
of 7,843,376 million barrels, and that United Management routed about $1.4 million
dollars to Bayoil for the same contract (IIC, Chapter II, p. 37). In January 19th, 2000,
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SOMO granted contract M/7/90 for 6.5 million barrels of oil to a Russian front company
called Tyumen Oil Co., also known as TNK (IIC, Chapter II, p. 37). The contract
consisted in four deliveries worth $620,000, $221,650 and $128,650 million respectively.
Italtech bridged $4 million dollars to a Russian financial entity with the name of Bayvan
Consulting to pay for the shipments, and United Management collected $7 million dollars
for the sale of the contracts (IIC Report, Chapter II, p. 37). Soon after, SOMO granted
contract M/8/40 to Crown Trade and Finance Ltd., a financial firm affiliated to Tyumen,
a Russian oil company as well. Tyumen delivered the contract in September 2000. It
contained 9 million barrels, and Italtech paid three cents per barrel to Tyumen through
Crown Trade and Finance Ltd. It always did it on Bayoil’s behalf. United Management
collected $30 million dollars (IIC, Chapter II, p. 37).
Later, in December 7th, 2000, SOMO assigned contract M/8/9/19 for 4 million
barrels to Machinoimport, yet another Russian company (IIC, Chapter II, p. 38).
Machinoimport delivered the contract in three shipments between July and August 14,
2001, but IIC and the 661 Committee did not find payments related to them. In August
2001, there was still a contract, M/10/19 for 6 million barrels. United Management’s
accounting ledgers revealed that it deposited $839,368.10 at Cyprus Popular Bank Ltd. in
favor of Machinoimport (IIC, Chapter II, p. 38). Finally, in August 26, 2001, Lukoil Asia
Pacific PTE Ltd, a subsidiary of Lukoil, Inc executed contract M/10/67 for 4 million
barrels which had been granted a couple of months before. Yet, United Management paid
Plasco Shipping three cents a barrel for the shipments (IIC, Chapter II, p. 38). It did not
pay Lukoil Asia Pacific Pte Ltd as it should have done according to the mandates of the
UN sanctions regime against.
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On the other hand, the way Italtech paid the Iraqi government was as intricate. It
went as follow: Bayoil deposited funds in Italtech’s accounts at BNP Paris. Italtech, at its
discretion, wire transferred the funds to United Management, Al-Hoda, or Al Wasel &
Babel’s accounts at Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank or Jordan National Bank (IIC, Chapter
II, p. 39; Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 117). They then paid
SOMO. One case illustrates it. Early in 2001, Bayoil financed and delivered Iraqi oil for
Petroleum Technical Services Co., also known as PTSC. Bayoil charged PTSC for the
services and instructed it to wire transfer $812,386.20 thousand dollars to Italtech’s
account at United European Bank, which in turn wire transferred it to Al Wasel &
Babel’s account at Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank in Dubai (IIC, Chapter II, p. 40; Duelfer
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 117). In total, between 2000 and 2001,
Italtech paid $11 million to Saddam Hussein through this intricate financial network o
bank accounts and banks (IIC, Chapter II, p. 40).
In all, David Chalmers and Bayoil purchased 9% of all oil contracts sold under
the UN sanctions regime against Iraq (WSJ, Oct 13th, 2004; American Journal of
International Law, vol.99, p. 904-906). Their network involved 7 nations, 12 Russian
intermediaries, 11 subsidiaries and affiliates, 9 banks, and an undetermined number of
bank accounts. In the end, the government of the United States accused Mr. Chalmers
and Bayoil of "Paying inflated commissions to brokers knowing that these commissions
were earmarked for the kickback to the Hussein regime" (WSJ, Oct 13th, 2004). The
accusations included “wire fraud, conducting financial transactions with a state sponsor
of terrorism and breaking the economic embargo with Iraq” (WSJ, Oct 13th, 2004;
American Journal of International Law, vol.99, p. 904-906). Mr. Chalmers and Bayoil
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were indicted in 2007 (WSJ, Oct 13th, 2004; American Journal of International Law,
vol.99, p. 904-906).

Trafigura - Ibex
This last case reveals the intricacy of global trading. This case tells us: a) how
banks, speculators and companies interact through multiple layers of bank accounts,
letters of credits, wire transferring and electronic money; b) how speculators
circumvented the Iraqi government; c) how speculators corrupted UN officials. This case
involves Trafigura and Ibex, two well established global traders secretly associated
through an amalgam of bank accounts and companies they owned around the world.
Trafigura Beheer B.V. was a British oil and commodity financier while Ibex
Energy/Multi-Prestation S.A.R.L. was a French oil and commodity service corporation
(IIC, Chapter II, p. 176). Basically, they both specialized in financing large operations of
commodities. Trafigura Beheer B.V. purposely created Trafigura Ltd in May 1997 to
participate in the UN sanctions regime. Yet, Trafigura created its own net of subsidiaries
and affiliates, among which was Toro Energy S.A.M. Trafigura registered and based it in
Monaco in October 1997 (IIC Report, Chapter II, p. 176). It made an initial wire transfer
of $51 million dollars to Toro’s account at a branch of Barclays Bank in Monaco.
Immediately, investors rolled in, and three months later Toro was worth $100 million
(IIC, Chapter II, p. 177). Trafigura employed Toro as a front company. Trafigura
received 65% of all profits while Toro retained 35% in form of investment for future
operations (IIC, Chapter II, p. 176). Toro purchased oil from Iraq and resold it in Europe.
In return, it purchased commodities in Africa and Latin America and sold them to Iraq. In
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total, Toro traded 21 million barrels of Iraqi oil in 1998 for a net profit of $128 million,
and it sold Iraq $29 million worth of rice, corn, salt and sugar to Iraq in two years (IIC
Report, Chapter II, p. 176). Toro paid dividends to its investors and still retained $17
million, a stocky amount for a 1 year-old company with just one customer: the Iraqi
government (IIC, Chapter II, p. 176).
Trafigura expanded its operations in 1991. It began to purchase oil allocated to
SOCO International, another speculative firm registered and based in London (IIC,
Chapter II, p. 178). Under the deal, Trafigura subcontracted 44 million barrels of oil
worth $240 million dollars. But in that same year, Saddam Hussein banned American and
British companies from purchasing Iraqi oil. The ban affected Trafigura and all its
associates. Trafigura circumvented Iraqi authorities by allying itself to Ibex, which at the
time was smuggling oil on behalf of the Iraqi government. Ibex was receiving 25% of the
proceeds, so it decided to pay 12% to Trafigura Ltd for allocating the oil in refineries
around the world and laundering the money (IIC, Chapter II, p. 178).
Trafigura and Ibex began cheating on the Iraqi government and the UN sanctions
regime in March 2000. They bribed Iraqi and UN inspectors who repeatedly allowed the
overloading of oil tankers (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182). The tankers belonged to Falcon
Navigation Corp., another affiliate of Trafigura Beheer B.V. Trafigura financed its oil
deals according to two schemes. First, it financed the top-off of the cargo portion with
standby letters of credit issued to Roundhead Inc., an “off the shelf” Bahamian company
that Trafigura Ltd had acquired in February 2000 (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182). Bank records
showed that on June 14th, 2001, Trafigura wire transferred $51 million from its account
at Credit Agricole Indosuez to Ibex Service & Equipment Ltd., a company registered and
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based in the British Virgin Islands. Part of the money, $24 million, was to cancel
Roundhead’s standby letters of credit (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182). The remaining portion,
$27 million, Ibex Service & Equipment Ltd. wired transferred it to Windmill Trade Ltd.,
also a shelf company registered and based in British Virgin Islands and parented to
Trafigura Beheer B.V. (IIC Report, Chapter II, p. 182). Windmill received the money in
its account at Banque Audi’s branch in Beirut. Finally, Windmill wire transferred the
money to a SOMO account at Fransabank in Beirut, Lebanon (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182).
A second scheme consisted in issuing letters of credit to Ibex. Trafigura issued
credit and sold contracts to Koch Petroleum and Marathon Ashland, two American oil
refineries. Koch Petroleum paid Trafigura $20.8 million dollars in two installments wire
transferred to Trafigura’s accounts at BNP Paris (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182). For its part,
Marathon Ashland paid Trafigura $23.2 million in two installments wired transferred to
Trafigura’s accounts at the London branch of Credit Agricole Indosuez S.A. The IIC
traced the two amounts to a branch of Barclays Bank in Cayman Island (IIC, Chapter II,
p. 182). In one instance, Trafigura issued a letter of credit to finance an Ibex contract
worth one million barrels of oil. Ibex overloaded the tanker with about 200,000 barrels. It
then sold it to Koch Petroleum and Petromar S.A., based in Curazao and affiliated to
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., owned by the state of Venezuela (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182).
Trafigura financed the extra 200,000 barrels through a stand-by letter of credit issued to
Roundhead (IIC, Chapter II, p. 184). To honor the credit, it wired transferred $6.4 million
to Ibex Standard & Equipment’s account at Credit Agricole Indosuez, which transferred
the money to Windmill’s account at Banque Saradar in Beirut. Windmill paid SOMO’s

257

share by wire transferring $5.2 million to SOMO’s account at Fransabank, in Beirut (IIC,
Chapter II, p. 182).
Even though the 661 Committee could not determine exactly how much oil the
two companies smuggled out of Iraq, it did estimate that they engaged in at least 75
overloading operations worth $900 million dollars in a period of three years (IIC, Chapter
II, p. 182). Trafigura and Ibex’s operations involved three holdings, 7seven subsidiaries,
four affiliates, three offshore companies, two shelf companies, five banks and a dozen
bank accounts. To complicate it even more, they involved seven nations from five
continents. It was so complicated that their smuggling went unnoticed with these
operations until 2003. The U.S. discovered it only after it invaded Iraq and confiscated
the archives of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. Indeed, the case of Trafigura and Ibex is intricate
and difficult to decipher precisely because Trafigura and Ibex wanted it that way, so they
would not get caught. After all, that is nature of trade under globalization: intricate and
difficult to decipher.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed how global banking, a means of globalization, and
banks, investors and speculators, the agents of globalization, undermines a multilateral
sanctions regime. I conclude that in effect, the current global banking system allowed
nation-states, banks, investors, speculators, corporations, and NSAs in general to operate
and profit under the UN sanctions regime. On one hand, I first found that the Iraqi
banking system actually expanded throughout the Middle East under the UN sanctions
regime. Secondly, Iraq utilized the domestic and regional banking to reach global

258

banking. On the other hand, when the UN conceived and implemented the UN sanctions
regime upon Iraq, it basically ignored the hawala, the credit system that Iraq and most
Middle Eastern nations had been using for centuries but alien to Western banking
standards. In addition, companies, traders, speculators and even nation-states such as
Belarus and Russia utilized banks and global banking to conceal their wrongdoings and
even to launder money. They did it through banking instruments such as letters of credit,
wire transferring, offshore accounts, and multiple layers of bank accounts for their
affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent companies. But what are affiliates, subsidiaries and
parent companies anyway? They are corporate models, another means of globalization. In
the next chapter, I analyze in more detail how companies employed global corporate
models to circumvent a sanctions regime.
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VI. AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: CORPORATIONS AND
CORPORATE MODELS
“The second great era [of] Globalization lasted roughly from 1800 to 2000. In globalization 2.0, the key
agent of change, the dynamic force driving global integration, was multinational companies. These
multinationals went global for markets and labor, spearheaded first by the expansion of the Dutch and
English joint-stock companies and the Industrial revolution”.
Thomas L. Friedman
“The company that then asked you to deliver its money that it was receiving for that overcharging to East
Star, which then of course, as we can see now, was owned by Commodities House Investment. Who knows
who owns Commodities House Investment?”
Congressman Mr. Rohrabacher

Introduction
Corporate models were essential for the circumvention of the UN sanctions
regime in Iraq. On the one hand, the government of Iraq employed corporate models to
sell to and purchase from corporations and states. Iraq used corporate models to reach
local, regional and global markets. On the other hand, there were non-Iraqi corporations
that were interested in the Iraqi market. They too employed corporate models to evade
UN sanctions and inspectors, conceal their wrongdoings, and laundry their profits. I use
the first part of this chapter to analyze corporate models. I include an analysis of
corporate governance and responsibility since they are part of the overall structure of
corporate models. In the second part, I present specific examples of how corporations
employed corporate models to circumvent the UN sanctions regime in Iraq.

The Corporation: A Global Agent and Globalizing Force
Corporations are among the main agents of globalization. I would argue that
corporations created globalization. For example, let us look at the colonization of the
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Americas. The European Crowns could not manage their American colonies from their
metropolis because they did not have the infrastructure. Bureaucracies were lousy, and
global means of transportation and communication were still in their “primitive” stages.
It took weeks to send a message from London to Philadelphia and months to send an
envoy to India. The solution was decentralization and delegation of authority to
corporations through charters.
A charter is probably the first global corporate model that ever existed. A charter
is a legal document issued to acknowledge full authority over a piece of territory
(Draakman, 2004, p. 37; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 74). The charter grants certain
prerogatives to a recipient, but those prerogatives do not include ownership, which
remains as a right of the entity or legal person who holds it. This person can annul the
charter at any time (Draakman, 2004, p. 39; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 74). If it
occurs, the recipient must restrain from claiming indemnity or relation to the property in
question (Draakman, 2004, p. 39; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 74). Based on those
principles, for example, the English Crown issued a charter to the London Company,
which in turn created the Charter of the Virginia Company of London with the sole
purpose of establishing colonies in North America. The English Crown also issued a
charter to the Plymouth Company to create the Virginia Company of Plymouth, also
known as Virginia Bay Company.
The Dutch Crown took another approach. It hired corporations to manage
colonization. It contracted the Dutch West Indian Company to open trade routes through
the Caribbean Sea and areas of South America like Brazil, Suriname and Guyana
(Draakman, 2004, p. 40; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 82). It created mining centers
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in what are today Ghana, Angola, Congo and some parts of South Africa. The Dutch
West Indian Company financed the expedition that led to the discovery of the Hudson
River. It later subcontracted the Hudson River Company to build a port there, and the
port soon became the most important trade center in what was then New Amsterdam,
which covered most of New York, Connecticut, Delaware and New Jersey (Draakman,
2004, p. 41; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 82). The Dutch also used the Dutch East
Indian Company, a parent corporation of the Dutch West Indian, to open trade routes in
Asia and establish markets there. For Draakman (2004), Easterbrook and Fishel (1991)
and other historian of Corporate Law, the Dutch West Indian was the first multinational
corporation and the first mega-corporation in the world. It was so powerful that it had the
power to wage war, negotiate treaties, coin money and establish colonies (Draakman,
2004, p. 44; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 87). The Dutch West Indian created what is
today Indonesia.
In “The World is Flat”, Thomas L. Friedman argues that companies consolidated
themselves as a true globalizing agent during the 1800-2000 period. Friedman calls it
“the second great era of globalization” (Friedman, 2008, p. 61) He explicates that,
during this period, corporations became multinationals through corporate models, which
they created for two main reasons: a) to control sources of raw materials worldwide; b) to
open and control new markets where they could allocate their finished products. It is in
that sense that corporations structured globalization. But William I. Robinson (2004)
disagrees. In “A Theory of Global Capitalism”, Robinson suggests that there is a key
difference between multinational and transnational corporate models, and that such a
difference has a structural character. The multinational model is built on three
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assumptions: a) there is a global economy; 2) there are national economies; 3) there are
different models of production and accumulation of capital across global and national
markets (Robinson, 2004, p. 10-11). In other words, each nation adopted an economic
model based on, among other factors, economic needs, natural resources, market forces,
political systems, and position within the context of regional and global economies.
Corporations had no choice but to conceive and adopt corporative models according to
national economic models. I have drawn Figure 6.1 to typify a transnational Firm
operating under the multinational model.

Figure 6.1 – Transnational “XYZ Inc” Operating under the Multinational Model
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I have called this hypothetical transnational XYZ Inc. Now, in Figure 6.1 each
color represents a unique corporate model, and each circle represents a different nation.
XYZ Inc is based and licensed to operate in nation Green. But then, XYZ Inc creates a
subsidiary to operate in nation Yellow. The subsidiary, known as ‘A Inc’, decides to
expand to operate in nation Blue, so it creates a parent company. It licenses and bases it
in nation Blue under the name ‘B Inc’. Lastly, when XYZ Inc expands to operate in nation
Red, it adopts three different corporate models. It becomes an intermediary, a shell, and a
front company. The same occurs as the corporation moves to operate from local to
bilateral, regional and global markets. That is, under the multinational model, a
corporation adopts a different corporate model as it crosses national borders.
It all works differently under the transnational corporate model. This model,
unlike the multinational, assumes that there is just a global economy, implying that there
is uniformity across national markets. The end of the Cold War, according to Fukuyama
(1992), presupposed the triumph of neoliberalism over planned-centralized and other
economic models. According to Robison (2004), transnational capital expanded global
models of production across states, in the process becoming a hegemonic political force
in a large number of nations. Most nations have adopted, although with some variations,
the same neoliberal economic structures, trade strategies, business legal codes, and even
political systems. In fact, I can safely argue that the proliferation of bilateral and regional
trade treaties during the last 20 years is an evidence of how little structural differences
there are among national economies in most of Europe, Latin America and South East
Asia. Moreover, the philosophical and practical concept behind the WTO is to induce
uniformity across national and regional markets, so a true global economy can
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consolidate and flourish. GATT and WTO attempt to guarantee the existence of just one
body of corporate and trade laws applicable to corporations regardless of their nation of
origin, domicile, and jurisdiction. Some nations resist such attempts though. For instance,
Russia and China have very different corporate and trade rules, and the European Union
and the US have different regulatory structures. But in general, I find that under the
transnational corporate model, this condition of uniformity across national economies is
ideal for corporations because they do not have to adopt different corporate models as
they cross markets boundaries. I drew Figure 6.2 below to exemplify how corporations
operate under uniform transnational markets.

Figure 6.2 – Transnational “XYZ Inc” Operation under Uniform Transnational Markets
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Let us assume that there is just one global regulatory regime. Let us assume that
there is full globalization under a global capitalist system and all nations signed up on
GATT, WTO and other international trade regimes. Under such assumptions, corporation
XYZ Inc would operate under a condition of full uniformity across local, bilateral,
regional and global markets, which in Figure 6.2 are delimited by black, yellow, and blue
circles respectively. Observe that XYZ Inc remains green because it does not need to
adopt different corporate models to operate across local, bilateral, regional and global
boundaries.
For one, uniformity creates a sense of stability and positive expectations across
transnational markets. It also facilitates production, transportation of raw materials and
finished goods, and movement of capital from nation to nation, region to region, and
globally. In addition, uniformity makes it easier for corporations to conceive and
implement global business strategies. The underlying assumption is that if corporations
did not need to adapt to different bodies of business laws and politics, then they would
employ the same corporate models across nations and regions. Under such conditions,
corporations can expand easily. They do not need to create new corporations. They just
have to acquire existing ones. In fact, scholars like Bhagwati (2004) and Friedman
(2008), and data from FMI (wwwfmi.org, 2008) indicate that merging and acquisition
have been the most common means of corporate expansion and growth from 1800s to
2000. I can cite many well known cases across different industrial sectors, from oil and
pharmaceutical to computer and food industries. But let us just take three corporations in
the automobile industry. For instance, although General Motors has consistently been
losing market shares to its competitors over the years, it has grown steadily by purchasing
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several automakers around the world, among which were Opel and Volvo. The same
occurred with Chrysler and Ford Motors. Chryslers, once in bankruptcy, purchased
Daimler-Benz. Ford Motors grew spectacularly by purchasing Jaguar, Hyundai, and Land
Rover. In all, General Motors, Chryslers and Ford are among the most globalizing agents
in the global economy not only for the markets they control but also because they have
suppliers, assembly plants and distributors in about 72 nations (Friedman, 2008, p. 119).
In sum, corporations have historically been among the main agents of
globalization. Their very nature demands expansion from their town of origin to the
global market. But corporate expansion does not come easy. Corporations in fact often
clash with politics, competition, litigation, geography and climate among other obstacles.
Corporations have created an array of corporate models to circumvent those obstacles or
at least minimize their effects.

Global Corporate Models
I can trace the concept of a corporation back to Roman times. The word itself
derives from the Latin language to mean corpus or body (Corporate Law, Black
Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, p. 471). For the Romans, a businessperson was a legal “body,” a
corporation, and Roman courts treated it as such (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary,
2007, Vol.3, p. 475). The concept reemerged early during the industrial revolution with a
new notion, of broader connotations. The “new” corporation was still a legal body but
also a person. A corporation was an abstraction yet a body in its own right (Corporate
Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, p. 476). If in Roman times a corporation had slaves
to do the work, the corporation of the industrial revolution had to hire free men for a
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salary. This new corporation could also raise capital, accumulate and use it as it pleased,
according to its abilities (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, p. 476). It is in
that sense that capitalists utilized corporations as agents to create and manage wealth, and
it was how corporations became the agents of capitalism. Even state-owned corporations
have corporate rights and enjoy certain freedoms to act as a business enterprise. The
Soviet Union, East Germany and other socialist states utilized corporations to manage
their planned centralized economies. And there are corporations in North Korea and
Cuba. They may be state-owned, but they are still corporations.
Indeed, the definition of a corporation varies according to each nation’s legal
framework (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, p. 478), which suggests that
different regulatory structures do exist. But as a whole, I would state that a corporation is
an organizational instrument with legal obligations and privileges. There are several types
of corporations, and each is formed according to business objectives and jurisdictions.
Corporations are independent from the entity and/or body that incorporated it, and even
ownership and profit sharing are limited by the legal rights of the corporation (Corporate
Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 480-95). Yet, we must distinguish a corporation
from a company. A corporation is a company that has been incorporated, meaning that a
corporation is legally separated from the person or persons who creates and runs it
(Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 480-495). A corporation exists and
acts on its own. In other words, a corporation collects, accumulates and spends capital,
sues and is sued, establishes structures and enacts statutes and procedures. A company,
on the contrary, adopts the legal standing of the person who creates it (Corporate Law,
Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 511-521). A company does not act on its own right,
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and suing the owner is like suing the company, and vice- versa. For legal purposes, the
money of the company is the money of the person who owns the company.
There are several types of corporations, but the most relevant for this analysis are:
holding, parent, intermediary, offshore, front, and state-owned. In one way or another, all
of them are: limited (Ltd) by shared capital, limited by guarantee, limited by guarantee
and share capital, and unlimited by liability. Yet, they also have particularities.
A holding is a corporation that owns part, all, or a majority of other corporations
(Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.8, p. 327-361). A holding does not produce
any product or service per se; rather, its role is to hold or manage several corporations
under one legal entity (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.8, p. 327-361). A
holding has two main objectives. The first is to maximize profits. It does it by gaining
market shares through growth and expansion across different industries and economic
sectors. The second objective is to minimize risks, chiefly legal risks. It does it by
creating corporations according to sectors, markets shares, nations and even regions and
sub-regions, which the holding usually defines as divisions and/or subdivisions
(Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.8, p. 327-361). Such structuring guarantees
flexibility while limiting liability. It means that the holding is only liable to the
jurisdiction of its legal domicile or “general headquarter” and not to the jurisdictions of
its numerous corporations (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.8, p. 327-361).
This way the holding can move funds throughout its numerous corporations; however, if
a corporation in a particular sector, subdivision or region loses money or it is found guilty
of a wrongdoing, only that corporation would be responsible. The other corporations of
the holding, and the holding itself, are not accountable and can actually distance from it.
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Examples of holdings are American Investment Corporation, which owns numerous
insurance groups around the world; UAL Corp., owner of United Airlines and its
subsidiaries; and AMR Corp., that in turn owns American Airlines and its parent
corporations.
Another model is the parent corporation. This is basically a holding that owns
enough shares in another enterprise as to make decisions over operations and profits
(Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). For example, Hewlett
Packard is a parent company of Compaq. Since they manufacture computers, they
compete against each other, seldom in the same market. One can go broke, found liable
and even be dismantled but the other one would stay in business and even take over its
failing “parent.” A parent corporation usually owns two types of corporations: affiliate
and subsidiary.
An affiliate, also known as an associate, owns small portions of shares while a
subsidiary owns large portions (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495510). But also, an affiliate is a corporation that owns less than 50% of another
corporation, either a subsidiary or a third party corporation (Corporate Law, Black
Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510).
A parent corporation usually creates a subsidiary by acquiring or merging with an
ailing company (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). It may do
it for two reasons. The first one is to get rid of the competition. A parent corporation buys
out the competition, incorporates it as an affiliate and later dismantles it. It is a common
practice among corporations that produce the same products and/or deliver the same
service but are located in different markets. The second reason is to expand and grow. A
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parent corporation purchases an ailing company to retool and return it to profitability. An
example is Nestlé, the Swiss producer and distributor of chocolate bars, among other
products. During the 1990s, Nestlé purchased numerous companies in South America,
including Donofrio, the largest candy and ice cream producer in Peru. Donofrio was an
ailing family owned company. It operated with obsolete technologies in a poor market. It
needed an infusion of cash to retool its plants and reduce costs, so it could make its
products more affordable. Nestlé provided the investment but allowed Donofrio to keep
its name, in part because it was a well-known brand, in part because of political reasons.
Nestlé did not want Peruvians to resent the takeover. In time, Donofrio returned to
profitability. Most Peruvians still ignore that their beloved Donofrio is actually owned by
a Swiss multinational (El Comercio, Aug 20, 1998). We will see shortly that this was a
common practice under the UN sanction regime in Iraq as corporations did not want their
customers to know that they were trading with Saddam’s regime.
Conversely, subsidiaries are mostly conceived to address issues related to
taxation. There are two kinds of subsidiaries: operating and non-operating. An operating
subsidiary refers to a corporation operating with its own identity, equipment, and within
its market share (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). A nonoperating subsidiary exists only on paper. It has been incorporated. It has a tax ID and
domicile, but it operates under the article of incorporation of the corporation it is parented
to (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). It even uses its tax ID.
Also note that a subsidiary can create its own subsidiaries, which in time can create their
own as well. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is a good example. Berkshire is a holding with
many parent corporations, which in turn own about 60 subsidiaries among numerous
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industries across the world. Berkshire Hathaway Inc is a true global corporation; yet,
most people have not heard of it. Indeed, anonymity is one of the main reasons for
creating corporate models such as affiliate and subsidiary. Nevertheless, we should not
confuse subsidiaries with divisions for the latter are legally binding and financially
dependent on a parent company. A parent corporation does not have to be stronger or
larger than its affiliates and/or subsidiaries. After all, they operate in different markets
across different industries and industrial sectors.
In addition, parent corporations usually create front corporations to shield
themselves from lawsuits, avoid accountability and still be able to collect profits on
behalf of its parent corporation (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495510). A front corporation never acts independently, but its actions are difficult to trace
back to the corporation it is parented to. The IIC defined a front corporation as “A
Company that the Government of Iraq secretly owned in part; the term does not connote
that the company had no genuine business operations or that the full scope of its
operations was carried in a fraudulent manner” (IIC, Chapter III, p. 249). Here, the
irony is that the CIA invented this corporate model during the 1940s to conduct covert
operations throughout the world, and now businessmen utilize it to “cover up” illegal
operations and dubious sources of income (Draakman, 2004, p. 290; Easterbrook and
Fishel, 1991, p. 221). For many years, Cuba has been using a dozens of front corporations
to circumvent the U.S.’s unilateral sanctions regime against the island. But in 1989, the
Cuban government accused and found guilty one of its front corporations, MC Inc., of
drug-trafficking and money laundering (Cabello, 1998, p. 27). In fact, front corporations
are seldom employed for gambling, money laundering, prostitution, and terrorism.
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A front corporation is not an intermediary, which is a corporation serving as
point of contact between two or more corporations (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary,
2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). An intermediary does not produce any product. It is just a
distributor of goods and services. For example, a supermarket is an intermediary for it
does not produce anything. It purchases vegetables, meats and dairy products, which then
advertises and sales to consumers at marginal price. Intermediaries dominate global trade
due to: 1) new economic infrastructures in the developed world as it moves from an
industrial-manufacturing oriented economy to one based on services; 2) improvement in
transportation, communication, and storing technologies. The growing influence of
intermediaries is reflected in the Dow Jones, Standard & Poor and others financial
indexes. For example, during the 1990s, the Dow Jones substituted old American
manufacturing corporations for service-oriented intermediaries. In fact, 12 of its 30
members are intermediaries. The most notable are Home Depot and Wal-Mart.
Next, a conglomerate is a group of corporations of diverse, dissimilar enterprises
across various industries (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). A
conglomerate can own a bank, an insurance company, an automobile plant, a construction
company, a research lab, a university, and so on. Walt Disney Corp., for example, is one
of the largest conglomerates in the world. It owns 15 corporations, each structured as a
group, and each group owns numerous corporations as well. Walt Disney Corp owns
movie and music studios, cable TV networks, newspapers and book publishers, radio
stations, hotels, restaurants, resorts, cruise lines, and amusement parks. Other
conglomerates are General Electric in the U.S., Vivendi in France, Televisa from Mexico,
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Sony from Japan, PRISA of Spain, Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso of Italy, and
Organizasoe O’Globo from Brazil.
Finally, another corporative model is the joint venture (Corporate Law, Black
Dictionary, 2007, Vol.10, pp. 364-381). Here, two or more investors create a corporation
to share legal responsibilities and operational expenses. This model aims at new markets,
foreign in particular. For example, corporation “A” wants to enter market X, in which
corporation “B” is well positioned. So “A” joins “B” to create corporation “C.”
Corporation “A” provides fresh capital and technologies while “B” provides labor,
required permits, licenses and market shares. The joint venture can take the form of a
company, corporation, partnership or limited liability (Ltd). Usually, joint ventures
operate for a limited period of time, after which inventors dismantle them. In a few
instances, investors decide to expand their venture by either welcoming more investors or
acquiring smaller corporations and/or Firms. Again, the underlying rationale is
minimizing risks and accountability even at the expense of profitability. That is why joint
ventures are considered one of the safest investments. Most governments utilize joint
ventures as a means to investing.
Altogether, I find that a global corporation is a well defined organizational
structure. The corporation is right at the center of the structure, from which emanates
other corporations in different corporate models. The corporation utilizes corporate
models to keep an active or dormant presence in global markets and move throughout the
global economy. Figure 6.3 illustrates how transnational corporation XYZ Inc is
structured to operate under globalization.
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Figure 6.3 – Structure of Transnational “XYZ Inc” under Globalization

Joint
Venture

Intermediary

Parent
Dormant

Corporation
XYZ Inc.
Subsidiary

Shell

Franchise

Note that XYZ Inc has become a holding, from which emanates several
transnational corporations. Yet, not all corporations touch the holding, and not all of them
keep the same distance from it. For instance, joint venture, subsidiary, parent and
franchise – the blue arrows - touch the holding. They are under the “shadow” of the
hurricane, and they spin at the same pace. But intermediary, dormant and shell do not.
Intermediary and dormant do not touch the holding at all. And the shell barely does. It all
means that, in the corporate world, some corporate models are closer to the corporation
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than others in terms of legal, financial, operational, and governmental standings. As we
stated earlier, corporations adopt corporate models not only to enhance efficiency and
high productivity but also to avoid accountability and circumvent regulatory regimes. The
Graph shows how: a) the closer a corporate model to the corporation, the more
accountable the corporation is; b) the closer the corporate model to the corporation, the
harder it is for the corporation to evade regulatory regimes. That is why intermediary,
dormant and shell corporations are so often utilized for the most risky businesses, in
particular to avoid taxation, circumvent laws and regulations, and to conceal wrongdoings. They become more unaccountable when they are registered and based in “save
heaven” centers such as The Bahamas, Cayman Island, Panama and Andorra among
others. Indeed, we saw in Chapters II, III and V that a large number of corporations that
violated the UN sanctions against Iraq had registration and domicile in those nations.
Some corporations adopt just one or two corporate models, but others implement
three or four. It all depends on their business objectives, strategies, market conditions,
and other factors (Draakman, 2004, p. 52; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 102). But
above all, Draakman (2004), Easterbrook and Fishel (1991) argue that corporations adopt
corporate models depending on two main factors: institutional and geopolitical
environments. On one hand, institutional environment here means civil and political
institutions in a particular market. Institutions influence the way corporations choose a
corporate model for that particular market. Institutions shape corporate culture,
governance, and compliance with legal and social norms. Of course, corporations
exercise great influence on civil and political institutions, their memberships and policies.
They do not want to adapt to institutions. They prefer it the other way: institutions
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adapting to corporate models. Corporations lobby and invest heavily to reshape
institutional environments, reframe institutional agendas, and bring institutional policies
closer to corporate goals. Corporations lobby heavily to shape regulatory and trade
regimes according to their interests.
Corporations fear geopolitics (Soskice, 1999, p.77). Geopolitics is bad for
business, and corporations cannot shape and control it. To address it, corporations have
conceived four market models: local, multi-local or semi-regional, regional, and global
models (Soskice, 1999, p. 78). The local model targets local markets and focuses on local
demand and consumption patterns (Soskice, 1999, p. 77). It targets cities of large
populations such as New York, Los Angeles, Beijing, and Mexico City. Budgeting and
marketing efforts are limited to a select clientele and competitors. The overall corporate
strategy is coordinated and managed from the core of the corporation. Another model is
the multi-local, which aims at several markets across a well-defined region (Soskice,
1999, p. 79). This is also a semi-regional model, and it can be national and multi-national
for it often includes small regions of two or more nations. This model is particularly ideal
for zones of high migrations, as it is the case of the U.S-Mexican and the VenezuelanColombian borders. According to Soskice (1999), some of those markets grow naturally
as result of historic, cultural, and religious linkages, as occurred on the borders between
Jordan, Syria and Iraq. A good example is the Kurdistan, which covers a good part of
eastern Turkey and a chunk of Northern Iraq. For Soskice (1999), this is probably the
most difficult model for it attempts to establish centralized corporate strategies while
recognizing the existence of marketing differing patterns across the various localities it
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targets. Management is centralized, but it grants some autonomy to budgeting and
decision-making.
As its name indicates, the regional model focuses on specific regional markets
like NAFTA in North America, CARICOM in the Caribbean Basin and Mercosur in the
south of South America (Soskice, 1999, p. 86). In the corporate world, regions are also
known as divisions. For instance, General Motors has a North American division, a
European Division, a South American division, and so on. That is so because the regional
model recognizes that there are different market patterns within and across regions.
Corporations cope with differing market patterns by: a) limiting the size of a market; b)
creating market-blocs (Soskice, 1999, p. 87). In other words, corporations conceive
regional models to induce uniformity and create a market of standardized features. The
main goals are to predict and control market behavior. Lastly, there is the global model
(Soskice, 1999, p. 98). The model is centralized and hierarchal. It is organized from top
to bottom, and it has a nucleus from where decisions emanate. Around the nucleus spin
several satellites, or regional and semi-regional trade centers. The model attempts to
consolidate blocs, segments and categories into just one big unit while keeping some
levels of differentiation. The goal is to demark assembling from distribution, supply from
demand, short from long term investing, short from long term planning, etc (Soskice,
1999, p. 98).
In sum, corporations conceive, adopt and dismiss corporate models as part of their
overall corporate strategies. Corporations expand, grow smaller, stagnate and even
disappear due to market conditions and decisions they make to deal with market
behavior. One of those decisions is to choose a corporate model to cope with regulatory
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regimes. I will explain here examples of corporations that adopted corporate models to
circumvent the UN sanctions regime in Iraq.

Corporate Governance
Examining corporate governance here is important for two main reasons: a) the
decision to circumvent a regulatory regime depends on corporate governance; b) the
decision to choose a corporate model to cope with a regulatory regime is a result of
corporate governance.
Corporate governance is a set of rules, processes, goals and interests inherent to a
corporation (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 32; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 449).
Corporate governance is built on goals and interests, which eventually lead to praxis.
Corporate governance directly affects the way a corporation operates. Of course,
corporate governance has both institutional and human faces. It is an institution because it
behaves according to rules, structures and hierarchies, and it is human because human
actors populate it and lead the decision-making process (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p.
32; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 449). Actors include: board of directors, investors,
creditors, members of management, regulators and in some instances unions and
employees. Scholars like Aaronson and Reeves (2002) do not consider unions, workers
and even management as part of corporate governance. They argue that unions and
employees have no saying whatsoever in the operations and decisions of a corporation,
and that investors and boards of directors dominate the agenda and decision-making
process. That is probably true. Yet, here the objective is to focus on diversity of interests,
conflicts among investors and between the headquarters, its subsidiaries and parents
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firms. Specially, I examine how corporations decide to violate a sanctions regime and
how they choose a corporate model to conceal the violations.
Global corporations seek two main goals: expansion and integration. Corporate
models and corporate governance aim at expanding production, distribution, marketing,
and accessing raw materials and financing, all at global levels. It is part of the operational
side of the corporation. However, only corporate governance has the means to integrate
the corporation according to global legal systems, political processes, culture,
compliance, responsibility, and accountability (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 51;
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 451). In other words, only corporate governance can
create and manage a true global corporation
First, corporate governance focuses on politics as much as it does on business
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 454). Corporate governance integrates political and
business decisions. Corporate governing boards are integrated to the politics of the
markets in which they operate. Politics determine laws and policies friendly and
unfriendly to corporations. Observe that nation-states establish regulatory regimes to
which corporations must adapt or circumvent at their own risk. Also, corporate governing
boards interact with multiple actors of diverse means, ends and idiosyncrasies (Aaronson
and Reeves, 2002, p. 32; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 449). They must engage,
negotiate, compromise and be willing to trade short-term gains for long-term goals and
not consider it a loss. Besides, as Soskice (1999) points out, corporations seldom operate
under complex market conditions like unfair competition, intense scrutiny, political
instability, and even violence. It is the task of corporate governance to adopt strategies –
corporate models among them - that could successfully take the corporation though
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diverse market conditions. Additionally, corporate governance is restricted and protected
by corporate laws, the result of over 300 years of corporate jurisprudence under
capitalism (Soskice, 1999, p. 141; Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 99; Aguilera and
Jackson, 2003, p. 457).
Second, corporate governance is about accountability too, which includes
efficiency and behavior (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 117; Aguilera and Jackson,
2003, p. 456). Efficiency here means profits. It aims at minimizing costs while
maximizing production and quality control. To address efficiency, corporate governance
relies on internal and external mechanisms (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 458). Internal
mechanisms are boards of directors, internal auditors, and balance of power between
directors, investors, management and employees. External mechanisms are competition,
creditors, governmental regulations and regulators, the media and interest groups. Some
corporations voluntarily invite and pay for external auditors whose task is to
counterbalance internal auditors. On the other hand, accountability attempts to deal with
behavior, both human and corporate behaviors. Individuals shape corporate structures,
culture and behavior (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 117; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p.
456). They decide and act on behalf of the corporation. But individuals bring their own
vices and habits in to the corporation as well. Corporate accountability attempts to tackle
them before they become part of a corporate culture. It does it by establishing codes of
conduct and corporate ethics.
It is common to find a corporation with multiple codes of conduct, one per market
and region (Soskice, 1999, p. 147). For example, a corporation can have a code of
conduct for its division in South America, another code for its parent corporations in
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Europe, and still another one for its subsidiaries in Asia. In effect, by doing so, the
corporation acknowledges the existence of operational divides or “ways of doing things”
across markets, namely subregional, regional and even local (Soskice, 1999, p. 148;
Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 125). The corporation can even acknowledge cultural
divides. It just cannot treat cultural patterns equally, with the same code of conducts and
corporate ethics. In fact, a corporation can have a code of conduct for its subsidiary in
Japan and another code for its subsidiary in China. Here, the corporation may be
addressing some cultural features inherent to Japanese market, but it may be coping with
some political issues characteristics of the Chinese political system. The case of Cuba is
illustrative. Corporations doing business there have created “especial” codes of conduct
to deal with Cuba’s unique economic and political systems. For example, Sol Meliá Corp,
the Spanish hotel chain, operates several hotels in Cuba. Sol Meliá pays some of its
Cuban employees in Cuban currency and some in American dollars. The objective is to
stimulate efficiency, high productivity and quality, but the corporation also wants to
create a corporate hierarchy to promote corporate mobility. That is, Sol Meliá retains and
promotes its best employees by paying them in the highly appreciated, by Cubans,
American dollars. Cubans seem to like it, but the practice may seem repugnant and
unacceptable to workers in other nations.
As a whole, corporate governance addresses multiple issues, from market
conditions, geography, scarce resources and local and regional politics to human
behavior. Corporate governance is above all about making business decisions while
restraining human impulses, balancing corporate with human interests (Soskice, 1999, p.
152; Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 129). It involves multiple actors, interests,
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procedural maneuvering, bureaucratic encroachments and structural imbalances among
other aspects. It is a very fragile process, one in which personal interests and greed can
overshadow corporate goals and reputation. At times, corporate rules are bent, codes of
conduct are twisted, and ethic is ignored, all for the sake of short-term goals. Then, the
corporate mission gets lost and the corporation loses its way. Corporate governors place
the corporation in a state of emergency and redefine their own responsibilities. Corporate
responsibility becomes ‘guaranteeing the survival of the corporation.’ Indeed, corporate
governance resembles a socio-political construct, but it also reflects the agency dilemma:
a conflict of interests between the corporation and its own agents resulting from
imbalances of powers. It usually leads to corporate scandals.
In the case of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq, violations of sanctions
provoked a scandal of political dimensions. First, it affected the UN’s reputation as the
most important global political institution for it was responsible for enforcing and
overseeing the sanctions regime. Second, it affected the U.S. as the most powerful global
superpower and the main sponsor and advocate of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.
Yet, it could not control corporate behavior, not even of American corporations. Third, it
illustrated the limits of sanctions regimes and their inability to deal with global
corporations and their corporate models.

Corporate Responsibility
Should corporations do more than just business? We know that they do politics,
but should they care about the environment, human rights and work conditions among
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other sociopolitical issues? Should they comply with sanctions regimes? What is the limit
of corporate responsibility? What is corporate responsibility?
The concept of corporate responsibility emerged during the 1970s, after about 200
years of capitalism and corporate history. The concept grew out of the Watergate Scandal
in the U.S. (Hall and Soskice, 1999, p.19; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.11). The scandal
reveled that corporations had channeled corporate money to political figures at the
highest level of the American federal government. The decision had been made at the
highest level of corporations. Some corporations had decided that it was a corporate
interest -and as such they included it in the corporate agenda- to finance the reelection of
the President Nixon even if they had to break some American laws. After Watergate, the
concept of corporate responsibility became a key component of corporate models and an
intrinsic part of the corporate world. Today, corporate responsibility has strong linkages
with the structures of global production, branding, marketing, and profitability (Hall and
Soskice, 1999, p.27; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.41). Yes, corporate responsibility can
boost profits when integrated into a well-coordinated public relation campaign. For
instance, many corporations utilize patriotism and nationalism to justify their actions.
Other corporations talk about corporate responsibility as a mean to eliminate poverty and
create jobs when in fact they mean profits for themselves. Certainly, in the case of Iraq,
many corporations claimed that they violated the sanctions regime to help the Iraqi
people. Some corporations, from the beginning of the sanctions regime, publicly stated
that they opposed the sanctions on moral grounds. Such a public stand, I would argue,
legitimized their later violations of the UN sanctions.
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There are several definitions of corporate responsibility. Some focus on its legal
side. Some are business driven. Others attach ethical and social components to it.
The legal definition addresses two key issues: jurisdiction and statutes.
Jurisdictions shield corporations from accountability and lawsuits (Hall and Soskice,
1999, p.37; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.42). They do it through procedural statutes like
forum non-convenient and subject matter jurisdiction (Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.45).
Most American laws utilize those two statues to block transnational litigations. That is
why corporations based beyond American jurisdictions are not liable to American labor
and environmental laws, among others. But scholars like Hall and Soskice (1999) depart
from the assumption that corporations are legal entities bounded by articles of
incorporation, namely rights and obligations. If statutes protect corporations from people,
governments and other legal entities, then the same statues shall hold corporations liable
for their acts with respect to others. Liability should include subsidiaries, parent
companies and even the activities of subcontractors overseas. Hall and Soskice suggest
that, “Corporations can be held vicariously liable for the torts of their overseas
subsidiaries based on theories alter ego, of agent, and respondent superior, and identity.
Note that European laws follow similar rules” (Hall and Soskice, 1999, p.62).
The theory alter ego argues that a corporation and its subsidiaries are equally
responsible for their acts since they are linked through business and statutes (Hall and
Soskice, 1999, p.79; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.111). If they share profits, losses, and
statutes, then they are just one corporation. The theory of agent states that the principal,
or a corporation, has so much control over the agent, namely its subsidiaries, that the first
is responsible for the acts of the latter. For its part, the theory respondent superior affirms
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that liability can be traced from the lowest to the highest corporate authority (Hall and
Soskice, 1999, p.79; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.111). Lastly, the identity theory argue
that the interests and ownership of a parent and subsidiary companies overlap so much
that the subsidiary could legally be considered to as if it does not exist (Hall and Soskice,
1999, p.79; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.111).
There are other theories, but overall Soskice (1999) claims that “The issue of
jurisdiction can be tackled through specific evidences of congressional intent to the
contrary. For instance, U.S. corporations can be directly liable for some wrongful acts
abroad which are illegal under U.S. laws such as violations of securities’ and exchange
commission rules and the Sherman Anti-trust laws” (Soskice, 1999, p.124). To which I
add that the U.S. often employs tax, wire transferring and money laundry laws as well as
the RICO Act to prosecute corporate wrongdoings. The U.S. used some of those laws to
prosecute a group of corporations and individuals for violations of the UN sanctions
regime in Iraq. For instance, we will see here in this Chapter that the U.S. charged Mr.
Waytt and his corporation of money laundering and conspiracy, but the true crime was
purchasing oil contracts from Saddam’s regime (New York Times, www.nyt.com, Sep.
20th, 2007; New York Times, www.nyt.com, April 15th, 2005). According to New York’s
Court of Appeals, Mr. Waytt did it through a group of front companies and a complicated
ring of offshore accounts that in the end belonged to his corporation. He was sent to
prison for two years and fined for $9 million dollars. His two corporations were put on
probation for three years and ordered to pay restitution (New York Times, www.nyt.com,
Sep. 20th, 2007; New York Times, www.nyt.com, April 15th, 2005.).
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In all, Aronson (2002), Federowicz and Aguilera (2003) argue that ccorporate
responsibility is about how corporations behave in the marketplace, produce goods and
services, deal with competitors, overcome market demands and still have positive impact
on the common good. The concept has evolved over the years. It has come from the pure
laissez-faire of early capitalism to a “government intervention” in the economy during
the twenty and twenty-first centuries. In the end, the debate on corporate responsibility
revolves around the two classic schools of economics: neoliberalism and Keynesianism.
For Aronson (2002), businesses have only one responsibility: manage resources to
create wealth. Aronson (2002), a neoliberal economist and corporate lawyer, argues that
private expenditures on environmental and social ends are resources that can be
distributed to employees, entrepreneurs, and stockholders in the form of salaries or
investments. He assumes that, first, money is what motivates employees and
entrepreneurs to produce efficiently; second, motivation based on self interest is
necessary for an effective and well functioning market. The pursuit of social
responsibility interferes with those two classic market assumptions. But Keynesians,
economists like Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) state that corporate responsibility can lead
to innovation, higher efficiency and productivity. Corporate responsibility should be seen
as an investment: it hurts a corporation’s bottom line in the short run, but it contributes to
profits at the long run. In addition, corporate responsibility usually translates into sound
public relations, which is very important in the era of global mass media. Yet, in the end
both neoliberals and Keynesians share two common denominators. First, they coincide in
that expenditures versus profits are at the center of the debate. That is corporations would
not be socially responsible if it affects their bottom line, but they would become socially
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responsible if responsibility leads to profitability. Second, corporate actions impact public
relations and trigger governmental policies, which then affect corporations and markets.
Next, scholars like Soskice (1999), Streeck (1997) and Hall (1997) attach social
and cultural features to corporate responsibility. The underlying assumption is that
corporations are not as autonomous as they claim. They are more than private entities
protected by legal statutes. They are in fact social creations, and they show all the
features of social entities. Moreover, they are an intrinsic part of human societies. They
are highly dependent on human behavior, habits, and actions. As evidence, Soskice
(1999), Streeck (1997) and Hall (1997) point to the fact that corporate features differ
across societies. For instance, there is the French model, which is rather socialist,
meaning that it emphasizes on redistribution of wealth as a means toward social justice
and equality. There is also the Japanese and Asian model, known as Nippo-Rhenish
model. It focuses on discipline, organization and loyalty to the corporation in exchange
for secured long-term employment, decent salaries, stability, and pride. Thirdly, there is
the Scandinavian, also known as the welfare model. This model is built on the
assumption that corporations must care for the overall wellbeing the employees. That is,
the success of the corporation depends on the wellbeing of its employees. Lastly, there is
the Anglo-Saxon, built on laissez-fair and individualism. More recently, India has put
forward its own model as it emerges as a world economic power. India incorporated in its
constitution Gandhi’s idea of trusteeship, which defines corporate responsibility as a
moral duty and a matter of pride (Sosckice, 1999, p.227).
All those models have advantages and disadvantages. Yet, Soskice (1999) and
other scholars propose that nation-states should renounce certain “cultural and ethnic”
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features in favor of a uniform global model that takes the Anglo-Saxon as the ideal type.
But Streeck (1997), Hall (1997) and others repudiate such an idea, arguing that the
Anglo-Saxon model jeopardizes accountability and lends itself to corruption since: a) it
excludes employees from decision-making process; b) it focuses on short-term profits; c)
its vertical hierarchy overshadows distinctions between personal and corporate interests.
Still, others scholars find no differences whatsoever among those models. They contend
that the capitalist system has eradicated most of those differences, and that globalization
will eventually eliminate any vestige of contradiction between the models.
Finally, I would argue that corporations are today more conscious about corporate
responsibility. Most corporations recognize the value of being responsive to the
environment, human rights, women rights, child labor laws, and fair salaries among other
issues. Corporations at least acknowledge that there is a global media and a global civic
society watching them. Reckless corporate behavior can translate into bad publicity,
which in turn may lead to the loss of customers and market shares. Yet, although there is
public demand for corporate responsibility, it does not seem to include compliance with
sanctions regimes. There are sharp disagreements about the issue. Eleven polls conducted
around the world during 10 years of UN sanctions against Iraq showed that 52% of the
people opposed the sanctions (CFIJ, 2002, p. 67). Opposition to the sanctions regime was
so strong that it forced the UN to adopt what then became known as “smart-sanctions”,
those that targeted products and technologies that could be used for military purposes.
But even if “smart sanctions” do not cause harm to civilians, I ask: Are sanctions regimes
fair to corporations? Should corporations comply with a sanctions regime?
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This argument is twofold: one approach is economic, and the other is political.
The economic approach argues that a sanctions regime is basically a political regime. It is
a group of political measures that target trade to attain a political objective. So a sanctions
regime is a political instrument that has particular effects on the behavior of economic
actors. First, sanctions regimes go against two key premises of laissez-faire capitalism:
open markets and free trade. Second, a sanctions regime is by default a sanctions regime
on corporations attempting to operate in the sanctioned market, limiting, constraining and
destroying the creation of wealth not only in that market but also at its adjacent. Third,
there is yet another paradox: by reducing commerce to a minimum, a sanctions regime
frees of competition an entire market, and corporations do not like competition. In fact, I
argue that sanctions regimes create business opportunities, in particular for nascent small
corporations not really capable of competing in regional and global markets. In the case
of the sanctions regime in Iraq, I found that most violators of the sanctions were small,
young corporations from developing nations, mainly from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
the Middle East, which in the past, had enjoyed good trade relations with Iraq. Also,
small young corporations acted as intermediaries since well-known corporations did not
want to be associated with Saddam’s regime but still wanted to do business with Iraq.
The political approach focuses on the feasibility of sanctions regimes as
instruments of global politics. Enforcement of sanctions regimes is not feasible due to the
fragmented structures of global trade and corporations. Sanctioned nations can go around
the sanctions through the numerous agents and means of globalization. In fact, some of
those who favor sanction regimes acknowledge that the true value of a sanctions regime
is not economic but political. That is, economic sanctions do not really lead to economic
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collapse, but they are useful tools for diplomatic negotiations and political maneuvering,
as in the cases of Libya and North Korea. Libya’s economic and political system did not
collapse, and nation-states like the U.S. and UK used their sanctions regime against Libya
as a negotiated way out of their conflict with that nation. The same is true with North
Korea. Its regime remains strong and defiant, and negotiations of the Five Parties
Negotiations spin around lifting and/or imposing sanctions regime on North Korea.
Sanctions regimes are political instruments and corporations are often criticized
for their involvement in politics. So, the question is, if corporations ought not to engage
in politics at all, why would they endorse a sanctions regime? Why would they endorse a
political policy that limits their very nature? There is another aspect here. The sanctions
regime in Iraq originated in the UN, a political institution with no real legal power over
corporations. The enforcement of the UN sanctions in Iraq relied solely on the will of
nation-states and corporations. In fact, the U.S. was the only nation that prosecuted
corporations and individuals for violating the sanctions, and the U.S. did it not for
violating the UN sanctions but for breaking American tax laws and the RICO Act. In
other words, if the sanctions regime was multilateral, its enforcement was unilateral.
All told, I conclude that it is around the contradictions between business interests,
corporate governance and corporate responsibility that corporations try to come to terms
with regulatory regimes, mainly political regimes such as sanctions regimes. Those are
contradictions that corporate governance must sort out before establishing a corporate
policy, one that could either strengthen or jeopardize the very existence of the
corporation. In the next section I present evidence of how corporations circumvented the
UN sanctions regime in Iraq through corporate models.
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Corporate Models and the Evasion of the Sanctions Regime in Iraq
GAO and the IIC estimated that during the period 1996-2002 corporations
generated $67 billion under the sanctions regime in Iraq (GAO Report, p. 22; IIC Report,
Chapter I, p. 9). On top, the IIC estimated that Saddam Hussein generated $10.1 billion in
illegal revenues, $5.7 billion from oil smuggling and $4.4 billion in “surcharges” (IIC
Report, Chapter I, p.10-11). According to GAO and IIC Reports, those are just estimates
because no one really knows how much money he generated from illegal trade. But what
is relevant here is how Saddam managed to circumvent UN sanctions. He could not have
done it without a helping hand from the corporate world. In fact, the IIC cited 23 case
studies to illustrate how front and middlemen companies contributed to the breakdown of
the UN sanctions. Table 6.1 lists corporate models used under the UN sanctions regime.

Table 6.1 - Distribution by Type of Company
Type of Company
1-Affiliate
2-Intermediary
3-Front Company
4-Subsidiary
5-Parent company
6-Shelf company
7-State owned company
8-Holding
9-Joint Ventures
Total

Based in
Based
Nation of Origin Offshore

Total

321
293
236
112
158
67
27
48

586
531
482
546
263
161
31
-

907
824
718
658
421
228
58
48

1,214

2,600

3,862

Source: IIC Report
Table 6.1 reveals that 3,862 corporations traded with Iraq under the UN sanctions
regime, and 1,213 operated from their nations of origins while 2,600 chose to operate
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from offshore. It also shows that corporations employed eight corporate models. The
table shows that 907 companies operated as affiliates, a model that does not lend itself to
corporate wrongdoings for it is too close to its parent corporation. But front company is
the ideal corporate model for corporate wrongdoing. The IIC Report, Annex 1 (pages 5455) shows a list of front companies that evaded the UN sanctions against Iraq. Table 6.1
above shows 718 front companies operated under the UN sanctions regime, and that
intermediaries were the second main corporate model under the sanctions regime. The
IIC defines intermediary firms as “third-party purchaser” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 3). GAO
calls them “middlemen companies” (GAO, p. 11). The IIC explains that “Companies
with limited access to the Programme used intermediaries to maintain their access to the
Iraqi market” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 3), to which I add that corporations hired intermediaries
to circumvent UN inspectors, conceal their profits, and launder their money. Also, most
intermediaries chose to register and obtain operational licenses in France, Russia, China,
Germany, Jordan, and Syria. Since those nations were friendly to Iraq, Saddam rewarded
them with “the most favored” status. It explains why there were so many French
intermediaries violating UN sanctions. It prompted a French official to argue that
“Contracts submitted to the French mission…were often formulated by economic entities
that were not French and whose goods and merchandises were not produced in France
and had not even transited through France” (Communiqué by the Embassy of France in
the U.S., October 11, 2004). It means that corporations did not necessarily represent their
nations of origin but where they registered to operate. France revealed a list of American
corporations that operated through intermediaries registered in France. Table 6.2
reproduces a sample of the list.
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Table 6.2 - American Corporations Trading with Iraq from France
Company

Profits in USD millions

Agco

113,491,600.00

Baker

10,611,624.00

Becton Dickinson

4,611,828.00

Boston Scientific

315,911.00

Cameron

5,764,117.00

Case France

32,418,805.00

Dosapro

1,199,904.00

Dow Agroscience

3,856,741.00

Dresser International / Dresser Rand

16,136,532.00

Envirotech

76,372,954.00

Fisher Rosemount

9,846,413.00

Flowserve

19,772,973.00

FMC Europe

3,327,597.00

General Electric

1,181,594.00

Grove

9,556,000.00

Hexacorp

5,072,602.00

Ibex

32,595,435.00

Ingersonll

62,105,914.00

Kema-Proser

7,598,562.00

Luxor

17,265,777.00

Marsoneilan

40,480.00

Purolite / Baker

357,833.00

Sanchez

2,046,178.00

Siemens S.A.S.

82,283,149.00

Toekheim

829,229.00

Toekhein

1,234,696.00

Tossco

3,025,489.00

Trouvay & Cauvin / Mandrel

20,625,320.00

Wemco / Envirotech

9,064,142.00

Wyeth / Lederle

101,849.00

Total

552,711,248.00

Source: Embassy of France in the United States – October 11, 2004

Intermediaries worked between: 1) local and global corporations; 2) Iraqi and
foreign corporations; 3) banks and corporations; 4) non-state actors and banks. The IIC
and the CIA found that intermediaries smuggled nearly $1 billion dollars per year
through the free-trade zones along the Jordan-Iraqi and Syrian-Iraqi borders.
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Next, according to the IIC, nation-states and corporations operated 718 front
corporations under the UN sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter I, and p. 17). Corporations had
two reasons for doing so. The first one was for business reasons. The IIC stated that, “As
the price of oil went higher, oil sales increasingly took the form of contracts with front
companies, backed financially and technically by international trading companies” (IIC,
Final Report, p. 4). The IIC here refers to corporations that lacked financial and logistical
expertise to execute import-export contracts. Some of those corporations were really
small businesses seeking their first opportunities. In fact, we saw in Chapter IV that
individuals, NGOs, political parties and other NSAs operated through 327 front
corporations.
The second reason was more about public relations than any other issue. The IIC
explained that corporations “Concerned about public relations opted for hiring front
companies to avoid being associated with Saddam’s regime” (IIC, Final Report, p. 5).
This issue –public relations- applied more to large global corporations preoccupied with
political correctness, public opinion, and their overall global image. As examples, the IIC
cited transnational corporations such as Shell Corp, Exxon-Mobil, Motorola, Volvo,
Siemens and Mitsubishi. Note that some nations saw in front corporations a means to
circumventing the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. These nations owned or co-owned
front corporations, to which they provided financial, legal and political support. Some
nations even utilized their embassies and diplomatic prerogatives to cover up their
relations and activities with their front corporations. In total, 58 nations owned front
corporations under UN sanctions regime. Table 6.3 below shows the top ten nations that
sponsored front corporations.
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Table 6.3 - Top Ten Nations Sponsoring Front Corporations
Countries

# of Front
Companies

Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Jordan
Syria
France
China
Iraq
Germany
Vietnam
Romania

41
37
29
29
26
17
14
13
9
8
4

Total

227

Source: IIC Report
The IIC found that Iraq created and operated two dozen front corporations right
after the UN established the sanctions regime. The IIC defined Iraqi front corporations as
“A Company the Government of Iraq secretly owned in part” (IIC, Chapter VI, p. 302).
Here, “owned in part” means owned in partnership with another corporation, individual,
nation or any other entity or third party, which seldom included a corporation owned by
the state of Iraq. In fact, the CIA explained that Iraq had front partnership corporations
with nations like Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Some other front partnerships included 5050% partnerships with private corporations from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, UAE, Lebanon
and Qatar. The CIA set their overall market value at $4.6 billion dollars and profits at
$9.3 billion during the 1996-2002 periods (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p.179). The Table 6.4 right below lists 16 of those front partnership
corporations. I gathered the data from the IIC and the Duelfer Report.
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Table 6.4 – Iraqi Front Firms in Partnership with Private Firms in the Middle East

Company

Industry

Nation of
Registration

Based
in

The Mudiaf Company

General Trade

Dubai, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Turkey

Jordan

Al-Wadi Al-Akhab

General Trade

Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar

Jordan

Al-Mansurah Company

General Trade

Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen

Jordan

Al-Awabi Company

General Trade

Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen

Jordan

Al-Nid

General Trade

Dubai, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria

Jordan

Al-Wasel & Babel

General Trade

Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, Turkey

Jordan

Al-Hoda

General Trade

Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Qatar

Jordan

Alia

General Trade

Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, Turkey

Jordan

Al-Yarmuk

Travel

Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, Turkey

Lebanon

Al-Dala

Travel

Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, Turkey

Jordan

Al-Huda Religious Tourism

Travel

Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Libya, Qatar, Syria, Yemen

Syria

Al-Zaytun

Restaurants

Jordan

Jordan

Al-Riyadh

Transportation

Jordan, Syria, Turkey

Jordan

Al-Riat

Unknown

Egypt, Jordan, Syria

Syria

Al-Manuria

Unknown

Egypt, Jordan, Syria

Syria

Al-Enbuah

Unknown

Egypt, Jordan, Syria

Syria

Source: The Duelfer Report (CIA Report)
Then, 658 subsidiaries traded with Iraq under the sanctions regime. The fact that
546 of them operated offshore tells us that they sought legal and financial protection
outside their nations of origin. The most illustrative example is Halliburton, which France
accused of using French subsidiaries to circumvent the UN sanctions regime. France’s
embassy in the Washington D.C. revealed that Halliburton’s subsidiaries in France
conducted business for almost $200 million dollars under the sanctions regime
(Communiqué by the Embassy of France in the US, Washington, October 11th, 2004).
The case of Halliburton explains why subsidiaries are not the best means to evade a
sanctions regime. They are just too “close” to their parent corporation, which could end
up paying for the violations. For their part, 421 parent corporations participated in the
sanctions regime, of which 263 were registered offshore from their nations of origin.
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Table 6.5 below shows that 531 of those companies were incorporated in offshore
“paradises”. I collected the data from the IIC Report.

Table 6.5 – Top Ten Corporate Paradises
Nation

Companies

Switzerland

97

Lichtenstein

88

Panama

71

Cayman Islands

70

The Bahamas

56

British Virgin Island

41

Qatar

40

Aruba

36

Dubai

32

Total

531

Source: IIC Report
Many parent entities were large global corporations such as General Electric,
Siemens S.A., Boston Scientific, Hyundai, Volvo, Lukoil, Gazprom and The Arab
Establishment (IIC, Chapter I, p. 34). But they did not seize the market for themselves.
They were not the most profitable either. In fact, mid-size regional corporations
controlled 61% of the Iraqi market (IIC, Chapter I, p. 37). Among them were Bayoil,
Taurus, Glencore, and Vitol. These four corporations were the most profitable under the
UN sanctions regime, accounting for 21% of all revenues (IIC, Chapter I, p. 37).
Finally, shelf corporations had a very active participation under the sanctions
regime, but they served mostly for banking purposes, for issuing and collecting
payments. Some of them were no more than empty offices with a p.o. box for mailing
purposes. In total, 228 shelf corporations traded with Iraq under the sanctions regime, and
161 were offshore (IIC, Chapter I, p. 39). Likewise, most holding companies operated

298

through their affiliates, subsidiaries, intermediaries, parent, and front companies. Their
direct participation was minimal, rather unnoticed. For the most part, participation of
holding and parent corporations in the sanctions regime was detected only after thorough
investigations of front corporations.
All in all, I found that corporate models served several purposes. First, they
helped corporations operate under a sanctions regime that was politically motivated.
Second, they helped deal with Saddam’s policy of granting contracts to nations friendly
to his regime. Third, they helped conceal their true identities. In all instances, companies
evaluated their positions and concluded that utilizing corporate models would minimize
risks and maximize profits. I explain next through several case studies how corporate
models really operated and helped corporations evade the UN sanctions regime in Iraq.

Case Studies
In this section, I further discuss the hypothesis of this chapter. First, corporations
are among the main agents of globalization. They are a globalizing force with a direct
impact on global politics. Second, corporations employ corporate models to circumvent
regulatory regimes, among which are sanctions regimes. To illustrate this hypothesis, I
present seven cases that involve several corporate models. They are Alia, Vinafood and
Vinamilk, Chinochem, Phoenix Investment International, Russian Engineering Company,
El Paso Corporation, and Vitol International. Those corporations exemplify: a) corporate
attitudes toward a sanctions regime; b) different facets of the corporate evasion of the
sanctions regime; c) and more important, how corporations utilized corporate models to
circumvent UN sanctions. In particular, I pay special attention to multiple layers and
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linkages among small corporations, and multiple parallel bank accounts across
corporations of no apparent relationship. Most of those corporations created small
corporations, usually with no more than a dozen employees. After two or four
transactions, they would shut down operations and create new small corporations. Lastly,
I pay close attention to periodic deposits and withdrawals of large amounts of money.
Mayer and Califano argued that “Money took circuitous routes that included a chain of
front companies, complicit or captive banks” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. XX). Figure
6.4 gives us an idea of how Iraq utilized corporate models to evade UN sanctions.

Figure 6.4 – Iraq’s Corporate Modeling to Circumvent the UN Sanctions Regime

Iraqi Government

Alia, an Iraqi
Conglomerate
Al-Wasel, an
Iraqi front
corporation

Al-Hoda, an Iraqi
front corporation

intermediaries

Intermediaries

Intermediaries

Non-Iraqi front
corporations

Non-Iraqi shell
corporations

intermediaries

intermediaries

Vinamilk and
Vinafood

Chinochem

Intermediaries

Intermediaries

Intermediaries

Non-Iraqi parent
corporations

Non-Iraqi
subsidiaries

Non-Iraqi
dormant
corporations

Non-Iraqi jointventures

intermediaries

intermediaries

intermediaries

Vitol

Phoenix
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REC

intermediaries

El Paso Corp

Figure 6.4 looks intricate and somehow overwhelming, but that is precisely the
purpose of corporations. They structure their corporate models in such as a way as to
overwhelm regulatory regimes and law enforcers. If the model in Figure 6.4 seems
intricate, it is not due to their lack of imagination by corporations but to the nature of the
business environment they want to circumvent. Indeed, models like the one in Figure 6.4
were very effective under the UN sanctions regime in Iraq.

Iraqi Government’s Front Corporations
The first case study involves the Iraqi government. The UN sanctions regime
constituted a matter of national security for Iraq. Therefore, dealing with it necessarily
involved the Iraqi government. Iraq confronted the sanctions regime with a corporate
model that involved an array of front corporations organized horizontally and through
multiple layers. This case also involves Alia, the Iraqi conglomerate that led Iraq’s
offensive against the UN sanctions. Observe in Graph IV that the Iraqi government acted
as an “umbrella” over Alia and its two front corporations. Business decisions came from
top to bottom, but all corporations were out in the market to obtain as many businesses as
possible. That is why some corporations overlapped, and at times their functions
duplicated. Also, observe in Figure 6.4 that Iraqi front companies did not deal directly
with non-Iraqi corporations. Instead, they hired a large number of intermediaries usually
owned by businessmen from the Middle East and loyal to Saddam’s regime.
In effect, Alia for Transportation and General Trade, known as Alia, Alia
controlled 39% of Iraqi trade under the UN sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter I, p. 306).
Alia was one big front corporation with several subsidiaries and intermediaries

301

disseminated all throughout the Middle East. The most visible were Al-Hoda
International Trading Co. and Al-Wasel & Babel General Trading LLC.
The IIC found documents at Iraq’s Ministry of Transportation confirming that the
said Ministry purposely created Alia as a regional front corporation. The objective was to
promote and manage Iraqi trade in the Middle East. The Ministry granted Alia the power
to create other corporations, enter in contracts, finance trade with foreign corporations,
collect payments and even establish its own bank. Alia’s Articles of Incorporation
showed that Alia entered in several 50-50 joint ventures with Iraqi private businessmen
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 306). The first was with Husain Al-Khawam, an Iraqi living in Jordan,
a close associate of Saddam Hussein. Mr. Al-Khawam registered Alia as a single
Jordanian corporation in Amman, Jordan, in August 1994 (IIC, Chapter I, p. 306). Its first
big project was to rebuild Iraq’s naval fleet and ports. It also included recruiting and
training a naval labor force and purchasing and shipping hardware, trucks, and
construction equipment to Iraq (IIC, Chapter I, p. 303). Alia reorganized and trained a
naval labor force in about three years. It also repaired a good portion of its cargo fleet and
two ports in southern Iraq. That Iraq had a functioning naval cargo fleet and ports is a bit
ironic. Cargo fleets and ports are means of trade, and the UN sanctions regime banned
Iraq from foreign trading. In fact, Alia signed contracts with Siemens, Peugeot, and
Volvo to import spare parts for Iraqi cargo vessels and trucking industry (IIC, Chapter I,
p. 308). It also signed a contract with Kato Corp, a Japanese manufacturer of industrial
cranes, and a three-year contract with Toyota to acquire $135.5 million in spare parts for
Iraq light trucks, the most popular means of cargo transportation in Iraq’s domestic
market (IIC, Chapter I, p. 308).
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Alia also operated as a “debt collector.” The IIC found that “In 1999 the Iraqi
Ministry of Transportation arranged with Alia to have it act as a…collection agent for
foreign suppliers” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 303). It was another illegal operation because the
661 Committee expressly “Prohibited any third party from engaging in financial
transactions with the government of Iraq except as permitted under Security Council
resolutions” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 303). In Chapter V, I explicated that the 661 Committee
designated the French bank BNP-New York as the sole payment collector under the
sanctions regime. Yet, the Iraqi regime ignored the mandate and ordered Alia to open
several bank accounts at Arab Land Bank, in Egypt, at Jordan National Bank and
Rafidain Bank, both in Jordan, allowing Alia to collect about $788 million in different
currencies from 2000 to 2003 (IIC Report, Chapter I, p. 303). Alia converted the money
into dollars and submitted it to the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation. The IIC concluded
that the main source of the money was fees on smuggling through Iraqi ports and free
trade zones along the Jordan-Iraqi and Syrian-Iraqi borders (IIC, Chapter I, p. 305).
Alia had several subsidiaries and intermediaries. Al-Hoda International Trading
Co. was one of the most active, as a front company though. The Iraqi government
appointed Hikmat Jergi, an Iraqi citizen living in Syria, as the sole proprietor of Al-Hoda.
Mr. Jergi registered it in the United Arab Emirates “For the purpose of entering into
contracts with foreign corporations” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 306). Al-Hoda acted as a
subcontractor for Alia. On its behalf, it negotiated most of the contracts Iraq entered with
Middle Eastern corporations under the UN sanctions regime. Al-Hoda specialized in
long-term contracts with large discounts on medicines, foodstuffs, pesticides and
agricultural machineries. Al-Hoda spent about $1,220.8 million worth of foodstuffs,
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construction materials, water tanks, medicines and detergents in just one year (IIC,
Chapter I, p. 307). Like Alia, Al-Hoda collected payments from importers and exporters,
only that it collected cash. It deposited it in accounts that the Ministry of Transportation
had at Arab Land Bank, in Egypt, and at Jordan National Bank and Rafidain Bank in
Jordan. After that, the money was wire-transferred to the Iraqi State Oil Marketing
Organization. SOMO’s account receivables show that $92 million dollars were received
from Al-Hoda from 1999 to 2003, and another $14 million in kickbacks and briberies
were received from 2002 to 2003 (IIC, Chapter I, p. 308). Sometimes the money was
carried in cash to Iraqi embassies in Moscow, Amman, El Cairo and Abu Dhabi.
Lastly, Al Wasel & Babel General Trading LLC was the third most important
Iraqi front corporation. It mainly acted as intermediaries between the Ministry of Oil, the
Ministry of Transportation, and non-Iraqi corporations. Alia created it in a 50-50 joint
venture with Ibrahim Lootah, a citizen of the United Arab Emirates with long business
relations with Iraq, where he had a permanent office until the UN established the
sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter I, p. 308).
The IIC found that Al Wasel operated from Abu Dhabi. It had several bank
accounts at Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and at Jordan National Bank, both in Abu
Dhabi. Al Wasel instructed its customers to deposit their payments at Abu Dhabi
Commercial Bank. Al Wasel then wire transferred the money to its account at Jordan
National Bank, from where it would be transferred to SOMO and the Iraqi Ministry of
Oil. The IIC and GAO reported that Al Wasel & Babel transferred $800 million to Iraqi
coffers in just 2 years (IIC, Chapter I, p. 308).
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Overall, the Iraqi government took many business risks, but it was cautious in the
way its corporations operated. Iraq worked hard to keep its front corporations in
anonymity, to the point that it hired a group of intermediaries for both A-Hadal and AlWasel. One of them was the Belhasa Group, which was a trading conglomerate
specialized in the distribution of diverse goods and services throughout the world (IIC,
Chapter I, p. 308-334). It was administered through a holding registered and based in
Dubai as Belhasa International Co. (IIC, Chapter I, p. 334). Belhasa had four major
subsidiaries. The first was Belhasa Motors Co. LLC, known as Belhasa Motors, which
distributed automotive and industrial spare parts. The second was Union Trading Co.
LLC, better known as Union Trading. It distributed construction technologies, materials
and combustibles. The third was Al–Rowa’a General Trading Co. LLC, known as AlRowa’a. The fourth was Safire Ltd., or Safire, which invested in real estate and tourism.
But Belhasa itself did not want to trade directly with Iraqi front corporations. Belhasa’s
top representatives told the IIC that “Some of the most important Belhasa’s customers in
the Middle East were not in good terms with the Iraqi government since it had defaulted
in some businesses” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 335). Therefore, Belhasa hired Ebstikar
Investment Company LLC and the Hartha Group, both based in Jordan. The Belhasa
Group became the largest Iraqi trade partner under the sanctions regime. It picked 129
contracts, worth $742.2 million (IIC, Chapter I, p. 334).
Still, Al-Hoda and Al-Wasel played a key role as representatives of the Iraqi
government in the trade protocol that Iraq signed with Vietnam. It takes us to the second
case study. This case is relevant because it illustrates how governments can secretly
create corporations to circumvent a sanctions regime. The governments of Vietnam and
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Iraq utilized front companies to execute a trade protocol that they had secretly conceived
and signed (IIC, Chapter I, p. 329). The governments of Vietnam and Iraq created a Joint
Committee to develop trade partnerships. The Committee was responsible for: a)
establishing terms of trade and contracts; b) setting prices, volumes and terms of
deliveries; c) meeting every six months to review compliance with contracts and discuss
future business deals (IIC, Chapter I, p. 330). Vietnam’s Minister of Trade headed the
Vietnamese party while the Grain Board, also known as “the Board,” led the Iraqi party.
Vietnam created two state-owned front companies to engage the Iraqi party. They were
Vietnam Northern Food Corp. and Vietnam Dairy Joint Stock Company. The Vietnamese
government registered them in the UN Sanction Commission as Vinafood and Vinamilk
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 330). For its part, the Iraqi government assigned the trade mission to
Alia, which in turn delegate it to Al-Hoda, and Al-Wasel.

Vinafood and Vinamilk
Vinafood was a Vietnamese agro-industrial company that specialized in
processing, packing and exporting rice, beans, sugar, coffee, ground nuts and other
commodities. Vinafood illegally sold $891 million in agricultural products to Iraq from
1996 to 1998. It sold another $429 million in medicines, cloths and school supplies from
1997 to 1998 (IIC, Chapter I, p. 331). In addition, UN investigators found that Vinafood
engaged in oil trade. It turned out that Vinafood had created The Nghe An Petro Trading
Services, a subsidiary through which it could purchase and import oil from Iraq.
Vinafood paid in cash for the oil, and it used the Vietnamese embassy in Bagdad as
collection center in plain violation of UN mandates and international law (IIC, Chapter I,
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p. 331). Records found at the Iraqi Ministry of Oil revealed that Iraq sold to Vinafood an
average of $700 million worth of oil per year. Iraq sold to Vinafood $1,100 million worth
of oil to Vietnam in 2001 when trade under the UN sanctions regime was at its highest
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 331).
Like Vinafood, Vinamilk was a state-owned front corporation only that it
specialized in processing and distributing dairy products. Vinamilk sold to Iraq $517
million in baby foods from 2000 to 2003 (IIC, Chapter I, p. 332). Vinamilk received its
payments from Alia through bank accounts at Jordan National Bank in Amman, Jordan.
The IIC estimated that Vinamilk paid about $23.5 million in bribes and kickbacks to
businessmen in Jordan and Syria (IIC, Chapter I, p. 332). Those businessmen helped
Vinamilk smuggled its goods into Iraq through the Jordanian and Syrian borders. The IIC
could not estimate how much Vinamilk exactly paid for inland transportation, but it put it
at $32 million in two years. Surprisingly, Vinamilk dared to make a delivery under the
Coalition Provisional Authority led by the U.S. after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 332). It was its last. Vinamilk sent payments to a bank account
belonging to State Company for Foodstuffs at Jordan National Bank, but the Coalition
Provisional Authority seized and reported it to the 661 Committee. The IIC noticed that
the payment to be 10% above the total value of the contract. It concluded that the extra
10% was to cover fees that the Iraqi regime imposed on foreign corporations for
transporting goods in Iraqi territory. The IIC also found $11 million in a second bank
account at Jordan National Bank in Amman. Vinamilk had deposited the money on Alia’s
behalf. Vietnam claimed it for itself (IIC, Chapter I, p. 332).
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In all, the IIC found that Vinafood and Vinamilk together made near $1.2 billion
dollars from 1998 to 2001. Iraq made close to $4 billion through its front corporations
Alia, Al-Hoda and Al Wazel. The Iraqi-Vietnamese trade protocol resulted in a $1.2
billion yearly trade operation, from 1997 to 2003 (IIC, Chapter I, p. 333).

REC and Its Subcontractors
The third case involves Russian Engineering Corporation (REC) and its
subcontractors. I include them here for three main reasons: a) its corporate models; b) the
way that corporations from the former Soviet Republics utilized their long trade relations
between the Soviet Union and Iraq to profit from the sanctions regime; c) how quickly
nascent ex-Soviet corporations learned their ways into the global economy. Indeed, the
UN sanctions regime in Iraq was a blessing for ex-Soviet corporations. They purchased
$19.4 billion worth of Iraqi oil, and in return they exported about $7.1 billion in goods
and services to Iraq at a time when ex-Soviet republics were going through a severe
economic crisis (IIC, Chapter I, p. 349).
REC was registered in Moscow in 1994 and operated from there. REC inherited
several military contracts with Iraq from the Soviet era. It did not engineer or
manufacture anything. It was just an exporter of Russian spare parts to the Middle East,
and Iraq represented almost 40% of its revenues. Thus, the Iraqi market was crucial for
its survival, and circumventing the UN embargo became a corporate goal. The IIC
explained that REC “Always maintained an office in Bagdad with Iraqi personnel, and
REC Staff members, including Sergei Issakov, Chairman of the Board of Directors,
frequently traveled to Iraq during the sanctions regime and reportedly met with high-
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level Iraqi officials, including Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein” (IIC, Interview to Andrei
Okhotking on May 5th, 2004). For his part, Sergei Issakov confessed to the IIC that
“Since 1997 on he traveled to Iraq four or five times a year” (IIC, Interview to Sergei
Issakov, May 28th, 2005). REC relied on three front corporations and one intermediary to
trade with Iraq. In fact, REC does not appear in any document of the Iraqi government.
The data that I gathered from IIC and Duelfer Report, and the Report from the Coalition
for International Justice show that Rosnefteimpex, Breton Ventures, North Refineries
Co., and Bukkehave A/S. REC registered Rosnefteimpex and Breton Ventures in Ukraine
in 1997. It registered North Refineries Co. in Baiji, in 1996. For its part, Bukkehave A/S
was a Danish corporation (IIC, Chapter I, p. 349-359).
Through them, REC secured 40 contracts worth about $210 million. It also struck
22 “side” deals worth $90 million (IIC, Chapter I, p. 349). REC supplied Iraq with
foodstuffs, cars and truck, construction materials and industrial equipments, most of them
manufactured in Germany, Japan, Italy and Russia. The IIC calculated that REC paid Iraq
about $9 million in kickbacks just for obtaining those contracts. In addition, REC
obtained contracts to purchase and resell Iraqi oil. According to the data, REC purchased
24.5 million barrels of oil, worth $517 million (IIC, Chapter I, p. 350). The money was
deposited in four different bank accounts owned by Iraq at BNP Genève in Switzerland,
Arab Land Bank in Egypt, and Rafidain Bank in Lebanon. In addition, REC paid the Iraqi
government $2.5 million for the right to resell that oil (IIC, Chapter I, p. 350). According
to the IIC, an Iraqi official testified that “Payments were done in cash and delivered by
Mr. Issakov in person to the Iraqi embassy in Moscow between February and August
2002” (IIC, Chapter 1, p. 352). The IIC itself was able to obtain receipts with footnotes
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confirming that “Payments were also made through the Iraqi embassy in Moscow
between October and December 2001; receipts for some of these payments reflect that
Mr. Issakov personally brought the payment money to the embassy” (IIC, Chapter I, p.
352). The receipt in question is tallied as No.7. It refers to contract M/09/25, dated April
28, 2001, and signed by Iraqi ambassador in Moscow, Dr. Mazhar No’man Al-Douri
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 353).
IIC’s records show that REC entered in partnership with Bukkehave through
Breton Ventures (IIC, Chapter I, p. 349). The Iraqi regime was shopping around for spare
parts for its transportation industry, but it had to be non-Soviet technologies. So it granted
a contract to Breton Venture, which in turn turned to Bukkehave A/S, the Danish
distributor of spare parts for buses, trucks, and automobiles. It was not a random pick.
Bukkehave’ best clients were global giants such as Kenworth, Renault, Mercedes Benz,
Toyota and Isuzu. Bukkehave had a net of affiliates in the United States, France,
Germany, Sweden, Brazil, Japan, Mexico and China, but not in the Middle East.
Bukkehave declared to the IIC that it contracted with Breton Ventures believing that the
contract was not about Iraq but the Middle Eastern market as a whole (IIC, Chapter I, p.
349). It was a good deal. Breton Venture obtained 11 contracts worth $731 million during
four years. Bukkehave financed and supplied all of them. It had a net profit of nearly
$300 million (IIC, Chapter I, p. 350). Bukkehave also entered “on the side” contracts
with Iraq. It eventually became an intermediary for Iraq’s front companies. As such, it
appointed Mr. Peter Post as its regional sales export-import person, and opened offices in
Amman, Jordan. Mr. Post hired Mr. Riad Marei, a Jordan sales export agent, to act as an
intermediary between Iraqi front companies and himself. When questioned about the
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need for an intermediary, Mr. Post argued that Bukkehave was new in the market and that
it did not have a permanent dealer in the region (IIC, Chapter I, p. 351). Nevertheless, the
IIC summarized Bukkehave’s modus operandi as follow: Bukkehave opened credit lines
for Iraqi State Company for Oil Projects, a front corporation of Iraqi Ministry of Oil. In
turn, Iraq paid Bukkehave through Mr. Marei’s account at Rafidain Bank. Mr. Marei
channeled the money to bank accounts that Bukkehave had in Rafidain Bank (IIC,
Chapter I, p. 352).

El Paso Corporation, Coastal Petroleum Company and Mr. Oscar Wyatt
The fourth case is exceptional in that it brings together the four agents of
globalization discussed in this dissertation. They are: 1) nations-states; 2) global non-state
actors such as empowered individuals; 3) global banks; 4) global corporations. This case
is about El Paso, a corporation that circumvented the sanctions regime through merger
and acquisitions, a key means of globalization and a recurrent practice in the global
economy during the 1990s. Court records in the State of New York show that El Paso
acquired Coastal Petroleum Company and by doing so it inherited Coastal’s customers
and, more importantly, access to Iraqi oil (the New York Times, Sep. 20th, 2007). El Paso
took over Coastal’s secret operations and expanded them. When it was caught, it simply
blamed it all on Coastal, arguing that it was not aware of Coastal’s previous business
deals (the New York Times, Sep.10th, 2007).
Coastal Petroleum, a Texan firm, had been a key Iraqi customer since Iraq
nationalized its oil industry early in the 1970s (IIC, Chapter I, p. 191). The owner of
Coastal was Mr. Oscar Wyatt. By all means, he was one of those empowered individuals

311

described in Chapter IV. The IIC and the New York Times revealed a good deal of Mr.
Wyatt’s activities related to the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. First, Mr. Wyatt
lobbied intensely the U.S. government against the American led invasion of Iraq in 1990,
an act that Saddam Hussein appreciated and did not forget. Second, Saddam invited Mr.
Wyatt to mediate between Iraq and the UN Security Council. Mr. Wyatt was among the
main negotiators of the UN sanctions regime in Iraq. Third, Mr. Wyatt had full access to
the Iraqi political nomenclature and oil industry. Fourth, Coastal Petroleum was the only
American corporation that Saddam Hussein granted oil contracts under the UN sanctions
regime (IIC, Chapter I, p. 171; the New York Times, Sep.10th, 2007).
Court Records published by the New York Times on Sept 10th, 2007, show that
early in the 1990s Coastal Petroleum hired an Argentine company and made it its “front
company” to purchase oil from Iraq. According to the Times, the Court does not mention
the name of the Argentinean Corporation, but it does state that it acquired about $550
million dollars worth of Iraqi oil. Coastal’s success did not go unnoticed to El Paso, a
Texan gas trader. El Paso acquired Coastal Petroleum in 1998. Michael J. Garcia, the
U.S. Attorney for Southern District of New York argued that “The acquisition of Coastal
seems to have been motivated to avoid successor liability in the context of mergers and
acquisitions. The timing of the merging itself seems suspicious as it stem from Coastal’s
illegal activities, of which El Paso was aware” (the New York Times, Sep.10th, 2007).
Again, citing court records, the New York Times reported that, in the year 2000,
and following instructions from El Paso, Coastal created Nafta Petroleum and Mednafta
Trading Co. Nafta Petroleum was incorporated in January 2001 and Mednafta Trading
Co. in March 2001. Both opened bank accounts at BNP Suisse with the pseudonyms
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“Cyprus” and “America” respectively. Curiously, when the Court followed Coastal’s
money, it found a company called NuCoastal, founded, registered and based in Houston,
Texas. NuCoastal had active deposits worth $40 million, which had been wire-transferred
from El Paso to Coastal Petroleum, to Nafta Petroleum and Mednafta Trading Co., and
then to NuCoastal. The money was to pay for one shipment of Iraqi oil. Nafta and
Mednafta were the beneficiaries. In total, after two years of investigating, the Southern
District Court of New York found 47 deposits totaling $1.2 billion dollars, all traced back
to El Paso Corporation (the New York Times, Sep.10th, 2007).

Vitol Group and Vitol France
The fifth case is different. First, the corporation in question executed and financed
contracts. To protect itself, it created a corporate model that involved two rings of
corporations. One ring covered up execution of contracts while the other concealed the
flow of money. The rings included a conglomerate, two regional subsidiaries, two shell
firms, a dormant company, two partnerships and a dozen of intermediaries for shipping
purposes. Second, this case explains a common practice in the global economy, widely
used to evade sanctions regimes: faking corporate identity and nation of registration. This
case is about Vitol France, of which the IIC Report stated that “No company called Vitol
France ever existed” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 158). Vitol was a Swiss company that “Used the
name to give it a French angle” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 158) since Saddam Hussein favored
french companies in appreciation for France’s friendly approach to Saddam’s regime.
Vitol France was in fact Vitol S.A. Geneva, a corporation registered and based in
Switzerland, a regional subsidiary of Vitol Group, a Swiss conglomerate with 27
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affiliates and subsidiaries operating in several European nations (IIC, Chapter I, p. 159).
Vitol Group authorized Vitol S.A. Geneva to provisionally change its name to Vitol
France, so it could obtain contracts from Saddam Hussein. To masquerade even more the
scheme, Vitol France created two rings of subsidiaries, intermediaries, front, dormant and
shelf corporations. It also hired Mr. Serge Boidevaix, a French diplomat, to act as a
liaison between itself and the Iraqi government (IIC, Chapter I, p.67 and p. 158).
Vitol France was officially registered as an oil trader, but it executed and financed
contracts under the sanctions regime. Vitol France organized a ring of intermediaries
around itself to which it channeled money and contracts. Some of them were Bayoil,
Sidanco, Awad Ammora & Co., and about a dozen Russian corporations such as
Rosneftegazexport, purposely created to ship oil out of Iraq (IIC, Chapter I, p. 160).
Vitol’s operations went unnoticed for a few years. The IIC traced about $670 million
back to Vitol France (IIC, Chapter I, p. 160). According to the IIC, it was just half of
what Vitol France actually invested in the sanctions regime. However, by 1998, Vitol
France saw itself involved in a dispute over fees, surcharges and revenues with Peakville
Limited, its financial trustee. Peakville Limited was the financial entity that Vitol France
hired to channel payments to SOMO. In practice, if there was any linkage between Vitol
France and the Iraqi government, it was Peakville. But payments and deliveries were
usually late, for which Vitol France had to pay penalties. Vitol France put the blame on
its ring of intermediaries, ultimately responsible for executing the contracts. They had
been confronting issues when chartering vessels to transport their cargoes. In the end,
Vitol France and Peakville Ltd agreed to pay the Iraqi government, hoping that it would
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grant some other contracts, but that was not the case. The Iraqi regime collected its
money and banned both corporations from Iraq (IIC, Chapter I, p. 161).
After that, Vitol SA Geneva replaced Vitol France with Vitol Asia, another of its
regional subsidiaries. Vitol Asia operated from Singapore. It approached a corporation
called Mastek Sdn Bhd and asked it to act as its front corporation. Mastek was a dormant
Malaysian corporation (IIC, Chapter I, p. 163). Three Malaysian businessmen “revived”
it in an attempt to access the Iraqi regime for contracts, but they were unsuccessful. So
they accepted the proposal from Vitol Asia. Mastek soon obtained its first contract. Its
role was to hire the shipping companies that would execute the contracts. It was also to
pay the surcharges that the Iraqi government demanded for using Iraqi roads and ports
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 161). The partnership worked well for a while. Mastek executed $89
million in imports-exports and paid about $10 million in surcharges to the Iraqi
government, $30 million to Vitol Asia, and it kept $20 million for itself (IIC, Chapter I,
p. 162). But by 2001, Mastek was facing illiquidity. Mastek claimed that Vitol Asia was
not paying enough surcharges and bribes, which the Iraqi government kept raising. The
Iraqi government considered that there were just too many corporations violating the
sanctions regime, and UN could find out at any time. Raising the surcharges was a way of
reducing participants. Even so, Mastek threatened Vitol Asia with going public with its
secret operations. In February 26, 2002, Vitol Asia paid Mastek an undisclosed sum and
abandoned the partnership for good (IIC, Chapter I, p. 162).
In the end, it all seemed like if Vitol Asia and Mastek never had direct business
contacts. Vitol Asia had placed two layers of corporations between Mastek and itself.
First, it placed two shell Malaysian corporations: Cosmos Capital Group Ltd and Keppel
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Oil. Cosmos was to intermediate between Vitol Asia and Mastek. For its part, Keppel Oil
was the link between Vitol and SOMO. Second, Vitol Asia hired a corporation called
Bahrain E.C. to deal with financial transactions involving SOMO and other Iraqi
institutions. The IIC discovered some transactions linking Bahrain E.C. to Vitol Asia and
then to Vitol SA Geneva. They were letters of credit that Vitol S.A. Geneva extended to
corporations trading with Iraq. The common denominator was that they had business
accounts at JP Morgan-Chase London, in the UK. They led IIC’s investigators to bank
accounts at Jordan National Bank Amman, where SOMO too had accounts.

Taurus Group
The last case to discuss is Taurus Group. It is unique for it shows how American
corporations evaded Saddam’s ban American companies. Yet, Taurus bought $256
million of Iraqi oil. It did through a dozen small Russian front corporations (IIC, Chapter
I, p. 125). For its ingenuity, Taurus is one of the most illustrative cases of corporate
modeling to deal with a sanctions regime and regulatory regimes in general.
Mr. Bem Pollmer founded Taurus Group in 1993 after resigning to its high
executive post at Bayoil Corporation. The decision could not be more opportune. Both
Taurus and Bayoil began to trade with Iraq very early into the sanctions regime. They
both were among the most influential corporations lobbying against the sanctions and
circumventing them. Taurus and Bayoil are examples of a dysfunctional corporate culture
and governance. They both were found guilty of corporate wrongdoing in a New York
Court (the New York Times, Sep. 20th, 2007). According to court records published by
the New York Times, Taurus consisted of two main affiliates. One was Taurus Petroleum
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Ltd, based in Nassau, Bahamas. The second was Taurus Petroleum Nevis, incorporated as
a shared ownership between Mr. Pollmer’s sons, who also owned a holding company
registered in Delaware. Both corporations had bank accounts at UEB Geneva and ING
Bank Geneva, both banks based in Switzerland. In February 1995, Taurus Group formed
a French-based company called Aredio Petroleum. In turn, Aredio hired a Liechtensteinbased financial service firm called ReviTrust to process the creation of two other
corporations: Fenar Petroleum Ltd. and Alcon Petroleum Ltd. Soon afterwards, Fenan
and Alcon opened bank accounts at BNP Geneva but not with their names. They used
Petrocorp AVV and Jabal Petroleum SAL respectively. Iraqi officials working for SOMO
confessed to the IIC that “They understood Taurus was using Fenar and Alcon as front
companies to purchase Iraqi crude oil” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 126).
Fenar purchased oil in its own name, but Alcon hired Reliance Petroleum, a small
Indian company, to do the purchases. Taurus, in order to conceal even more of its
operation, ceded the ownership of Fenar Petroleum Ltd to Mr. Musbah Ladki. The
corporate maneuvering allowed Taurus to extended 92 contracts to 17 small Russian front
companies such as Sidanco, Machinoimport, Neftegazexport, Rosnefteimpex, Zangas,
Zarnestservice, and Zarubezhneft. Taurus used some of those companies for just one
contract. It used others to conceal money or move it from account to account, bank to
bank. Most of those Russian companies dissolved right after UN ended the UN sanctions
regime in Iraq. Again, after researching court records, as well as data from the IIC, the
Duelfer Reports and the CFIJ, I was able to reconstruct Taurus’s operational model under
the UN sanctions against Iraq. Figure 6.5 exemplifies the intricacy of Taurus’s corporate
scheme.
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Figure 6.5 – Taurus’s Intricate Corporate Scheme
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Observe in Figure 6.5 the flow of profits, represented in red arrows, from
intermediaries at the bottom and back to Taurus Group. The flow was not as
straightforward though. Taurus used a ring of bank accounts and financial institutions as
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intricate as its corporate models to evade UN auditors. The ring resembled a spider,
linking about 50 bank accounts in nine different banks such as Credit Suisse, Banque
Bruxelles, Lambert S.A., and UEB/BNP (IIC, Chapter I, p. 129). Most of the money
circulated through wire transfers from two accounts under the names of Petrocorp and
Jabal at First National Bank in Lebanon. Bank records showed that just between 1999
and 2000, Petrocorp and Jabal wired $27.6 million from their accounts at First National
Bank to Mr. Musbah Ladki’s accounts at Cairo Amman Bank (IIC, Chapter I, p. 130).
The money ended up at UEB, in Geneva, after circulating through seven bank accounts to
Cairo Amman Bank, in Cairo. For its part, Taurus Nevis wired $9.2 million from its
accounts at UEB/BNP to Banque Bruxelles in 7 months (IIC, Chapter I, p. 130). And it
later transferred the funds from Banque Bruxelles to Lambert and Credit Suisse. The IIC
traced the money to Petrocorp’s accounts at First National Bank, then to Cairo Amman
Bank, and lastly to SOMO’s accounts in Jordan National Bank. The money was to pay
for execution of contracts. During the same period, Taurus Nevis wire transferred another
$4 million dollars to Jabal’s account at First National Bank (IIC, Chapter I, p. 130). The
money stayed there for two weeks, after which it was transferred to Cairo Amman Bank.
It ended it up at SOMO’s account at Jordan National Bank.
From August 1, 2001, to December 31, 2002, the flow of money from Taurus
took two new itineraries. One began in an account at Credit Agricole Indosuez, in
Genova. The account belonged to Taurus London, a small affiliate of Taurus Nervis.
Taurus London moved $6 million to Alcon’s account at UEB/BNP, which then moved
the funds to Jabal’s account at First National Bank, and from there to Cairo Amman Bank
and SOMO’s Jordan National Bank (IIC, Chapter I, p. 130). A second itinerary began at
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Taurus Nevis in Paris and Geneva. From August 2001 to December 2002, Taurus Nevis
moved $14.3 million to Fenar’s account at UEB, which then wired the money to
Petrocorp, and from there to Cairo Amman Bank and to Jordan National Bank (IIC,
Chapter I, p. 130).
In all, the operation worked well for a long time. The Taurus Group executed 14%
of all Iraqi contracts under the sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter I, p. 132). The operation
involved complex wire transferring and corporate models. Taurus’s operations came to
illustrate, like no other case, the use of corporate modeling to evade not only a sanctions
regime but any regulatory regime.

Conclusion
This chapter is about key agents and means of globalization: corporations and
their various corporate models. The argument is twofold. First, I argue that corporations
are a key agent of globalization, one with enormous influence over regulatory regimes.
Second, corporations use corporate models to attain efficiency, high productivity and
expansion, but above all they use corporate models to circumvent regulatory regimes.
Corporate models were essential for the circumvention of the UN sanctions regime in
Iraq. On the one hand, the government of Iraq employed corporate models to sell to and
purchase from corporations and nations. Iraq used corporate models to reach local,
regional and global markets. On the other hand, foreign corporations interested in the
Iraqi market employed corporate models to evade UN sanctions and inspectors, conceal
their wrongdoings, and laundry their profits. I used the first part of this chapter to analyze
corporate models. I included an analysis of corporate governance and responsibility since
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they are part of the overall structure of corporate models. In the second part, I present
specific examples of how corporations employed corporate models to circumvent the UN
sanctions regime upon Iraq.
In this chapter we showed how corporations circumvented the UN sanctions
regime in Iraq though corporate models. In general, the method seems repetitious, but the
examples illustrate how corporations can deal with not only a sanctions regime but also
regulatory regimes in general. It is not simple. Corporations do a whole set of corporate
models and maneuvering mechanisms to avoid regulations, responsibility and
accountability.
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VII. AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: THE GLOBAL ASSEMBLY
LINE, CONTRACT MANUFACTURERS AND VALUE NETWORKS
“So this is our conference room, probably the largest screen in Asia – this is forty digital screens put
together- […] Infosys can hold a virtual meeting of the key players from its entire global supply chain for
any project at any time on that supersize screen. So their American designers could be on the screen
speaking with their Indian software writers and their Asian manufacturers all at once. We could be sitting
here, somebody from New York, London, Boston, San Francisco, all live. And maybe the implementation
is in Singapore, so the Singapore person could also be live here… That’s globalization”.
Thomas L. Friedman
“Iraqi chemical industry appears to have evolved into a nation-wide, pan-industry, pan-academia merit
based competition for project ideas and project implementation into an operation of regional proportions”.
The ISG Report
“By God, spare us your evil. Pick up your goods and leave. We do not need an atomic bomb. We have the
dual chemical. Let them take note of this. We have the dual chemical. It exists in Iraq”.
Saddam Hussein

Introduction
I examined in previous chapters how Iraq utilized agents and means of
globalization to circumvent the UN sanctions regime, reach global markets, and engage
in trade with corporations, banks, financiers, NGOs, political parties and powerful
individuals. Now I want to address a key question of this Dissertation: whether or not
globalization allowed Iraq to rebuild its military infrastructure. I argue that Iraq attempted
to rebuild its military capabilities in three main ways. First, Iraq designed and
implemented a vast, ambitious procurement program to obtain components and parts for
its military industry. Second, Iraq rebuilt part of its military industry. Third, Iraq
outsourced an important portion of its military industry. In working toward these goals,
Iraq’s plan for rearmament consisted of purchasing technologies, industrial machinery,
and component parts; rebuilding a grid of assembly lines that were domestic and regional
in scope; and assembling, researching, testing and storing missiles and WMDs.
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I have divided this chapter into two parts. First, I discuss how globalization trends
of the 1990s brought about a radical transformation of the global economy, precisely at
the time the UN was enforcing a multilateral sanctions regime against Iraq. Specifically, I
examine the changes that globalization brought about to productive processes and
manufacturing models. I then discuss the transition from an international to a
transnational economy and from the local to the global assembly line. I explain in the
second part how Iraq took advantage of the new global manufacturing model to rebuild
its military-industrial complex.

From International to Transnational Production
The UN sanctions regime did not allow Iraq to purchase weapons and to rebuild
its military industry, especially industries linked to missiles and WMDs. Therefore, Iraq
opted for manufacturing its own weapons. The problem for Iraq then became how to
rebuild its military industrial complex and organize an efficient and secret production
process. Basically, Iraq had two main choices. First, Iraq could manufacture its weapons
in the traditional way: a domestic manufacturing operation based on Fordism or
centralized assembly line. But such a choice was not feasible because UN inspectors
could detect and stall the operation. Second, Iraq could do what most big transnational
manufacturing corporations were already doing at the time: decentralize production
processes and outsource the assembly line to foreign nations. Iraq opted for this choice.
Iraq decentralized what was left of its military industrial production, dismantled portions
of its assembly lines, and outsourced them to nations such as Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.
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Iraq accomplished this thanks to some important structural changes that occurred in the
global economy during the 1990s.
The globalization process of the 1990s brought about radical structural changes to
productive processes. The changes applied to almost all economic sectors and industries,
from agriculture and agroindustrial, to services and manufacturing. Globalization
converted a) international productive processes into transnational productive processes;
b) centralized manufacturing into contract manufacturing (CMs); c) lineal assembly lines
into fragmented ensemble lines; d) local and regional distribution centers into global
value networks.
International production process was the dominant manufacturing model for most
of the 20th century. International production was “A simple extension of economic
activities across national boundaries and is essentially a quantitative process”
(Robinson, 2004, p.14). It accounted for just a few nations within well-defined small
regional patterns. International production was in essence local, and bilateral in a handful
of cases. It was rarely regional. But international production brought regional suppliers
and importers to local production centers. In other words, regional economies were
integrated into local industries as providers of raw materials and importers of finished
products. Again, it was so for most of the 20th century. Before the 1950s, there were not
regional economies at all (Dickens, 1998, p.74). There were no regional economic
infrastructures, no regional integration, no regional markets and no regional trade treaties.
Most nations were mainly suppliers of raw materials to the manufacturing centers in the
U.S., Great Britain, Germany, France and two or three more European nations. With the
exceptions of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, Latin American nations only embraced large
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scale manufacturing by mid 1950s. They did it not as a means to integration but to
substitute importation of industrial products for domestic industrial manufactures
(Skidmore and Smith, 2008, p. 29). The model, above all, aimed at transforming trade
relations that Latin American nations had with respect to the U.S. and European nations.
For its part, most of Asia did not develop a manufacturing industry until 1960s. And even
today it cannot be said that Africa is manufacturing center. Only South Africa could
claim to have a manufacturing industry. Latin America, Asia and Africa were the largest
importers and consumers of American and European manufactures. As a whole, it was
only during the last 40 years of the 20th century that manufacturing became a
transnational trend.
According to Palloix (1975) and Robinson (2004), transnational production
processes are radically different from international production processes. Transnational
production is based on four pillars: a) decentralization of production; b) fragmentation of
assembly line and distribution centers; c) integration of management and supply chains;
d) specialization through creation of segments of productions.
First of all, transnational production is decentralized, fragmented and spatially
dispersed throughout the global economy, but the fragments remain linked through
integrated management and a chain of production (Robinson, 2004, p.16). Both are global
in scope. Transnational production takes local manufacturing centers and imbeds them in
regional clusters integrated into a global production process. Yet, integration does not
mean asymmetrical relations between manufacturers on one hand, and suppliers of raw
materials and importers of finished products on the other, for that was the case of the
internationalization model. Rather, integration here refers to the production process itself,
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to the assembly line in particular. Transnational production breaks up the assembly line
into phases and segments which are then outsourced to independent manufacturers. It
means that a large number of small companies, namely sweat shops, disseminated
throughout the globe, participate in the manufacture of just one product. Each shop
manufactures a piece of the final product. It does not matter which part or piece of the
final product they produce; all shops are important to the quality and overall cost of the
final product. Under this model, national borders matter, for the most part, in terms of
cost differentials due to national economic policies which affect the global structure of
production. Regional boundaries act as organizational mechanisms, as a means of
grouping, integration, cost saving, and efficiency. Every segment of the production
process counts when it comes to minimizing costs and increasing productivity. The entire
process aims at reconsidering and reconstructing the notion of comparative advantage, a
process that Krugman (1991) explains in his trade theory.
The result is decentralization and fragmentation on a large scale. Yet, note that, as
Robinson does, that “Worldwide decentralization and fragmentation of the production
process has taken place together with the centralization of command and control of the
global economy” (Robinson, 2004, p. 17). Indeed, there is a global chain of production
and a global chain of command also, one that is highly coordinated even when the
commanding center, as Friedman (2008) argues, is far away from the production centers.
For one, no corporation leads the production process even thought there is an inherent
hierarchy in the form of a pyramid. Brand-name corporations are at the top, followed by
retail corporations, suppliers and the assembliers. Lately, retail corporations and suppliers
have been merging as to increase their size, market shares and bargaining power with
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respect to brand-name corporations and contract manufacturers. In general, brand-name
corporations, suppliers, retailers and contract manufacturers must be seen as a very
cohesive structure of independent elements. If one of them fails, the entire operation
collapses. Note that corporations like to keep little or no inventory at all, so they can save
money in terms of warehousing, utilities and waste. It means that supply and demand
must be highly synchronized, to the point that production occurs as actual orders for more
products come in to the assembly line. The process is known as just in time production.
The result is a fragmented production process, highly specialized but structurally strong
and interconnected. Global production allows fragmented global production to work as a
unit in different latitudes but in real time.
The intensification of globalization during the 1990s triggered technological
innovations which facilitated further fragmentation and decentralization of assembly lines
and the emergence and proliferation of contract manufactures (CMs) and global value
networks (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001, p. 15), or as what Castell (2000) calls network
societies, namely a new form of capitalist economic organization and association.
First of all, arguing that globalization transformed the international assembly line
into a transnational operation actually means that globalization replaced Fordism with
CMs and value networks (Robinson, 2006, p. 14; Castell, 2000, p. 37). Fordism was one
of the most important innovations of the 20th century. It was the basis of the
internationalization of the production process. It took manufacturing from a small scale
regional operation to a large scale local one. As Berger and Doran argue, “Ford itself was
a regional corporation before it was a local operation” (Berger and Doran, 1996, p. 74).
Fordism centralized the entire production process. It put all phases of production
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together, one after the other, uninterrupted, in a lineal sequence, under just one roof.
Henry Ford called it the assembly line, consisting of a step by step process in which
workers performed a specific, repetitious task. The process sought the specialization of an
uneducated, unskilled labor force. The idea was to create large outputs at the lowest cost
and at the fastest pace possible. Fordism was about mass production and speed. It
demanded large volumes of raw materials for its operations and large markets to allocate
its large outputs. Yet, corporations could not utilize Fordism equally in all nations. They
had to introduce some structural modifications in the model to adapt it to the specific
conditions of some nations. For example, Berger and Doran (1996), as well as Robinson
(2004), argue that Fordism did not work well in small markets where mass production
often led to high inventories and waste. Fordism even had problems in Japan, a large and
rich market. Fordism created outputs so large there that it saturated the Japanese market,
to the point that manufacturers had to sale their products at a loss (Berger and Doran,
1996, p. 119). It led to massive layoffs and recessions. The transition from Fordism was a
product of increased global competition for markets that original Fordist firms once
dominated, and “An effort by these same corporations to lower costs and reverse
declining rates of profit (from 1965-1985) that had characterized the leading Fortune
500 companies on the downside of the Fordist production system” (Berger and Doran,
1996, p. 127; Berger and Lester, 1997, p. 202).
The assembly line went through a series of transformations as new technologies
emerged. The main was the restructuring of the production process dependant on
parameters such as proximity to raw materials, market shares, access to cheap but
qualified labor force, and geopolitical stability. Also, manufacturing corporations were
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very cautions when expanding their operations to other nations. They invested in nations
with stable macroeconomic indexes and political systems, but they also sought weak
labor laws since Fordism required intense labor. Thus, the assembly line did not really
change for many years. Corporations retooled and improved it, but they did it within the
scope of Fordism. Along the way, corporations created a comparative advantage for
themselves. Corporations with the most efficient assembly lines reduced more costs and
saved more money. Logically, corporations with local and regional advantages were
better positioned to adapt to the changes that came during the 1990s (Castell, 2000, 9. 64;
Arndt & Kierzkowski, 2001, p. 20).
Globalization brought about drastic changes to the corporate world during the
1990s. This time, it targeted the production processes, the assembly line in particular. In
Chapter VI, I explicated that corporations decentralized themselves through corporate
models such as holdings, subsidiaries, and parent and front companies among others. But
then globalization took corporations a step further toward decentralization. Globalization
allowed holdings, subsidiaries, and parent companies to decentralize their production
processes and to dismantle their local assembly lines and take them to regional zones.
They replaced Fordism, the once vertically highly integrated assembly line, with CMs
and value networks strategically located across regional centers of productions
(Robinson, 2004, p. 17; Castell, 2000, p. 36; Luthje, 1997, p. 81).
Indeed, first note that consolidation of regional centers of production came after
the creation of regional trade treaties such as Mercosur and NAFTA, just to mention two.
It must not be ignored that: 1) manufacturers lobbied strongly for the treaties; 2) it is not
a coincidence that firms began to move their manufacturing operations to regions like the
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Mexican-American and Argentinean-Uruguayan borders. Second, fragmentation of
assembly lines and creation of regional production centers cannot be done without
transnational flow and accumulation of capital essential, as Robinson (2004) argues, to
finance production processes. Third, it all underlines Bhagwati’s image of a global
economy: “The global economy is not just one gigantic unit. It is a group of production
and trade blocs dispersed across regional lines” (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 47).
Arndt and H. Kierzkowski (2001) explain that, under the new paradigm, brandname corporations broke up their assembly lines into phases and segments and
outsourced them to CMs. A cautious study would reveal that CMs are just subassemblies,
subcontractors, intermediaries, partnerships, and independent suppliers located around
the world but linked through a contract to a brand-name corporation. As Sturgeon argues,
“CMs are independent units interconnected by a common denominator: a finished
product” (Sturgeon, 1997, p.20). CMs are usually under cheap contracts, meaning that
their values and profits are marginal, but they still provide large outputs at very low cost.
Some CMs provide logistics, repair services, and distributions at very competitive costs.
They divide the production chain into multiple segments linked through assembling
sequences. This idea is based on the theory of value added (Arndt and H. Kierzkowski,
2001, p. 25; Sturgeon, 1997, p. 22), meaning that each segment of the assembly process
adds an X value to the product being produced. In the case of Iraq, CMs and value added
were not to increase sale values but to create trade linkages with Iraq’s neighbors and
conceal production from UN inspectors. This was particularly vital for Iraq’s military
industry, for its missile and WMD programs in specific.
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For Robinson (2004), Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001), and Castell (2000), CMs are
at the core of the just-in-time-production process. Paradoxically, CMs are not brands.
They do not stick their names and logos to the finished product they help to produce,
which explains why they remain unknown to most people even though they are
everywhere. In fact, as Arndt and Kierzkovski affirm, “An essential feature of
transnational production process is the relationship between CMs and brand-name
corporations, which structures the hierarchal relationships that still exist within the
market” (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001, p. 17). Brand-name firms are now at the top of
the value chain. That is, technologies allow brand-name firms to focus on bureaucratic
functions like management, marketing and investment while delegating to CMs the
operational portions of the production process. Brand-name firms do not manufacture any
product. CMs do. Table 7.1 shows some of the most important CMs in the global
assembly line in terms of specialization and/or division of labor across industries.

Table 7.1 - Some of the Most Important CMs in the Global Assembly Line

Fabless company – minimal final
ensemble and testing
Full scale outsourcing of ensemble lines
and/or plants
Large scale final ensemble with high
volume outsourcing of key components
Customized final ensemble in key
markets

Full scale manufacturing and supplychain (engineering & logistics
Full scale manufacturing and supply
chain management
Mass production of key components
Final ensemble (box-build) including
local CM partners

Source: IMF, World Bank
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The new business relationship between brand corporations and CMs emerged for
the first time during the 1960s although in small scale. In 1981, IBM contracted a “noname” small corporation to take over a segment of IBM’s keyboard manufacturing
process (Berger and Lester, 1997, p. 51). It was a great financial success, so soon other
brand-name firms began to execute the same model. By the 1990s, new technologies and
regional trade treaties facilitated the expansion of fragmentation of the assembly line,
which in turn led to the proliferation and consolidation of CMs. Erickson, the mobile
phone manufacturer, led the wave of fragmentation, decentralization and outsourcing of
the 1990s, but Siemens mastered it to levels difficult to outperform (Berger and Lester,
1997, p. 53). Siemens, a technological innovator itself, invested billions to create
technologies that facilitated further fragmentation and outsourcing of assembly lines.
Siemens in turn made billions selling its innovations to brand-name corporations and
CMs (Berger and Lester, 1997, p. 52). Two cases illustrate how it all works.
The first example is Coda Automotive, a small car manufacturer headquartered in
Santa Monica, California. Coda’s owner himself, Kevin Czinger, revealed Coda’s
production line to the New York Times. Coda only does accounting and marketing, and it
employs a Chinese assembly line to manufacture its cars. The Chinese assembling firm
purchases the chassis from Mitsubishi Corporation and the hood, bumpers and lights
from Porsche. Delphi Corp. provides the power steering and BorgWarner Corp the
transaxle. Coda makes electric cars that use lithium batteries, so it buys the batteries from
Tianjin Lishen Battery, a Taiwanese subcontractor to Motorola and Samsung. Coda does
not have a dealer network. It does not need it for it sells its cars over the internet.
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The second example is more telling since most people ignore that computer
brands like Dell and Hewlett-Packard (HP) do not really produce a thing. Pearson and
Raymond (2006) explain in their reportage about Dell and HP that the two computer
giants are just brands, or trademarks. They purchase components, meaning hard and
software, from a number of suppliers around the world. They pay a shipping corporation
for delivering the components to an assembly line owned by another corporation. Once
the assembly manufactures the PCs, Dell and HP sell them in the global marketplace.
Dell sells its products over the internet, so it does not need a net of stores and
showrooms. HP does it through a global network of retail stores. Table 7.2 shows the
largest CMs of hard and software in the global PC industry.

Table 7.2 – The Largest CMs of Hard and Software in Global Computer Industry

Company

Revenues in US
Millions per year

Solectron

$

16,149

Flextronics Int.'l

$

12,923

Sammina SCI

$

10,830

Celestica

$

10,004

jabil Circuit

$

4,086

Hon Hai Precission

$

3,562

Elcoteq Network

$

1,667

Symex

$

1,620

M anufacturers' Services

$

1,522

Benchmark Electronics

$

1,277

Sources: IFM, World Bank
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It catches my attention that those corporations in Table 7.2 are not really
recognizable. They never make the headlines. They are almost anonymous to the public
at large. We ignore their jurisdiction and nations of origin. We do not know if they are
publicly owned, if they are partnerships or private enterprises. We really know very little
about them. However, their contractors, Apple, Dell and HP among others, enjoy public
recognition as computer manufacturers. This is very important to understand how
vulnerable a sanctions regime is to this new global assembly line. Later in this chapter, I
will site more examples, but for now I want to mention the case of Huawei Technologies,
a Chinese firm that started out as a CM but is today among the most recognizable
Chinese brands. Huawei was a sub-assemblier for Motorola. It manufactured fiber optic
equipment for radio communication, a technology that Motorola owned. It turned out that
Huawei sold some of this equipment to Iraq, which then used them for its missile system.
Huawei is today one of the largest assemblier of smart phones in the world. Its most
known product is the Android, Google’s smart-phone.
In general, CMs guarantee: a) anonymity and dispersed accountability; b) mass
production at high speed and very low cost; and c) linkage of the production process from
national to regional and global assembly lines. CMs are by nature transnational network
builders. The computer industry calls it the Silicon Valley System, but scholars
knowledgeable of the assembly industry call it the value network paradigm
For Pearson and Raymond (2006), and Berger and Lester (1997), there are three
types of value networks. First, there is the captive value network. It is a CM that depends
on a brand-name corporation for it survival. CMs are mainly suppliers and intermediaries
highly reliant on one or two customers. They are so dependent that if they lose a contract,
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they could go out of business. They are not treated equally; yet, they have no choice but
to stay captive of their customers. Second, there is the relational value network, in which
a CM builds a close, long-term business relationship with a brand-name corporation. The
relationship can be contractual, but cost is not the base of the contract. Instead, trust,
reciprocity and commitment to efficiency and productivity are the basis for their
relationship. Relational value networks promote positive corporate culture and norms, as
well as responsive corporate governance. Thirdly, there is the turn-key value network.
These are short and/or long- term relations between highly qualified CMs specializing in
manufacturing different pieces of the same product. Their relations consist in a pledge to
cooperate and get the job done. Turn-keys networks are intrinsic parts of all productive
sectors, from banking to infrastructures, chemical and high-tech industries. Saddam
utilized turn-key networks for two main goals: 1) jump start trade with its neighbors,
meaning regional trade; 2) obtain political support from contractors and subcontractors,
any firm that had business relation with Iraq. I mentioned in Chapters II and III that Iraq
granted contracts to firms and nations that publicly opposed the UN sanctions regime.
In addition, Pearson and Raymond (2006), as well as Berger and Lester (1997),
explicate that corporations often employ turn-key networks to circumvent regulatory
regimes. On one hand, Pearson and Raymond (2006) argue that turn-key networks are all
over the global economy. They tend to operate around regional manufacturing centers,
but they have very low entry-exit requirements, which allow them to move in and out of
markets with no difficulty. Brand-name corporations often use turn-key value networks to
enter and exit emergent markets, depending on the macroeconomic conditions of a

335

particular market. Some corporations use turn-key value networks in the developing
world to take advantage of weak laws and enforcement mechanisms there.
Berger and Lester (1997), on the other hand, find that turn-key networks over
time develop solid relations with large numbers of corporations specializing in crosscutting operations, which refers to dual use components required to manufacture a
specific product used in dissimilar industries. That is the case, for example, of certain
chemicals manufactured for the pharmaceutical and semi-conductor industries, but they
can also be used to manufacture some electronic components needed to assembly a longrange missile system. In fact, the U.S. Congress strictly regulates technologies that can
have a use in military manufacturing industries. The most notable is the nuclear
technology conceived for civilian purposes but that can be utilized for military ends.
Though there are others not so notable. For instance, Iraq purchased large quantities of
spare parts presumably for its trucking industry. The parts ended up in the Iraqi army, for
its trucks and even tanks. As a whole, value networks take specialization and division of
labor to levels never attained in the history of assembling and even industrialization.
Pearson and Raymond (2006), Berger and Lester (1997), Sturgeon (1997) and other
scholars call it dual fragmentation, or fragmentation of fragmentation, in which a
corporation outsources some operations to CMs, but then some of those CMs retain a
portion of their contracts and outsource the other portion to other CMs, and so on. This is
particularly feasible when cargo transportation is cheap due to low operational costs and
proximity between production, distribution and consumption centers.
The model works well for nations linked by bilateral and regional trade. As I
stated earlier, intensification of globalization during the 1990s coincided with the creation
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of regional trade blocs and, as result, CMs and value-networks. The intensification of
globalization led to the emergence of new manufacturing centers, this time aligned to
regional trade blocs like NAFTA, ASEAN, EU, and MERCOSUR. Thus, as Berger and
Lester (1997) explain, now Mexico is the manufacturing center in North America;
Malaysia is the manufacturing hub for Asia and Brazil is for South America. Hungary,
Poland, the Czech Republic became the manufacturing centers of Europe as soon as they
entered the European Union. Hungary alone had 8 manufacturing centers in 2001. And of
course, the obvious exception is China, which has become the manufacturing basket of
the world. Figure 7.1 below shows some of the largest CMs in the information
technology industry in the world. The Figure gives us an idea about percentages of
market shares per nation of manufacturing centers across regions.

Figure 7.1 – Market Shares of CMs per Nation across Regions

Mexico, 29

China, 39

Brazil, 26
East Europe,
16
Malaysia, 21

Sources: IMF, the World Bank
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Although wages are not the only factors influencing the proliferation and
consolidation of CM centers, note that the largest CM centers are aligned to the lowest
labor costs across regions and/or regional trade agreements. For instance, as for 2008,
IMF and World Bank’s data show that Mexico has the lowest salaries in North America
and NAFTA. Mexico has the largest CM centers in North America and NAFTA as well.
In the European Union, Eastern Europe has the lowest salaries and the largest number of
CM sites. And we can say the same of China in Asia and Brazil in MERCOSUR.
One notable point here is that the new global manufacturing model does not seem
to create problems for corporations in terms of cultural, social and political adaptation.
American corporations work well in Mexico; Argentinean firms do well in Brazil, and the
same is for British firms in Hungary. Corporations make profits and workers do not seem
to mind. Of course, such a “stable relations” do not come naturally. In fact, global
relations require a great deal of lobbying, bargaining and political maneuvering with
institutions and governments to secure “peaceful” outsourcing. For example, in the case
of China, the Chinese state works closely with corporations in a political process
designed to facilitate their relocation and adaptation to China’s political, social and
cultural environments.
In all, the new model has brought about the relocation of economic activities and
the realignment of productive forces. Productive structures and components have come
together regardless of political systems, economic patterns and geography. Political
relations still matter, but for the most part the highly centralized micro-managed Chinese
capitalism has no problem doing business with the highly unregulated decentralized US
economic system. The German and Japanese coordinated production models work well
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with the East Asian NICs. They all converge through global linkages, including economic
and political ties.

Transnational Production and Regulatory Regimes
Corporations first decentralized corporate operations through corporate models
such as holdings, subsidiaries, parent companies and others. But as Robinson (2004) and
Henderson (2005) argue, with CMs and value-networks, they took decentralization and
fragmentation of production processes to levels never seen before in the corporate world.
Both decentralization and fragmentation of production processes aimed at minimizing
costs while maximizing profits, but they also attempt to minimize accountability and
responsibility at both corporative and national levels. In the Iraqi case, Iraqi corporations
and Iraq itself were capable of circumventing the UN sanctions regime by adopting
production processes within the context of bilateral trade agreements and regional trading
schemes. On one hand, Iraq utilized subsidiaries, intermediaries, and parent and front
companies to access the global markets, so it could acquire technologies, machineries and
components for its military industry. On the other hand, Iraq utilized CMs and valuenetworks within the context of bilateral trade agreements with neighboring nations to
rebuild an assembly line for its military industry. The formula seemed perfect for the
overall objectives of the Iraqi government, which was the circumvention of UN sanctions
with a minimum of accountability and responsibility.
Indeed, I find that transnational production presents a direct challenge to
regulatory regimes precisely due to its level of fragmentation, dispersion and
specialization, which in turn guarantees a high percentage of anonymity. The problem is
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that, as Henderson (2005) explains, by default, outsourcing manufacturing contracts
means outsourcing both legal responsibility and corporate accountability to a third party.
In fact, it means outsourcing to multiple parties because, as we stated earlier, under the
new manufacturing scheme outsourcing is about breaking up the entire assembly line and
selling its pieces to multiple contractors which, in turn, outsource some portions of their
contracts to subcontractors.
Under this manufacturing network, corporate accountability is no longer relative
to internal corporate structures but to external forces and actors. The result is a partition
of contracts, the dissemination of duties and obligations through an amalgam of obscure
parties. It all represents a true challenge to international institutions and nation-states in
terms of supervision, enforcement and litigation. First, tracing evidence and assigning
responsibilities becomes a true legal challenge for institutions that too often lack legal
authority to take on transnational corporations. Even the follow the money method
becomes somehow unfeasible because, as Robinson (2004) argues, transnational
production liberates transnational money from institutional constrains. Even national
governments lose control over the movement of money throughout regional and global
markets. Second, enforcing accountability becomes a gargantuan task. It is so for nations
with not enough financial resources to enforce their own laws. Poor nations are too
vulnerable to powerful corporations. In addition, some nations are not really interested in
holding corporations responsible for wrongdoings. They depend on corporations to create
jobs, increase exports, and balance their national budgets. In fact, enforcing
accountability is even difficult for rich nations like U.S., France, U.K, Germany and
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others. They are often trying to reconcile complicated geopolitical and economic
dilemmas with rules and legal regimes they have set for themselves.

The Iraqi Case
In previous chapters I found that agents of globalization such as corporations,
NGOs, individuals and nation-states, including Iraq, successfully and consistently
circumvented the UN sanctions regime. They did it through means of globalization such
as global trade, global banking, and global corporative models. In this section, I present
findings that respond to the central questions of this dissertation: Did globalization allow
Iraq to circumvent the UN sanctions regime and rebuild its missile and WMD programs?
There is a key point to observe here. UN inspectors and American troops did not
find WMDs in Iraq after the invasion of 2003. That is, they did not find the final product,
and by that I mean no missile, bomb or any kind of ammunition armed, ready to be
launched, with chemical and bacteriological agents. But the objective of this dissertation
is not to argue whether or not Iraq had such a final product. Rather, the central question
here is if globalization facilitates the circumvention of a multilateral sanctions regime and
if circumvention could in turn lead to rearmament. I find that yes: a) Iraq circumvented
the UN sanctions regime; b) Iraq utilized the means and agents of globalization to
circumvent the UN sanctions regime; c) Iraq rebuilt a good portion of its military
manufacturing infrastructure; d) Iraq organized a regional and global procurement
program to design, manufacture, and test missiles and WMDs.
To present and discuss the evidence, I divide this section into two parts. In the
first part, I look at Iraq’s procurement effort as a whole. I present a brief history and some
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accounts about reforms Iraq undertook to adapt to the demands of the UN sanctions
regime. In the second part, I present two case studies: the Missile Program and the
Chemical-Bacteriological Program.

Iraq’s Procurement Effort
The CIA, the ISG, the IIC, the CFIJ, and other sources coincide in that Coalition
Forces destroyed most of Iraq’s military infrastructure in 1991. It included about three
thousand short, medium and long range missiles, and most of its WMD stockpiles. They
also acknowledged that Iraq never fully recovered its military levels after the American
led invasion of 1991. Particularly, Iraq did not really manage to replenish the military
arsenals it had before 1991. But that does not mean that Saddam sat and waited for
miracles. He was not a religious person after all. After 1991, Saddam worked arduously
to rebuild Iraq’s military capabilities. He conceived and implemented a plan to
circumvent the UN sanctions regime.
Indeed, I revealed in Chapter II how Iraq managed to sell oil by manipulating oil
prices, imposing arbitrary fees, and bribing nation-states, corporations, individuals and
NGOs. I explained in Chapter III that Iraq entered trade protocols with Middle Eastern
nations. In Chapter V, I showed how Saddam reformed Iraq’s banking industry, and that
he created a network of banks all around the Middle East. In Chapter VI, I provided
examples of how Saddam created hundreds of corporations throughout the Middle East.
It was all part of a sound plan to circumvent the UN sanctions regime and rearm Iraq.
Saddam personally managed the rearmament effort through the Military Industrial
Commission (MIC), an institution of his own creation (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime
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Strategic Intent, p. 8). The effort was top secret and enjoyed priority over any other
governmental plan or activity. The Iraqi government did not hesitate in assigning
resources to it. Saddam even put Iraq’s intelligence services to work for MIC and the
procurement effort.
According to the Duelfer Report, MIC became a solid institution after numerous
restructurings. It emerged during the 1980s as SOTI, but it then evolved into MIO, after
which it became the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI). It
became MIC in 1991, responsible for planning, financing, and managing Iraq’s military
industries, including those engaged in the missile, chemical-biological, and nuclear
programs. MIC managed 95% of all purchases for the Ministry of Defense (Duelfer
Report, 2004, Regime Strategic Intent, p. 18). But by 1997, after the failure of several
projects, Saddam introduced several modifications. He made MIC a division of the
Ministry of Defense, responsible for acquiring components, equipment and technologies
for the military worth millions of dollars. MIC was basically the procurement arm for the
Ministry of Defense. Its budget grew from $7.8 million in 1993 to $2.7 billion in 2002
(Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Strategic Intent, p. 19). The organization obtained about
$300 million per year as result of its oil sales through the trade protocols with Syria,
Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey. A second source of revenues was ARADET, an Iraqi front
company with plants in most Middle Eastern nations. ARADET produced and sold oil
derivatives all around the world, with annual revenues of nearly $112.2 million (Duelfer
Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 37). ARADET also had an
investment arm to purchase small failing factories in Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Lebanon.

343

In reality, MIC consisted of hundreds of mid-side military front companies,
manufacturing plants, and research and training centers dispersed throughout the Middle
East (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 53). I call them military
because they only traded products and technologies that had military applications. We
should not confuse them with civilian front companies studied in Chapter V and VI,
which traded products for civilian purposes. More importantly, civilian front companies
did not enjoy the support that military front companies had from IIS and ISS. Civilian
front companies, moreover, did not enjoy the personal support of Saddam Hussein.
Military front companies did. Saddam appointed CEOs for military front companies. He
met with and briefed them weekly, in some instances daily. Saddam even set up
intelligence offices throughout the Middle East to protect and oversee “his” military front
companies.
Military front companies acted with relative independence. Unlike civilian front
companies, they could create and dismantle subsidiaries, intermediaries and parent
companies. They were autonomous, meaning that they sought their own funding. Yet,
they could not move their money around so easily for they had to report directly to
Saddam. The number of Iraqi military front companies grew rapidly from 1996 to 2002.
Their budgets grew as well, reaching $8 billion dollars yearly, a considerable amount for
an embargoed nation (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 53-54).
The ISG calculated that the workforce for military front companies amounted to
approximately 63,000 in 2002 (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement,
p. 54). And as for research front companies, they usually worked closely with universities
to camouflage their work. They researched mostly missile and bio-chemical technologies.
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Military research projects grew from 40 in 1994 to about 3,200 in 2002 (See Annex K).
Below is a list of the most important military companies (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime
Finance and Procurement, p. 54-55).

Table 7.3 – Most Important Military Companies in Iraq

Research Companies
Al Milad General Company

Al Quds General Company

Al Battani General Company

Al Khawarizmi General Co.

Ibn-Sina' General Company

Al Raya General Company

Al Kindi General Company

al Basil General Company

Al Fat'h General Company

Al Razi General Company

Manufacturing Companies
Jabir Bin-Hayyan General Company

Al Hadir General Company

Salah-al-Din General Company

Al Zahf Al Kabir General Co.

al Karamah General Company

Al 'Izz General Company

Ibn-Firnas General Company

Al Salam General Company

Al Mansur General Company

Al Nida' General Company

Al Nu'man General Company

Sab'a Nissan General Company

Al Yarmuk General Company

Al Samud General Company

al Majid General Company

Al Faw General Company

Al Walid General Company

Al Radwan General Company

Al 'Ubur General Company

T ariq General Company

Saddam General Company

al Shahid General Company

Hittin General Company

Umm-al-Ma'arik General Company

Al Rashid General Company

Al Qa'qa General Company

Badr General Company

Sinharib General Company

Ibn-Rushd General Company

Sa'd General Company

Ibn-Majid General Company

T abuk General Company
Al Nasr Al'Azim General Company
Al Harith General company

Front Companies
Al Bashair

Al Mufakhir

Armos

Source: ISG and the Duelfer Report
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I took the data from the ISG Report and the Duelfer Report. The data reflect the
ranks of Iraqi military companies according to the size of their operational budgets. The
Reports did not publish the actual numbers, and I could not find them in any other source.
But digging into Iraqi (ISS and IIS) records, I found that, for example, Al Milad and Al
Quds had the two largest Iraqi research front companies (ISS, p.116). Al Milad focused
its research on missile systems while Al Quds focused on WMDs (IIS, p. 71) By the same
token, among military manufacturing companies, Jabir Bin-Hayyan and Al Hair had the
largest budgets (ISS, p.35; IIS, p. 78). Jabir Bin-Hayyan was the largest assemblier of
components and equipment for Iraqi missiles. Al Hadir had the largest laboratories to
process and test chemical and bacteriological substances in Iraq. For their part, Al
Bash’ir, Al Mufakhir and ARMOS were procurement companies (ISS, p.42; IIS, p. 66).
They had the largest procurement budgets among all Iraqi corporations. They procured
components, equipment and technologies for both the Iraqi missile and WMD programs,
while Mufakhir procured materials for the short-lived Iraqi nuclear program. Al Bash’ir
and ARMOS emerged as the two largest, most important Iraqi front companies under the
UN sanctions regime (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 56).
They contracted and subcontracted with hundreds of small companies throughout the
Middle East to design, manufacture, refurbish, test and transport components for missile
and WMD programs. These contractors had no direct relationship with the Iraqi
government. They worked separately most of the time without knowing that, in the end,
they produced for the Iraqi military.
MIC created Al-Basha’ir in 1991 (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p. 56-57). Its CEO was Munir Mamduh Awad al-Kubaysi, a former 15-year
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employee of IIS. The company specialized in assembling. It had nine assembly plants
dispersed throughout Iraq, some of them camouflaged in bunkers. It had another 19
assembly plants in Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Egypt, the four nations with which Iraq had
Trade Protocol agreements (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p.
56-67). Al-Basha’ir had one problem and one virtue. Its problem was that it was short of
funding compared to its large, ambitious projects. Its virtue was that it was a great
innovator in a nation so centralized that it left too little room for innovations. A careful
research revealed that Al-Bashra’ir’s main innovation was outsourcing. Through
subcontractors, Al-Bashra’ir exported oil and, with the proceeds, purchased and imported
military equipment and technologies, which it then channeled to its contracted
manufacturers (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 56-67).
According to the Duelfer Report, Mr. Munir, the CEO, established the Syrian
Division through his friend Dr. Asif Shalish and his family. This Syrian family owned
SES International, a procurement corporation with a dozen small companies in Syria
(Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 74). Munir wanted SES to
open more companies, not only in Syria but also throughout the Middle East and even in
Europe if possible. For that end, Munir granted 89% of all Iraq’s military procurement
contracts to SES. Al-Basha‘ir became the largest investor to SES, and Syria became the
center of illicit procurement to Iraq’s military industry. The company’s name was found
in hundreds of contracts to purchase technologies, weapons, “dual-use” materials as well
as legitimate goods and supplies. SES smuggled the merchandise through the Syrian-Iraqi
border with the complicity of Iraq‘s intelligence and secret services. This in part explains
why it went undetected by UN inspectors (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and
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Procurement, p. 74). Also, Al Basha’ir was the first Iraqi company to use humanitarian
missions to smuggle military equipment into Iraq. Al-Basha’ir used a Bulgarian NGO
known as JEFF Company to obtain spare parts for T-72 tank, artillery, and trucks. The
NGO shipped the cargoes by air via Syria, Jordan and Turkey. Al-Basha’ir tallied those
shipments as “Spare parts for air conditioning for hospitals” (Duelfer Report, 2004,
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 74-75; Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 59).
Fort its part, ARMOS was a front company that Al-Baha’ir created in 1998 in a
joint-venture with Russia. ARMOS accounted for about 15 to 20% of Al-Baha’ir
procurement contracts (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 74).
The Company’s mission was to account for all military contracts with Russia. This
included vital procurements for the Iraqi air force, helicopters, and missile defense
systems. ARMOS purchased from Russia planes and helicopter engines in pieces to
assembly them in Iraq (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 116).
ARMOS contracted an NGO to purchase components for the Iraqi missile project. The
NGO was “The Russian Nuclear Disaster Victims Fund Institution” from Russia (Duelfer
Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 116). By 2003, ARMOS had spent $3
billion dollars in Russian military products for Iraq‘s numerous military programs
(Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 116; Albright and Khidhir,
1997, p. 60). ARMOS even expanded to markets like Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine.
There it spent about $700 million in parts and components. ARMOS purchased from
Poland 250 engines for Volga missiles (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p. 121-123). In 2002, ARMOS paid $70 million to a Cypriot firm to acquire
and ship to Iraq a Bulgarian made electro-chemical lab. Other purchases, through the
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Cypriot intermediary, included about 65 types of substances for “fertilizers” and the
petro-chemical industry (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 139;
Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 59).
According to the IIC, the Duelfer Report, and the CFIJ, Iraq used four main routes
for its procurement programs. First, Iraq utilized Iranian territorial waters. Ironically, it
did it with the consent of its archenemy: the Iranian government. Iranian coastguards
even escorted the ships all throughout the zone. Second, Iraq utilized the Iraqi-Jordanian
border. To camouflage this military operation, Iraq contracted the Land Transport
Company, a front company Iraq created to carry out the terms of the Jordanian-Iraqi trade
agreement of 1998 (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 137142). Third, Iraq utilized the Iraqi-Syrian border. Again, Iraq assigned the operations to a
civilian company created under the Syrian-Iraqi trade agreements. I should point out that
there was a sharp increase of smuggling though this route when in 2001 Syria and Iraq
reopened the rail tracks between Mosul in Northern Iraq and Aleppo in Syria. In June 10,
2002, the Times of London reported in headlines that Baghdad was using new rail tracks
in Syria to smuggle military hardware. According to the article, the cargoes included old
Bulgarian tanks, Czech-made Scud missile guidance systems, and surface-to-air missiles
(Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p. 198; Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 59).
In all, Al-Basha’ir created hundreds of front companies to evade the UN sanctions
and inspectors. The ISG accounted for nearly 230 such companies. Most of them closed
operations after conducting just one or two transactions. Iraqi front companies were
instrumental in procuring the materials necessary for the three primary military programs
established by Saddam Hussein: the missile, chemical and biological programs.
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Two Case Studies on Iraq‘s Rearmament: Missile and Chemical Programs
Iraq’s rearmament included conventional and non-conventional weapons, but my
research focuses on non-conventional. Specifically, in this section I look at the missile
and chemical programs. I examine how Iraq utilized agents and means of globalization to
circumvent the UN sanctions regime and procure materials for its missile and chemical
programs. I selected these two programs for four main reasons. First, the two programs
complemented each other, meaning that Saddam wanted missiles armed with chemical
agents. Second, by Saddam’s own accounts, both programs were key parts of Iraqi
deterrence policy toward Iran and Israel. The irony is that it did not deter the United
States. Third, the programs required significant logistical, technical, and financial
commitments from Iraq. Iraq’s missile and chemical programs demonstrated that Iraq
was capable of evading UN sanctions and inspectors. Fourth, they were the most
scrutinized of all Iraqi rearmament efforts. They were scrutinized by the media, UN
inspectors on the ground, intelligence services from the U.S. and Israel in particular, and
two no-fly zones over Iraq enforced by American and British air forces.

The Missile Program
Iraq’s missile program was the result of a 30-year effort by the Iraqi regime. It
was a secret that everyone knew. The UN knew about the program. The CIA and Israeli
secret agencies knew about it. In fact, Iraq itself made it known as a means to deter Iran,
Saddam‘s main security concern. Iraq began to build missiles in 1972 when it signed
contracts with the Soviet Union. Iraq first focused on short-range missile systems,
spending about $8 billion from 1974 to 1988. Iraq also signed contracts with Yugoslavia,
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North Korea, Brazil and Argentina during 1980s (Duelfer Report, 2004, Delivery
Systems, p. 3; Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 42). It was the “war of the cities” between
Bagdad and Teheran that convinced Saddam of the need for long-range missiles and
missiles armed with WMDs. This second aspect is important because, according to the
CIA and ISG, at the time Iraq already had WMDs. Yet, all attempts to transport and drop
them over Iranian territories had failed miserably. But the Independent IIC, after the IraqIran War Iraq had serious difficulties replenishing its missile stockpiles. The effort was
too costly, mainly when oil prices were so low, and oil was Iraq’s main source of
revenue. Thus, Iraq chose to design and assembly its own missiles. The CIA and the ISG
assure us that, by 1988, Iraq had its own assembly line ready to start production (Duelfer
Report, Delivery Systems, p. 3-4). Iraq purchased enough components to assembly 1000
Scud-B missiles, most of them acquired from the Soviet Union, North Korea, Yugoslavia,
and France (ISG, p. 229). Iraq bought components from the Soviet Union to assembly
400 Scud-B missiles and ground support equipment in two years. By 1991, Iraq had the
technological capabilities to arm the Scuds with WMDs. The American led invasion of
1991 destroyed most of them (Duelfer Report, Delivery Systems, p.3-4; Albright and
Khidhir, 1997, p. 53). The UN sanctions forced Iraq to rethink its rearmament.
UN Security Council Resolution 687 ordered Iraq to dismantle its long-range
missile programs, but Resolution 687 allowed Iraq to develop and possess some types of
missiles provided that they did not exceed the 150 km range (Duelfer Report, Delivery
Systems, p. 17). The proposal came from Russia. China and France backed it up. The
U.S. and United Kingdom agreed in an effort to get Russia, France and China to vote for
the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. The U.S. imposed as condition that Iraq deploys its
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missiles along the Iraq-Iran border, pointing at Iran at all times. It was a great opportunity
for Iraq because now it could legally work on missile projects it had put on hold for some
years. Once the UN passed the new resolution, Iraq set itself two goals, which included
rebuilding plants to manufacture missiles and establishing a procurement operation to
acquire technologies, components and machinery. This takes us back to the central
question of this dissertation: how would Iraq establish and implement its procurement
program? Would globalization help? To answer this question, I examine the case of the
Al Samud II missile.
The ISG always suspected that Iraq was secretly rebuilding its missile capabilities
beyond 150 km. It confirmed it when Husayn Kamil deserted the Iraqi regime in 1995.
Kamil was Saddan’s son-in law and, more importantly, Chairman of the MIC. He was in
charge of the missile and WMD programs. Kamil confirmed that Iraq had already rebuilt
9 plants, which employed about 3,000 technicians and engineers working on eight
assembly lines for three different missile models. Kamil also stated that Iraq had
outsourced portions of the assembly lines to Syria and Egypt, and that Iraq was buying
parts and machinery from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, China and North Korea, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia and even American corporations (ISG, Annual Report, 1997, p. 91). Of
course, UN inspectors and American intelligence services did not confirm everything
Kamil said. They assumed that Kamil would inflate his information to obtain some
benefits from it. UN inspectors investigated the allegation that American corporations
were selling equipment and technologies to Iraq. This led to a paper trail followed up and
published by the New York Time on September 16th, 2002. The trail connected the Iraqi
regime to Huawei, a Chinese contract-manufacturer (CM) that operated with technologies
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licensed by American corporations such as IBM, Digital Equipment Corp, Sun
Microsystems, Qualcomm, and Motorola, among others. The Clinton Administration had
granted permission to American firms to sell their technologies to Chinese entities, and
Huawei was one of the beneficiaries. Another Chinese corporation, stated-owned,
purchased some of Huawei’s products and sold them to Iraq. Some of the products were
microelectronics, transmission lines, fiber optics, receptors and respondent devices. They
all are used in the missile industry.
UN inspectors later found that the Iraqi missile program had begun as early as
1993 when Saddam Hussein asked his most important scientists and engineers to work on
a missile system capable of striking beyond 150 km (Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p.
17; Cordesman, 1998, p. 14). Saddam’s project was both politically and financially risky;
politically because it was a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and
financially because it was going to be expensive due to the costs of circumventing the
sanctions regime. Saddam did not mind. He secretly brought in engineers and technicians
from nations such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, North
Korea, China, France, Argentina, South Africa, and India (Duelfer Report, Delivery
System, p. 79; New York Times, Sep. 16th, 2002; Cordesman, 1998, p. 21; Albright and
Khidhir, 1997, p. 61). Those technicians and engineers, along with Iraqi engineers,
immediately began to work on a first project directly assigned by Saddam Hussein. The
project consisted in a 400-1,000 km range solid propellant missile. Saddam Hussein
called it Al Samud II. To procure the project, Saddam created the front company Al
Karamah State Establishment, also known as Al Karamah General Company. The
company included 16 plants in Iraq and dozens of contractors and subcontractors in
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Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. At some point, Al Karamah employed about 2,500 workers,
including Iraqis and non-Iraqis (Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p. 166; Cordesman,
1998, p. 22; Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 61). Table 7.4 rights below represents the
organizational assembly lines for the Iraqi missile Al Samud II. For the Table, I
reproduced obtained from both the ISG and the Duelfer Report.

Table 7.4 – Organizational Assembly Line of an Al Samud II Missile

Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report,
The Table reveals that three factories and seven companies participated in
assembling Al Samud II missiles, but in reality there were many more factories involved.
The chart does not include them for two main reasons. First, a company can own several
factories or plants. Second, and more importantly, Iraqi companies outsourced operations
to private contractors or CMs to minimize costs and mislead UN inspectors and

354

American intelligence services. The plants operated independently, and management and
operators did not know each other. The plants were rather small with an average of 10-20
employees who were not aware of final product they produced (Cordesman, 1998, p. 79;
Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 71). And the plants were located throughout Iraq, Syria,
and Egypt. For example, data collected from the Duelfer Report and the Iraqi Survey
Group (ISG) show that Al Ma’mun was located in Iraq, but its owner was a Christian
Syrian émigré, living in Iraq for over 30 years. Al Ma’mun was the center of the
manufacturing process, from research to manufacture and testing. But Al Ameen and Al
Fida’a were based in Syria while Al Mutassem was based Egypt. They had Syrian and
Egyptians employees, but the management was Iraqi, members of the Iraqi Intelligence
Services (IIS). Still, note that each company specialized in assembling a piece of the
missile, and only one plant would see the missile completely manufactured. This plant
was Al Mutassern Factory at Al Mussayyib. It was responsible for putting together the
final pieces of the missile and testing it (Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p. 172).
It is central to mention the role that former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia played
in the Al Samud II project. The Duelfer Report and the ISG found data confirming that
the government of Yugoslavia owned Yugoimport, a corporation that repaired and
managed 32 small plants or shops to assembly portions of Al Samud II missiles. The
government of Yugoslavia financed the operations (Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p.
181; ISG, p. 271; Cordesman, 1998, p. 29; Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 61).
Data collected from the Duelfer Report and ISG indicate that delegations from
Yugoslavia and Iraq met from February 25th to March 2nd of 1999 in Bagdad. The Iraqi
Minister of Defense headed the Iraqi delegation, and Major General Jovan Cekovic,
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Director General of Yugoimport, headed the Yugoslav party. The delegates signed a trade
protocol. According to the Protocol, Yugoimport was to repair at least 21 Iraqi plants to
assembly portions of Al Samud II missiles, for which Yugoimport would provide
equipments and tools. For their part, the Iraqis had two proposals for the Yugoslavs. First,
they wanted to manage the Protocol through the Iraqi-Syrian and Iraqi-Jordanian
Protocols. Second, they wanted to pay not with currency but with crude oil and some of
its derivatives. The Yugoslavian government agreed. They financed the operation through
loans obtained from Infobank, the Belarusian state-owned bank. The Bank, in turn, issued
bonds that the Yugoslavian government backed up. Yugoimport appointed Colonel Krista
Grujovic as its representative in Bagdad. Colonel Grujovic traveled to Amman, Jordan,
in 1998, where he opened several bank accounts for Yugoimport FDSP. He later named
the accounts to MIKA, and later to MEGA, both Lebanese companies registered in
Amman. In all, the operation lasted for about three years, during which the Iraqis
manufactured and tested 70 missiles in cooperation with engineers and technicians from
Yugoslavia (Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p. 166; ISG, p. 274; ISG, p, 129).
Next, I examine the second part of the missile program: the procurement
operation. The operation was based on three pillars: purchase scrapped parts, target parts
and products of dual use and, through the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS), recruit
businessmen, military men, engineers and any individuals willing to go around the world
buying components and technologies for Iraqi missile programs. As the Michigan Project
commented in June 2002, “Saddam went in a shopping spree for his missile program.”
Indeed, following the advice of his top engineers, Saddam authorized the
purchase of scrap parts. My research shows that Saddam set up a procurement operation
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that targeted 271 corporations, businessmen, universities and NGOs from 31 nations
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 154; Cordesman, 1998, p. 47;
Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 65). I present here specific cases in which individuals,
corporations, banks, NGOs, and nations worked together to circumvent UN sanctions and
inspectors. These examples seem repetitious and similar at times, but it is okay: repetition
and uniformity guarantee low costs, rapidness and efficiency in the global economy. I
collected the data from multiple and diverse sources such as the CIA (Duelfer Report),
the IIC, the ISG, CFIJ, the Brooking Institute, and Arms Control Today (ACT).
I start with Mr. Wiham Garbiyah, a Palestinian businessman. The particularity of
this case consists in that Mr. Garbiyah was one among dozens of businessmen that the IIS
recruited to help Iraq evade UN sanctions and inspectors. The IIS recruited Mr. Garbiyah
for his 20 years experience as an importer of electronic devices and components from
Asian nations like Taiwan, Japan, Singapore and South Korea. The ISG in fact found that
“Illicit trade between South Korean companies and Mr. Garbiyah was largely limited to
contracts signed for high technologies, such as military computer equipments,
sophisticated communication and radar systems” (Duelfer Report, Vol.1, p. 47). The ISG
also stated that “There is no evidence to suggest that the South Korean Government was
complicit in illegal trade between Mr. Garbiyah and South Korean companies” (Duelfer
Report, Vol. 1, p. 47).
Mr. Garbiyah began to work for Iraq in 1998 when he traveled to South Korea as
the head of a group of engineers working for Al-Basha’ir Company, an Iraqi front firm.
He closed a deal to purchase components to assembly communications systems for the Al
Samud II missile. The deal was worth $51 million dollars. The assembly plant was in
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Syria (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 47). In 2000, Mr. Garbiyah returned to South Korea. He
struck a deal worth $44.4 million dollars in which Techmec, a South Korean corporation,
was to design for the Iraqis a computer to test missile launches and flights (Duelfer
Report, Vol. 1, p. 47-48). The contract included building a $22 million dollars facility in
Bagdad to assembly circuit boards, integrated circuits and other microelectronic
components. Also in 2000, Mr. Garbiyah mediated between the South Koreans and
United Commodities, a front company from India. United Commodities purchased, on
Iraq’s behalf, components from South Koreans to assembly radios, radars, transponders
and receivers. United Commodities also trained Iraqi engineers working for Salah-Al-Din
General Company, a small Iraqi contract manufacturer (CM) to do the assemblage. In
2001, Mr. Garbiyah negotiated with LG Innotec, a South Korean corporation, a contract
to purchase optical fibers, digital exchanges and CPU systems. The contract was worth
$22 million. Slah-al-Din General Company, an Iraqi shipping company operating under
Lebanese flag, transported the cargo into Iraq (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 47). In 2002,
Mr. Garbiyah met with representatives from Shinsung, Armitel, and Unimo, all South
Korean companies. He negotiated several deals for Iraq’s missile programs.
I could go on listing Mr. Garbiyah’s business deals with South Korean
corporations. In all, the ISG concluded that Mr. Garbiyah negotiated about $300 million
dollars with South Korean companies in a period of four years (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p.
50). The Michigan Project set the amount at $316 million dollars (the Michigan Project,
p. 132). But those amounts do not include what Mr. Garbiyah made through business
deals with Russian corporations.
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I have explained throughout this dissertation that Russia played a distinctive role
in Iraq’s economic survival under the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. Russia was
among Iraq’s most important trading partners under the UN sanctions regime. Russia’s
outstanding trade relations with Iraq are linked to the former Soviet Union, which had
been Iraq’s second trade partner since the 1970s. The Soviet Union was the premier
supplier of weapons to Iraq during the 1980s, accounting for 50% of all Iraqi military
purchases from 1981 to 1991. Since Russia was the economic and military engine of the
former Soviet Union, it inherited the long-standing trade relations, including military
relations that the Soviets had with Iraq. Consequently, Iraq became dependent on
Russia’s ability to supply spare parts, equipment and technologies. But Russia suddenly
fell into an economic crisis during most of the 1990s, which affected its ability to supply
spare parts to Iraq. Russian’s military industrial output fell to almost zero. Russia was so
short of money that it began to rely on the U.S. to safeguard its nuclear arsenals. To raise
money, Russia began to sell its vast inventories of conventional weapons and
technologies. Russian’s decision coincided with Saddam’s decision to purchase scrap
parts for his missile programs. The ISG and the CIA calculated that Iraq purchased from
Russia about $900 million dollars worth of inventories and scrap parts from 1993 to
2003, and it was just for missile projects. Purchases included parts for anti-tank guided
missiles, electronic jamming equipment, communication and guiding systems, start
rotors, engines, launchers and radars (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 102). And Mr. Wiham
Garbiyah was the mastermind of the negotiations.
Indeed, in September of 1994, Mr. Garbiyah visited Zagorsk, a city near Moscow
and house of Mars Rotor, a Russian military conglomerates with long experience with
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guidance equipments (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 107). Mars Rotor was famous for having
designed and manufactured the short mid-range missile SS-N-18. Iraqi technicians
determined that they could use some of the SS-18 components for their Scuds and Al
Hussein missiles. At the time, Mars Rotor was selling its inventories, particularly
scrapped parts. So Garbiyah closed the deal with representatives of Mars Rotor. UN
records show that on July 15, 1995, Garbiyah made his first shipment to Amman, Jordan
(Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 108). UN inspectors detected and intercepted it. But after that,
Mr. Garbiyah successfully smuggled into Iraq 28 fiber-optic gyroscopes, 40 ring laser
gyroscopes, 100 Volga rotors, 100 Volga starters, and 380 missile thermal batteries
(Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 102). Mr. Garbiyah kept making deals with the Russians
throughout the 1990s, until 2001 when the Russian government banned him from
entering Russia. The Russian decision was a reprisal to Iraq’s ban on Mr. Vladimir
Zhirinovsky, the nationalist Russian legislator and head of the Russian National Party but
who had failed to pay Saddam millions of dollars for oil purchases.
Iraq also had Yuri Orshansky, a three-star Ukrainian general now purchasing
scrapped parts from Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic and Poland.
UN inspectors found out about it in details in the year 2000 when they returned to Iraq to
resume inspections of Iraq’s military capabilities. UN inspectors found about 300 files
concealed, apparently, in an abandoned office of a military manufacturing plant at Al
Kawthar. One file revealed that the IIS recruited Yuri Orshansky to “Gain access to
Ukraine’s significant military production facilities, including plants in Ukrainian soil but
that belonged to former Soviet space and rocket industries” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p.
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119). For 5 years, Gen. Orshansky served as an intermediary between the IIS and various
military corporations from ex-Soviet Republics and nations in Eastern Europe.
General Orshansky secured a deal with Aviation Trading House, a Russian small
corporation specialized in export-import of military industrial equipments and
machineries. For the enterprise, Gen. Orshansky created a small firm named Montelect,
and he registered it as an industrial auditor. Livinvest, the financial arm of Ukrainian Air
Force, financed the operations. The Lebanese shipping company Amsar Trading Co
transported the cargo into Iraq. The deal accounted for six shipments of scrapped parts
for short and long range missiles, totaling $21 million each in 15 months. The shipment
included $7 million dollars worth of equipments for a small chemical plant that was
going to manufacture tiethylamine (TEA) and other ingredients required to produce
combustible for missiles (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 119). The plant in question was being
rebuilt at a cost of $26 million dollars. Iraq obtained the funds from Financial and
Investment Bank of Jordan and the Central Bank of Syria.
Gen. Orshansky also helped the Iraqis obtain access to military corporations in
Belarus and Bulgaria. Gen. Orshansky had been stationed in Belarus and Bulgaria as
military attaché during the 1990s. He had many friends there. And he knew well the
political terrain of those two nations. So he visited Belarus in July of 1995 with a
delegation from Badr State Establishment, an Iraqi front company (Duelfer Report, Vol.
1, p. 122). The objective of the visit was to negotiate the purchase of high precision
machineries to refurbish scrapped parts. Badr was the Iraqi manufacturer of some
components utilized for the Iraqi Al Hussein missiles, launched against Tel Aviv during
the invasion of 1991. Badr’s delegates paid special interest to Belstroyimpex and Visoky
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Vacuum Co., two Belarusian small firms that produced diamond-cutting tools, powder
metallurgy, and highly sensitive plasma sprays to protect missiles from corrosion and
heat. Badr and Belstroyimpex signed seven contracts with Iraq. Trading Company, a
Syrian financial firm, loaned $70 million dollars to finance the operations in exchange for
a 10-12% margin profit. The Belarusian Infobank kept an escrow account for the
transactions. Also, Al Zarka Trading Co, a Syrian shipping firm, transported the cargoes
from Belarus to Iraq via the free-trade zones of Aqaba, in Jordan (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1,
p. 122-123).
Later in 1998, Gen. Orshansky and Badr’s delegates traveled to Sofia, Bulgaria,
where he introduced Iraqi delegates to JEFF, a Bulgarian corporation. According to the
Duelfer Report, Mr. Orshansky’s trip was private, and he claimed that he did not
represent the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. However, Iraqi records showed that the
Ministry did cover the expenses of the trip and that the Iraqis later reimbursed the
Ministry.
Bulgarians and Iraqis met for two days. They agreed that a delegation from JEFF
was going to travel to Bagdad to “Evaluate the situation on the ground” (Duelfer Report,
Vol. 1, p. 123-126). JEFF’s personnel traveled to Bagdad two months later. They met
with delegates of Basha’ir Corp, a leading Iraqi military corporation. Basha’ir proposed
the used Iraq-Syrian trade Protocol as an umbrella for the deal. Basha’ir purchased from
JEFF tandem warheads, launcher units, thermal imagers, testing and simulators software.
SES International, a Syrian financier, paid for purchasing and operational costs. JEFF
sold to Basha’ir $80 million dollars worth of dual use machines (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1,
p. 1123-126). The next Table shows some of them.
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Table 7.5 – Dual Use Machines and Technologies

Source: Iraqi Survey Group (ISG)
The UN created a list of codes for all goods allowed to export to Iraq under the
UN sanctions regime. The name of the list was the Goods Review List (GRL). UN
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inspectors audited and approved each good upon arrival to Iraqi soil. But the goods in the
chart had a use in both civilian and military industries. For example, the machines in the
chart have a use in the oil industry, but the Iraqis found a use for them in the missile
industry. They utilized some of those precision machineries to reshape metals and
polytetrafluorethylene (PTEE), which is a special type of plastic used for rocket motor
cases and propellant tanks. Machineries like CNC served to mold special patterns on
metals. The Iraqis utilized them to reproduce and, particularly, refurbish scrapped parts
for old discontinued missiles they were purchasing from the Russians, Ukrainians,
Belarusians and others (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 127).
Gen. Orshansky also worked with Polish corporations. One of those corporations
was Evax Corp, from which Gen. Orshansky purchased components for 380 engines for
the Al-Rawa missile model (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 123-126). The shipments were to
arrive through the port of Tartus, in Syria; yet, at an Iraqi port UN inspectors detected a
shipment of 32 Volga rocket engines and 750 different types of components that included
water and air pressure valves, radars, radio transmitters, and tow trucks to transport
missiles (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 123-126). Additionally, Gen. Orshansky and Evax
acted as intermediaries between two Australian corporations and Rabban Safina, an Iraqi
front company. On Gen. Orshansky’s behalf, Evax purchased from the Australians
American-made 100 WAE-342 engines, 29 servomechanisms, 70 mechanical
gyroscopes, and 20 MP2000 and 3200 VG autopilot systems. Evax sold them to Rabban
Safina (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p.123-126). In another deal, Gen. Orshansky purchased
military components and weapons systems on Iraq’s behalf from Metropol Ltd, a Czech
corporation. In a letter to Metropol, dated October 2001, the General expressed his
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interests –Iraq’s interests- for industrial parts. Metropol responded that it had access to
“Old Russian missiles and other equipments” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 123-126). The
Czech government wanted to get rid of its missiles because it could not maintain and did
not need them. The Duelfer Report quoted an Iraqi official as saying that “After all the
Czechs would not need the obsolete Russian arsenals for it’ll soon be a member of
NATO” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 129). Gen. Orshansky purchased from Metropol 60
portable GPS jamming systems, radios and radars for cruise missiles (Duelfer Report,
Vol. 1, p. 128).
Next, one the 300 files found at Al Kawthar revealed in detail how Iraqi engineers
envisioned yet another approach to circumventing the UN sanctions regime and
procuring components for Iraq’s missile programs (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and
Procurement, p. 57). The approach consisted of purchasing parts of dual use in the global
market from well-established global corporations. Note first that the UN sanctions regime
defined “dual use” as “items that might be of use to the military, but were not specially or
originally designed or modified for military use; the term dual-use can be contrasted with
military goods that were specially or originally designed for use by the military”
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Welfare, p. 18). This included
equipments, chemicals, raw materials, spare parts, technologies and software.
Here too the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) were involved. The IIS recruited
businessmen and supervised procurement operations. For example, according to the files,
two Iraqi engineers recruited by the IIS needed a high precision electronic switch to
create “controlled” electrical pulses to activate missile warheads once in the air. After
searching through numerous catalogs, they found the switchers in a lithotripter, a
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machine designed to disintegrate kidney stones. They could care less about kidneys and
stones. They needed about 3000 switchers, six per warhead. So they contacted Siemens,
the German transnational. Siemens and Iraq had had a long trade relationship, so it was
not hard for them to work out a deal. They did it under humanitarian licenses granted by
the UN and sponsored by French-Arab Friendship, a French NGO. Siemens sold the 1200
switchers to the NGO. Siemens never confirmed nor denied the transactions, but the most
important issue here is the novelty of the approach to procurement via goods of dual use
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 61). Purchases like the one just
described became a common practice for Iraqis. Every time they needed a component,
they searched for products of civilian ends. They would contact the manufacturer and
purchase a large quantity of the product. That was in effect the reason for the UN to boost
the sanctions to goods of dual-use, which Iraq evaded anyway.
For example, the IIS recruited Mr. Xu Govan, a member of the Chinese High
Committee for Electronic Warfare and a Professor in a Chinese university. Xu was an
expert in electro-optics. The IIS recruited Xu in May 17th, 2001 for a monthly salary of
$7,500 and a bonus of $500 per month (Duelfer Report, Vol.1, p. 428). The IIS filmed the
recruitment. Xu’s boss was Abd - Al Wahab, the head of the IIS at the Iraqi embassy in
Beijing and director of the Iraqi procurement effort in China. Initially, Xu’s job consisted
in collecting information on products of dual use but related to missile technologies,
communication in particular. Xu located infrared cameras, so Iraqi engineers could watch
mid-range missiles while flying at long distances. He also located electronic equipment in
Taiwan to test communication and guidance systems for Iraqi missiles. But in 2002, the
IIS created a front company for Xu, so he could purchase parts and technologies for
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Iraq’s missile programs. They named the company CIEC Corp. Through it, Xu purchased
laser tracking systems and infra-red cameras for radars for “civilian” aviation. He labeled
the equipment as children’s computer software (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report
on WMDs, p. 428).
All in all, I would safely conclude that the Iraqi procurement operations allowed
Saddam to begin assembling missiles around December 2001. Saddam’s goal was to
produce 10 missiles per month, an ambitious quantity for an embargoed nation. The files
found at Al Karamah also showed that an Iraqi subcontractor had assemblied 20 Al
Samud II missiles during the first two quarters of 2002 (Duelfer Report, Report on
Delivery Systems, p. 439). Testing showed that it could reach 183 km, a technical success
for an embargoed nation.
In addition, during the period 1998-2002, Iraqi technicians worded on the Al
’Ubur SAM missile project. The missile carried an Al Fat’h rocket engine. With a singlestage ballistic launcher, it could exceed the 200 km range, 50 km more that what UN
allowed under the sanction regime. Saddam Hussein ordered the design of a new missile
that could range from 650 to 725 km. Saddam wanted the missile ready in about one year.
The project was terminated in 1999 due to poor technical feasibility, but it was
resuscitated in 2001 with the Sa’d, a project to develop a missile of 250-400 km range
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on WMDs, p. 439). Iraqi scientists and
technicians worked on the project until 2002 when, under pressure from the international
community, Saddam Hussein accepted UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and
allowed UN inspectors to return to Iraq. The table below represents some of the missile
components that UN inspectors found when they finally came back to Iraq.
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Table 7.6 – Parts of Iraqi Missiles Accounted by ISG, CIA, and IIC

1995 1996 1997 1998
Warheads
Motors
Airframes
Sent to QC inspections

1999

2000

2001

127
119
120
82

18

24

61

79

86

102

7

28

57

92

106

110

13

1

66

78

100

109

0

9

24

53

60

88

2002

2003

127 109
121 122
141 149
90
72

Total
733
640
777
478

Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, IIC, the Michigan Project
I draw three main conclusions from the data above. First, Iraq began recording
this data in 1995. It is very unusual for a regime that, like most dictatorships, regarded
record-keeping a means to survive political plots and purges. Since no data were recorded
before 1995, I assume that, as the ISG and the Duelfer Report argued, Iraq did not
purchase components for missile projects before 1995. After all, 1992-1995 was a period
of deep financial and economic crisis for Iraq. Therefore, perhaps Iraq did not even have
an ongoing missile project before 1995. If it did, it was in small in scope and used
scrapped parts from missiles that Coalition Forces destroyed in 1991. Secondly,
purchases show not only that Iraq had money but also that it managed to circumvent the
sanctions regime. Third, observe that procurement consistently increased from 1998 on,
precisely the year that Saddam Hussein expelled UN weapon inspectors from Iraqi soil.
Also, note that despite the large purchases, Iraq sent 478 missiles to quality control (QC)
for testing. Those are just too many missiles for a nation under a multilateral sanctions
regime. Still, I assume that many missiles failed the testing process, after which they did
not become operational and were not accounted for in the chart above. The next chart
shows the number of missiles that the IIS, CIA, and Michigan Project accounted for as
“operational” after the fall the Saddam in 2003.
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Table 7.7 – Iraqi Missiles Accounted as Operational by IIS, CIA and Michigan Project

Missiles available

260

256

259

Missiles fired

12

16

16

Missiles damaged/destroyed

74

77

72

Missiles captured

159

147

143

Unaccounted for

167

187

191

Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, IIC, the Michigan Project

First, note that the data do not vary significantly from source to source. There are
three main reasons. On one hand, UN inspectors never had full access to Iraq’s military
arsenal because Saddam kept fooling them until he finally decided to expel them from
Iraq. Saddam considered UN inspectors American and British spies. On the other hand,
the American army seized most of Iraq’s records and archives after the invasion of 2003.
The CIA and other American intelligence services had full access to Iraqi archives while
investigators from the ISG, IIC, Michigan Project and others worked with second hand,
“contaminated” information, which they often shared. Nonetheless, what is notable here
is that the Iraqi army had had between 256 and 260 missiles at its disposal in 2003. That
is a number a bit high for a nation under a 12 year-old multilateral sanctions regime.
More importantly, Iraq manufactured its missiles through a net of civilian contractors and
subcontractors closely watched by Iraq Intelligence Services (IIS).
In sum, the evidence suggests that Iraq did rebuild a good portion of its missile
defense after 1991. The ISG and the CIA concluded that Iraq had rebuilt one-third of the
capacity that existed in 1991. The Michigan Project assures us that, by 2003, Iraq’s
missile capabilities were 25% short of what it had been in 1991. But here I am not
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concerned about Iraq’s operational missiles, although settling on a final number of
missiles could constitute a good measure of Iraq’s ability to circumvent the UN sanctions
regime and the scrutiny of U.S. intelligence services. That is, manufacturing 200 missiles
under a multinational sanctions regime is a big deal. It could us enough about how
efficient and useful the sanctions regime might be. It could tell s us enough about the
utility of conceiving and enforcing a sanctions regime in a global economy. Nevertheless,
the key question here is how Iraq managed to acquire whatever amount of missiles it had
from 1991 to 2003. In fact, the question is: how Iraq circumvented UN inspectors and
American intelligence services? Evidences cited here suggest that Iraq relied on the
agents and means of globalization to evade UN sanctions. Iraq utilized a network of
secret agents, NGOs, banks and bank accounts, businessmen, corporations and corporate
models, and even universities and scientists to circumvent the UN sanctions regime.
Through them, Iraq purchased technologies, parts and machinery for its missile programs.
In the next section I examine how Iraq attempted to rebuild its WMD program.

Chemical and Biological Programs
There are contrasting findings with respect to Iraq’s possessions of WMDs during
the UN sanctions regime. For example, the ISG found “No credible indications that
Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter the 1991 Persian Gulf, a
policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual,
or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered in Iraqi soil” (Duelfer Report,
Vol. 3, p. 1). However, the ISG acknowledged that “Based on available chemicals,
infrastructures, and scientist debriefings, Iraq probably had a capability to produce large
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quantities of WMDs”, and that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) “Maintained
throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test
various chemicals and poisons” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 3). UN inspectors confirmed
that “Baghdad’s declarations vastly understated the production of biological agents and
we estimate that Iraq actually produced two-to-four times the amount of agents that it
acknowledged producing” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 3-4). For its part, the CIA
recognized that “ISG did not discover chemicals or production units configured to
produce key precursors or CW and BW agents” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 3-4). The CIA
cited ISG’s own findings to affirm that “Site visits debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained
its ability for reconfiguring and ‘making-do’ with available equipments as substitutes for
sanctioned items” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 4).
Note that in this report (Report on WMDs) the CIA’s language is rather moderate,
somehow opened for future findings and conclusions. In fact, later in the Duelfer Report
the CIA reported that “Although Iraq’s WMD was crippled by the Gulf war, its chemical
industry began to recover in the mid 1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of
key military and civilian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources,
provided Iraq with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base, its military in
particular” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 14).
My findings coincide with ISG’s and CIA findings. Coalition Forces did destroy
most of Iraq’s WMD stockpiles during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, and thereafter UN
inspectors kept Iraq in check, limiting for the most part Iraq’s ability to complete any
project related to WMDs. I also found that Iraqi claims of having destroyed WMDs
unilaterally were true only in part. Iraq kept some of its infrastructure in conditions
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suitable enough to allow Iraqi engineers to return to WMD projects some time later. Yes,
I found that from 1991 to 2003, Iraq neither possessed nor fully developed WMDs of any
kind. But I emphasize the word fully because although Iraq did not succeed, it did attempt
to develop WMDs. Yet, Iraq’s WMD program after 1991 was not as vast as some
“experts” predicted. Iraq itself was largely responsible for such failed predictions and the
perception that the world had about its possession of WMDs even though evidences
suggest that the Bush administration exaggerated Iraq’s WMD capabilities to legitimize
its invasion to Iraq. After all, most Iraqi officials, under interrogation, declared that
Saddam too exaggerated the scope of Iraq’s WMD programs to fool Iran and Israel
(Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 11).
There were still enough factual reasons to believe Saddam though. For example,
the ISG calculated that Iraq invested about $3.5 billion dollars from 1991 to 2003 to
rebuild factories, purchase parts and equipments, and recruit scientists to produce WMDs
(Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 16). At some point, Iraq had about 2,000 engineers and
technicians working on activities related to WMDs. Iraq spent nearly $400 million dollars
in research and development of chemical and bacteriological agents (Duelfer Report, Vol.
3, p. 22). Yes, $3.5 billion dollars is not really enough considering that WMDs are
expensive. It is actually a luxury of few rich nations such as the U.S., Great Britain, and
France, which in fact develop and possess WMDs. But $3.5 billion dollars is indeed a
considerable amount of money for Iraq if we take into account that it was a nation under
a multinational sanctions regime, apparently, heavily enforced and scrutinized.
Iraq’s WMD Programs had three main phases: 1) the Edict of 1993 and the
centralization of research in universities and labs; 2) the Edict of 1997 and the
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centralization of petrochemical, fertilizing and pharmaceutical industries; 3) the
establishment of a procurement program.

First Phase: The Edict of 1993
The first phase officially began with the Edict of 1993, through which Saddam
Hussein forced all Iraqi universities to conduct research for WMD Programs. The Edict
consolidated all universities under an office of the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS). It also
asked universities to search for funding in the private sector, although the Ministry of
Defense and Saddam himself provided enough resources as to keep them busy. The
Edict, as a result, triggered a nationwide competition among companies, universities,
institutions and scientists for funding. As the ISG put it, “With the Edict of 1993, the
IIC’s Program for the Indigenous Production of Chemicals appears to have evolved into
a nation-wide, pan-industry, pan-academia merit-base competition for projects, ideas
and project implementation” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 12-13).
Two universities in particular took over WMD research: the University of
Baghdad and Saddam University. The University of Baghdad was the center of research
for Variola (smallpox), Newcastle virus, chicken eggs vaccines and other pathogenic
viruses. For its part, Saddam University was particularly relevant because Saddam
personally funded and directed it. He would show up regularly without previous notice.
He would ask questions, demand results, and punish those who failed.
The Edict of 1993 forced hundreds of Iraqi engineers and technicians to work in
the WMD programs. Iraqi scientists and technicians had strong incentives to join the
programs. First, the Iraqi government paid well. Second, Iraqi scientists did not really
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have a choice: they either worked for the government or Saddam would kill them. The
ISG and the Michigan Project coincided in that “The issue of retaining scientists in Iraq
was a Regime policy. Given the nature of the Iraqi economy, which offered limited
possibilities for work at private chemical companies, it is not surprising that most key
personnel from the former CW program remained employed in the government chemical
sector” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 12-13). Nonetheless, the Edict financed the
recruitment of hundreds of scientists and technicians from other nations, especially from
former Soviet Republics and Egypt. I have previously mentioned that, at the time, most
former Soviet Republics were going through a severe economic crisis, which affected all
economic sectors, including universities and research institutions. Saddam paid well, so
many former Soviet scientists were happy to join Saddam’s laboratories and universities.
Second, Saddam for many years relied on Soviet technologies and scientists. In fact, the
three top Iraqi scientists, in charge of Iraq’s WMD programs, obtained their PhDs at the
Chemical Warfare Academy in Moscow, former Soviet Union. They were: Dr. Imad
Husayn ‘Abdallah Al ‘Ami, Chair of Research and Development; Dr. Salah-al-DimAbdallah, Chair of Weapons Design and Toxicity Research; Dr. Hammad Shakir, Chair
of Weapons Preparation and Planning.
Conversely, Egyptian and Iraqi scientists had worked together before. They
worked to develop various WMD projects during the 1980s. For example, in 1983, they
modified the 122 mm multiple launch rocket system to arm it with chemical agents. In
1984, Egypt sold Iraq rockets of the Grad model, capable of carrying chemical agents. In
1987, Iraq brought in Egyptian scientists to oversee research of Sarin and CW agents.
Nationals and foreign technicians worked side by side in Iraq’s WMD programs.
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Second Phase: The Edict of 1997
The second phase of Iraq’s WMD program began in 1997 when Saddam issued
yet another Edict to create the National Project for Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 24). Through NPPP,
Saddam centralized all Iraqi industries that utilized chemicals in any way. The main
objective was to guarantee what Saddam Hussein called the breakout capability (Duelfer
Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 24), namely the ability of Iraq’s
chemical industrial sector to produce and test CWs as needed. He argued that all
industries, not only the chemical, had to be able to move rapidly from civilian to military
production and back to civilian. NPPP supposedly focused on drugs and pesticides, but in
reality NPPP’s plants and procurements had dual purposes, meaning civilian and military.
Iraq’s industrial investments ensured such a duality, but, basically, Iraq halted chemical
production for civilian purposes, and Iraqi engineers were told to “cannibalize” chemical
plants to ensure production capabilities for military ends. As the ISG stated, “By
cannibalizing production and equipments from civilian chemical facilities, it was possible
for Iraq to ensemble production plants for chemical weapons (CW). Alternatively,
equipments that were less suitable were reconfigured at an existing site and used for
short-term limited production of civilian use” (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on
Chemical Warfare, p. 26). I found evidences suggesting that, in effect, Iraq was on its
way to accomplishing its breakout capability policy.
One example is the case of Al-Dawrah, a small plant built during the 1980s to
produce a vaccine for foot-mouth disease. American war planes bombed it in 1991. In
1996, Saddam asked the UN for permission to repair it, so it could produce a vaccine to
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fight a sudden outbreak of “foot and mouth” virus in some Iraqi rural areas. The UN
objected, arguing that the organization could sell the vaccine to Iraq at a preferential
price. But Saddam insisted and UN granted permission. One year later, UN inspectors
found BW agents in the plant (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical
Warfare, p. 29). Other examples include the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute and
the Fallujah III Castor Oil Production, which did produce several types of engine oil. But
UN inspectors were always suspicious about the plant for two reasons (Duelfer Report,
Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 45-50). First, it was situated next to an
industrial park well-known as a center for research, testing and production of CW agents.
Second, Iraq had in the past created resin-toxin, a key ingredient for BW and CW agents,
from engine oil residuals. In 1997, UN inspectors found residuals of psychomimetic,
mustard and nerve agents in the plants. And in 1998, UN inspectors found that work
conducted on a biopesticide (Bacillus thuringiensis) and single protein (SCP) at Al
Hakam was in fact a cover up for a research on dry anthrax spores (Bacillus anthracis)
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p.45-50).
Those findings were so important that they eventually led to serious tensions
between UN inspectors, the Clinton Administration, and the Iraqi government. The
tension escalated in 1998 when UN inspectors discovered and unveiled the infamous Air
Force Document, an Iraqi report that revealed extensive evidence of numerous Iraqi
plants engaging in research, testing and production of chemical vectors and biochemical
agents (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemicals Welfare, p. 13). The
Michigan project argues that “The discoveries of 1998 and Saddam’s subsequent
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demonstration of anger contributed to Saddam’s decisions to suspend cooperation with
UNSCOM and IAEA and expel UN inspectors from Iraq” (The Michigan Project, p. 74).
In effect, UN inspectors left Iraq in 1998. When they left, NPPP had just 4
companies, which in turn controlled about 9 small plants and a dozen very small
laboratories. When they came back in 2001, they found that Iraq’s chemical and
petrochemical industries were booming, literally. When they came back, they found that
NPPP had grown into a huge conglomerate of 70 companies and hundreds of small
plants, laboratories, contractors and subcontractors. The Complex, as Saddam liked to
call it, had a Board of Directors known as Research and Development Directorate
(R&DD). The ISG concluded that “Iraq was successful in procuring, constructing, and
commissioning complete state-of-the-art chemical facilities, notably from 1998 to 2003
as its economy grew and UN inspectors left Iraq” (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive
Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 11). NPPP was a true big enterprise with operations even
outside of Iraq. So, the questions to ask are: how did Iraq do it? Where did it get the
money? How did it acquire equipment, machineries, raw materials, entire plants? How
did it smuggle into Iraq? I found evidences suggesting that Iraq did it by exploiting the
means and agents of globalization. Indeed, in previous chapters, I showed evidences of
how and why the Iraqi economy began to improve in 1997 as result factors such as: 1) the
Oil for Food Program; 2) the emergence of domestic and regional black markets; 3)
smuggling; 4) Iraq’s ability to make allies willing to trade with Iraq; 5) Iraq’s own ability
to circumvent UN inspectors; and 6) Iraq’s ability to manage scarce resources.
In 1998, NPPP led a major effort to rebuild Iraq’s chemical and petrochemical
industries. It began by creating Al-Furat State Company for Chemical Industries and the
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State Enterprise for Petrochemical Industries. These were two major complexes of small
plants, labs and warehouses to produce fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and other
products. Consequently, Iraq’s capacity to produce nitric acid tripled between 1998 and
2003, plastic production increased by 12% in 2000, and PVC production increased by
105%, just to mention a few examples (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on
Chemical Warfare, p. 30-36). Also in 1998, Iraq repaired and rebuilt: 1) Al Tariz, two
plant at Fallujah to produce chlorine, benzyl alcohol, acetyl chloride, and phenols; 2) a
plant to produce sulfuric acid and corrosion resistant metals at Al Qa-Qa’a ; 3) a plant for
nitric acid, another one for sodium hydroxide, aluminum hydroxide, calcine, orthochloroanaline, ferrous chloride, and phosphorous in Karbala, 4) and another, known as
Samara Drug Industries, for animal oils and mono-chloro-acetic acids at Samarra
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 32-36).
Iraq could not do it alone. The Duelfer Report stated that Iraq built seven
chemical plants and repaired another 9, in some instances with foreign collaboration
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 40. For instance, Iraq
rebuilt the Al Tariq complex with French collaboration. This plant processed about 60
different substances for the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries. UN inspectors
visited the plants on several occasions. They found that the company imported
concentrated pesticides used to produce nerve agents, and that (Duelfer Report,
Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 32-36). Iraq purposely produced
pesticides that carried substances similar to nerve agents. In addition, the Iraqi company
Al Majid rebuilt a chemical plant in collaboration with the Germans to process
multipurpose controllers of chemical mixes. The plant complied with the UN sanctions
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regime, but the production process enabled Iraq to divert resources and substances to labs
and smaller plants working on WMD projects (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on
Chemical Warfare, p. 45-54). For example, the plant converted phosphate rock and white
phosphate into a nerve agent precursor. The Germans helped Iraq to rebuild a second
plant, known as Hutin Munitions Production and Storage Facility, where UN inspectors
found about 30 gallons of phosphorus like the one used to produce phosphorus
illumination rounds (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 4554). In 1999, Iraq hired the Indian company NEC Engineers Private to rebuild a chlorine
production line. A group of Iraqi technicians traveled to India to train on how to operate
the plant. The plant became operational by 2000, although I found no evidence of the
plant being used to produce CW and BW agents. Finally, the Italians helped Iraq rebuild
the Al-Qaim Superphosphate Plant. The plant converted phosphate into phosphoric acid
and phosphorus compounds for highly reactive agents. Iraqi paid $41 million for the
repair (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report, Chemical Warfare, p. 45-54).

Third Phase: Procurement Program
The third phase of Iraq’s WMD program included a procurement operation.

Through it, Iraq managed to purchase a significant amount of chemicals to produce BW
agents to arm its short, mid and long-range missiles called the Al Husayan Missile
Project. During this period, Iraq was busy working on other projects as well, such as the
Fahad-300, Fahad-500, Al Rohma (Javwelin) SAM, the G-1 and SA-1. They all were
redesigned to carry biological agents. But the Al Husayan was without doubt the most
important because it eventually became the core of Iraq’s deterrence policy toward Iran

379

and Israel. Ironically, the plan to arm the Al Husayan missile with biological agents did
not deter the United States. Instead, the United States used it as the main reason for
invading Iraq in 2003. The procurement program targeted 1,000 substances which Iraqi
engineers considered vital to produce CW and BW (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive
Report on Chemical Warfare, p.12). The list of substances were labeled according to
order of importance, or as Saddam called it, order of emergency. So there was a “first,”
“second”, and “third” order emergency. Below is the list of “first order emergency.”
Bacillus anthracis (‘Agent B’)
Clostridium botulinum (Botulinum toxin, ‘Agent A’)
Clostridium perfringens (‘Agent G’)
Afl toxin (‘Agent C’)
Brucella
Ricin
Wheat Cover Smut (‘Agent D’)
Viruses
Camel Pox
Smallpox
Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever
Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis (Enterovirus 70)
Rotavirus
Thionyl chloride
Thiourea

Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, the Michigan Project

Here, it is central to note that all those substances are of dual use, and as the
British Intelligence Services asserted, “Almost all components and supplies used in
WMDs and ballistic missile programs are of dual-use. For example, any major
petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health organization will have
legitimate need for most materials and equipments required to manufacture chemical and
biological weapon” (British Assessment on Iraq, Report on WMD Program, p. 27). The
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CFIJ argued that Iraq’s WMD production is difficult to trace for “All key components are
dual use items and can be used for peaceful medical purposes, food processing, and
include everything from bio-medical equipment and micro-encapsulation equipment and
food storage equipments” (CFIJ, Sources of Saddam’s Money, p.7 7). Further, the
Michigan Project found that “Iraqi research and production efforts can be widely
dispersed and can be concealed in relatively small buildings, particularly if the
government is willing to take moderate risks of the kind widely taken by the Soviet Union
during the Cold War” (Michigan Project, Report on WMD, p. 167). Here, I should
mention that the Iraqi WMD Program resembled very much the Soviet’s in terms of
design, components and scope. Iraq actually purchased must of equipment and chemical
agents from the former Soviet republics. I have stated earlier, the most prominent Iraqi
scientists working for Iraq’s WMD program went to Soviet universities to train there.

Combustible Materials for Missiles
A central part of the Iraqi missile project was to procure combustible, or
propellant, materials for missiles. Propellant was difficult and expensive to acquire, so
Iraq decided to manufacture it. Since manufacturing required dozens of chemical
compounds, the Iraqi regime assigned it to the WMD program under the supervision of
IIS. Based on my research, I conclude that the project was multinational in scope, and
that global commerce facilitated the use of a multinational procurement network where
Iraq could acquire most of what it needed to manufacture propellants.
Iraq used two types of propellants: solid and liquid. I focus on liquid propellant
because it seems to have been the most important for Iraq in terms of money invested and
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type of missile projected for manufacturing. Iraq invested $70 million in two plants and
one research lab for liquid propellant (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p.
68). The figure below shows Iraqi plants and labs engaged on research, production and
testing of liquid propellant.

Figure 7.2 – Iraqi Plants and Labs for Liquid Propellant
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Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, the Michigan Project

382

Eight plants participated in the project. Three were located in Iraq, three in Syria,
and two in Egypt. The plants had German technology. Iraq purchased them from Karl
Kolb, a German firm. The ISG described the plants as “General multi-purpose pilot
plants, which provided Iraq with plausible deniability regarding the plants and
distancing Karl Kolb from being implicated in contributing to WMD programs” (Duelfer
Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 69). In effect, the plants had been designed to
process chemicals for fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and petrochemicals, but now utilized
parts of their facilities to manufacture liquid propellant.
I observed two points here. First, unlike before 1991, most of the new plants were
rather small, employing from seven to ten employees. Small plants guaranteed discretion
and flexibility, the ability to conceal illegal operations and to move from military to
civilian production quickly in preparation for unexpected, unannounced visits by UN
inspectors. Second, the products they produced were just a part or portion of a larger
product, so employees would not know the true purpose of the products they produced.
One individual, Dr. Mahmud Faraj, managed the entire project through a small Syrian
corporation subcontracted by Al-Basil (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p.
66-74). Here too the process was decentralized, secretive and compartmented.
Iraq had to cope with the problem of procuring ingredients to produce the
propellant. Once again, Iraq returned to the agents and means of globalization. For
example, several contracts show that Iraq turned to Inaya Trading Company, a Chinese
corporation, to acquire Diethylenetriamine (DETA), Hydrazine, Hydrogen, Xylidene and
Triethlanmine, the main ingredients to produce liquid propellant for the mid-range
missile AZ-11 (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 66-74). On the other
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hand, Iraq hired NEC, an Indian corporation, to act as intermediary. NEC established an
office in Bagdad, in the same building as the Iraqi corporation Al Qa’qaa General Co.
had an office. Al Qa’qaa was the Iraqi front company created to deal with NEC
exclusively. NEC purchased 20 tons of methyl aziridinyl phosphate oxide (MAPO) from
China to then sell them to Iraq through Al Qa‘qaa. NEC purchased from France 200 tons
of perchlorate (AP) and 120 tons of aluminum powder that were then sold to Iraq. NEC
also acquired chloride, nitric acid, and unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) from
a state-owned plant in India that was then sold to Iraq (Duelfer Report, Report on
Delivery Systems, p. 64-74).
Below is a list of chemicals, part of a shipment belonging to NEC that UN
inspectors intercepted and confiscated near the Iraqi-Syrian border.
Ammonium Perchlorate (AP)
Ammonium Perchlorate (AP)
Aluminum Powder
Hydroxyl Terminated Poly Butadiene (HTPB)
Dioctyl Azelate (DOZ) - or - Dioctyl Adepate (DOA)
Ferric Oxide
Toluene Disocyanate (TDI)
TriMethyl Aziridiny or Phosphine Oxide (MAPO)

Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, the Michigan Project
After this incident, NEC proposed a new plan. NEC wanted Iraq to bring back
production of those products to an Iraqi plant that had been bombed during the US-led
invasion in 1991. NEC offered itself to repair the plant. Iraq granted permission to the
NEC, along with a $52 million loan drawn from an Iraqi account in Jordan National Bank
(Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 69). By 2000, the plant was already
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producing small quantities of substances like ferric oxide, dioctyl, chlorine and caustic
soda. However, they could not use them because they did not meet quality standards.
Then Iraqi engineers turned to Aerofina, a military firm based in Romania specialized in
the production of liquid-propellant. Experts from the Iraqi firms Ibn Al Haytham and Al
Karama signed contracts with Aerofina to purchase 25 tons of some of the substances
(Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 69-71). As part of the deal, Romania’s
Industrial Group of the Army agreed to purchase, if needed, more of those substances
from Russia. Romtechnica and Turbomechanica, parent companies of Romania’s
Industrial Group, executed the freight-forwarding and shipping to Lebanon, where GIARA, an intermediary, smuggled it into Iraq (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems,
p. 68).
For their part, Iraqi front companies purchased directly from French, Italian, and
Brazilian corporations. For example, the ISG found that Iraqi front companies Al
Sharquivah, Al Maghib and Al ‘Ayan, all of them established in Syria, purchased 126
tons of aluminum powder from France. The Iraqi front company Al Sharquiyah, based in
Jordan, purchased 40 tons of hydroxyl-polybutadience (HTPB) from an Italian
petrochemical. Al Sharquiyan also purchased 60 tons of dioctylazelate (DOZ from a
Japanese intermediary and 10 tons of resin-phenol from South Africa (Duelfer Report,
Report on Delivery Systems, p. 57-67). This last purchased caught the attention of UN
inspectors, members of ISG, because Iraq actually had a plant north of Baghdad that
produced resin-phenol. It seemed that Iraq preferred to import the product than to
manufacture it itself. Nevertheless, Iraq also paid $80 million to a Brazilian corporation
for carbon fiber filaments (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 69). This
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material is a key ingredient for missile construction. It has unique material properties like
weight, flexibility, and durability. It stands well the heat of the dessert. This is important
because carbon fiber filaments are used, among other things, to ignite engines and
warheads. Eventually, Iraq built a plant with Russian and French technologies to produce
carbon fiber. The plant began production in August 2002 (Duelfer Report, Report on
Delivery Systems, p. 69).

The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project and WMDs
Another key part of the missile and WMD programs was a project for an
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) armed with chemical and/or bacteriological agents. The
CSIS said of this Program that “UAV and slow flying civilian aircraft make excellent
delivery systems of WMDs. They do not produce major indications of testing and
development, and are inherently difficult to detect and track to a given source and
location” (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 42).
The UAV was a very ambitious and challenging project for a nation under a
multilateral sanctions regime. Even the U.S., the richest nation in the world, had not yet
fully developed an unmanned aerial vehicle, today known as “drones”. In fact, at the
time, Israel was working on a UAV, which later proved useful to the U.S. in designing its
own UAV. But for Iraq, a UAV constituted a technological puzzle, a procurement
nightmare at a huge financial risk, none of which it could afford. The UAV project was a
caprice of a dictator.
Iraq did not mind. I found that Iraq had first tried to develop a UAV before 1991
as part of its overall military strategy toward Iran. Iraqi engineers experimented with the
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Russian fighter jet MIG-21. They promptly abandoned it due to technical difficulties that
they could not reconcile. The jet was too heavy to lift up when armed with liquid
chemicals, and it was too fast to drop them on time to hit its target. According to SIPRI,
Iraqi engineers tried for a while with the French Exocet missile technology and Mirage
jets, but they gave it up as well. Then, after 1991, and despite the UN sanctions regime,
Saddam Hussein kept funding the program. This time they tried with an L-29, a plane
that the Russians used to train pilots. It was a success. Even the CIA stated that “Given
the time, most likely (Iraq) would have produced some UAVs even with greater payload
capabilities” (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 42).
Evidences show that Russian technicians gave a big boost to the Iraq’s UAV
program. But after long discussions, Iraqi technicians opted for the advice of Dr. Olga
Vladimirovna, from Ukraine. She reasoned that, given the unstable economic and
political situation in Russia, Iraq should not rely solely on Russian procurements. Russia
in fact was having problems complying with the several procurement contracts that it had
with Iraq at that very moment. Dr. Vladimirovna further recommended that Iraq should
design a UAV capable of using components from different sources, particularly from
China, North Korea, and France (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p.4 2).
The Duelfer Report and SIPRI found, in separate researches and reports, that Iraq
never really managed to assembly more than two UAVs, but it did purchase most of the
parts and components needed to build 12. It purchased them from 14 nations. For
instance, the Iraqi UAV model Al Musayara-20, posted by the Duelfer Report in its
website, was really a Russian L-29 with British WAE-342 piston engines, French
MP2000 and 3200VG Micropilots, German embedded GPS cards, Chinese guidance
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software, Taiwanese radios, and Argentinean radars. The launching ramps were North
Korean, Russian and Ukrainian. The testing equipment was Brazilian made, and the
simulators were from Belarus (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 42-54).
The entire project could not be more multinational.
Yugoslavia played a key role in procuring materials for the UAV project. The
Duelfer Report reported in 2000, a group of American soldiers found 60 computer hard
drives while searching a military base at Bijeljin, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among other
things, the hard drives revealed discussions between Yugoslavian and Iraqi officials
related to procurement for Iraq’s UAV project. Just to mention three examples, the two
delegations discussed the sale to Iraq of 20 R13-300 and R25-300 overhauled jet engines.
ORAO Aviation Company from Yugoslavia made the sale, worth $70 million dollars
(Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 57-58). Yugoimport, another
Yugoslavian company, sold to Iraq parts and equipments to test the jet engines. The deal
was worth $18.5 million dollars. The Iraqi company Al-Basha’ir paid a Lebanese
shipping firm to transport the cargo from Bosnia to Turkey and then to Iraq. Al-Basha’ir
paid $300,000 for transportation (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 58-59).
The hard drives also revealed financial records related to the operations, and that the
President of Yugoslavia had a bank account in the Bank of Jordan which did not have a
specific name. All it said was “the President of Yugoslavia.” The Iraqi front company AlBasha’ir made 12 consecutive deposits of $2 million dollars on that account, from where
it was directed to an account that belonged to the Yugoslavian embassy in Amman,
Jordan (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 57-58).

388

In all, I found that Iraq did not really go beyond planning and trying to recreate
the WMD program it had before 1991. Iraq had a WMD program in the form of a
procurement program to acquire materials and equipment necessary to rebuild its
chemical industry, which in turn would allow the production of WMD agents. However,
Iraq never came near producing the final product, meaning a CW and/or BW readied to
kill. Such a contradiction is reasonable: Iraq had a WMD plan to deter its archenemy
Iran; but it never implemented it to avoid provoking the U.S.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined a key question of this dissertation: whether or not the
agents and means of globalization allowed Iraq to rebuild its missile defenses and acquire
WMDs. With respect to the missile program, the Duelfer Report stated that “After the
flight of Husayn Kamil in 1995, Iraq admitted that it had hidden Scud-variant missiles
and components to aid future reconstitution of missile defenses” (Duelfer Report,
Delivery Systems, p. 1). The ISG argued that “Between 1991 and 1998, Iraq had
declared development programs underway for liquid and solid propellant ballistic
missiles and unnamed aerial vehicles (UAVs)” (Duelfer Report, Delivery Systems, p.
74). I found that Iraq utilized agents and means of globalization to rebuild both its missile
and WMD program. In this chapter I showed an array of cases in which Iraq and
companies, banks, NGOs, secret services, universities, businessmen, scientists and others
actively participated in violations of the UN sanctions regime. In particular, I found that
Iraq utilized globalization, meaning the agents and means of globalization, to purchase
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technologies, industrial machineries, components and spare parts. Iraq also utilized
globalization to decentralize its domestic military manufacturing industry and instead
build regional networks of ensemble lines.
With respect to the WMD Program, the ISG found that “Given the circumstances
“Iraq’s WMD program grew tremendously during the 1996-2003. Iraq was able to
conceive a procurement network, regroup skilled scientists and technicians, and work on
projects financially and technically challenging for an embargoed nation” (Duelfer
Report, Comprehensive Report on WMDs, p. 18). For my part, our findings pretty much
coincide with that assessment. Iraq did attempt to rebuild its WMD programs. I showed
in this chapter evidence of how Iraq employed its IIS, universities, companies,
businessmen, scientists and even other nations to acquire equipment, labs, and chemicals
to attempt to produce WMDs. Note that I emphasize “attempt.” I do it because I did not
find any evidence that Iraq produced, obtained, and stored WMDs. No one found WMDs
in Iraq after the U.S. invasion of 2003.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I examine the limits of multilateral sanctions regimes as
instruments of foreign policy. I argue that the political economy of contemporary
globalization jeopardizes the overall efficacy of multilateral sanctions regimes. In
particular, I hypothesize that six key features of globalization undermine the effectiveness
of a sanctions regime. They are: 1) intense global competition among nation-states for
strategic raw materials; 2) the nature of global trade fragmented by bilateral and regional
trade agreements; 3) proliferation of global non-state actors such as NGOs, religious
organizations, banks and corporations equipped with global instruments such as
transportation, communication and mass media; 4) the nature of an international banking
system built on transnational credit, electronic moneys, offshore accounts, and other
means of moving capital throughout global markets; 5) proliferation of global corporate
models such as subsidiaries, dormant, shell, and parent companies; 6) the global
production process, reconfigured around a global assembly line linked to contract
manufactures and regional manufacturing centers. Those six aspects form two specific
blocs of features: agents and means of globalization. Agents of globalization are:
corporations, NGOs, political parties, empowered individuals and others. Means of
globalization are: global trade, the global banking system, corporate models, and the
global manufacturing process or the global assembly line. To test my hypothesis, I utilize
as case study the multilateral sanctions regime that the UN imposed on Iraq. I ask two
central questions: 1) whether or not globalization allowed Iraq to circumvent the
sanctions regime; 2) Did globalization allow Iraq to rearm and acquire or manufacture
WMDs?
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My findings support the hypothesis of this Dissertation. On the first question, I
find that globalization does undermine the efficacy of a sanctions regime. Globalization
allowed Iraq to circumvent UN sanctions and inspectors. On the second question, I find
that globalization allowed Iraq to access regional and global markets where it purchased
technologies and components for its rearmament programs, including its missile and
WMD programs.
For example, my findings in Chapter I show that a global demand for oil
constituted a central motive for nation-states to violate the UN sanctions against Iraq and
purchase Iraqi oil. In particular, geopolitics among permanent members of the UN
Security Council, namely their interests in securing access to Iraqi oil wells, weakened
the scope of the sanctions and the efficacy of enforcing them. Also, national interests
contradicted corporate interests. For instance, whereas the British and U.S.’s
governments were the leading voices behind the UN sanctions regime, British and
American corporations were among the leading profiteers despite the sanctions. Then, I
find in Chapter III that the fragmented nature of global trade allowed Iraq to circumvent
UN sanctions. Iraq accessed global trade through a number of trade agreements it signed
with about 25 nations, particularly with Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and Syria. Those
Agreements opened two-way trade routes: Iraq shipped its oil to global markets through
Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and Syria. In turn, those nations attracted trade from all around the
world, which Iraq accessed through its trade protocols. Here, geography, history, a
common language and traditional trade ties facilitated the circumvention of sanctions.
Iraq also utilized geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East to attract support against the
UN sanctions regime.
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Next, in Chapter IV I find that NSAs contributed to violations of the sanctions
regime against Iraq. Individuals, NGOs, political and religious groups, banks and
businesses of all sorts worked together, and in many cases with Saddam’s regime, to
evade the sanctions and profit from them. Here, one key finding is that political and civic
activists, NGOs, religions organizations and political parties did not have the required
expertise to finance and carry out the contracts they obtained from Saddam’s regime.
They passed their contracts on to banks and corporations. They ultimately executed the
operations, which I discuss in Chapters V and VI. For instance, in Chapter V I examine
the global banking system and how it financed trade under the UN sanctions regime
against Iraq. I conclude that the current global banking system allowed nation-states,
banks, investors, speculators, corporations, and nonstate actors in general to operate and
profit under the UN sanctions regime. On one hand, I show evidences of how the Iraqi
banking system actually expanded throughout the Middle East under the UN sanctions
regime. Iraq utilized domestic and regional banking to reach global banking. It is worth
noting that when the UN conceived and implemented its sanctions against Iraq, it
basically ignored the hawala, the credit system that Iraq and most Middle Eastern nations
had been using for centuries. The hawala system was essential to finance small
businesses that sought to trade under the UN sanctions regime. On the other hand, I
conclude that corporations, traders, speculators and even nation-states such as Belarus,
Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria, and Vietnam utilized banks and the global banking system to
conceal their wrongdoings and launder money. They did it through banking instruments
such as letters of credit, wire transferring, offshore accounts, and multiple layers of bank
accounts for their affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent companies.
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For its part, Chapter VI is about corporations and their various corporate models.
Corporations, including Iraqi’s, utilized corporate models to circumvent the UN sanctions
regime in Iraq. On the one hand, the government of Iraq employed corporate models to
operate in local, regional and global markets. On the other hand, foreign corporations
employed corporate models to evade UN sanctions and inspectors and reach the Iraqi
market. Both the Iraqi government and corporations utilized corporate models to conceal
their wrongdoings and laundry their profits. That is precisely why corporations intricate
corporate models and their modus operandi. They aim at outmaneuvering governments,
regulatory institutions and regulators. They want to avoid responsibility and
accountability. In fact, one thing that UN and the US can learn from corporate the UN
sanctions regime against Iraq is how corporations operate under globalization and global
regulatory regimes such as WTO, GATT and sanctions regimes as instruments of foreign
policy. Knowing how corporations operate the modus operandi, policy makers can target
specific trends and models. Law enforcers would know where to look at and how to trace
and gather evidences.
Finally, in Chapter VII I examined a key question of this dissertation: whether or
not the agents and means of globalization allowed Iraq to rebuild its missile defenses and
acquire WMDs. I conclude that globalization, namely the agents and means of
globalization, allowed Iraq to access the global market, purchase technologies, industrial
machineries, components and spare parts, and hire technicians and engineers from around
the world. Globalization also allowed Iraq to decentralize its military manufacturing
industry and disseminate it’s a regional network of ensemble lines to ensemble, research
and test its missiles. With respect to the WMD Program, my findings show that Iraq did
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attempt to rebuild its WMD programs. I showed evidences of how Iraq employed its IIS,
universities, companies, businessmen, scientists and even other nations to acquire
equipment, labs, and chemicals to attempt to produce WMDs. Note that I emphasize
“attempt.” I do it because I did not find any evidence that Iraq produced, obtained, and
stored WMDs. No one found WMDs in Iraq after the U.S. invasion of 2003. But the
objective of this Dissertation is not to find WMDs in Iraq. Rather, the main goal was to
find evidences of whether or not globalization undermines the effectiveness of a
sanctions regime and, in the case of Iraq, how globalization could have helped Iraq
circumvent UN sanctions and inspectors to rebuild its WMD programs. According to my
findings, the answer is positive. Globalization undermined UN sanctions against Iraq, and
thanks to globalization Iraq acquired enough technologies, components and technicians to
rebuild the infrastructures of its missile and WMD programs to levels unacceptable to
UN resolutions on the issue and US’s policy toward Iraq and the Middle East.
Overall, my findings have direct relevance with respect to the current U.S. policy
of economic sanctions as a means to force Iran to give up its nuclear program. The policy
could face setbacks in terms of diplomacy. That is, like in the Iraqi case, the U.S is
confronting serious difficulties when trying to obtain support for a multilateral sanctions
regime against Iran. For example, the U.S has not found support in the UN Security
Council, where France, China, and Russia adamantly oppose such a regime against Iran,
a nation in which they hold of economic interests. Also, the U.S has not found support
from Middle Eastern nations against Iran. In addition, like in the Iraqi case as well, Iran
can circumvent sanctions regime through neighboring nations such as Iraq, Afghanistan,
and the ex former Soviet states in the north.
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In fact, the US has been confronting serious obstacles when enforcing a sanctions
regime against Iran. Diplomatic dispatches recently leaked to the public by Wikileak
confirmed what the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Financial Times and Fox
News have been reporting for quite some time: China, Russia, France and North Korea
have been selling to Iran technologies and components for Iran’s nuclear industry. The
problem is that they can also be used for military nuclear purposes. For example, in 2010,
the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran purchased hardware to enrich uranium from a
Chinese company. Note that the Chinese company complicated its transaction just like
many corporations did under the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. That is, the Chinese
company bought the hardware from a French firm, which in turn had purchased it from a
subsidiary of Tyco International, a U.S. industrial conglomerate. Another Wikileak’s
cable revealed that in 2009, US diplomats blocked a deal between a Russian and Chinese
corporations that wanted to sell to Iran 66,000 pounds of tungsten copper. The mineral is
a central element for missile-guidance systems. Wikileak also reported that “China
brushed off several U.S. requests to stop Iran-bound shipments of technology and
materials that could be used in ballistic-missile and chemical-weapons programs”
(Cablegate, www.wikileaks.com). Another cable confirmed that “China declined to act
on multiple U.S. requests that it stop shipments of ballistic-missile components from
North Korea to Iran on commercial flights via the Beijing airport in 2007” (Cablegate,
www.wikileaks.com). Still a third cable described how Secretary of State Mrs. Clinton
asked China to prevent Chinese corporations from selling to Iran gyroscopes and carbon
fiber for Iran’s ballistic missiles. What it is more striking is that the Chinese government,
in its reply to Mrs. Clinton, argued that “China, just like the US and other nations, cannot
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control its exports and enforce its exports laws under globalizations” (Cablegate,
www.wikileak.com).
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